Histórico de interrupções do Spreedly

1. 2 Gwengolo 2026 da 15:11 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly detectou um problema potencialmente resultando em desempenho degradado em APIs transacionais. Enquanto estamos fornecendo uma notificação precoce em um esforço para alertá-lo o mais rápido possível, ainda estamos investigando o escopo e impacto real e forneceremos uma atualização assim que mais detalhes estiverem disponíveis. Obrigado pela vossa paciência.

2. 2 Gwengolo 2026 da 15:57 UTCmonitoring

   Estamos trabalhando para resolver uma defasagem de desempenho afetando algum processamento de pagamento (especificamente compra, captura e criação de método de pagamento) relacionado à manutenção recente do banco de dados. Está a caminho uma solução e a nossa equipa está a monitorizar o sistema. Por favor, verifique aqui as atualizações em tempo real.

3. 2 Gwengolo 2026 da 21:32 UTCresolved

   Este incidente foi resolvido.

4. 9 Gwengolo 2026 da 21:50 UTCpostmortem

   ### Setembro 9, 2026 — Taxas de erro elevadas que afetam o processamento de transações ## # Resumo de Alto Nível Em 2 de setembro de 2026, entre 14:35 e 15:19 UTC, Spreedly experimentou um período de taxas de erro elevadas que afetam um subconjunto de pedidos de transação entre os endpoints. A questão durou aproximadamente 44 minutos e foi causada por um problema de nível de infraestrutura com nossa plataforma de banco de dados. A nossa equipa identificou e resolveu o problema no mesmo dia. O que aconteceu Durante uma atualização de esquema de rotina, um defeito em nossa plataforma de banco de dados subjacente fez com que um de nossos nós de banco de dados ficasse indisponível. Isso reduziu temporariamente a redundância de uma parte de nossos dados de transação, o que levou algumas solicitações a um tempo fora ou receber uma resposta de erro do sistema \(HTTP 500\) em vez de processar normalmente. Nossa equipe trabalhou diretamente com nosso fornecedor de banco de dados para identificar a causa raiz e confirmar a recuperação total da infraestrutura afetada. Próximos Passos Identificamos a causa subjacente como um problema conhecido no software do nosso fornecedor de bases de dados. Uma correção fornecida pelo fornecedor está programada para ser aplicada durante a manutenção programada normal. Em paralelo, estamos adicionando monitoramento adicional para detectar esta classe de problema mais cedo, e ajustar nossos procedimentos internos em torno de trabalhos de manutenção de banco de dados para reduzir ainda mais o risco de um incidente semelhante acontecendo. - A Equipa Espalhada

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 14 Eost 2026 da 16:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an increase in 5xx errors on the Core Transactional API. Some transactions may be failing or returning unexpected error responses during this time. We will provide an update as soon as we have more information.

2. 14 Eost 2026 da 16:34 UTCresolved

   A fix has been implemented and error rates have returned to normal. Some transactions may have failed or returned errors during the affected window. We're continuing to monitor and will follow up with a more detailed post-incident summary.

3. 3 Gwengolo 2026 da 20:55 UTCpostmortem

   ### Service Disruption on Transaction Endpoints ### ‌High Level Summary On August 14, 2026, Spreedly experienced a brief service disruption affecting some transaction-related API endpoints for approximately 20 minutes \(4:06 PM – 4:26 PM ET\). During this window, some requests to endpoints involving transaction lookups, captures, voids, credits, and payment method operations may have received error responses. The issue was identified and resolved quickly by our engineering team. ### What Happened A routine database schema update caused a subset of existing database connections to reference outdated schema information, resulting in intermittent errors on affected requests. Once identified, our team refreshed the affected database connections, which fully resolved the issue. ### Next Steps We are reviewing our schema migration process to add additional safeguards that will prevent this class of issue from recurring, and are improving automated testing coverage for this scenario. We have added auto-retry and recovery mechanisms so that if a connection does reference an outdated schema it will not affect transactions going forward.

1. 27 Gouere 2026 da 13:50 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos actualmente a investigar esta questão.

2. 27 Gouere 2026 da 14:00 UTCidentified

   A questão foi identificada e está a ser implementada uma solução.

3. 27 Gouere 2026 da 15:00 UTCmonitoring

   Detectaram amplamente um problema que pode ter impactado o desempenho da transação principal. Embora a questão pareça agora estar resolvida, nossa equipe está monitorando ativamente os sistemas para garantir a estabilidade contínua. Forneceremos uma atualização final assim que nossa investigação sobre todo o escopo e impacto estiver concluída. Por favor, continue a seguir o nosso StatusPage para a última atualização.

4. 27 Gouere 2026 da 21:41 UTCresolved

   Após acompanhar de perto e confirmar que todos os sistemas estão estabilizados e funcionando como esperado, este incidente é considerado resolvido. Não se espera mais impacto do cliente. Estamos completando nossa investigação sobre as causas do incidente e qualquer impacto residual. Pedimos desculpa por qualquer inconveniente ou perturbação.

5. 3 Gwengolo 2026 da 20:57 UTCpostmortem

   Resumo de Alto Nível Em 27 de julho de 2026, Spreedly experimentou erros intermitentes em um subconjunto de pedidos de transação, incluindo compras, autorizações e webhooks. O que aconteceu Uma migração de banco de dados atualizou o esquema de um serviço interno que gerencia métodos de pagamento armazenados. Isso causou erros nas conexões existentes referenciando um cache obsoleto. Retrocedemos a mudança e ciclamos essas conexões, resolvendo totalmente o problema. Próximos Passos Estamos revisando nosso processo de migração de esquemas para adicionar salvaguardas adicionais que impedirão que esta classe de problemas se repita, e estamos melhorando a cobertura de testes automatizados para este cenário. Nós adicionamos auto-retry e mecanismos de recuperação de modo que se uma conexão faz referência a um esquema desatualizado não afetará transações que vão adiante.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 11 Gouere 2026 da 14:33 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos investigando taxas de erro elevadas que afetam certas solicitações de API. Alguns endpoints de lista e recuperação podem retornar intermitentes 500 respostas enquanto trabalhamos para identificar a causa raiz.

2. 11 Gouere 2026 da 15:38 UTCresolved

   Identificamos e resolvemos o problema causando 500 respostas intermitentes em determinadas listas e desfechos de recuperação. Uma atualização de configuração foi implantada para evitar que as solicitações sejam prematuramente encerradas, e continuamos a monitorar o serviço.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 8 Gouere 2026 da 15:22 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly detectou um problema potencialmente resultando em desempenho degradado em transações de crédito Cybersource. Enquanto nós estamos fornecendo esta notificação precoce em um esforço para alertá-lo o mais rápido possível, nós ainda estamos investigando o escopo eo impacto real. Nós forneceremos uma atualização assim que mais detalhes estiverem disponíveis.

2. 8 Gouere 2026 da 16:08 UTCidentified

   Identificamos um erro de resolução de DNS interno transiente que ocorreu entre 15:00 e 15:05 UTC, causando 500 erros selecionados nos serviços Spreedly. Continuamos a investigar o impacto total e forneceremos informações adicionais à medida que estiver disponível.

3. 8 Gouere 2026 da 16:54 UTCresolved

   Após acompanhar de perto e confirmar que todos os sistemas estão estabilizados e funcionando como esperado, este incidente é considerado resolvido. Não se espera mais impacto do cliente. Estamos completando nossa investigação sobre as causas do incidente e qualquer impacto residual. Pedimos desculpa por qualquer inconveniente ou perturbação.

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 17 Mezheven 2026 da 14:55 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly detectou um problema potencialmente resultando em desempenho desenraizado com transações assíncronas. Enquanto estamos fornecendo uma notificação precoce em um esforço para alertá-lo o mais rápido possível, ainda estamos investigando o escopo e impacto real e forneceremos uma atualização assim que mais detalhes estiverem disponíveis. Obrigado pela vossa paciência.

2. 17 Mezheven 2026 da 15:00 UTCmonitoring

   Implementamos uma correção e estabilizamos as transações assíncronas. Nossa equipe está acompanhando a situação de perto para garantir que não haja impactos adicionais. Por favor, continue a seguir o nosso StatusPage para a última atualização.

3. 17 Mezheven 2026 da 16:03 UTCmonitoring

   Estamos a acompanhar de perto quaisquer outras questões ou impactos adicionais. Por favor, continue a seguir nosso StatusPage para as últimas atualizações.

4. 17 Mezheven 2026 da 21:42 UTCresolved

   Após um período de monitorização, confirmámos que a questão foi resolvida e que os sistemas funcionam normalmente. Se você continuar a experimentar quaisquer problemas, por favor, entre em contato com o Suporte.

5. 24 Mezheven 2026 da 20:10 UTCpostmortem

   24 de junho de 2026 — Disrupção do processamento de transações assíncronas ** Resumo de Alto Nível ** Em 17 de junho de 2026, de aproximadamente 10:02 a 10:41 AM UTC, Spreedly experimentou uma perturbação afetando transações assíncronas de gateway e fluxos de autenticação 3DS. Durante a janela de 39 minutos, aproximadamente 1.634 transações foram deixadas em estado pendente sem resultado confirmado, representando menos de 1% do volume total de transação durante esse período. * O que aconteceu * Uma implantação de código introduziu um problema de compatibilidade entre instâncias de aplicação recém-implantadas e anteriores. Durante um processo de rollback, algumas requisições foram roteadas em versões de código misto, causando falhas ao processar atualizações de status de transação assíncrona. Tipos de transações afetadas incluem transações assíncronas de gateway \(gateway específica 3DS, e outras verificações sincronias, autorizações e compras\) e autenticação global 3DS. Transações que entraram no fluxo afetado durante esta janela podem refletir um resultado indeterminado, o estado de transação em seu gateway pode diferir do que Spreedly relata. **Próximos Passos Recomendamos a revisão de transações da janela UTC 10:02-10:41 AM em 17 de junho que permanecem em estado pendente: As verificações podem ser feitas com segurança. As autorizações devem ser anuladas no portal antes de tentar novamente. Compras carregam um risco de duplicação, recomendamos reembolso antes de tentar novamente. Por favor, entre em contato com o suporte Spreedly se você precisar de assistência para identificar as transações afetadas ou determinar o caminho de remediação adequado. Estamos trabalhando ativamente para evitar esta classe de problema através de melhores salvaguardas de implantação e detecção automática de retrocesso. - A Equipa Espalhada

Traduzido automaticamente da atualização oficial do incidente.

1. 8 Mae 2026 da 18:00 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring results.

2. 8 Mae 2026 da 18:05 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19 Meurzh 2026 da 15:13 UTCidentified

   We are currently investigating performance of the Dodgeball service.

2. 19 Meurzh 2026 da 15:30 UTCidentified

   We are working to resolve an issue with delayed processing of requests to the Dodgeball services.

3. 19 Meurzh 2026 da 15:55 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the Dodgeball component that was experiencing a partial outage. We are continuing to monitor

4. 19 Meurzh 2026 da 16:07 UTCmonitoring

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

5. 19 Meurzh 2026 da 16:09 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 16 Meurzh 2026 da 17:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating elevated errors on API endpoints

2. 16 Meurzh 2026 da 17:51 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring to ensure services are operating correctly

3. 16 Meurzh 2026 da 18:07 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

4. 19 Meurzh 2026 da 19:07 UTCpostmortem

   ### Mar 18th 2026 — _Decryption Errors on API endpoints_ ### Summary Between 5:40 PM and 5:43 PM UTC on March 16, 2026, we experienced a brief issue during a key rotation that caused a small subset of API requests to fail due to decryption errors. These errors occurred within our system before any external processing took place. The issue was quickly identified, and traffic was immediately redirected to a stable environment, restoring normal service. ### What Happened At 5:36 PM UTC, we routed traffic to a newly deployed cluster of our encryption service running with the latest security keys. Shortly after, we observed decryption errors affecting a small subset of records, which resulted in some requests returning 500 error responses. We promptly redirected traffic back to the existing cluster, restoring normal operation. Further investigation determined that these records were still associated with a key in the process of rotation, and we updated them as a follow-up action to prevent the issue from recurring. ### Next Steps We have enhanced our process to ensure that a key’s usage is fully verified before it is removed from the encryption service. -The Spreedly Team

1. 26 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 16:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting customers using Dodgeball. The production database backing Dodgeball has reached critically low available storage, which is expected to result in elevated error rates. Customers may begin experiencing errors within the next 10 minutes as the system’s ability to process requests degrades. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working to restore normal capacity as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

2. 26 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 16:59 UTCmonitoring

   The engineering team has successfully resolved the storage issue affecting the Dodgeball production PostgreSQL instance. Capacity has been restored and the system is now operating normally. At this time, we are not observing any elevated error rates for customers using Dodgeball. We will continue to monitor the system closely to ensure stability. Further updates will be provided if necessary.

3. 26 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 18:44 UTCresolved

   The storage issue affecting the Dodgeball production instance has been fully resolved. Capacity has been restored and systems are operating normally. We are no longer observing elevated error rates for customers using Dodgeball. Thank you for your patience while we worked to resolve this issue.

1. 25 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 19:18 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating performance of the Dodgeball service.

2. 25 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 19:48 UTCidentified

   We are working to resolve an issue with processing of Checkpoints that is causing latency and errors for requests to the Dodgeball services.

3. 25 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 20:35 UTCmonitoring

   Service has resumed and we are monitoring for further impact. We apologize for any inconvenience this has caused

4. 25 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 21:52 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

1. 5 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 15:56 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue where credit transactions referencing Capture transactions are failing in production. Some customers may see errors when attempting to issue credits against Capture transactions. Capture transactions themselves are processing successfully. Our engineering team is actively investigating this behavior to determine the cause and confirm whether this is a regression or an unintended change. We will provide updates as soon as more information is available.

2. 5 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 16:25 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve deployed a revert to address the issue where credit transactions referencing Capture transactions were failing. We’re actively monitoring to ensure credit requests referencing Captures are processing as expected. At this time, we’re not seeing further errors related to this behavior.

3. 5 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 17:01 UTCresolved

   After monitoring the system post-deploy, we’re no longer seeing errors related to credits referencing Capture transactions, and processing has returned to normal. Thank you for your patience.

4. 10 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 17:22 UTCpostmortem

   ### February 10, 2026 — Credits Referencing Capture Transactions Failing ### ‌High Level Summary Between approximately 1:56 PM UTC and 4:15 PM UTC on February 5, 2026, credit transactions where the reference transaction was a capture failed with the error "The specified `reference_token` corresponds to a transaction which cannot be used as a reference." ### What Happened At approximately 1:56 PM UTC on February 5, 2026, Spreedly rolled out a change to support credits on the CyberSource Rest gateway. This included a change in the way we validated reference transaction types used in credits. Specifically, there was an unintended side-effect which caused captures to no longer be treated as a valid reference type for credits on gateways other than CyberSource Rest. Once this was discovered, the code was reverted at 4:01PM UTC. By 4:15 PM UTC, credit requests against captures were fully functional. ### Next Steps * Any credit attempts that failed with this error are safe to retry * We are making improvements to our code review processes and regression test suite to ensure we catch similar errors before they make it into production * We have identified a gap in our observability surrounding validation errors that we will be prioritizing ‌ -The Spreedly Team

1. 4 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 18:15 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue that is affecting multiple customers using Payflow Pro where some transactions fail with the error: “Invalid Request. Malicious string found in XML document”. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 4 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 19:52 UTCmonitoring

   We are no longer seeing errors at this time, and the issue appears to have subsided. We are working with Payflow Pro to identify the root cause. Our team continues to monitor the situation closely to ensure stability. Please continue to follow our StatusPage for the latest updates.

3. 4 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 19:56 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 27 Genver 2026 da 19:59 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue related to a dodgeball component experiencing a partial outage. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 27 Genver 2026 da 20:12 UTCresolved

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the Dodgeball component that was experiencing a partial outage. After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

1. 27 Genver 2026 da 19:08 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue potentially resulting in a high number of pending 3DS2 Global transactions. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 27 Genver 2026 da 19:25 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the 3DS2 Global transactions. Our team is monitoring the situation closely to ensure there are no additional impacts. Please continue to follow our StatusPage for the latest update.

3. 27 Genver 2026 da 19:29 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

4. 3 Cʼhwevrer 2026 da 15:38 UTCpostmortem

   ### February 3rd, 2026 — 3DS2 Global Transactions Pending ‌ Between 5:40 pm UTC and 7:24 PM UTC on January 27, 2026 the latest version of the Spreedly iFrame \(`iframe-v1`\) was configured to use version 1.180 which contained a bug related to the handling of device fingerprinting for `Sca::Authentications` in an end user's browser. As a result there was an elevated number of `Sca::Authentications` stuck in a pending flow with a `required_action` of `device_fingerprint`. These transactions were held in a pending state and never completed. Our team identified the issue and updated the version of iFrame \(`iframe-v1`\) to utilize `1.179`. ### What Happened At 5:40 pm UTC on January 27th, 2026 a new version of iFrame was released \(1.180\) and updated the version to be used in the `iframe-v1.min.js` asset to point to `1.180`. This change was meant to improve the error handling for the loading of 3rd party critical SDKs however it caused the SDK to enter a permanently error-ed state when attempting to perform device fingerprinting due to a race condition with loading the SDKs. At 7:20 pm UTC on January 27th, 2026 the change was rolled back and by 7:24 pm UTC, 2026 the `iframe-v1.min.js` asset globally was pointing to version `1.179`. ### Next Steps We have identified a gap in our observability and alerting within the iFrame service related to the managing of 3DS lifecycle flows that we will be prioritizing. -The Spreedly Team

1. 9 Genver 2026 da 18:46 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 9 Genver 2026 da 18:52 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 9 Genver 2026 da 19:07 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been deployed and we are seeing systems recover. We will continue to monitor to ensure stability and will provide further updates as needed.

4. 9 Genver 2026 da 19:10 UTCresolved

   After a period of monitoring, we have confirmed that the issue has been resolved and systems are operating normally. If you continue to experience any issues, please reach out to Support.

1. 29 Kerzu 2025 da 16:50 UTCresolved

   Between 7:00 PM EST on Saturday, December 27th, and 1:00 AM EST on Sunday, December 28th, we identified a period of higher-than-normal latency caused by a pre-planned customer event that resulted in a significant traffic spike. Although we did not observe any service failures or timeouts, our systems experienced degraded service due to the increased latency. Systems recovered quickly once peak traffic subsided and are now operating normally. We expect performance to remain stable moving forward.

1. 16 Kerzu 2025 da 21:56 UTCresolved

   Between 3:59 and 4:03 EST, customers may have experienced degraded performance when processing transactions that required 3D Secure (3DS) authentication via our Global 3DS service. Performance has since returned to normal, and no further impact has been observed. If you have any questions about potential impact to your transactions during this time window, please reach out to Spreedly Support for assistance.

2. 18 Kerzu 2025 da 21:26 UTCpostmortem

   # _December 18, 2025 — Delayed Processing of Some 3DS Global Transactions_ ‌ _A targeted update intended for Gateway-Specific 3DS processing impacted a subset of 3DS Global transactions. This caused a small number of transactions to remain in a "Pending" state rather than progressing to completion._ ### What Happened Between 08:59 PM and 09:03 PM UTC on December 16, 2025, a deployment intended to update Gateway-Specific 3DS logic inadvertently affected the processing of 3DS Global transactions. As a result, 52 transactions failed to reach a final state and remained "pending." During this 4-minute window, customers attempting a 3DS-authenticated operation would have encountered an interruption, preventing their transactions from completing. Our team identified the impact immediately and rolled back the change to restore normal service. ### Next Steps _We have successfully identified and corrected the underlying logic error within the change. We are also enhancing our automated deployment tests to better catch cross-module dependencies of this nature. We sincerely apologize for any disruption this caused to your operations._ ‌ — The Spreedly Team

1. 9 Kerzu 2025 da 15:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where roughly 30–40% of transactions are not appearing in Spreedly reporting since 12/03. Primary datastores and secondary services show no data loss, indicating the issue lies within the reporting ingestion process. Please reach out to Spreedly Support if you need assistance.

2. 10 Kerzu 2025 da 06:53 UTCinvestigating

   Our team continues to investigate the root cause of the missing transaction data appearing in Spreedly reporting. All primary datastores and transactional processing are functioning normally, and there is no indication of data loss at the source. The issue appears to be isolated to the reporting ingestion process.

3. 10 Kerzu 2025 da 14:42 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified and fixed the issue that was causing some transaction data to be missing from Spreedly reporting. Our team is now working on backfilling the missing reporting data to ensure completeness and accuracy. All primary processing systems continue to operate normally, and there is no impact to transaction processing.

4. 10 Kerzu 2025 da 20:04 UTCresolved

   Our team has completed the backfill process, and all missing transaction data has now been fully restored in Spreedly reporting. Transaction reporting is up to date and functioning as expected. All primary processing systems continued to operate normally throughout this incident, and no transaction processing impact occurred.

5. 2 Genver 2026 da 21:44 UTCpostmortem

   ### _Postmortem: January 2, 2026_ — _Transaction Reporting Degraded_ ### ‌High Level Summary Select data related to transactions did not make it into our downstream systems, causing inaccurate reports in [app.spreedly.com](http://app.spreedly.com) ### What Happened After completing system updates on December 3, 2025, approximately 30-40% of data related to transactions did not make it into our reporting tools due to a latent bug in one of our supporting applications. This caused inaccurate reports in [app.spreedly.com](http://app.spreedly.com). This did not impact any primary system functionality and no data was lost. ### Next Steps * Our team has since identified and fixed the affected application. The missing data was backfilled and subsequent data continues to flow normally * We are adding additional monitoring in order to more quickly flag discrepancies * We are continuing to make updates to simplify our data pipeline that will prevent similar issues in the future -The Spreedly Team

1. 20 Here 2025 da 15:41 UTCidentified

   The major AWS outage on October 20, 2025, has been largely resolved for most affected services, though some residual issues may persist. Spreedly’s core platform remains stable and fully available. However, due to downstream impact from the AWS outage, some of Spreedly’s indexing endpoints and callback processing are experiencing delays. This is related to dependencies on third-party systems that were affected by the outage and are still undergoing recovery. As a result, you may continue to see intermittent latency or delayed responses for API requests involving these systems. We are actively monitoring the situation as AWS and its downstream services continue recovery efforts. For ongoing updates, please refer to the AWS status page here

2. 20 Here 2025 da 20:22 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected.

3. 23 Here 2025 da 18:27 UTCpostmortem

   ### Postmortem: October 24, 2025 — _AWS outage_ Monday's AWS outage had downstream impact on some 3rd-party systems utilized by Spreedly's platform. Namely, our indexing endpoints and callbacks lagged behind due to the outage and recovery steps. ### What Happened Spreedly's 3DS global service and legacy smart routing product both faced a period of failures due to 3rd-party systems relying on AWS. ### Next Steps Spreedly will improve its response to our alerts platform, and are actively working on multi-region support slated for 2026, which should mitigate the impact of similar events going forward. -The Spreedly Team