Histórico de interrupções do Alphavps

1. 30 Gouere 2026 da 12:50 UTCidentified

   Começamos a manutenção preemptiva de hardware nos seguintes nós: SOFSTORAGEM01 SOFSTORAGEM06 SOFSTORAGEM07 As instâncias VPS hospedadas nos nós afetados podem experimentar uma interrupção temporária. O tempo de parada esperado é de aproximadamente 15 a 30 minutos por VPS. Nossa equipe está monitorando a manutenção de perto e fornecerá novas atualizações à medida que o trabalho avança.

2. 30 Gouere 2026 da 13:13 UTCidentified

   Estamos a começar a trabalhar no SOFSTORAGE07. As VMs foram graciosamente desligadas e serão reiniciadas em breve.

3. 30 Gouere 2026 da 13:25 UTCidentified

   Nós completamos o trabalho sobre SOFSTORAGE07 e máquinas virtuais estão inicializando de volta. Estamos avançando com SOFSTORAGE01, máquinas virtuais estão sendo desligadas e a manutenção começa.

4. 30 Gouere 2026 da 14:00 UTCidentified

   Nós completamos o trabalho sobre SOFSTORAGE01 e máquinas virtuais estão inicializando de volta. Estamos avançando com SOFSTORAGE06, máquinas virtuais estão sendo desligadas e a manutenção começa.

5. 31 Gouere 2026 da 10:55 UTCidentified

   A manutenção do SOFSTORAGE06 é feita e todas as VMs estão sendo inicializadas.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 29 Mezheven 2026 da 18:42 UTCidentified

   Atualmente, estamos experimentando um ataque DDoS em larga escala visando porções de nossa infraestrutura de rede. Este ataque está causando problemas de conectividade intermitente e aumento da latência para alguns clientes. Nossa equipe de engenharia de rede está trabalhando ativamente para implementar medidas adicionais de mitigação permanente para lidar plenamente com esse ataque e fortalecer ainda mais a resiliência de nossa infraestrutura. A mitigação temporária já está em vigor, e continuamos a monitorar e adaptar nossas defesas à medida que o ataque evolui. Pedimos sinceras desculpas por qualquer perturbação que isso possa causar e apreciar sua paciência enquanto trabalhamos para uma resolução completa e permanente. Serão apresentadas novas actualizações à medida que forem sendo feitos progressos.

2. 29 Mezheven 2026 da 19:39 UTCidentified

   Continuamos trabalhando em uma solução para esse problema.

3. 29 Mezheven 2026 da 20:01 UTCidentified

   Aplicámos mitigação em Nuremberg. Sofia está pendente e deve ser aplicada em breve. Como estamos a lidar com ataques de extorsão/resgate DDoS, não podemos partilhar mais detalhes publicamente.

4. 29 Mezheven 2026 da 21:22 UTCidentified

   Enquanto os atacantes maliciosos estão constantemente mudando os padrões de ataque, estamos aplicando mitigação e a maioria dos nossos clientes estão de volta online. Também estamos a envolver a polícia local na situação. Mais informações a seguir.

5. 30 Mezheven 2026 da 00:52 UTCmonitoring

   Implementámos mitigação em todas as nossas localizações e o tráfego voltou ao normal. Pode haver variações no ICMP, mas confiamos que o problema está sendo resolvido na íntegra.

6. 30 Mezheven 2026 da 07:30 UTCmonitoring

   Continuamos a monitorar a situação e aplicar ajustes de mitigação. Todos os serviços em todos os locais estão online e são considerados estáveis atualmente.

7. 30 Mezheven 2026 da 07:36 UTCmonitoring

   Continuamos monitorando quaisquer outros problemas.

8. 30 Mezheven 2026 da 16:38 UTCmonitoring

   Estamos monitorando a situação e ajustando o perfil de mitigação em todos os locais para garantir um trabalho contínuo dos aparelhos de mitigação com interrupções mínimas.

9. 9 Gouere 2026 da 03:44 UTCresolved

   Este incidente foi resolvido.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 27 Mae 2026 da 12:56 UTCidentified

   Iniciamos a manutenção urgente da rede em nossa localização em Nova York para implantar nova conectividade upstream após a saída inesperada do nosso provedor atual da instalação. Mais detalhes são enviados por e-mail para todos os clientes de máquinas virtuais afetados. Durante esta manutenção, alguns clientes podem experimentar interrupções intermitentes de conectividade ou tempo de parada temporária enquanto as atividades de migração de rede são realizadas. Espera-se que a janela de manutenção dure até 8 horas, embora acreditemos que a ruptura real será significativamente menor. Pedimos sinceras desculpas pelo curto prazo e qualquer inconveniente causado. Esta atualização é um passo importante para melhorar a estabilidade a longo prazo e a qualidade dos nossos serviços de Nova Iorque. Outras atualizações serão publicadas aqui à medida que o progresso continuar.

2. 27 Mae 2026 da 15:28 UTCmonitoring

   Terminamos com a atualização da rede e a partir de 1 hora - toda a rede é estável. Continuaremos a monitorizar por mais algumas horas, até encerrarmos o caso.

3. 30 Mezheven 2026 da 00:51 UTCresolved

   Este incidente foi resolvido.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 7 Ebrel 2026 da 09:31 UTCidentified

   Uma falha crítica no array RAID ocorreu no dalstorage01 hoje cedo. O controlador RAID entrou em um estado instável e continuou as operações de gravação, o que resultou em corrupção de várias imagens de disco KVM. O nó foi retirado imediatamente para evitar mais impacto. O controlador RAID foi substituído e os procedimentos de recuperação estão em andamento. Devido ao tamanho do array, a recuperação é intensiva em tempo e a consistência dos dados não pode ser garantida. Neste momento, a capacidade disponível em Dallas é limitada. Estamos trabalhando ativamente na implantação de hardware adicional, no entanto uma ETA exata ainda não está confirmada. Os clientes afectados estão a ser prestados com serviços de substituição em locais alternativos. O acesso de resgate pode ser permitido mediante pedido para a melhor recuperação de dados de esforço. Serão apresentadas novas actualizações à medida que o progresso se mantiver. Se seu VPS for afetado por isso, você já foi enviado um e-mail com outras etapas. Se nenhum e-mail for enviado para você - por favor abra um ticket imediatamente.

2. 30 Mezheven 2026 da 00:52 UTCresolved

   Este incidente foi resolvido.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 22 Gwengolo 2025 da 22:05 UTCinvestigating

   We've been alerted of an issue with our sofstorage22 node. We've dispatched DC engineers to check the status of the server and attempt recovery.

2. 24 Gwengolo 2025 da 17:35 UTCidentified

   We continue working on the sofstorage22 host node. Unfortunately, at the moment we're unable to restore the RAID array. We're continuing with data recovery and further updates will be posted within 24 hours.

3. 29 Genver 2026 da 20:02 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 4 Gwengolo 2025 da 05:13 UTCinvestigating

   We've been alerted of a problem with our nuestorage03 KVM storage Node. Upon checking, we've discovered the node is completely unreachable by IPMI. We've dispatched on-site techs to check the condition of the node. Further updates to follow.

2. 4 Gwengolo 2025 da 05:26 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 3 Gwengolo 2025 da 05:09 UTCidentified

   We've been alerted by our system that our nueryzenkvm01 host node is currently down. As we're unable to open an IPMI connection, we have engaged Datacenter technicians on-site. Updates to follow.

2. 3 Gwengolo 2025 da 05:27 UTCidentified

   We're currently experiencing a hardware failure and we'll be replacing some parts of the chassis with on-site spares. ETA of resolution: 2-3 hours.

3. 3 Gwengolo 2025 da 07:33 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 5 Gouere 2025 da 08:58 UTCidentified

   On July 4th, 2025, we detected a catastrophic RAID10 SSD array failure on node nueovz04. Fortunately, this node was in the process of being decommissioned and actively migrated to new infrastructure, so the impact is limited to a small number of customers. Since discovery, we have attempted multiple recovery approaches, including replacing RAID controllers and utilizing advanced data recovery techniques. We are currently preparing an identical server chassis to import the array and attempt further recovery efforts. At this time, we cannot guarantee recovery success or provide a precise ETA, but we are targeting the first half of the upcoming week for the next update or resolution. We sincerely apologize for the inconvenience and thank you for your patience while we work through this. — The AlphaVPS Team

2. 9 Gouere 2025 da 08:33 UTCresolved

   Status: Recovery Unsuccessful – Services Being Recreated Following extensive recovery efforts on node nueovz04, we regret to inform you that we have not been able to restore the RAID10 SSD array. Our team has attempted: - Replacing the RAID controller cache - Replacing the entire RAID controller with multiple known working controllers - Transplanting the drives into an identically configured chassis, with fully matching firmware and hardware Despite all recovery attempts, the RAID array remains inaccessible. At this stage, we must consider the data on this node to be lost. We are now moving forward with recreating affected services on a new node. Our team will be reaching out individually to each impacted customer to coordinate this process. If you were hosted on nueovz04 and have not received an email from us, we urge you to contact our support team as soon as possible. We deeply regret this outcome and sincerely apologize for the disruption. Thank you for your patience and understanding during this time. — The AlphaVPS Team

1. 25 Mezheven 2025 da 16:40 UTCidentified

   We've detected an issue with our sofovz06 node. We're working on resolving it. Please stand by for updates.

2. 26 Mezheven 2025 da 07:44 UTCresolved

   We've resolved the issue as of 14 hours ago. We've monitored the situation throughout the time and believe that system is now stable.

1. 31 Mae 2025 da 03:59 UTCidentified

   We've been informed of an urgent DataCenter maintenance in our NYC facility, affecting some of our services there. ETA of service restoration is 1-2 hours.

2. 31 Mae 2025 da 12:59 UTCresolved

   The incident is fully resolved.

1. 20 Kerzu 2024 da 07:49 UTCinvestigating

   We've been alerted of a catastrophic RAID failure on our nuestorage07 node. Earlier this morning, the controller started flapping, which jumped the I/O load to over 90. This made every VM on the host hypervisor unresponsive. We've proceeded with replacing the RAID adapter and we're moving towards an attempted recovery. At this point, we're unsure if recovery would be possible.

2. 20 Kerzu 2024 da 09:31 UTCidentified

   We're currently working on bringing the node back online in a stable state. We estimate that it would take us 3-4 additional hours before we start booting the virtual machines up and assessing the damage. Please stand by for further updates.

3. 20 Kerzu 2024 da 13:54 UTCidentified

   We are starting with restoration of individual KVM machines. Further updates to follow.

4. 20 Kerzu 2024 da 21:04 UTCidentified

   We're continuing to work on restoring VMs, if your VM is affected - please wait until it's booted up.

5. 21 Kerzu 2024 da 14:01 UTCmonitoring

   We'll be booting up the remaining virtual servers in the next 1 hour and continue with monitoring the hypervisor.

6. 21 Kerzu 2024 da 15:44 UTCmonitoring

   Unfortunately, as we booted up the majority of the affected VMs, the node started becoming unstable again with flush operations starting to get queued. We're looking into alternative solutions at the moment. Further updates to come.

7. 21 Kerzu 2024 da 23:35 UTCmonitoring

   We've proceeded with replacing additional hardware. After we've performed manual fsck on each virtual machine's virtual drive - we've proceeded with booting up all affected VPS. As of now, all services are restored. We'll be monitoring the situation throughout the next days.

8. 1 Genver 2025 da 12:08 UTCresolved

   We've monitored the situation for the past 11 days and as of now, everything is stable and we're closing the issue.

1. 27 Gwengolo 2024 da 12:04 UTCidentified

   We've identified an issue with our Nuremberg network. We're working on resolving it.

2. 27 Gwengolo 2024 da 12:10 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented. The issue was related to a reboot of a virtual chassis member, causing multiple BGP sessions to start flapping. We're monitoring the environment and we'll apply further fixes as necesary.

3. 28 Gwengolo 2024 da 15:38 UTCresolved

   We've been monitoring the situation and a fix has been implemented for this specific edge case. We're closing this as resolved.

1. 9 Gwengolo 2024 da 16:47 UTCinvestigating

   Our monitoring has alerted us that our laxryzenkvm07 node is currently offline. During our investigation, we've found out that we're unable to reach IPMI/BMC as well. We're dispatching on-site technicians to check the status of the server. Further updates to follow!

2. 9 Gwengolo 2024 da 17:15 UTCresolved

   Services are back online now.

1. 18 Mae 2024 da 10:00 UTCidentified

   Our engineers have identified an upstream-related problem, causing packet loss from certain routes towards our London infrastructure. The issue was identified to be upstream-caused. We're awaiting our London connectivity partners to further update us with an estimation of time for service restoration.

2. 18 Mae 2024 da 10:10 UTCmonitoring

   The issue seems to be currently resolved but we're awaiting updates from our upstream. We will keep monitoring throughout the day.

3. 18 Mae 2024 da 13:40 UTCmonitoring

   Our London connectivity partners state that the issue has been identified and resolved. We will continue to monitor the network throughout the day.

4. 18 Mae 2024 da 17:44 UTCresolved

   As per now - we consider this to be resolved.

1. 12 Kerzu 2023 da 09:12 UTCidentified

   We've identified a hardware issue with our nueovz04 node and we've immediately taken it offline, pending remote hands in DC to swap some hardware components.

2. 12 Kerzu 2023 da 10:06 UTCmonitoring

   The node is back online and we'll be monitoring it for stability and further issues.

3. 3 Ebrel 2024 da 08:57 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 10 Du 2023 da 06:09 UTCidentified

   Hello, We've identified an issue in our Sofia location, affecting our network. We've isolated it to our QFX Virtual Chassis Core. We've restored back connectivity on a single member of our Virtual Chassis and no redundancy is present at the moment. We're working on bringing the rest of our VC members online to restore redundancy.

2. 10 Du 2023 da 09:04 UTCidentified

   We've identified the main problem, which was related to one of the members of our Juniper QFX Virtual Chassis. At the moment, we believe that one of the virtual chassis members suffered a catastrophic failure of internal storage. Unfortunately, this specific Juniper QFX device was the active master in our VC configuration. As per best practices, we run multiple devices, which can take over the mastership when the current master fails, however in this case - this has not happened, as JunOS was partially running on the failing device. The master killed the internal routing sessions and no packets were being transmitted via the secondary devices. Once we determined the root cause, we've done a manual switchover to another VC member and connectivity was restored. We're working on replacing the failing device and bringing it back in our VC to restore redundancy. Service redundancy should still be considered to be at risk. IPv6 connectivity is not restored on 100% yet, as our priority is bringing v4 redundancy back in place. Further updates to follow.

3. 10 Du 2023 da 09:39 UTCidentified

   As of now, IPv6 connectivity is also restored. We're proceeding with replacing the virtual chassis member.

4. 10 Du 2023 da 12:34 UTCmonitoring

   We've installed a new QFX member, after initial configuration and restored full redundancy. As of now, all systems are back to being fully redundant again. We'll continue monitoring the infrastructure and close this issue later today.

5. 10 Du 2023 da 18:19 UTCresolved

   We're closing this incident as resolved.

1. 22 Mae 2023 da 07:58 UTCidentified

   As per our previous email - we're beginning the pre-scheduled migration of nuestorage* nodes.

2. 22 Mae 2023 da 08:08 UTCidentified

   We're taking down nuestorage01 node down.

3. 22 Mae 2023 da 08:23 UTCidentified

   Nuestorage01 is ready and booting up, nuestorage02 is currently being shutdown.

4. 22 Mae 2023 da 08:47 UTCidentified

   We've shutdown nuestorage03. As of the moment - nuestorage02 shows further hardware problems and we'll shut it down again to further debug.

5. 22 Mae 2023 da 09:05 UTCidentified

   We've completed the maintenance on nuestorage03 and we've taken back nuestorage02 for further checks. As of now - both nuestorage01 and nuestorage03 can be considered stable.

6. 22 Mae 2023 da 09:23 UTCresolved

   nuestorage02 node is back up and running. As of now - all nodes are back online and all instability issues should be permanently resolved! We're closing this as resolved.

1. 15 Mae 2023 da 08:38 UTCinvestigating

   Our monitoring has detected network connectivity issues and packetloss in our LAX location. This seems to be related to our upstream and is out of our scope. We're currently awaiting their network engineers to sort out the problem.

2. 15 Mae 2023 da 11:22 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 15 Mae 2023 da 12:42 UTCresolved

   The incident has been resolved and the main cause was a significant peering disturbance in the LA ANY2 peering platform.

1. 25 Genver 2023 da 12:47 UTCinvestigating

   We've started the pre-scheduled network maintenance in Sofia. Minor and short service disruptions might occur.

2. 25 Genver 2023 da 15:54 UTCresolved

   We've completed the maintenance without any disruption to client services and are closing the maintenance window.

1. 2 Genver 2023 da 15:03 UTCinvestigating

   We're investigating a complete network outage in London, related to our upstream. Further news to follow.

2. 2 Genver 2023 da 16:16 UTCidentified

   As of now, we've restored connectivity to the majority of our clients in London. A small portion of clients residing on a specific network segment are still affected. We're dealing with a large-scale network attack and working closely with our upstreams on completely mitigating the attack.

3. 2 Genver 2023 da 17:00 UTCresolved

   Our upstream applied some additional mitigation rules on the Corero device and as of now - all clients are back online.