58 Cloudamqp incidents · Kerzu 2024 — official updates, affected components, duration and resolution details.
We're investigating connectivity issues affecting some servers in Azure West Europe. We'll post an update as soon as we know more.
Connectivity to servers in southeast Asia has been restored.
Estamos investigando problemas de conectividade que afetam alguns servidores no Google Europa-west2. Publicaremos uma atualização assim que soubermos mais.
Continuamos a investigar esta questão.
Incidente é limitado a servidores na Europa-west2-b
GCE ainda está relatando problemas, mas estamos vendo algumas chamadas API ter sucesso.
A GCE confirmou que uma queda de energia na Europa-west2-b causou a ruptura. O problema de energia foi atenuado, e a recuperação total das cargas de trabalho afetadas é tentadoramente esperada pelas 13:00 UTC hoje. Continuamos a monitorizar a recuperação.
Continuamos monitorando quaisquer outros problemas.
Este incidente foi resolvido.
Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.
Estamos a investigar problemas de conectividade que afectam alguns servidores na Europa Ocidental de Azure. Publicaremos uma atualização assim que soubermos mais.
Azure está ciente desta questão e está a investigar activamente. Publicaremos outra atualização assim que soubermos mais.
Azure identificou esta questão. Eles reduziram a questão à acessibilidade ao armazenamento que afeta a região. Suas equipes estão realizando ativamente ações de recuperação na infraestrutura afetada, enquanto continuam investigando a causa subjacente. Estamos a acompanhar o progresso da recuperação e a trabalhar para restaurar os recursos afectados.
Conseguimos estabelecer uma comunicação com as instâncias da Europa Ocidental de Azure. A maioria dos casos estão de volta a funcionar. Azure ainda tem algumas VMs para resolver.
Todas as instâncias CloudAMQP estão funcionando na Europa Ocidental Azure.
**Resumo** CloudAMQP perdeu conectividade com um subconjunto de clusters na Azure West Europe zona de disponibilidade 2 em 9 de outubro. Os clusters uninodais em AZ2 foram os mais impactados pelo incidente. □ **Impacto Os clientes não conseguiram acessar os dados ou nós de sarna impactados durante o incidente. Linha do tempo de eventos de Azure. * 12:25 UTC em 09 de outubro de 2026 – Identificamos esta questão através de nossos alertas internos de monitoramento de serviços. * 12:29 UTC em 09 de outubro de 2026 - O impacto do cliente começou, com falhas de disco VM detectadas na unidade de escala de armazenamento da Europa Ocidental afetada. * 2:30 UTC em 09 de outubro de 2026 - A investigação identificou perda de batimento cardíaco através de múltiplos nós de armazenamento e domínios de falha, resultando na unidade de escala de armazenamento para ir em modo de socorro. * 15:32 UTC em 09 Outubro 2026 - Nós pegamos a unidade de escala de armazenamento fora do modo de socorro, isolando os discos nos servidores de armazenamento impactados para permitir a recuperação dos discos restantes. Nesta fase, a maioria dos clientes afetados começou a ver recuperação. * 21:00 UTC em 09 de outubro de 2026 - Engenheiros de Datacenter e Armazenamento continuaram executando o plano de recuperação em múltiplos nós de armazenamento. * 23:27 UTC em 09 de outubro de 2026 - Esforços para recuperar os nós de armazenamento afetados foram bem sucedidos, e o trabalho para recuperar os discos virtuais continuou. As ações de recuperação subsequentes incluíram recuperação de nível de nó e restauração de recursos de armazenamento afetados. * 03:00 UTC em 10 de outubro de 2026 – Funcionalidade de serviço recuperada, e impacto do cliente foi atenuado. ** Causa da raiz Azure experimentou um problema de plataforma resultou em um impacto para discos de armazenamento de máquinas virtuais Azure na região da Europa Ocidental AZ 2. Clientes impactados podem ter experimentado falhas de conectividade, reinícios inesperados ou Máquinas Virtuais entrando em um estado falhado na região. □ **Resolução** O acesso à máquina foi restaurado pela Azure em cerca de 3 horas. CloudAMQP foi capaz de restaurar a comunicação com os nós impactados. Nós continuamos a monitorar atualizações do Azure para garantir que nós não foram mais impactados.
Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.
Estamos vendo conectividade de rede degradada entre algumas redes não azuis e Azure UAE North (azure-arm::uaenorth), causada por um problema de roteamento em um provedor de trânsito a montante. Todos os servidores da região estão atualizados e processando mensagens, e monitoramento, métricas e logs estão funcionando como normais. Clientes cujos clientes se conectam de redes afetadas por este problema de roteamento também podem ver timeouts de conexão. Relatamos o problema ao provedor e estamos encaminhando nosso próprio tráfego de gestão em torno dele.
O roteamento voltou ao normal.
Este incidente foi resolvido.
Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.
Estamos actualmente a investigar esta questão.
A questão foi identificada e está a ser implementada uma solução.
Foi implementada uma correção e estamos monitorando os resultados.
Este incidente foi resolvido.
Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.
DigitalOcean está atualmente enfrentando problemas com sua API e painel de controle e você pode encontrar erros e maior latência enquanto o problema persiste
Este incidente foi resolvido.
Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.
Recebemos vários alertas a avisar-nos sobre dois servidores implantados na Azure West US não serem acessíveis. Aparentemente, isso parece estar relacionado especificamente a essa região impactando 25% dos servidores.
Microsoft Azure confirmou que estavam tendo problemas de rede na região oeste dos EUA. Por enquanto, a maioria dos servidores estão operacionais. Vamos continuar a monitorizar as horas seguintes.
Este incidente foi resolvido.
Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.
We are currently investigating this issue.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
**Summary** Between June 25 and June 26, our monitoring system incorrectly reported some dedicated servers as unreachable and sent "server down" notifications for servers that were in fact operating normally. This was a monitoring-side issue only — no customer servers or services were actually down, and no data or message delivery was affected. **Impact** Affected customers received one or more alerts indicating their dedicated server was down. These alerts were false positives. The servers themselves remained healthy and fully available throughout the incident. **Root cause** Before connecting to a server, our monitoring system performs a network authorization step. A defect in how one component handled a transient network hiccup could leave a monitoring process unable to complete that step, after which it failed to connect to the servers it was responsible for checking. The servers themselves stayed healthy and available throughout — the monitoring process had simply lost its ability to reach them, and reported them as down. **Resolution** We identified the affected monitoring processes, confirmed the root cause in production, and deployed a fix that makes this authorization step resilient to such transient failures and able to recover automatically. After deploying, we monitored the system to confirm that notifications returned to normal. We apologize for the confusion these false notifications may have caused.
Between 17:30 and 20:00 UTC on 2026-05-30, our server monitoring system generated a large number of false "server_unreachable" alerts. Clusters were operational and healthy throughout this period — no customer data or message delivery was affected. The alerts were caused by a rolling restart of our monitoring service, during which individual monitoring workers went offline mid-cycle and lost state. This caused the workers to report connection timeouts for servers they could no longer reach — even though those servers were fully healthy. We apologize for any concern this may have caused.
This incident has been resolved.
We are investigating connectivity issues affecting some CloudAMQP instances in Azure West Europe. Affected instances may see connection failures or unexpected restarts. The root cause is an ongoing Microsoft Azure platform incident in the West Europe region (started 14:31 UTC, 23 May 2026). Microsoft is investigating.
Resolved — Microsoft has confirmed that the Azure West Europe Virtual Machines incident is resolved. The impact window was 14:09–14:13 UTC on 23 May 2026, during which a limited number of customers may have experienced connection failures or unexpected Virtual Machine restarts. The Azure environment self-healed and the service has been confirmed restored. Affected CloudAMQP instances should now be operating normally.
Since around 8pm UTC last night, some metrics are not being forwarded to legacy integration. Prometheus integrations not affected. We are investingating.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
# Legacy host metrics integrations degraded Incident window: 2026-05-21 18:37 UTC – 2026-05-22 04:05 UTC \(9h 28m\) Affected service: Legacy metric integrations \(CloudWatch, Datadog, Librato, New Relic, Splunk, Stackdriver\). Host metrics affected, not broker metrics, nor was internal monitoring or console graphs. ## Summary For ~9.5 hours, the service that collects host-level metrics \(CPU, memory, disk, network\) for legacy third-party integrations entered a crash loop and stopped shipping data. ## Root Cause An internal credential-signing service was migrated to a new container runtime the afternoon before. Due to a bug with environment variables the collector could not renew it's credentials. The collector's existing credential remained valid for several hours, so the failure only surfaced when it tried to renew. ## Resolution On-call staff detected the failure early morning, developers helped restore the service and collector recovered at 04:05 UTC. ## Prevention * All services, both signing and collector report failed authentication attempts earlier and with higher severity * Metrics pipeline alarm thresholds was tightened so a similar drop in data triggers alarms faster.
We are currently experiencing issues with our backend services handling account and server creation. This does not affect any running customer servers but might delay provisioning new servers.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently experiencing issues with our backend services handling account and server creation. This does not affect any running customer servers but might delay provisioning new servers.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
Still seeing slow requests, doing another investigation.
Looks like we're back at full performance now.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently investigating this issue.
Servers in Azure West Europe can experience connection issues due to underlying issues at provider. Latest update from Azure "Current Status: We continue to investigate an availability issue caused by a subset of unhealthy backend storage infrastructure supporting Azure Virtual Machines and Azure Direct Drive in West Europe."
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently experiencing issues with our backend services handling account and server creation. This does not affect any running customer servers but might delay provisioning new servers.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
We had an abnormal increase in traffic causing timeouts and slow responses for customer.cloudamqp.com, we increased capacity and are back to normal. This did not affect any running clusters, just provisioning and configuration updates.
We are getting indications of instances being down in Azure region westus. We are investigating the issue.
This incident has been resolved.
Servers in Azure West US 3 can experience connection issues due to underlying issues at provider. We monitor and will update when we know more.
This incident has been resolved.
There appears to be an issue regarding sending metrics to all Legacy metrics integrations. Alarms based on broker metrics also got affected. We are currently investigating the issue Prometheus based metrics (Datadog v3 etc) not affected.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
Broker metrics and metrics integrations degradation Window: 2026-04-23 03:25 – 05:35 UTC \(2h 10m\) ## Impact Broker metrics \(connections, channels, queues, consumers, message rates, node and netsplit state\) were degraded, progressively dropping until recovery at 05:35 UTC. Downstream effects: * Queue, Consumer, Connection, Channel, Connection flow, and Netsplit alarms: threshold breaches during the window may not have triggered, or triggered late. Alarms already tripped before 03:25 UTC kept their state. * Metrics Integrations \(Datadog, CloudWatch, New Relic, Splunk, Dynatrace, etc.\): delivery of broker metrics was reduced for the duration of the window. Alarms configured on the receiving side may likewise have missed or lagged. Not affected: server metrics \(CPU, memory, disk\) and their corresponding alarms, Notice alarms, broker availability, and the metric graphs shown in the CloudAMQP console \(these use a separate data path and continued to update normally\). ## Timeline \(UTC\) * 03:25 — broker-metrics collection begins degrading * 03:35 — ~30% of broker-metric samples missing * 03:50 — ~50% plateau * 05:25 — collector workers cycled and re-initialised * 05:35 — full throughput restored ## Root cause Broker metrics are polled from each cluster's management HTTP API by a pool of collector workers and published to an internal message bus that both the Alarms service and Metrics Integrations consume from. At 03:25 UTC this service became unresponsive without raising an error. Affected workers silently stopped polling while remaining alive to the platform, so automatic restart did not trigger. On-call staff began investigating around 05:00 UTC; force-restarting the service restored metric flow. The exact trigger has not been identified. Our focus is on ensuring the condition is detected and handled promptly if it recurs. ## What we are changing * Added metrics and alarms specific to this service, with high-urgency paging for on-call. * Reliability improvements in the service itself to detect and restart stalled work. ## What you can do CloudAMQP offers a new generation of metrics integrations based on Prometheus, with a re-engineered pipeline that does not rely on these centralised services — each server forwards data directly to your endpoint. These have been running in production for some time and have proved very reliable. * [https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/prometheus-metrics-integrations.html](https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/prometheus-metrics-integrations.html) * [https://www.cloudamqp.com/docs/monitoring\_metrics\_datadog\_v3.html](https://www.cloudamqp.com/docs/monitoring_metrics_datadog_v3.html) * Background: [https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/decentralized-observability-with-open-telemetry-part-1.html](https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/decentralized-observability-with-open-telemetry-part-1.html)
One of our backend components suffered a small outage due to an unexpected full services restart. Connectivity with the servers were broken and service triggered alarms for many clusters. We apologize for the inconvenience. All clusters were operational and healthy within the incident/alarms timespan.
Customers are experiencing Management UI being unavailable with 502 Bad Gateway. Timeline: - 14:16 UTC -> The issue was identified - 14:30 UTC -> Recent code changes were reverted. No relationship with incident noted.
The Management UI and brokers are serving traffic normally. You can still use the Management UI by using the Broker URL and properly typing User and Password. The impact is related to our backend service logs into Management UI via CloudAMQP SSO.
We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.
The Management UI SSO shortcut is back to service. Impacted Clusters: All customers with clusters created more than 6 months ago Cause: Some code changes unexpectedly changed the communication schema between our backend services and the SSO component on the clusters. The proxy configuration conflicted with those changes causing the 502 Bad Gateway error to show up. Impact: Only the SSO via CloudAMQP Console was impacted given it required communication with our backend components. The AMQP Clusters were healthy and servicing traffic via both AMQP and HTTP on Management UI and API. Logging into the Management UI via Credentials and all Authentications Backends was functioning normally.
