Histórico de interrupções do Confluence

1. 27 Eost 2026 da 04:22 UTCinvestigating

   Nossas equipes identificaram que esta questão também está impactando a Jira Service Management. Atualizaremos o mais rápido possível.

2. 27 Eost 2026 da 04:25 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos investigando um problema com o acesso a produtos que estão impactando os clientes Confluence, Jira Cloud e Jira Serivce Management. Nossa equipe está investigando urgentemente esta questão e forneceremos mais detalhes dentro de uma hora ou mais cedo se a informação estiver disponível.

3. 27 Eost 2026 da 04:33 UTCidentified

   Nossas equipes identificaram uma possível solução para os problemas que impactam Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management e Confluência. Isto está agora a ser levado para as regiões afectadas e vamos actualizar dentro de uma hora, ou mais cedo se estiverem disponíveis mais informações.

4. 27 Eost 2026 da 04:51 UTCmonitoring

   Os problemas relacionados ao carregamento de Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management e Confluência estão agora em recuperação. Vamos continuar a monitorar de perto para confirmar a estabilidade e fornecer uma atualização dentro de uma hora, ou mais cedo, quando mais informações estiverem disponíveis.

5. 27 Eost 2026 da 05:16 UTCresolved

   Em 27 de agosto de 2026 UTC, os produtos Atlassian incluindo Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management e Confluence sofreram uma perturbação, e os serviços não estavam disponíveis para usuários afetados. O problema já foi resolvido, e o serviço está funcionando normalmente para todos os clientes afetados. Uma autópsia pública para este incidente será disponibilizada nesta página quando a nossa investigação completa do incidente estiver concluída.

6. 7 Gwengolo 2026 da 02:53 UTCpostmortem

   **SUMÁRIO** Em 27 de agosto de 2026, entre 03:51 e 04:35 UTC, os clientes Atlassianos nas regiões da Europa Ocidental e Sudeste APAC não conseguiram alcançar os produtos Atlassian Cloud, incluindo Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search e Talent. O evento foi desencadeado por uma alteração de código defeituosa na camada de roteamento de uma das nossas frotas de proxy. Isso levou a erros HTTP 404 serem atendidos a todo o tráfego de clientes através dessas frotas de proxy nas regiões da Europa Ocidental e Sudeste APAC. O incidente foi detectado dentro de 1 minuto por nossos sistemas de monitoramento automatizados, e mitigado por retornar à versão de configuração anterior, que colocou a frota proxy em um estado conhecido. Após a recuperação da frota proxy, alguns clientes Jira e Confluence (independentemente da localização) receberam erros HTTP 503 entre 04:33 e 04:53 UTC como frotas de servidores ajustadas ao influxo de tráfego. ** IMPACT** O impacto global foi dividido em dois períodos discretos: - Primeiro, em 27 de agosto de 2026, entre 03:51 e 04:35 UTC em Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluência, Foco, Guarda, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search e Talent. O incidente causou interrupção do serviço ao tráfego de clientes provenientes das regiões da Europa Ocidental e Sudeste APAC, com erros HTTP 404 retornados. Não houve impacto no tráfego de API do cliente, independentemente do local de origem. - Em segundo lugar, em 27 de agosto de 2026, entre 04:33 e 04:53 UTC, alguns clientes Jira e Confluência, independentemente da localização recebido HTTP 503 erros após os erros HTTP 404 foram resolvidos: ~32% dos pedidos em ap-sudeste-2, ~4% dos pedidos em eu-west-1, ~2,5% dos pedidos em us-west-2 e ap-sudeste-1, e <1% dos pedidos em todas as regiões globais restantes. ** CAUSA DO ROOT** O evento foi desencadeado por uma mudança de código para uma das nossas frotas de proxy. No entanto, houve um defeito no código implantado que não foi detectado por testes manuais e automatizados. Isso levou a uma má configuração de uma funcionalidade de busca de inquilinos no nível proxy, o que levou ao tráfego não ter um caminho de rede válido, resultando em erros HTTP 404 sendo servidos para todo o tráfego de clientes através dessas frotas proxy nas regiões da Europa Ocidental e Sudeste APAC. Após a recuperação do impacto do nível de procuração, um segundo período de impacto foi causado a alguns clientes da Jira e da Confluence. Devido à redução do tráfego servido à Jira e à Confluência pela frota proxy, as camadas de serviços Jira e Confluência tinham automaticamente escalado o número de servidores que atendem o tráfego de clientes. Uma vez que a funcionalidade da frota proxy foi restaurada, a onda de tráfego oprimiu o nível de serviço Jira, que devolveu uma taxa elevada de HTTP 503s até que automaticamente dimensionou novamente. **PLANO DE ACÇÕES REMÉDIAS E PRÓXIMAS AÇÕES Sabemos que as interrupções afetam sua produtividade. Embora tenhamos uma série de processos de teste e prevenção no local, este problema específico não foi identificado porque a mudança foi relacionada a um tipo muito específico de caso de borda que não foi captado por nossas suítes de implantação contínua automatizada e scripts de teste manuais. Estamos priorizando as seguintes ações de melhoria para ajudar a evitar repetir esse tipo de incidente: - ** Adicionando outras salvaguardas de implantação:** O pipeline de implantação para a configuração do nível de proxy impactado estava usando um sistema legado e não tinha os recursos de implantação regional lentos adequados configurados corretamente. Nós já adicionamos as salvaguardas corretas, e estamos movendo isso para o oleoduto de implantação padrão da nossa empresa que inclui todos os nossos controles de segurança habilitados por padrão. Estamos também a verificar todos os serviços de rede para validar que estão todos no novo serviço padrão de implantação de gasodutos. - ** Melhorar as políticas de escala da frota de serviços:** A configuração de escala automática para nossas frotas de serviços Jira e Confluence foi configurada para escalar muito agressivamente. Estamos revisando e atualizando todas as complexas políticas de escala automática Jira e Confluência para garantir que isso não ocorra novamente. Pedimos desculpas aos clientes cujos serviços foram impactados durante este incidente; estamos tomando medidas imediatas para melhorar o desempenho e disponibilidade da plataforma. Obrigado. Suporte ao cliente da Atlassian

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 25 Eost 2026 da 08:42 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos ativamente investigando relatórios de degradação de desempenho resultando em maior latência para notificações de e-mail, celular e folga para Jira, JSM e Confluência. Nossas equipes estão investigando o problema e mais informações serão compartilhadas dentro de 1 hora.

2. 25 Eost 2026 da 09:44 UTCinvestigating

   Nossas equipes identificaram as regiões impactadas e estão trabalhando ativamente para mitigar o problema. Forneceremos atualizações adicionais dentro de uma hora, ou mais cedo se tivermos um progresso significativo para compartilhar.

3. 25 Eost 2026 da 10:49 UTCinvestigating

   Nossas equipes tomaram poucas medidas corretivas para mitigar o problema em uma das regiões impactadas e estão observando algumas melhorias. Continuamos a acompanhar a situação e tomaremos as medidas necessárias até que o incidente seja totalmente recuperado. Nós forneceremos atualizações adicionais dentro de duas horas, ou mais cedo se tivermos progresso significativo para compartilhar.

4. 25 Eost 2026 da 13:01 UTCmonitoring

   Nossas equipes continuam a mitigar o problema e estão observando algumas melhorias. Continuamos a acompanhar a situação e tomaremos as medidas necessárias até que o incidente seja totalmente recuperado. Nós forneceremos atualizações adicionais dentro de duas horas, ou mais cedo se tivermos progresso significativo para compartilhar.

5. 25 Eost 2026 da 14:33 UTCresolved

   Em 25 de agosto de 2026, alguns usuários podem ter experimentado maior latência em notificações de e-mail, celular e folga. O problema já foi resolvido, e o serviço está funcionando normalmente para todos os clientes.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 24 Eost 2026 da 19:22 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos ativamente investigando relatórios de degradação de desempenho resultando em maior latência para notificações de e-mail, celular e Slack para JIRA, JSM e Confluência. Iremos partilhar actualizações aqui à medida que mais informações estiverem disponíveis.

2. 24 Eost 2026 da 20:25 UTCinvestigating

   Nossas equipes identificaram três regiões impactadas, e continuam investigando o aumento da latência que afeta notificações de e-mail, celular e Slack para JIRA, JSM e Confluência.

3. 24 Eost 2026 da 21:30 UTCidentified

   Identificamos a causa provável do problema, e nossas equipes estão trabalhando diligentemente em uma mitigação. Usuários afetados podem experimentar maior latência em notificações de e-mail, celular e Slack para JIRA, JSM e Confluência. Continuaremos a compartilhar atualizações adicionais aqui à medida que mais informações estiverem disponíveis.

4. 24 Eost 2026 da 23:15 UTCresolved

   Em 24 de agosto de 2026, alguns usuários de JIRA, JSM e Confluência podem ter experimentado degradação de desempenho resultando em maior latência nas notificações de e-mail, celular e Slack. O problema foi resolvido para notificações recém-criadas, e o serviço está funcionando normalmente. Pode haver notificações mais antigas que estão a ser processadas, e esperamos que sejam concluídas nas próximas horas.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 21 Eost 2026 da 07:16 UTCidentified

   Identificamos a causa básica de um problema impactando as macros do Marketplace App na Confluência. Os usuários podem experimentar macros não renderizando corretamente ou exibindo erros. A nossa equipa de engenharia identificou a causa raiz e a reparação está em curso. Forneceremos novas atualizações nos próximos 60 minutos.

2. 21 Eost 2026 da 08:15 UTCidentified

   Uma correção foi identificada e está sendo implementada atualmente. Os usuários devem começar a ver o impacto MarketPlace App - Conecte macros para começar a renderizar corretamente, uma vez que a correção tenha sido totalmente propagada. Forneceremos novas atualizações nas próximas 2 horas.

3. 21 Eost 2026 da 10:10 UTCresolved

   Em 21 de agosto de 2026, entre 04:26 UTC e 09:33 UTC, alguns usuários podem ter experimentado problemas com macros não renderizando corretamente em Confluência. O problema já foi resolvido e o serviço está funcionando normalmente para todos os clientes.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 12 Eost 2026 da 20:11 UTCidentified

   Some Confluence Cloud users visiting public links saw a Something went wrong error page. The issue affected anonymous access paths for public links, and some related Confluence areas could also show the same error message.

2. 12 Eost 2026 da 22:13 UTCresolved

   On August 12, 2026 some Confluence users utilizing anonymous access via public links, may have experienced a 'Something went wrong' error message. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 6 Gouere 2026 da 09:23 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos investigando questões que afetam seus serviços. Estamos a trabalhar activamente para identificar a causa e resolver a questão. Forneceremos novas atualizações dentro de uma hora.

2. 6 Gouere 2026 da 10:04 UTCmonitoring

   Nós aplicamos com sucesso a correção e estamos vendo recuperação. As capacidades de automação estão sendo restauradas e devem funcionar normalmente indo em frente. Os pedidos de processamento de dados apresentados durante o período de interrupção não foram preenchidos devido à indisponibilidade do serviço. Continuamos a monitorizar a situação e esperamos recuperação total na próxima hora. Nós forneceremos atualizações adicionais na próxima hora ou mais cedo.

3. 6 Gouere 2026 da 11:46 UTCinvestigating

   Continuamos a ver algumas questões relacionadas com a investigação do utilizador, a recolha de utilizadores e os activos em toda a UE-Região. Continuamos a investigar a situação e forneceremos atualizações adicionais na próxima hora ou mais cedo.

4. 6 Gouere 2026 da 12:25 UTCmonitoring

   Nós aplicamos a correção para mitigar o problema e estamos vendo recuperação. Continuamos a acompanhar a situação e devemos ser plenamente recuperados em breve. Devemos ser capazes de fornecer mais atualizações na próxima hora ou mais cedo.

5. 6 Gouere 2026 da 13:04 UTCresolved

   Em 6 de julho de 2026, entre 06:51 UTC às 09:39 UTC alguns usuários podem ter experimentado problemas relacionados à Automação, e entre 08:10 UTC às 11:50 UTC alguns usuários podem ter experimentado problemas relacionados à pesquisa de usuários, coletor de usuários e ativos na UE-Região. As questões foram agora resolvidas e os serviços estão funcionando normalmente para todos os clientes.

6. 17 Gouere 2026 da 16:59 UTCpostmortem

   # # Resumo Em 6 de julho de 2026, entre 06:51 e 20:17 UTC, os clientes da Atlassian usando produtos em nuvem em regiões europeias (UE) experimentaram interrupções de serviços afetando a execução de regras de automação, pesquisa de usuários, coletor de usuários e fluxos de trabalho relacionados. O incidente teve início quando um serviço de identidade central experimentou saturação da base de dados nas regiões da UE, aumentando as taxas de latência e de erro. Enquanto os respondedores trabalhavam para restaurar a capacidade, uma mitigação de emergência foi aplicada que bloqueou as regras de automação de acessar o endpoint de identidade. Paralelamente, a elevada latência de identidade contribuiu para uma falha de cascata em um serviço de busca de usuários a jusante, degradando a busca de usuários e experiências de catadores de usuários em vários produtos. O serviço foi progressivamente restaurado após a adição de capacidade adicional de leitura do banco de dados, remoção do bloco de emergência e ampliação manual do serviço de busca do usuário. # # Impacto O incidente afetou clientes em vários produtos Atlassianos nas regiões da UE em 6 de julho de 2026 entre 06:51 e 20:17 UTC. - **Degradação do serviço de identidade core:** observaram-se taxas de acesso intermitentes elevadas em todos os produtos nas regiões da UE. - ** Falhas de execução de regras de automação:** Regras de automação usando o usuário padrão (Automação para Jira) em Jira, Jira Service Management e Jira Product Discovery em regiões da UE falhou com um erro de permissões. - ** Falhas na pesquisa de utilizadores e na recolha de utilizadores:** As taxas de sucesso na procura de utilizadores diminuíram significativamente nas regiões da UE, com a capacidade de escolha de utilizadores praticamente indisponível em todos os produtos. # # Causa raiz O incidente originou-se de uma mudança de configuração recente que reduziu a vida útil do cache para um serviço de identidade central. À medida que o tráfego no dia de trabalho da UE aumentava em 6 de Julho de 2026, uma parte maior dos pedidos começou a chegar directamente à base de dados de apoio do que a ser ser servida do cache. As bases de dados da UE não dispunham de capacidade regional suficiente para absorver o aumento da carga, e a CPU da base de dados atingiu a saturação, causando elevadas taxas de acesso intermitentes negadas. Como parte da mitigação, foi aplicado um bloco de emergência para reduzir a carga no banco de dados do serviço de identidade saturada e priorizar a restauração do serviço de identidade central. Isso inadvertidamente impediu que as regras de automação passassem em suas verificações de permissão pré-execução, fazendo com que elas falhassem. A duração prolongada foi principalmente devido a uma onda secundária de falhas de regras de automação causada pelo limite de processamento estrangulamento. Paralelamente, a degradação sustentada causou maior latência e falhas intermitentes em produtos que dependem dessas verificações e contribuíram para uma falha em cascata em um serviço de busca de usuários a jusante. Consequentemente, as experiências de busca de utilizadores e de recolha de utilizadores tornaram-se, em grande medida, indisponíveis nas regiões da UE até que o serviço de permissões recuperado e o serviço de busca de utilizadores foram dimensionados para restaurar a capacidade. # # Plano de ações corretivas e próximos passos Sabemos que as interrupções impactam a produtividade dos clientes. Atlassian está priorizando as seguintes ações para ajudar a prevenir incidentes semelhantes no futuro: - **Melhorar as salvaguardas para mitigação de emergência de alto impacto:** Endure as ferramentas operacionais para etapas de mitigação que poderiam desativar fluxos de trabalho voltados para o cliente requerem revisão adicional. - ** Fortalecer a capacidade da infra-estrutura de identidade e alterar a segurança:** Reveja o dimensionamento e a capacidade do banco de dados regional para reduzir o risco de saturação durante os períodos de tráfego de pico e refine o processo de avaliação para mudanças de configuração, de modo que o impacto da carga a jusante seja avaliado antes da implantação da produção. - ** Fortalecer a resiliência contra falhas em cascata resultantes da degradação a montante:** Controle de contrapressão de auditoria, configuração do disjuntor e comportamento de auto-escalamento em serviços, de modo que a degradação upstream não cause impacto mais amplo do produto em busca de usuários, coletor de usuários e experiências relacionadas. - ** Mecanismos de repetição de Harden para falhas de regra de automação:** Aumentar a resiliência das regras de automação para reduzir o impacto associado aos incidentes que ocorrem em dependências. Reconhecemos como os fluxos de trabalho de produtos confiáveis são críticos para nossos clientes, e pedimos desculpas aos clientes que foram afetados por este incidente. Obrigado. Suporte ao cliente da Atlassian

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 16 Mezheven 2026 da 13:46 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is investigating degraded performance affecting your service. We are actively working to identify the cause and resolve the issue. We will provide further updates within one hour.

2. 16 Mezheven 2026 da 14:28 UTCidentified

   We have identified the source of degraded performance affecting some Confluence Cloud users. A subset of users may experience errors or slowness when viewing or editing pages. Our team has initiated a remediation and is actively monitoring recovery. We will provide another update within one hour or once the issue is fully resolved.

3. 16 Mezheven 2026 da 14:53 UTCmonitoring

   We have been able to apply the fix to mitigate the issue and we are seeing recovery. We continue to monitor the situation and should be fully recovered soon. We should be able to provide more updates in the next one hour or earlier.

4. 16 Mezheven 2026 da 15:56 UTCresolved

   On June 16, 2026, Confluence Cloud users for some customers may have experienced performance degradation of view and edit page experiences. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23 Mezheven 2026 da 18:25 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary ### On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT ### The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ### ROOT CAUSE ### 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ### We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. We have already deployed the following fix: - Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: - Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. - Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12 Mezheven 2026 da 07:39 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing experiencing degraded performance in Confluence Cloud affecting view page and edit page functionality. Our teams are actively investigating and will be sharing more updates in next 1 hour or sooner.

2. 12 Mezheven 2026 da 08:45 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing degraded performance with view content, create and edit functionality on Confluence Cloud primarily in the EU region. Our teams are actively working to identify the root cause of the issue. We will share additional updates in next 2 hours or sooner as more information is available.

3. 12 Mezheven 2026 da 10:29 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause of this issue and implemented a fix. We are beginning to observe signs of recovery, with some affected users regaining access to view, create, and edit content on Confluence Cloud. We will provide a further update within one hour, or sooner if we confirm full recovery for all affected customers.

4. 12 Mezheven 2026 da 11:15 UTCresolved

   On June 12th 2026, between 07:04 to 11:06 UTC, some Confluence users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23 Mezheven 2026 da 18:28 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ‌ ### ROOT CAUSE ‌ 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ‌ ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ‌ We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. ‌ We have already deployed the following fix: * Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: * Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. * Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ ‌ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 10 Mezheven 2026 da 06:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating reports of extended delays being experienced across tasks such as processing of Incoming Emails, Notifications relating to changes or creation of Work Items, in addition to delays in processing Scheduled Triggers from Marketplace apps. Our team is looking into this with urgency and we will provide further update within one hour as our investigation continues.

2. 10 Mezheven 2026 da 06:14 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause for this issue and has now deployed a fix that is rolling out across impacted products. At this time we are monitoring for the recovery of these events across Jira Service Management, Jira Cloud and Ecosystem app Scheduled Triggers. We will provide further update within one hour or when we have seen a full recovery of all task processing across these products.

3. 10 Mezheven 2026 da 06:14 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has now determined that performance has returned to expected levels for those impacted by this incident. Additional products that are now known to have been impacted by this incident are Confluence, Customer Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery. These products would have seen similar impact where email notifications or processing of events may have been delayed while this incident was underway. We are now monitoring for the full recovery of performance across all products and will update when we are confident this issue is fully resolved, or within one hour, whichever is sooner.

4. 10 Mezheven 2026 da 06:31 UTCresolved

   We are now confident that any of the tasks that were impacted by this incident and were delayed should now be operating as expected. We apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.

1. 27 Mae 2026 da 06:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where customers attempting to view Calendars receive an error message on Confluence Cloud pages. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 27 Mae 2026 da 07:06 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause and are in process of deploying a fix. We will share further updates in next 1 hours, or sooner if we have any meaningful developments to report.

3. 27 Mae 2026 da 07:48 UTCresolved

   Between 00:50 UTC and 07:30 UTC on 27 May 2026, some users were facing errors when attempting to view Calendars in Confluence. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and this incident has been fully restored.

1. 26 Mae 2026 da 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where some custom extensions may fail to load when editing Confluence Cloud pages. Affected users may see 'Error loading the extension!' messages or notice that certain macros are missing from the editor's extension selection menu. Viewing published pages is not affected. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 26 Mae 2026 da 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating an issue affecting the editing macros in Confluence Cloud editor. Our team is working to identify the root cause. We will provide an update within approximately one hour.

3. 26 Mae 2026 da 13:55 UTCresolved

   Between 08:30 UTC and 13:51 UTC on 26 May 2026, some users were unable to load or edit certain macros in the Confluence Cloud page editor. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and macro functionality has been fully restored.

1. 14 Mae 2026 da 04:54 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue with multiple Atlassian products that is impacting a large number of Confluence and Jira Cloud customers. We are continuing to investigate and will add further details about additional impact as our investigation continues. We will provide more details within the next hour or sooner if further information becomes available

2. 14 Mae 2026 da 05:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware that the current issues with accessing Atlassian products are impacting additional products. We have now expanded the impact of the incident to cover the known impacted products at this time. We will provide further update within one hour or sooner as information is available.

3. 14 Mae 2026 da 05:11 UTCidentified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

4. 14 Mae 2026 da 05:24 UTCidentified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

5. 14 Mae 2026 da 05:34 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

6. 14 Mae 2026 da 05:43 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

7. 14 Mae 2026 da 06:40 UTCmonitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

8. 14 Mae 2026 da 06:41 UTCmonitoring

   We are approaching full system recovery at this time, and are performing final confirmations that services are restored.

9. 14 Mae 2026 da 06:48 UTCresolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

10. 19 Mae 2026 da 19:04 UTCpostmortem

    ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 8 Mae 2026 da 01:31 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 8 Mae 2026 da 04:10 UTCidentified

   We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

3. 8 Mae 2026 da 04:10 UTCidentified

   Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

4. 8 Mae 2026 da 04:10 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

5. 8 Mae 2026 da 05:53 UTCmonitoring

   The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

6. 8 Mae 2026 da 08:03 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

7. 8 Mae 2026 da 11:12 UTCmonitoring

   Our services are now fully operational. We continue to replay any events that were missed during the incident, and are making good progress. We will provide a further update once replays are complete. If you experience any ongoing issues, please contact our support team. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

8. 8 Mae 2026 da 19:45 UTCresolved

   On May 8, 2026, some customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

9. 20 Mae 2026 da 06:55 UTCpostmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support.

1. 14 Ebrel 2026 da 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a partial service disruption affecting Rovo, specifically for customers using automation rules that invoke Rovo agents. Some customers may find that these automations are not completing as expected. We'll share updates here as more information becomes available.

2. 14 Ebrel 2026 da 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified that this incident also affects automation rules in Confluence that use Rovo agents. We are investigating and will provide updates as we learn more.

3. 14 Ebrel 2026 da 14:11 UTCidentified

   We have identified the issue, and our teams are working to resolve it and restore normal operations as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as they become available.

4. 14 Ebrel 2026 da 15:46 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

5. 14 Ebrel 2026 da 16:11 UTCresolved

   On April 14, 2026, affected users may have experienced some service disruption with automation rules that use Rovo agents. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 13 Ebrel 2026 da 07:29 UTCmonitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 13 Ebrel 2026 da 08:33 UTCmonitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 13 Ebrel 2026 da 10:17 UTCresolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 21 Ebrel 2026 da 02:33 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 8 Ebrel 2026 da 06:01 UTCinvestigating

   The impact of this incident is now understood to also be impacting search in Jira and Confluence, as well as additional downstream impacts to Rovo Chat, User Management, Administration and Guard. Our team is continuing to investigate with urgency and we will provide further update within 1 hour.

2. 8 Ebrel 2026 da 06:25 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is aware that users are currently experiencing errors while attempting to search in Confluence and Jira. Our team is investigating with urgency and will be providing an update within 1 hour.

3. 8 Ebrel 2026 da 07:40 UTCidentified

   Confluence and Jira search reliability is improving, and we expect full recovery shortly; we will continue to closely monitor the services to ensure they remain stable.

4. 8 Ebrel 2026 da 08:33 UTCidentified

   We have restored core search functionality and services are operating again, but some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour while new data continues to be indexed. We are actively working to complete reindexing and will update this page as performance fully recovers.

5. 8 Ebrel 2026 da 09:03 UTCidentified

   We are also aware of impact as a result of these search failures to Customer Service Management, Asset Reports, Jira Service Management and dashboards within Focus. Our team have identified the potential root cause of the issue and our teams are working with urgency on a resolution. We will provide further update within 1 hour.

6. 8 Ebrel 2026 da 09:03 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally. Some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour, while new data continues to be indexed. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

7. 8 Ebrel 2026 da 11:43 UTCresolved

   The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

8. 17 Ebrel 2026 da 16:24 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. A configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high‑density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers. The root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC. ### **IMPACT** During the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period. Impacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context. **Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions. **Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue. **Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC. **Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC. **Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC. ### **ROOT CAUSE** Atlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. An infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \(CPU & Memory\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products. The change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst‑affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: * **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types** Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly. * **Strengthen automated pre‑deploy validation for resource changes** Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads. * **Improve post‑deploy verification and alerting** Enhance monitoring and post‑deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod‑IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out. * **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits** Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts. * **Enhance recovery automation** Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12 Meurzh 2026 da 13:38 UTCinvestigating

   Confluence Cloud users may experience errors when accessing certain Marketplace macros. Affected customers are seeing the message Error rendering macro 'static-macro': Page loading failed. Our team is actively investigating this issue. We will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner.

2. 12 Meurzh 2026 da 13:38 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the cause of this issue, and a fix is currently being deployed. We are monitoring the deployment, and we will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner if needed.

3. 13 Meurzh 2026 da 00:26 UTCresolved

   On March 12, 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 10 Meurzh 2026 da 00:15 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of customers experiencing delays with their automations within Jira, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Jira Product Discovery and Confluence. Our team is investigating with urgency and we will provide an update within one hour.

2. 10 Meurzh 2026 da 00:15 UTCidentified

   Our team has now identified the cause of this issue relating to delayed automation events and has put a hotfix in place to help restore automation performance. We will continue to monitor performance as the backlog of issues is now being processed.

3. 10 Meurzh 2026 da 00:51 UTCmonitoring

   The performance degradation of automations has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. 10 Meurzh 2026 da 00:59 UTCresolved

   On 9 March UTC, Automation users in the APAC region may have experienced performance degradation within Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Confluence. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 20 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 04:14 UTCidentified

   Customers using Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours as we continue our investigation.

2. 20 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 12:26 UTCidentified

   We understand that customers using Customer Service Management, Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours or sooner based on significant progress.

3. 20 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 12:26 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved and all services are functional.

1. 19 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 15:44 UTCmonitoring

   We have received and investigated reports of a partial service disruption affecting Confluence Cloud for some customers in AP South, APSE, APSE2, East, and Central. The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

2. 19 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 17:47 UTCresolved

   On February 19 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption in AP South, APSE, APSE2, East, and Central regions. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.