Histórico de interrupções do Neo4j Aura

1. 3 Gwengolo 2026 da 16:43 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos actualmente a investigar esta questão.

2. 4 Gwengolo 2026 da 10:23 UTCidentified

   A questão foi identificada, as instâncias permanecem disponíveis e as etapas a serem resolvidas para as instâncias impactadas sendo revistas atualmente.

3. 4 Gwengolo 2026 da 15:36 UTCresolved

   Todas as instâncias estão disponíveis, passos manuais para desbloquear o restante pequeno número de instâncias foi realizado para resolver.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 20 Eost 2026 da 15:49 UTCinvestigating

   Nossa equipe identificou um problema com a coleta das métricas para instâncias Aura. Isso afetará a visibilidade métrica e o encaminhamento. Estamos neste momento a investigar a questão.

2. 20 Eost 2026 da 16:48 UTCinvestigating

   Continuamos investigando a questão das métricas de Aura.

3. 20 Eost 2026 da 19:10 UTCresolved

   Desde a última actualização, a investigação seguiu em frente. A questão foi identificada e monitoramos o serviço à medida que se recuperava da degradação. Confirmamos que a questão está agora resolvida.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 5 Eost 2026 da 17:31 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified an issue currently that could result in unexpected query failures when using the trim() Cypher function. Investigations into the cause are in progress.

2. 5 Eost 2026 da 19:27 UTCidentified

   We have found the issue and are working on a fix. A small percentatge of queries using trim may still err. VDC customers with databases set to highest are not impacted at all unless they pause and start their instances.

3. 6 Eost 2026 da 00:58 UTCidentified

   We are testing the fix for the trim() Cypher function issue. We will update before we begin our deployment into the Aura environment.

4. 6 Eost 2026 da 07:13 UTCidentified

   We are actively validating the fix for the trim() Cypher function. Further updates will be provided before we begin deploying to Aura instances

5. 6 Eost 2026 da 11:17 UTCidentified

   We continue to validate the fix for the trim() Cypher function. Further updates will be provided before we begin deploying it to Aura instances.

6. 6 Eost 2026 da 14:54 UTCidentified

   The fix for the trim() Cypher function is undergoing testing and validation before deployment. Further updates will be provided before we begin deploying it to Aura instances.

7. 7 Eost 2026 da 01:15 UTCidentified

   Development has completed on the hot-fix for this issue, and we are finalizing the rollout plan for Aura.

8. 7 Eost 2026 da 01:16 UTCidentified

   We are actively working on addressing the issue. The fix for the trim() Cypher function is undergoing testing and validation currently before deployment. Further updates will be provided before we begin deploying it to Aura instances.

9. 7 Eost 2026 da 09:44 UTCidentified

   The fix to the trim() Cypher function has passed testing and validation and is now being deployed.

10. 7 Eost 2026 da 13:49 UTCmonitoring

    The fix to resolve the issue has now completed deployment to the Aura service and we are monitoring the situation.

11. 7 Eost 2026 da 15:34 UTCresolved

    We have monitored the fix and found the service to be stable. This incident is now considered resolved.

1. 23 Gouere 2026 da 10:52 UTCinvestigating

   Neste momento, estamos a investigar uma questão.

2. 23 Gouere 2026 da 11:08 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos trabalhando com equipes de engenharia e progredindo com as investigações no momento atual.

3. 23 Gouere 2026 da 11:24 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos trabalhando com equipes de engenharia e continuamos fazendo progressos com as investigações no momento atual.

4. 23 Gouere 2026 da 11:38 UTCidentified

   Identificámos a causa da questão actual e estamos a trabalhar activamente na solução actualmente.

5. 23 Gouere 2026 da 11:53 UTCidentified

   Estamos implementando a primeira parte da correção e continuar trabalhando ativamente na implantação da solução completa. Esperamos uma chegada na ordem de 1 hora a partir de agora.

6. 23 Gouere 2026 da 12:11 UTCidentified

   Identificamos o subconjunto de instâncias impactadas e continuamos a implantar a correção neste momento.

7. 23 Gouere 2026 da 12:32 UTCidentified

   Implementamos uma correção de configuração e agora estamos trabalhando para resolver o subconjunto de instâncias impactadas.

8. 23 Gouere 2026 da 12:49 UTCidentified

   Com a correção de configuração implantada, continuamos a resolver o subconjunto de instâncias ainda impactadas.

9. 23 Gouere 2026 da 14:07 UTCidentified

   Continuamos a resolver o subconjunto de instâncias ainda impactadas.

10. 23 Gouere 2026 da 14:27 UTCidentified

    Continuamos a resolver o subconjunto de instâncias que ainda são impactadas.

11. 23 Gouere 2026 da 14:44 UTCmonitoring

    Continuamos a resolver o subconjunto de instâncias que ainda são impactadas.

12. 23 Gouere 2026 da 15:03 UTCmonitoring

    AuraDB Virtual Dedicated Cloud e AuraDB Business Critical devem agora ser corrigidos. Continuamos a resolver o subconjunto de instâncias que ainda são impactadas para o AuraDB Professional e Free.

13. 23 Gouere 2026 da 15:29 UTCmonitoring

    Continuamos a resolver o subconjunto de instâncias que ainda são impactadas para o AuraDB Professional e Free.

14. 23 Gouere 2026 da 15:57 UTCmonitoring

    Continuamos a resolver o subconjunto de instâncias que ainda são impactadas para o AuraDB Professional e Free.

15. 23 Gouere 2026 da 16:32 UTCmonitoring

    Continuamos a resolver o subconjunto de instâncias que ainda são impactadas para o AuraDB Professional e Free

16. 23 Gouere 2026 da 17:01 UTCmonitoring

    Continuamos a corrigir um subconjunto de instâncias que ainda são impactadas para o AuraDB Professional e Free

17. 23 Gouere 2026 da 17:31 UTCmonitoring

    Continuamos a corrigir um pequeno subconjunto de instâncias que ainda são impactadas sob os níveis AuraDB Professional e Free.

18. 23 Gouere 2026 da 18:07 UTCmonitoring

    Abordamos a questão em todas as instâncias profissionais do AuraDB. Aura Free ainda pode ser afetada. Continuaremos a monitorizar e a corrigir as restantes bases de dados.

19. 23 Gouere 2026 da 19:39 UTCmonitoring

    Continuamos a corrigir um pequeno subconjunto de instâncias Livres que ainda são impactadas.

20. 24 Gouere 2026 da 06:00 UTCmonitoring

    Continuamos a acompanhar de perto a situação relativamente a quaisquer outras questões.

21. 24 Gouere 2026 da 08:30 UTCmonitoring

    Continuamos monitorando quaisquer outros problemas.

22. 24 Gouere 2026 da 12:59 UTCmonitoring

    Todas as instâncias identificadas foram corrigidas, continuando a monitorar. Contacte o suporte ao cliente para quaisquer outros problemas.

23. 24 Gouere 2026 da 15:56 UTCresolved

    Todas as correções foram implantadas e o problema está agora marcado como resolvido.

24. 29 Gouere 2026 da 21:58 UTCpostmortem

    O que aconteceu? Na quinta-feira, 23 de julho de 2026 10:33 UTC foi implantada uma mudança de configuração para Aura que involuntariamente alterou como as alocações de memória foram calculadas para instâncias de banco de dados. Como resultado, um subconjunto de instâncias recebeu memória insuficiente, fazendo com que algumas instâncias de banco de dados fiquem indisponíveis ou incapazes de completar atualizações. A alocação ajustada de memória levou a condições fora da memória, fazendo com que as instâncias do banco de dados reiniciassem repetidamente devido a recursos de memória insuficientes ou se tornassem atualizadas. Este problema afetou instâncias em vários provedores de nuvem e vários níveis de produtos. Uma vez identificado o problema, revertemos imediatamente a alteração de configuração, impedindo que quaisquer instâncias adicionais recebessem a configuração incorreta. Uma configuração corrigida foi implantada na produção até quinta-feira, 23 de julho de 2026 11:56 UTC. No entanto, as instâncias de banco de dados que já haviam recebido a configuração incorreta exigiam ações de recuperação individual antes que pudessem retornar à operação normal. Por volta de 23 de julho de 2026 17:59 UTC, todas as instâncias conhecidas do banco de dados de impacto do cliente tinham sido recuperadas. O monitoramento continuou durante o dia seguinte, com o incidente totalmente resolvido na sexta-feira, 24 de julho de 2026 16:30 UTC. Como o serviço foi afectado O impacto primário do cliente foi que várias instâncias do banco de dados do AuraDB ficaram indisponíveis ou entraram em um estado degradado. As instâncias afetadas não foram capazes de completar atualizações de software de rotina e, em alguns casos, reiniciadas repetidamente porque memória insuficiente havia sido alocada. * ** Disponibilidade de serviço:** Impacto do cliente variado por nível de serviço. As instâncias profissionais do AuraDB, que não fornecem alta disponibilidade, experimentaram o maior nível de interrupção do serviço, com um subconjunto se tornando indisponível e incapaz de processar leituras ou gravações. Para as instâncias AuraDB Business Critical e Virtual Dedicated Cloud \(VDC\), o impacto foi geralmente limitado a uma perda temporária de tolerância a falhas enquanto a disponibilidade de serviço foi mantida. Em um número menor de casos, as instâncias Business Critical e VDC também se tornaram indisponíveis. * ** Atualizações do Stuck**: Outras instâncias permaneceram disponíveis, mas ficaram presas em um estado de atualização, que bloqueou operações iniciadas pelo cliente, como redimensionamentos ou alterações de configuração. * **Cross-platform escopo**: O impacto abrangeu todos os três provedores de nuvem suportados e várias regiões, afetando os clientes globalmente. Casos de suporte ao cliente foram levantados e nossa equipe triou e recuperou manualmente instâncias afetadas em ordem prioritária. A maioria das instâncias do AuraDB continuou a funcionar normalmente. O impacto do cliente foi totalmente atenuado através da recuperação manual da configuração revertida e direcionada de cada instância afetada. O que estamos a fazer agora Realizamos uma análise aprofundada deste incidente e identificamos as seguintes ações: * **Prevenção** * ** Validação de implantação melhorada:** Estamos fortalecendo nosso processo de validação de lançamento para identificar melhor as mudanças de configuração. * ** Desacoplamento de componentes**: Estamos avaliando melhorias no sequenciamento de implantações de componentes para reduzir o risco de alterações não intencionais serem incluídas em versões. * ** Estratégia de implantação progressiva**: Estamos a rever o processo de implantação dos componentes afectados, para os alinhar com os controlos de implantação utilizados para outros componentes críticos. * **Detecção** * ** Melhor alerta**: Estamos melhorando nosso monitoramento para detectar aumentos anormais nas taxas de falha \(como perda de tolerância à falha ou disponibilidade\) mais rápida e confiável. * **Mitigação** * ** Implementação de configuração segura:** Estamos melhorando a forma como as mudanças de configuração de produção são implantadas para que possam ser desativadas ou removidas mais rapidamente sem precisar de uma versão de software mais ampla. * ** Ferramenta de recuperação manual mais rápida**: Estamos melhorando nossa ferramenta de recuperação para reduzir o tempo necessário para identificar e recuperar manualmente instâncias afetadas. Reconhecemos a perturbação que este incidente causou e pedimos desculpas pelo impacto para os clientes afetados. Completámos as medidas correctivas imediatas, e as melhorias a mais longo prazo acima descritas já estão em curso para reduzir a probabilidade e o impacto de incidentes semelhantes no futuro.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 10 Gouere 2026 da 17:18 UTCinvestigating

   Atualmente estamos investigando um problema que afeta o Console Aura onde alguns clientes podem não ser capazes de ver suas instâncias. Esta questão é causada por uma falha em um serviço de terceiros que depende da Aura. As instâncias afetadas continuam rodando normalmente, e a conectividade do banco de dados não é impactada. A nossa equipa está a investigar a questão.

2. 10 Gouere 2026 da 17:23 UTCinvestigating

   Continuamos a investigar esta questão.

3. 10 Gouere 2026 da 17:51 UTCmonitoring

   O serviço de terceiros de que a Aura depende restaurou operações normais e os sistemas Neo4j Aura recuperaram. Nossa equipe está monitorando o problema ativamente para confirmar que a Aura Console está atuando como esperado.

4. 10 Gouere 2026 da 19:23 UTCresolved

   Os serviços são confirmados como operacionais e não se esperam mais interrupções.

5. 27 Gouere 2026 da 04:28 UTCpostmortem

   # # O Que Aconteceu A Aura Console e outros componentes da Aura sofreram interrupções em 2026-07-10 às 16:14 UTC, resultando em falhas e falhas. Consequentemente, um segmento de clientes enfrentou problemas de visibilidade em relação às suas instâncias. Foi causado por uma interrupção em um serviço externo de terceiros integrado com Aura. Crucialmente, a conectividade do banco de dados permaneceu descomprometida, e as instâncias impactadas continuaram suas operações normais. O serviço LaunchDarkly foi restaurado para resolver o problema # # Como o serviço foi afetado Vários componentes da Aura, incluindo o Console Aura, sofreram perturbações. Os usuários encontraram erros HTTP 500 em páginas e operações relacionadas ao banco de dados, embora organizações e projetos ainda pudessem ser acessados. As ligações directas a instâncias específicas da base de dados não foram completamente afectadas O plano de controle tornou-se indisponível, o que significava que os usuários não poderiam criar, excluir, redimensionar ou ajustar configurações para instâncias através da API ou do console Aura. No entanto, as instâncias existentes mantiveram-se operacionais. O problema foi causado por uma falha no LaunchDarkly e nossos serviços não lidaram com essa falha de dependência graciosamente durante a inicialização. Todos os sistemas afetados retornaram à operação normal até 2026-07-10 às 17:07 UTC # # O que estamos fazendo agora A equipe de engenharia Neo4j rapidamente diagnosticou a causa raiz e o serviço restaurado. Ao avaliar este incidente, identificamos áreas-chave para acelerar futuras resoluções e mitigar os riscos de recorrência: * Analisadas as principais métricas de incidentes, com foco na duração alerta-resposta para identificar oportunidades para acelerar a eficiência de resposta * Conduziu uma retrospectiva abrangente destacando resultados bem sucedidos, incluindo análise rápida da causa raiz através de registro transparente, alinhamento sem costura através da ferramenta de gerenciamento de incidentes, e a degradação resistente e graciosa de múltiplos componentes que manteve a conectividade do plano de dados intacta * Desenvolvimento ativo de padrões mais graciosos para flags de recursos para proteger operações principais durante o tempo de inatividade do fornecedor * Fortalecer a resiliência arquitetônica integrando planejamento avançado, práticas de engenharia do caos e testes de injeção de falhas em nível de produção para descobrir e mitigar caminhos de falha potenciais * Limitações lógicas endereçadas no cache de flag do operador, enfatizando a necessidade de operadores armazenarem bandeiras avaliadas localmente para preservar a continuidade operacional se as dependências externas falharem.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 30 Mezheven 2026 da 14:45 UTCidentified

   A execução do ÌNDICE DE CRIAÇÃO DE VERSÍCULOS falha com o erro 51N31 erro: configuração do sistema ou exceção de operação - não suportado. Criar um índice vetorial com configurações fornecidas não é suportado em V2026 02. A versão necessária para operação é V2026 06. Por favor, atualize o DBMS.. Isto só afeta o novo índice, o ÌNDICE VECTOR existente não é afetado. Qualquer índice vetorial criado antes de 2026-06-30 às 09:00 continuar a operar normalmente.

2. 30 Mezheven 2026 da 15:41 UTCidentified

   Estamos começando agora a implantar uma correção para resolver este problema e irá fornecer uma atualização em breve sobre o progresso.

3. 30 Mezheven 2026 da 16:05 UTCmonitoring

   Uma solução está a sair e a progredir bem. Atualizaremos com o progresso.

4. 30 Mezheven 2026 da 17:45 UTCresolved

   A correção foi totalmente implantada em todas as instâncias impactadas. Este incidente está agora resolvido.

5. 20 Gouere 2026 da 08:40 UTCpostmortem

   # # O Que Aconteceu Um problema foi identificado após a implantação da versão 2026.06 em 2026-06-30 às 08:00 UTC, onde executar `CREATE VECTOR ÌNDICE` em instâncias atualizadas Aura desencadeou uma exceção do sistema. Esta falha na geração do índice ocorreu porque o armazenamento subjacente e o kernel necessitaram de atualizações adicionais para suportar a operação Este problema apenas afetou a criação de novos índices; os índices vetoriais existentes não são afetados. Qualquer índice vetorial criado antes das 09:00 em 2026-06-30 não foi afetado e continuou a funcionar normalmente. # # Como o serviço foi afetado Após o lançamento da versão 2026.06, a execução da instrução CREATE VECTOR INDICE falhou, impactando aplicações que dependiam da adição de novos índices vetoriais. Clientes afetados receberam o erro: Criar um índice vetorial com configurações fornecidas não é suportado em V2026\ 02. A versão necessária para operação é V2026\ 06. Por favor, atualize o DBMS . Os índices existentes \(criados antes deste incidente\) e outras consultas permaneceram inteiramente inalterados e totalmente funcionais. # # O que estamos fazendo agora As equipes Neo4j identificaram a causa raiz como um bug no planejador Cypher e resolveram o problema com uma correção de código. Esta correção foi implantada em todas as instâncias Aura afetadas, resolvendo completamente o erro Para evitar futuras ocorrências, estamos aprimorando nossos sistemas de monitoramento e alerta para detectar problemas semelhantes mais cedo, especialmente dentro de ambientes de estadiamento, antes que ocorram desdobramentos. Simultaneamente, estamos refinando nossos processos de implantação para minimizar o impacto do cliente e os tempos de recuperação Além disso, estamos investigando opções para implementar testes automatizados de validação pós-atualização especificamente para operações críticas, como criação de índice vetorial

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 23 Mezheven 2026 da 11:25 UTCidentified

   O console Aura está passando por alguns erros intermitentes: "Nosso sistema está tendo problemas agora mesmo. Tente novamente mais tarde ou contacte o suporte se o problema persistir." Isso pode exigir que você recarregue ou espere mais tempo para navegar no console As operações e a API do Aura permanecem inalteradas Estamos trabalhando ativamente em uma correção

2. 23 Mezheven 2026 da 13:03 UTCidentified

   Continuamos a investigar uma solução para o problema

3. 23 Mezheven 2026 da 13:39 UTCidentified

   Continuamos trabalhando em uma solução para esse problema.

4. 23 Mezheven 2026 da 15:43 UTCmonitoring

   Estamos a lançar uma mudança. Vamos monitorizar e actualizar.

5. 23 Mezheven 2026 da 19:27 UTCmonitoring

   Continuando a monitorar as alterações implantadas. Próxima atualização prevista 6/24/2026 10am UTC.

6. 24 Mezheven 2026 da 09:14 UTCmonitoring

   Verificamos e confirmámos que a questão está agora totalmente resolvida.

7. 24 Mezheven 2026 da 09:14 UTCresolved

   Este incidente foi resolvido.

8. 10 Gouere 2026 da 14:50 UTCpostmortem

   # # O Que Aconteceu Por volta das 12:00 UTC em 22 de janeiro de 2026, os usuários encontraram banners de erro intermitentes no console Aura exibindo, "Estamos tendo um problema. Tente novamente.", que ocorreu ao lado de 500 erros dos terminais de API do console. Essas interrupções foram transitórias e causadas pelo timing interno da API durante o processo de aperto de mão do TLS, normalmente resolvendo em cerca de 10 segundos ou seguindo uma atualização da página # # Como o serviço foi afetado A API Aura Console e Aura experimentou desempenho degradado, que se manifestou como banners de erro intermitentes dentro da interface do console Aura. Uma investigação identificou a causa raiz como alto uso de CPU e estrangulamento dentro da API do console. Esta questão foi principalmente impulsionada por constantes listas de entidades de grande dimensão e pedidos de conciliação dispendiosos Para resolver o problema, correções direcionadas foram implantadas com sucesso no console Aura e API Aura. Seguiu-se a adaptação da configuração dos recursos para aumentar a sede operacional e garantir a estabilidade. # # O que estamos fazendo agora Foram implementadas as seguintes medidas reativas e proativas para reduzir a probabilidade de incidentes semelhantes: * Desenvolveu um painel de monitoramento para observar as quedas de solicitação com base em dados internos do log da API para implementar monitoramento automatizado e alerta para problemas de captura antes que ocorram * Implementou um atraso escalonado entre pedidos de reconciliação paginada para mitigar o alto consumo de recursos e melhorar a estabilidade da API * Melhoria dos cálculos de recursos conscientes da infraestrutura para melhorar o desempenho * Introduziu um novo filtro para consultas baseadas em níveis de serviço para otimizar a sobrecarga da CPU para cada chamada realizada pelo reconciliador * Desativado processo de middleware de solicitação redundante para otimizar chamadas API

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 26 Mae 2026 da 18:23 UTCinvestigating

   Aura Console is currently not accessible. Our team is investigating the issue. Aura instances are running normally and are not impacted. They remain accessible via https://browser.neo4j.io/ and https://bloom.neo4j.io/ Console-related administration and configuration procedures may be unavailable. We will provide updates as soon as more information is available.

2. 26 Mae 2026 da 19:19 UTCmonitoring

   The Aura Console issue has now been resolved. The root cause was a failure while fetching public certificates from Auth0. We are reaching out to the Auth0 team to gather more detailed information about the incident.

3. 26 Mae 2026 da 23:06 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 9 Mezheven 2026 da 16:50 UTCpostmortem

   **What Happened** During the incident window, users attempting to log in to the Aura Console were unable to do so. Auth0, the authentication provider for Aura Console, experienced an issue that prevented new authentication requests from completing. Existing sessions with valid cached tokens were largely unaffected. Aura database instances were running normally throughout and were not impacted, and access via the Aura API to database instances was also unaffected. **How the service was affected** Authentication requests from the Aura Console to Auth0 began failing, preventing new logins and session refreshes. Affected users received 503 errors when accessing the Aura Console. Once Auth0 recovered, access was restored. **What are we doing now** We've made two changes as a result of this incident: * Client identification: Authentication requests now include a clearer client identifier, reducing the chance of requests being incorrectly blocked in the future. * Observability: We've improved logging and alerting for authentication failures, including better visibility into errors from external services,so we can detect and escalate issues like this faster.

1. 6 Meurzh 2026 da 10:18 UTCidentified

   We identified an issue with the availability of console.neo4j.io - we are investigating

2. 6 Meurzh 2026 da 10:24 UTCmonitoring

   We have made a code change and we believe the console is available again.

3. 6 Meurzh 2026 da 10:25 UTCresolved

   We have checked and confirm that the issue is now fully addressed.

4. 30 Meurzh 2026 da 07:25 UTCpostmortem

   ## What Happened On March 6, at 10:04 AM UTC,  the Aura Console became inaccessible following a recent deployment. The deployment included changes related to user organizations and switching to an org memberships entity. This change caused the console to become inaccessible for a short period. ## How the service was affected A deployment to the Aura Console introduced an issue that caused an unexpected increase in backend requests related to access validation. This led to elevated CPU usage, which impacted the availability of the console and dependent services. We rolled back to a previous version to restore access. The rollback ensured the full restoration of access to the Aura Console, resolving the core issue within the incident window ## What are we doing now We are currently implementing a comprehensive strategy to bolster system resilience and prevent future recurrence. Our immediate actions include integrating stricter and more robust safeguards into the deployment pipeline. Crucially, we are significantly enhancing our validation processes to proactively detect and flag any potential performance impacts _before_ code is promoted to the production environment

1. 3 Meurzh 2026 da 21:35 UTCidentified

   A recent update resulted in MERGE queries which referenced the same merged property on both the left and right hand side of an ON MATCH SET or ON CREATE SET clause deleting that property from the node, or setting it to an invalid value during query runtime. The node being matched against must have had at least one property uniqueness constraint present. A fix has been identified and will be applied as soon as possible. Instances marked as "Production" are not impacted.

2. 4 Meurzh 2026 da 01:39 UTCidentified

   The fix is being deployed and the status page will be updated upon completion of the full deployment of the fix.

3. 4 Meurzh 2026 da 04:52 UTCidentified

   The fix is being deployed and the status page will be updated upon completion of the full deployment

4. 4 Meurzh 2026 da 14:07 UTCmonitoring

   The fix has now been deployed to those instances impacted and we are monitoring the situation.

5. 4 Meurzh 2026 da 15:19 UTCresolved

   The fix has been fully deployed to all impacted instances. This incident is now resolved.

6. 8 Ebrel 2026 da 06:39 UTCpostmortem

   ## What Happened An issue was introduced in the Neo4j 2026.02 release where MERGE queries that referenced the same property on both the left and right sides of an `ON MATCH SET` or `ON CREATE SET` clause could potentially delete that property from the node or set it to an invalid value during query execution. This behaviour was observed specifically when the node being matched had at least one property uniqueness constraint. ## How the service was affected A change in the Neo4j 2026.02 release introduced a potential risk of writes failing or invalid data being returned for queries using MERGE together with `ON MATCH`. This issue affected instances across Aura tiers and required immediate investigation by Neo4j Engineering. The team identified the root cause and deployed a fix in version 2026.02.1. ## What are we doing now The following proactive measures have been implemented to reduce the likelihood of similar incidents: * We have strengthened test coverage for `ON CREATE` and `ON MATCH` clauses, particularly those involving more complex expressions. * We are investigating additional safeguards to improve our ability to control MergeInto/MergeUnique behaviour more flexibly, as well as potential rollback capabilities to support recovery in future incidents

1. 2 Meurzh 2026 da 19:55 UTCidentified

   We are aware of issues in the Middle East regions via our cloud partner AWS, affecting AWS me-central-1 (United Arab Emirates) and AWS me-south-1 (Bahrain). The most up-to-date information from AWS is available at: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status We are actively working to limit the impact on the Aura service. However, customers should expect that new deployments in the affected regions may be impaired. Additionally, existing services deployed in these regions may experience reduced availability. Customers with services in these or nearby regions who are concerned about potential operational impact are encouraged to contact Neo4j Customer Support through the usual channels. Our team is available to advise and assist as needed.

2. 3 Meurzh 2026 da 15:26 UTCidentified

   We continue to monitor the situation in the affected AWS Middle East regions. The most up-to-date information from AWS is available at: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status We will provide additional updates as soon as more information becomes available.

3. 6 Meurzh 2026 da 14:29 UTCidentified

   We continue to monitor the situation in the affected AWS Middle East regions. The latest information from AWS is available at: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status We will provide additional updates as more information becomes available. Please review the AWS recommendation on the website above.

4. 6 Meurzh 2026 da 16:06 UTCresolved

   While AWS continues working on this situation, we are closing this incident and invite our customers to monitor the AWS Status on our main Neo4j Status Page under AWS (Amazon Web Services). The latest information from AWS can be found at: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

5. 29 Meurzh 2026 da 15:16 UTCpostmortem

   ## What Happened On March 1, at 12:51 PM UTC, AWS services in the ME-CENTRAL-1 & ME-SOUTH-1 Region were impacted. Connectivity and power issues affected APIs and AWS core services essential to run Neo4j Aura prompting AWS to initiate an investigation ## How the service was affected Operations \(clone, backup, resuming/pausing, resizing\) that require additional resources like EC2 Instances, EBS Volumes, and other resources were impaired in the ME-CENTRAL-1 and ME-SOUTH-1 Region. Other AWS Services also experienced error rates and latencies for some workflows. Due to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, both affected regions have experienced physical impacts to infrastructure. A detailed summary of the AWS regional incident can be found here:[ https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status](https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status) ## What are we doing now We are actively working to limit the impact on the Neo4j Aura service. However, customers should expect that new deployments in the affected regions may be impaired. Additionally, existing services deployed in these regions may experience reduced availability. Customers with services in these or nearby regions who are concerned about potential operational impact are encouraged to contact Neo4j Customer Support through the usual channels Please visit AWS Status page for more info:[https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status](https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status)

1. 26 Genver 2026 da 19:26 UTCidentified

   Identificamos um problema que pode afetar um conjunto limitado de consultas do Cypher 25 para o AuraDB Free, Professional e AuraDS. Isto pode afectar: - Consultas usando a consulta condicional QUANDO em combinação com uma agregação não agrupando sobre valores nulos resultam em um número incorreto de linhas devolvidas. - Consultas usando NEXT pode produzir uma variável inesperada não definida erro em algumas instâncias. Estamos trabalhando ativamente em uma correção e atualizaremos esta página à medida que mais informações ficam disponíveis.

2. 27 Genver 2026 da 01:37 UTCidentified

   Identificámos uma solução para esta questão e vamos avançar em Aura. Assim que a atualização for implantada, atualizaremos esta página de tatus.

3. 27 Genver 2026 da 09:50 UTCidentified

   Estamos rolando a correção e vamos atualizá-lo quando isso estiver concluído.

4. 27 Genver 2026 da 11:10 UTCmonitoring

   A correção foi feita para os componentes afetados, estamos agora monitorando a situação neste momento.

5. 27 Genver 2026 da 14:51 UTCmonitoring

   Continuamos a acompanhar a situação neste momento.

6. 27 Genver 2026 da 15:58 UTCresolved

   A correção foi totalmente implantada em todas as instâncias impactadas. Este incidente está agora resolvido.

7. 2 Gouere 2026 da 04:22 UTCpostmortem

   * O que aconteceu * Neo4j começou a implantação da versão 2026.01.1 para instâncias livres Aura às 07:49 AM UTC em 26 de janeiro de 2026. Após a detecção de falhas de consulta durante o teste interno, o lançamento foi interrompido antes de atingir níveis mais elevados Aura. As falhas ocorreram em consultas condicionais \(por exemplo, QUANDO ...THEN ...\) após a fase de planejamento para se comportar de forma diferente no caso de agregação sobre valores nulos. Identificamos a causa raiz e desenvolvemos uma resolução, que foi integrada na versão 2026.01.2. Em 27 de janeiro de 2026, começamos a implantar 2026.01.2 através de instâncias Aura, atualizando com sucesso todos os ambientes afetados para a versão corrigida # # Como o serviço foi afetado Consultas usando When em 2026.01.1 em combinação com agregação sobre valores nulos obter um número incorreto de linhas retornadas. Consultas usando NEXT podem em algumas instâncias produzir uma variável inesperada não definida erro. Isso fez com que a consulta reescrita se comportasse de forma diferente no caso de agregação sobre valores nulos. A consulta condicional precisaria receber linhas de entrada contendo valores nulos e ser agregada sobre os valores sem usar um agrupamento. Os clientes receberam um resultado incorreto se estivessem usando o constructo de consulta condicional em Cypher 25 \(ver [https://neo4j.com/docs/aura/managing-instances/cypher-version/](https://neo4j.com/docs/aura/managing-instances/cypher-version/)\), um impacto limitado a um número limitado de instâncias de Aura. # # O que estamos fazendo agora Nós aprimoramos nossos procedimentos de teste para garantir uma cobertura abrangente em todas as áreas do produto. Isto inclui o desenvolvimento de novos casos de teste concebidos para resolver questões identificadas e potenciais cenários futuros. Além disso, integramos o teste de consulta Cypher no Aura como um componente padrão do nosso conjunto de testes de regressão. Essas verificações são agora etapas obrigatórias dentro de nosso pipeline de integração contínua e ambientes de estadiamento antes de qualquer implantação da produção.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 16 Genver 2026 da 14:25 UTCidentified

   Impact is that currently it is not possible to load data into GDS via native projection. Customers using Aura Graph Analytics are not impacted. We have identified a packaging issue with the latest release of Aura. Our engineering team is working on a fix.

2. 16 Genver 2026 da 15:13 UTCidentified

   Our teams have a fix and initiated the work to get it ready to roll-out. No current ETA available. We will keep you updated soon.

3. 16 Genver 2026 da 17:07 UTCmonitoring

   The fix is currently rolling out to production. We will update you upon completion

4. 16 Genver 2026 da 19:36 UTCresolved

   All instances should have the fix applied and if not it should be in the next 60 minutes

5. 23 Ebrel 2026 da 13:27 UTCpostmortem

   ### **What happened** On January 15, 2026 at 22:12 UTC we began rolling out an update that included an incompatible version of a key component, affecting customers using the GDS plugin. This issue was reported on January 16 at 12:59 UTC, and a fix was deployed within hours, restoring functionality for the majority of affected users by 20:03 UTC.  The issue occurred because Neo4’s packaging automation process selected the wrong version of the GDS component. GDS 2.25 should have been selected but instead GDS 2.24 was included in the bundle, which caused a compatibility issue. Although a corrected package was created and labeled separately, the release pipeline selected the incorrect package for deployment.  This issue highlighted a gap in the release validation process, where incompatible component versions were not detected before rollout. ### **How customers were affected** Customers using the GDS plugin were unable to use any of the functionality the plugin provides during the incident window.  The system configuration has been updated to ensure compatibility with the intended component versions, restoring full functionality. ### **What we are doing now** The following mitigations have been implemented:  * Enhanced testing procedures to automatically verify compatibility between Neo4j and all bundled components before release. * Improved release processes to ensure that only explicitly validated and correctly labeled packages can be selected for deployment.

1. 26 Du 2025 da 15:47 UTCidentified

   Neo4j opened a ticket with Azure and is awaiting updates on their resolution of the Azure Infrastructure issues. Impact on Neo4j Aura Services: Create, Resize (CPU and Storage), Pause, Resume.

2. 26 Du 2025 da 20:33 UTCidentified

   Neo4j continues working with Microsoft via an Azure cloud ticket and is awaiting updates on their resolution of the Azure Infrastructure issues. Some resources have been made available, and impacted Neo4j Services have resumed operation. Customers have been notified. The Neo4j Aura Service is impacted when performing the following operations: Create, Resize (CPU and Storage), Pause, Resume. If Azure resources are unavailable when requesting these types of Neo4j operations, the operation will fail, and the Neo4j instance will become unavailable until Azure is able to provision additional resources.

3. 27 Du 2025 da 14:33 UTCidentified

   The Neo4j Aura Service continues to be impacted by Azure Infrastructure issues in the US east region, effecting the following operations: Create, Resize (CPU and Storage), Pause, Resume. If Azure resources are unavailable when requesting these types of Neo4j Aura operations, they will fail and the Neo4j Aura instance will become unavailable until Azure is able to provision additional resources.

4. 27 Du 2025 da 17:07 UTCidentified

   The Neo4j Aura Service continues to be impacted by Azure Infrastructure issues in the US east region, effecting the following operations: Create, Resize (CPU and Storage), Pause, Clone, Resume. As Azure resources become available when performing some Aura operations, the impacted instances may progressively recover and operations successfully complete. We continue to monitor progress, work with Microsoft Azure Infrastructure issues and will update.

5. 28 Du 2025 da 00:09 UTCidentified

   We continue to work with our cloud infrastructure provider . Aura operations affected: Create, Resize (CPU and Storage), Pause, Clone, Resume.

6. 28 Du 2025 da 10:55 UTCidentified

   We continue to work with our cloud infrastructure provider. Aura operations affected: Create, Resize (CPU and Storage), Pause, Clone, Resume.

7. 28 Du 2025 da 16:23 UTCidentified

   We continue to work with Microsoft Azure. No expected improvements in addressing the issues around cloud resources in the affected regions before next week. Aura operations affected: Create, Resize (CPU and Storage), Pause, Clone, Resume. We will resume updates after this weekend or earlier if we have more information.

8. 1 Kerzu 2025 da 09:54 UTCidentified

   The Neo4j Aura Service continues to be impacted by Azure Infrastructure issues in the US east region, effecting the following operations: Create, Resize (CPU and Storage), Pause, Resume. If Azure resources are unavailable when requesting these types of Neo4j Aura operations, they will fail and the Neo4j Aura instance may become unavailable or degraded until Azure is able to provision additional resources.

9. 5 Kerzu 2025 da 10:20 UTCidentified

   The Neo4j Aura Service continues to be impacted by Azure Infrastructure issues in the US east region, affecting the following operations: Create, Resize (CPU and Storage), Pause, Resume. If Azure resources are unavailable when requesting these types of Neo4j Aura operations, they will fail and the Neo4j Aura instance may become unavailable or degraded until Azure is able to provision additional resources.

10. 5 Kerzu 2025 da 16:59 UTCidentified

    The Neo4j Aura Service continues to be impacted by Azure Infrastructure issues in the US east region. We are working with our cloud partner and will resume updates once we have an ETA to share.

11. 11 Kerzu 2025 da 10:24 UTCmonitoring

    Cloud resources have become available in USEAST2 and we will monitor for a few hours to ensure there is no further customer impact.

12. 11 Kerzu 2025 da 15:39 UTCresolved

    Cloud resources have become available in USEAST2 and no further customer impact has been detected. This incident is resolved.

13. 4 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 15:18 UTCpostmortem

    ### **What Happened** Starting at 13:26 UTC on November 24th Microsoft Azure region eastus experienced a stock out situation, which impacted operations for all tiers of Neo4j Aura in that specific region. Additional capacity was requested straight away, but not until 17:06 UTC on December 10th did enough additional resources become available to resume all normal operations. **How the service was affected** All tiers within the Neo4j Aura Service were impacted when performing the following operations during this incident: Create, Resize \(CPU and Storage\), Clone, Pause and Resume. If Microsoft Azure resources were unavailable when requesting these types of Neo4j operations, the operation would fail, and the Neo4j instance would become unavailable until Azure was able to provision additional resources.  ### **What are we doing now** To mitigate the scope of impact of future regional stock out issues, Neo4j is implementing the following measures: * Closely monitoring resource capacity to improve stockout predictions. * Regular calls with with our Cloud Service Provider to: * Learn about where regional resource capacity restrictions are forecast. * Plan for more resources in restricted regions. * Investigating other deployment models to allow us to keep Aura running in situations where 3 Availability Zones are not available.

1. 18 Du 2025 da 15:56 UTCidentified

   We have identified an issue resulting in Pause, Resume and Delete operations to fail in both Console and Aura API across all tiers of Aura. We are actively working to resolve the issue and will report progress.

2. 18 Du 2025 da 16:16 UTCmonitoring

   We have released a fix to this issue and are monitoring to ensure all operations are back to normal.

3. 18 Du 2025 da 16:39 UTCresolved

   After monitoring the fix for some time, we can confirm that the issue is resolved and normal operations have resumed.

4. 14 Genver 2026 da 14:05 UTCpostmortem

   ### What happened On November 18, 2025, some customers experienced issues with the delete, pause, and resume operations in the Console. These actions failed due to a temporary system issue introduced during a sequence of updates. While the updates were intended to improve functionality, they unintentionally reintroduced a previously resolved defect. The issue was identified quickly, and our teams acted immediately to restore normal operation. The root cause was a misconfiguration in the data processing module. An outdated schema caused the data parsing logic to misinterpret certain input parameters, leading to incorrect behavior and data display within the Console. We have since corrected the schema and added stricter validation to ensure compatibility moving forward. ### How customers were affected During the incident, some users experienced service disruptions when accessing the Console. Impacts included: * Intermittent connectivity issues * Inability to log in * Temporary unavailability of specific Console features No customer data was lost. To prevent a recurrence, we have improved our release process to ensure updates are deployed in the correct order, eliminating overlapping or out-of-sequence changes. ### What we are doing now Neo4j takes service reliability seriously and is strengthening safeguards to prevent similar incidents. New mitigations being deployed include: * Enhanced monitoring to detect related issues earlier * Additional automated checks to block faulty configurations before deployment * Improvements to overall service resilience to better tolerate similar failures We apologize for the disruption and appreciate our customers’ patience as we continue to harden our systems.

1. 20 Here 2025 da 16:43 UTCidentified

   Many core operations for instances in AWS region us-east-1 are degraded as a result of AWS incident in that region: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status Core operations include create, pause, resume, clone, backup, among others. We continue to monitor the AWS incident and will provide updates accordingly.

2. 20 Here 2025 da 19:14 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to monitor the AWS incident, and can report some slow improvement of impacted Aura instances in the AWS us-east1 region, though the service remains degraded in this region at this time. We are continuing to monitor progress in the AWS incident: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

3. 20 Here 2025 da 21:28 UTCresolved

   Instance operations in AWS us-east-1 region are back to normal following the resolution of the AWS incident. We will continue to monitor but all data indicates that the issue is fully resolved at this time.

4. 15 Genver 2026 da 17:48 UTCpostmortem

   ### **What Happened** Between 08:41 UTC on October 20th and 09:00 UTC on October 21st, Neo4j Aura experienced service disruptions affecting the us-east-1 \(N. Virginia\) region in AWS. The incident was triggered by a broad AWS regional outage impacting Identity and Access Management \(IAM\) and the EC2 control plane. This resulted in delayed backups, temporary loss of database fault tolerance for a subset of users, and internal delays in administrative actions due to toolchain failures. A detailed summary of the AWS regional incident can be found here: [https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/) ### **How the service was affected** The primary cause was several AWS regional service disruptions in us-east-1. We will cover how each of these affected Neo4j Aura and its users. Neo4j Aura is designed to isolate regional failures. This is achieved through deploying customer instances in Orchestras that have instances in three availability zones and no cross region dependencies. AWS IAM and Identity Center became unresponsive, preventing Neo4j Aura’s automated systems from authenticating with AWS resources in us-east-1. This affected Neo4j Aura backups to be written to AWS S3 buckets. Customers were also not able to resume paused instances during this period as the resume process was not able to authenticate with AWS S3 buckets to retrieve the paused data set. Neo4j Aura’s inability to authenticate with Route53 to create new DNS entries affected Neo4j Aura DB creation, as new databases were created. AWS Network Load Balancer health check system failures and AWS EC2 “request limit exceeded” or “insufficient capacity” errors in us-east-1 were false negatives with the NLB heath checks which resulted in some Neo4j Aura DB clusters in us-east-1 losing fault tolerance \(1 out of 3 cluster members unavailable\). When this happened instances were removed by kubernetes and we were not able to provision new ones due to the EC2 failures noted earlier, leaving the clusters without fault tolerance for a prolonged period of time. All of these clusters still had full availability of the other two cluster members. ### **What are we doing now** Largely Neo4j Aura responded as designed to these events, isolating failures to us-east-1, with no to minimal cross system failure propagation. The cross cloud impact of creating DNS records for new instances was the main outlier.  To mitigate the scope of impact of future regional outages, Neo4j is implementing the following measures: * Full Neo4j Aura reviews to ensure Neo4j Aura design is implemented as intended across all sub-systems to surface any cross region dependencies.  * Remove identified cross-region dependencies.

1. 20 Here 2025 da 09:15 UTCidentified

   An active issue on AWS us-east-1 is affecting Neo4j Aura operations in the regions where we have some dependency on an impacted AWS service. See more details https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status Other regions not currently impacted.

2. 20 Here 2025 da 09:39 UTCidentified

   Operations such as Create, Pause, Resume, Clone are affected globally due to a dependency. Backups in the affected region of AWS us-est-1 will be impacted The affected AWS service is now starting to recover and we are monitoring the situation

3. 20 Here 2025 da 09:58 UTCmonitoring

   We see clear signs of recovery and our impacted service are progressively getting back to normal. We will monitor and update when we can confirm full recovery and normal operations.

4. 20 Here 2025 da 10:32 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to see good recovery across the service. We will update when this is completed.

5. 20 Here 2025 da 11:13 UTCresolved

   The underlying AWS incident has bene resolved and our services have now resumed and fully recovered

6. 15 Genver 2026 da 17:34 UTCpostmortem

   ### **What Happened** Between 08:41 UTC on October 20th and 09:00 UTC on October 21st, Neo4j Aura experienced service disruptions affecting the us-east-1 \(N. Virginia\) region in AWS. The incident was triggered by a broad AWS regional outage impacting Identity and Access Management \(IAM\) and the EC2 control plane. This resulted in delayed backups, temporary loss of database fault tolerance for a subset of users, and internal delays in administrative actions due to toolchain failures. A detailed summary of the AWS regional incident can be found here: [https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/) ### **How the service was affected** The primary cause was several AWS regional service disruptions in us-east-1. We will cover how each of these affected Neo4j Aura and its users. Neo4j Aura is designed to isolate regional failures. This is achieved through deploying customer instances in Orchestras that have instances in three availability zones and no cross region dependencies. AWS IAM and Identity Center became unresponsive, preventing Neo4j Aura’s automated systems from authenticating with AWS resources in us-east-1. This affected Neo4j Aura backups to be written to AWS S3 buckets. Customers were also not able to resume paused instances during this period as the resume process was not able to authenticate with AWS S3 buckets to retrieve the paused data set. Neo4j Aura’s inability to authenticate with Route53 to create new DNS entries affected Neo4j Aura DB creation, as new databases were created. AWS Network Load Balancer health check system failures and AWS EC2 “request limit exceeded” or “insufficient capacity” errors in us-east-1 were false negatives with the NLB heath checks which resulted in some Neo4j Aura DB clusters in us-east-1 losing fault tolerance \(1 out of 3 cluster members unavailable\). When this happened instances were removed by kubernetes and we were not able to provision new ones due to the EC2 failures noted earlier, leaving the clusters without fault tolerance for a prolonged period of time. All of these clusters still had full availability of the other two cluster members. ### **What are we doing now** Largely Neo4j Aura responded as designed to these events, isolating failures to us-east-1, with no to minimal cross system failure propagation. The cross cloud impact of creating DNS records for new instances was the main outlier.  To mitigate the scope of impact of future regional outages, Neo4j is implementing the following measures: * Full Neo4j Aura reviews to ensure Neo4j Aura design is implemented as intended across all sub-systems to surface any cross region dependencies.  * Remove identified cross-region dependencies.

1. 25 Eost 2025 da 13:34 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 25 Eost 2025 da 13:36 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of an issue that could result in a degradation in write performance for all Aura instance. We have identified the cause and are preparing a fix.

3. 25 Eost 2025 da 13:47 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

4. 25 Eost 2025 da 15:34 UTCmonitoring

   The issue impact has been refined and currently could impact AuraDB Virtual Dedicated Cloud and Business Critical instances only. We have identified the cause and the faulty component has been reverted for the majority of instances. We will continue to monitor the situation, while the full fix is prepared.

5. 25 Eost 2025 da 21:44 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to work towards the issue resolution.

6. 26 Eost 2025 da 04:06 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

7. 26 Eost 2025 da 10:53 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor the situation whilst a full fix for the solution is prepared.

8. 26 Eost 2025 da 14:48 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor the situation. The full fix for the solution is currently undergoing final testing and will start deployment once testing is completed.

9. 26 Eost 2025 da 23:12 UTCmonitoring

   The full fix for the solution is starting to be deployed across the estate and are continuing to monitor the situation.

10. 27 Eost 2025 da 06:36 UTCmonitoring

    We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

11. 27 Eost 2025 da 11:16 UTCmonitoring

    The full fix for the solution is continuing to be deployed across the estate and are continuing to monitor the situation.

12. 27 Eost 2025 da 16:46 UTCresolved

    The full fix for the solution has now been deployed across the estate and this issue is now resolved.

13. 6 Here 2025 da 13:32 UTCpostmortem

    ### **What happened** Between August 22 and August 28, 2025, a performance issue affected some of our database services following a recent update. Our team quickly responded and discovered that the problem was due to a bug in the latest update, which caused certain memory settings to be incorrectly configured. We promptly applied the previous version of those settings to stabilize the affected databases. By August 28, all databases were successfully transferred to a new, stable version, and the incident was fully resolved. The issue was caused by a misconfiguration in the system's data processing module. Specifically, an incorrect parameter setting in the data pipeline led to a bottleneck, which slowed down the processing speed. This misconfiguration affected the way data was being queued and processed, resulting in delays. Our technical team has identified the root cause and implemented a fix to ensure that the data pipeline operates efficiently, preventing future occurrences of this issue. ### **How the service was affected** Some customers reported a performance change on their instance.  ### **What we are doing now** Neo4j remains committed to providing reliable service and is implementing additional safeguards to prevent similar incidents in the future. New mitigations being deployed: * Enhancing our monitoring systems to detect similar issues faster * Implementing additional automated checks to prevent service disruptions * Improving our service resilience to handle similar scenarios * Introducing dynamic configuration management to ensure seamless updates * Enabling multiple configuration defaults to better manage database priorities * Improving notification systems for faster response to potential issues * Enhancing our tools to streamline database management and transfers

1. 22 Eost 2025 da 11:02 UTCinvestigating

   Engineers are investigating an issue whereby instance actions are not working. You may be unable to import data, pause, resume, create, delete or run manual backups for your instances. Regular Neo4j scheduled backups are continuing to run as normal. You may be unable to see your instances in the Aura Console. CMI is also experiencing an outage, you may be unable to ingest metrics from your Aura instances.

2. 22 Eost 2025 da 11:42 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been identified and implemented. Instances should be showing on the console and instance operations should now be available. You should now also be able to ingest metrics using CMI. We are continuing to monitor the status of these services.

3. 22 Eost 2025 da 13:31 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 12 Gwengolo 2025 da 15:45 UTCpostmortem

   ### What happened On August 22, 2025, from 10:10 to 11:27 UTC, users experienced an issue with the Aura Console where instance operations were unavailable. This was due to a timing issue with refreshing security keys that affected the visibility and operations of instances in the Aura Console and also caused an outage in the Customer Metrics Integration \(CMI\) and Aura API. The issue was identified within 5 minutes and efforts to resolve it began promptly. The problem was traced back to a recent update and issues with authentication were resolved by refreshing the system cache, with the service fully restored by 11:27 UTC.  The issue arose because of a timing mismatch between the creation of new security keys and their recognition by our system. When new keys were generated, they were quickly used by the Console API. However, another part of our system, the database manager, was still using an older set of keys to verify requests. This mismatch caused requests to fail because the database manager could not recognize the new keys. No unauthorized operations were allowed and this did not affect the security of the service in any way. After approximately an hour, the system automatically updated its keys, and everything started working correctly again. ### How customers were affected Aura Console features were impacted, including the visibility of instances and therefore ability to connect to instances through the console. Driver connections to instances were not impacted. The issue also impacted the use of parts of the service including Customer Metrics Integration \(CMI\) and the Aura API. ### What we are doing now Neo4j remains committed to providing reliable service and is implementing additional safeguards to prevent similar incidents in the future. We are taking steps to prevent similar issues in the future by improving our processes and monitoring systems. Changes we are making: * Enhancing our caching mechanisms to ensure seamless updates and prevent similar issues in the future. * Designing a robust process for updating service accounts and keys to guarantee uninterrupted service reliability.

1. 19 Eost 2025 da 09:19 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with backups. We will update shortly as we get more details

2. 19 Eost 2025 da 10:05 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate the issue with backups. New backups after 0:00 last night are failing to complete. Existing backups are unaffected and remain available.

3. 19 Eost 2025 da 10:34 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

4. 19 Eost 2025 da 10:51 UTCinvestigating

   We continue to investigate and have identified the issue more clearly. Beyond backups, other operations are also affected: pause and clone. Operations may fail or take a long time to complete.

5. 19 Eost 2025 da 11:30 UTCmonitoring

   The fix has been deployed and we will continue to monitor this incident.

6. 19 Eost 2025 da 12:04 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

7. 12 Gwengolo 2025 da 19:41 UTCpostmortem

   ### What happened On August 18, 2025, at 19:18 UTC, the release of a faulty component in Neo4j Aura impacted the ability to perform backups of customer instances. The problem was identified when a critical component was updated without aligning with another dependent component, leading to failed backup attempts. This resulted in Neo4j not being able to take backups of customer instances for a period of approximately 17 hours. Our team quickly identified the root cause and began mitigation efforts early on August 19, 2025. By 11:54 UTC, the issue was fully resolved, and normal backup operations resumed. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused and are taking steps to prevent similar issues in the future. The issue arose because the deployment of the neo4j-backup system was not properly synchronized with the deployment of the neo4j-operator. This misalignment led to critical changes being introduced that impacted the ability to create new backups effectively. Essentially, the two components were not updated in harmony, which caused disruptions in the backup process. ### How customers were affected Customers were unable to  get successful backups of their instances for 17 hours. We promptly addressed the issue by reverting the recent backup changes that caused disruptions and ensured the stability of our service by cleaning up old, failing backups. ### What we are doing now Neo4j remains committed to providing reliable service and is implementing additional safeguards to prevent similar incidents in the future. New mitigations being deployed: * Enhancing our monitoring systems to detect similar issues faster * Implementing additional automated checks to prevent service disruptions * Improving our service resilience to handle similar scenarios