Histórico de interrupções do Circleapp

1. 5 Here 2026 da 09:44 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos actualmente a investigar esta questão.

2. 5 Here 2026 da 10:21 UTCresolved

   Este incidente foi resolvido. O incidente foi causado por uma configuração ausente na aplicação que usamos para implantar alterações de código na aplicação Circle. Após a investigação, aplicamos imediatamente um patch temporário para restaurar a disponibilidade. Identificamos então a causa raiz e implementamos uma correção permanente. Todos os serviços funcionam normalmente.

3. 5 Here 2026 da 15:46 UTCpostmortem

   Resumo A aplicação do círculo experimentou um incidente entre 5:44 e 5:57 AM EST Lamentamos a interrupção # # # O que aconteceu \(alto nível\) O incidente foi causado por uma configuração em falta no aplicativo que usamos para implantar novas alterações de código para o aplicativo Círculo Mitigação e correções imediatas Ao investigar o problema, nós imediatamente patched este aplicativo com uma mudança temporária que restaurou a disponibilidade do aplicativo. Mais tarde, identificamos a causa raiz e aplicamos uma correção definitiva. Situação Todos os serviços funcionam normalmente.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 3 Here 2026 da 08:13 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos actualmente a investigar esta questão.

2. 3 Here 2026 da 08:18 UTCresolved

   Este incidente foi resolvido.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 1 Gwengolo 2026 da 13:59 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos actualmente a investigar esta questão.

2. 1 Gwengolo 2026 da 15:43 UTCresolved

   Hoje mais cedo, tivemos uma breve interrupção de serviço das 9:59-10:50 ET durante uma atualização de segurança programada. O serviço foi totalmente restaurado e estabelecemos salvaguardas para evitar que isto volte a acontecer. Pedimos desculpa por qualquer inconveniente.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 27 Eost 2026 da 22:25 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos actualmente a investigar esta questão.

2. 27 Eost 2026 da 22:30 UTCresolved

   Este incidente foi resolvido.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 20 Eost 2026 da 17:51 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos actualmente a investigar esta questão.

2. 20 Eost 2026 da 17:54 UTCresolved

   Este incidente foi resolvido.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 20 Eost 2026 da 13:04 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos actualmente a investigar esta questão.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 19 Eost 2026 da 08:52 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos actualmente a investigar esta questão.

2. 19 Eost 2026 da 09:15 UTCresolved

   Este incidente foi resolvido.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 28 Mae 2026 da 16:44 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 28 Mae 2026 da 17:12 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 28 Mae 2026 da 18:46 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 28 Mae 2026 da 20:12 UTCresolved

   The issue has been fully resolved and all systems are operating normally. A detailed post-mortem report will be published here shortly. Thank you for your patience and cooperation.

5. 1 Mezheven 2026 da 15:06 UTCpostmortem

   ## Delays in Asynchronous Actions and Workflows ‌ **Issue Summary** On May 28, 2026, we experienced an incident that caused delays in asynchronous actions and automated workflows. **Timeline \(UTC\)** * **11:29** – The issue began, causing delays in newly scheduled automated workflows. * **15:51** – Our engineering team identified the root cause of the scheduling interruption. * **16:42** – A fix was deployed, restoring normal operations to the background processing framework. * **18:45** – The resulting backlog of delayed tasks was completely cleared and normal service was confirmed. **Root Cause** A routine system update included a software dependency upgrade that unexpectedly conflicted with our background processing framework. This conflict prevented scheduled background jobs from moving into the active processing queue. As a result, automated workflows and other asynchronous actions were delayed, though no underlying data was lost or corrupted during this time. **Resolution** Upon investigating the anomaly in the scheduling queue, our engineering team determined that the recent dependency upgrade was responsible. We immediately reverted the update, which restored the flow of scheduled tasks. To resolve the issue as swiftly as possible, we temporarily scaled up our infrastructure's processing capacity to rapidly clear the backlog of delayed actions. **Preventative Measures** To prevent this type of issue from occurring in the future, we are planning on implementing the following improvements: * **Enhanced Alerting:** We are deploying strict, automated alerts specifically designed to detect anomalies in scheduled task queues, drastically reducing our time to detection. * **Upgraded Telemetry:** We are adding granular, time-series visualizations to our monitoring systems to better track the exact states of background jobs \(scheduled, enqueued, and processed\) in real time. We sincerely apologize for any disruption this may have caused to your operations. The issue was fully mitigated, and all backlogged tasks have been successfully processed.

1. 22 Mae 2026 da 13:26 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 22 Mae 2026 da 19:20 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 20 Mae 2026 da 16:12 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 20 Mae 2026 da 16:15 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 9 Mae 2026 da 03:12 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 9 Mae 2026 da 03:43 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 30 Ebrel 2026 da 18:00 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30 Ebrel 2026 da 19:43 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

3. 30 Ebrel 2026 da 19:43 UTCpostmortem

   Some users experienced an issue where app.circle.so was unavailable. This was caused by the Redis cluster reaching 100% CPU due to a large volume of workflow jobs being re-enqueued. We identified the root cause, scaled down the background deployment pods to relieve the load, and restored service within approximately 3 minutes. We are continuing to investigate and address the underlying issue.

1. 30 Ebrel 2026 da 14:35 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30 Ebrel 2026 da 15:39 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 30 Ebrel 2026 da 11:36 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30 Ebrel 2026 da 12:19 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 30 Ebrel 2026 da 10:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30 Ebrel 2026 da 11:03 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19 Ebrel 2026 da 16:50 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 19 Ebrel 2026 da 18:32 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19 Ebrel 2026 da 01:01 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 19 Ebrel 2026 da 05:23 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 17 Ebrel 2026 da 18:53 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 17 Ebrel 2026 da 19:01 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 15 Ebrel 2026 da 20:01 UTCresolved

   Search functionality was degraded starting at approximately 6:52 PM EDT on April 14. The issue was caused by Elasticsearch cluster degradation. An incident report was filed internally. This issue should have had a status page entry since customers reported broken search. Customers checking [status.circle.so](http://status.circle.so) saw 'All Systems Operational' during this period.

2. 15 Ebrel 2026 da 20:01 UTCpostmortem

   Search functionality was degraded starting at approximately 6:52 PM EDT on April 14. The issue was caused by Elasticsearch cluster degradation. An incident report was filed internally. This issue should have had a status page entry since customers reported broken search. Customers checking [status.circle.so](http://status.circle.so/) saw 'All Systems Operational' during this period.

1. 14 Ebrel 2026 da 04:17 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 14 Ebrel 2026 da 04:36 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

3. 15 Ebrel 2026 da 19:50 UTCpostmortem

   Communities experienced approximately 19 minutes of downtime starting at 12:17 AM EDT. The database crashed due to an out-of-memory error at the infrastructure level, a known AWS RDS bug. Our team raised a second escalation to AWS \(case 177616832700336\), and both cases have been escalated to AWS's highest priority tier. We are actively working with AWS to resolve the underlying infrastructure issue and have additional safeguards in place.