1password driftsforstyrrelser

1. 22. juli 2026 kl. 17.55 UTCinvestigating

   SaaS Manager er i øjeblikket ude af stand til at kommunikere med Administreret Valgs. Som et resultat, kunder, der bruger Bedre Sammen funktioner kan være ude af stand til at foretage ændringer i kreditværdighed ejerskab. Vi undersøger aktivt spørgsmålet og vil levere opdateringer, efterhånden som flere oplysninger bliver tilgængelige.

2. 22. juli 2026 kl. 19.20 UTCresolved

   Et fix er blevet brugt, og dette spørgsmål er nu løst.

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1. 17. juli 2026 kl. 18.52 UTCmonitoring

   SaaS Manager kunder med aktive arbejdsgange kan have oplevet en forringelse af tjenesten, der forhindrede nogle arbejdsgange i at køre som planlagt. Vores hold identificerede hurtigt problemet og implementerede et fix. Vi overvåger nu opsvinget for at sikre, at tjenesterne fortsat bliver normale.

2. 17. juli 2026 kl. 18.57 UTCresolved

   Denne hændelse er blevet løst.

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1. 13. juli 2026 kl. 18.59 UTCinvestigating

   Vores ingeniørhold undersøger et problem, der forårsager nedbrudte brugerrelaterede operationer for individuelle og familiekonti. Brugerne kan ikke bekræfte eller slette brugere eller oprette og slette servicekonti. Brugerne er også ude af stand til at indlæse Integrations side.

2. 13. juli 2026 kl. 19.37 UTCidentified

   Problemet er blevet identificeret, og vores ingeniørhold arbejder på at implementere et fix.

3. 13. juli 2026 kl. 19.57 UTCresolved

   Et fix er blevet brugt, og dette spørgsmål er nu løst.

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1. 13. juli 2026 kl. 15.47 UTCresolved

   Der er implementeret en løsning på dette problem, og vores hold overvåger. Under udfald, GitHub Handlinger kunne have undladt at trække den seneste CLI version, der forårsager rørledningen til at mislykkes.

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1. 2. juli 2026 kl. 19.44 UTCinvestigating

   Vi er klar over en afbrydelse af Device Trust og er ved at undersøge spørgsmålet.

2. 2. juli 2026 kl. 20.05 UTCinvestigating

   Vi fortsætter med at undersøge problemet.

3. 2. juli 2026 kl. 20.12 UTCidentified

   Spørgsmålet er blevet identificeret, og et fix er ved at blive gennemført.

4. 2. juli 2026 kl. 20.30 UTCresolved

   Der er sat et fix ind, og alle tjenester er operationelle.

5. 11. juli 2026 kl. 01.05 UTCpostmortem

   "Incident Postmortem - Device Trust Authentication Outage * * hændelsesdato: * * 2026- 07- 02 * * hændelsestidspunkt\ (UTC\): * * 19: 28 - 20: 28 * * Service\ (s\) Påvirkede: * * Denne hændelse påvirket: USA / Global\ (Device Trust Authentication Service, Device Trust Control Server, Device Trust Portal, Device Trust API\) og Europa\ (Device Trust Authentication Service, Device Trust Control Server, Device Trust Portal, Device Trust API\). * * Effektvarighed: * * 1 time # # Summary Den 2. juli 2026, 1Password Device Trust oplevede et udfald, der varede omkring en time, begynder kl 19: 28 UTC. Under dette vindue var alle Device Trust-tjenester ikke tilgængelige, og brugerne var ikke i stand til at autentificere. Vi har identificeret den grundlæggende årsag: en intern konfiguration ændring til vores cloud load balancering infrastruktur blev anvendt mere bredt end planlagt, som midlertidigt gjort en krævet endpoint uopnåelig. Dette var ikke en sikkerhedshændelse og involverede ingen tredjepart. Konfigurationen er blevet rettet, tjenesten er blevet genoprettet fuldt ud, og vi har gennemført yderligere sikkerhedsforanstaltninger for at hjælpe med at forhindre denne type problemer i at gentage sig. # Indvirkning på kunder * * * Alle Device Trust tjenester var helt utilgængelige under 60-minutters udfald vinduet. Brugerne var ikke i stand til at autentificere til en enhed Trust tjeneste, herunder autentificering portal\ (* * [* auth.kolide.com * *] (http: / / auth.kolide.com) * *\), admin konsol\ (* * [* * app.kolide.com * *] (http: / / app.kolide.com) * *\), API endepunkter, og enhed server. * * * * * * Antal Berørte Kunder\ (ca.\): * * 100% af Enhedens Trust kunder * * * Geografiske regioner påvirket\ (hvis relevant\): * * USA og EU Hvad skete der? Den 2. juli 2026 blev en konfigurationsændring, der havde til formål at forbedre sikkerhedskonfigurationen af en intern tjeneste, anvendt mere bredt end planlagt, hvilket påvirkede en delt netværkskomponent, som Device Trust anvendte. Ændringen erstattede den underliggende netværksinfrastruktur, der understøtter Enhedstillid. Konfigurationen af trafikforbindelserne fortsatte imidlertid med at henvise til den tidligere infrastruktur i stedet for de nyligt leverede ressourcer. Som et resultat, Endepunkter Endepunkter Device Trust blev utilgængelig. Returnering af ændringen genoprettet forbindelse og service. * * * Tidsplan for begivenheder\ (UTC\): * * * 19: 28: Netværkskonfiguration ændring anvendes; Network Load Balancere med ansvar for routing trafik for Device Trust-tjenester blev utilgængelig * 19: 30: Automatisk overvågning registrerer udfald og udløser advarsler * 19: 33: Tilfælde er erklæret på [status.1password.com] (http: / / status.1password.com) * 20: 03: Rodårsagen er identificeret som en belastning balancer konfiguration problem * 20: 24: Belastningsbalancer genskabes med korrekt konfiguration * 20: 26 Inddrivelse bekræftes for [app.kolide.com] (http: / / app.kolide.com) * 20: 28 Inddrivelse bekræftes for [auth.kolide.com] (http: / / auth.kolide.com) * * * Bidragende faktorer\ (hvis nogen\): * * * * * Fælles komponentanvendelsesområde, der ikke kan ses under gennemgang eller validering. * * Den netværksinfrastrukturklasse, der blev påvirket af ændringen, blev delt på tværs af flere tjenester, men denne afhængighed blev ikke dokumenteret eller dukket op i ændringsrevisionsprocessen. Som følge heraf omfattede præ-produktionsvalideringen, mens den blev udført i et lavere miljø før produktionsudrulningen, ikke alle afhængige tjenester, og påvirkningen af Enheden Trust blev ikke identificeret, før ændringen nåede frem til produktionen. * * * Samtidige diagnostiske signaler bremsede root årsag identifikation. * * På det tidspunkt, den udfald begyndte, ikke-relaterede certifikat fornyelse fejl dukkede op sammen med netværksforbindelse fiasko. Undersøger begge signaler samtidig forsinket identifikation af netværkskonfigurationsændringen som den grundlæggende årsag. Hvordan blev det løst? * * * Opløsning trin: * * Når kilden til udfald blev identificeret, ingeniører vendt den konfiguration ændring. Den berørte netværksinfrastruktur blev genskabt med sin oprindelige, offentligt tilgængelige konfiguration, genoprette routing til alle Endepunkter for EnhedsTrust. Service opsving blev bekræftet sekventielt på tværs af berørte tjenester, før hændelsen blev lukket. * * * Kontrol af resolution: * * Efter tilbagekomsten, ingeniører bekræftede, at alle Endepunkter Endepunkter til Enhedskonfiguration var tilgængelig og acceptere trafik. Kundebekræftelse af opløsning blev efterfølgende modtaget via supportholdet. # Hvad vi gør for at forhindre fremtidige hændelser * * * Kræv udtrykkelig godkendelse af destruktive infrastrukturændringer. * * Vi gennemfører sikkerhedsforanstaltninger, der kræver manuel gennemgang og godkendelse, før ændringer, der vil ødelægge og genskabe kritisk netværksinfrastruktur, kan anvendes. Dette skaber en tvangsfunktion til at fange utilsigtet omfang, før ændringer når frem til produktion. * * * Forbedre mulighederne for fælles infrastrukturkomponenter. * * Vi dokumenterer afhængigheden mellem delte infrastrukturkomponenter og de tjenester, der er afhængige af dem, og integrerer disse oplysninger i vores ændringsproces. Fremtidige ændringer af fælles komponenter vil kræve en udtrykkelig vurdering af downstream-effekten før ibrugtagning. * * * Styrke validering forud for produktion på tværs af fælles afhængigheder. * * Vi opdaterer vores ændringsfremmende proces for at kræve validering mod alle tjenester, der deler berørte komponenter - ikke kun det tilsigtede mål - før ændringer fremmes til produktion. * * * Reducer enkeltpunkter for svigt i trafikruten. * * Vi evaluerer arkitektoniske ændringer for at indføre redundans i Device Trust 's trafik routing konfiguration, så en fejl i en enkelt komponent resulterer i forringet service snarere end en komplet udfald. # Next Steps and Communication * Der kræves ingen handling fra vores kunder på dette tidspunkt. Vi er forpligtet til at yde en pålidelig og stabil service, og vi tager de nødvendige skridt til at lære af denne begivenhed og forhindre, at det sker igen. Tak for din forståelse. Med venlig hilsen, 1Password Team

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1. 29. juni 2026 kl. 22.08 UTCinvestigating

   Brugere, der forsøger at acceptere deres invitation med SSO håndhævelse er ude af stand til at acceptere invitationen og modtage en 403 fejl. Vores ingeniørhold undersøger sagen aktivt.

2. 29. juni 2026 kl. 22.55 UTCidentified

   Problemet er blevet identificeret, og vores ingeniørhold arbejder på at implementere et fix.

3. 29. juni 2026 kl. 23.40 UTCidentified

   Vores ingeniørhold fortsætter arbejdet med at implementere et fix for dette spørgsmål. I mellemtiden er der fundet en løsning. Kontakt venligst vores support team direkte på support @ 1password.com og de vil støtte dig gennem workout trin.

4. 30. juni 2026 kl. 14.09 UTCresolved

   Denne hændelse er blevet løst.

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1. 24. juni 2026 kl. 17.15 UTCinvestigating

   Nogle brugere, der er låst ude af deres 1Password-konto støder på en "noget gik galt" fejl, når du forsøger at gendanne adgang ved hjælp af en recovery kode. Vores udviklingsteam er klar over problemet og undersøger aktivt årsagen. Vi vil levere opdateringer, efterhånden som flere oplysninger bliver tilgængelige.

2. 24. juni 2026 kl. 17.30 UTCinvestigating

   Vores hold fortsætter med at undersøge dette spørgsmål. Vi arbejder aktivt på at bestemme årsagen og vil dele yderligere opdateringer, efterhånden som de bliver tilgængelige.

3. 24. juni 2026 kl. 17.50 UTCinvestigating

   Spørgsmålet er stadig under undersøgelse. Vi vil fortsætte med at dele opdateringer, når de bliver tilgængelige.

4. 24. juni 2026 kl. 18.32 UTCinvestigating

   Undersøgelsen er i gang. Vores hold arbejder aktivt på at bestemme årsagen og vil dele opdateringer, efterhånden som de bliver tilgængelige.

5. 24. juni 2026 kl. 18.35 UTCidentified

   Spørgsmålet er blevet identificeret, og et fix er ved at blive gennemført.

6. 24. juni 2026 kl. 18.51 UTCmonitoring

   Et fix er blevet gennemført, og vi overvåger resultaterne.

7. 24. juni 2026 kl. 19.01 UTCresolved

   Problemet er nu løst, og adgang til 1Password-tjenester bør være fuldt genoprettet.

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1. 18. juni 2026 kl. 17.54 UTCidentified

   We have identified the cause of the synchronization issues affecting legacy 1Password 7 clients (OPI7 and OPM7) with 1Password and are deploying a fix. Affected customers may experience item creations or updates not synchronizing to 1Password, in some cases without a visible error. We expect service to be restored shortly and will provide another update once the fix has been fully deployed and verified. Modern clients and broader 1Password functionality do not appear to be affected.

2. 18. juni 2026 kl. 18.50 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 16. juni 2026 kl. 16.24 UTCidentified

   Sign in attempt audit events are currently delayed and admins are unable to migrate to hosted provisioning. Our engineering team has identified the issue and are actively working on a fix.

2. 16. juni 2026 kl. 16.58 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been deployed and we are now monitoring the results.

3. 16. juni 2026 kl. 21.11 UTCmonitoring

   We are still monitoring the results of the deployed fix. Hosted provisioning issues are resolved. Audit events in some regions are caught up while others are still in progress.

4. 17. juni 2026 kl. 16.00 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 11. juni 2026 kl. 21.49 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting the Device Trust Authentication Service. Customers may experience timeouts or receive 503 responses when attempting to authenticate with Device Trust. Our team is actively working to identify the cause and restore normal service as quickly as possible.

2. 11. juni 2026 kl. 22.02 UTCinvestigating

   Our teams continue to investigate the cause of timeout errors affecting the Device Trust Authentication Service.

3. 11. juni 2026 kl. 22.17 UTCinvestigating

   Our teams continue to investigate the cause of timeout errors affecting the Device Trust Authentication Service. Customers may experience authentication failures, timeouts, or 503 errors when attempting to authenticate with Device Trust. At this time, there is no significant change in impact or scope to report. Investigation and mitigation efforts remain ongoing, and we will provide another update as soon as additional information becomes available.

4. 11. juni 2026 kl. 22.32 UTCinvestigating

   Authentication services have recovered, and our teams continue to investigate the cause of timeout errors affecting the Device Trust Authentication Service. Investigation and mitigation efforts remain ongoing, and we will provide another update as soon as additional information becomes available.

5. 11. juni 2026 kl. 22.47 UTCmonitoring

   Our teams have identified a cause of the issues affecting the Device Trust Authentication Service and have taken steps to provide relief. We are seeing improved service performance and are continuing to monitor the situation closely to ensure stability. We will provide further updates as needed.

6. 12. juni 2026 kl. 23.18 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 16. maj 2026 kl. 15.51 UTCinvestigating

   Files can not be uploaded or downloaded, and images may not be loading properly. Pages within the application may not be loading. Some integrations and workflows may have experienced errors. This issue affects the US and EU regions. Our engineering team is currently investigating.

2. 16. maj 2026 kl. 17.33 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified, and our engineers are working on a fix.

3. 16. maj 2026 kl. 17.46 UTCmonitoring

   Issues with file uploads and downloads, pages not loading, and errors affecting some integrations and workflows are now resolved. Customers may still experience issues with images loading properly, and our engineering team is actively working to resolve them. We expect further progress and resolution later today. The issue affected both the US and EU regions.

4. 16. maj 2026 kl. 20.36 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 4. maj 2026 kl. 17.59 UTCidentified

   Workflows and integrations have not run as of approximately 12:30pm ET today, this means that automatic onboarding and off-boarding are currently not occurring. In addition, the Workflows and Integrations pages are failing to load. Our Engineering team has identified the issue and are currently working on a fix.

2. 4. maj 2026 kl. 18.27 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are now monitoring the results. Failed workflows will need to be manually re-run, failed integrations will re-run automatically within 24 hours but likely sooner.

3. 4. maj 2026 kl. 18.34 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 27. april 2026 kl. 14.54 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue causing errors and increased latency across our services. Customers may experience failures or delays when logging in and syncing, including via CLI.

2. 27. april 2026 kl. 15.08 UTCinvestigating

   Our teams continue to investigate an issue causing errors and increased latency across our services. Customers may experience failures or delays when logging in and syncing, including via CLI. We are actively working to identify the root cause and will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

3. 27. april 2026 kl. 15.22 UTCidentified

   We are seeing signs of recovery for the issue causing errors and increased latency across our services. Some customers may still experience intermittent failures or delays when logging in and syncing, including via CLI. Our teams continue to monitor the situation closely.

4. 27. april 2026 kl. 15.41 UTCmonitoring

   Service has largely recovered, and we are continuing to monitor the situation closely. Some customers may still experience intermittent issues with login and syncing, including via CLI.

5. 27. april 2026 kl. 17.09 UTCmonitoring

   Traffic levels have returned to normal and service performance has stabilized. We are continuing to monitor to ensure full recovery.

6. 28. april 2026 kl. 18.00 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

7. 12. maj 2026 kl. 15.38 UTCpostmortem

   # Incident Postmortem - Login and Sync Issues **Date of Incident:** 2026-04-27 **Time of Incident \(UTC\):** 14:15 - 15:41 **Service\(s\) Affected:** All web APIs **Impact Duration:** Approximately 86 minutes ## Summary On April 27, 2026, [1Password.com](http://1password.com/) experienced a period of elevated error and full service unavailability in our USA/Global region. A defect deployed in application scaling logic caused a cascading failure during peak usage. This resulted in a period of service unavailability for customers in the USA/Global region. This was not a security incident, and there was no loss of data. ## Impact on Customers * **Sign-in and account access:** Customers in the USA/Global region experienced errors or were unable to sign in or access their 1Password accounts between approximately 14:15 and 15:41 UTC on April 27, 2026. * **All 1Password clients:** The disruption applied to all client types, including the web app, CLI, browser extensions, and desktop and mobile applications, for customers connecting through the USA/Global region. * **Geographic regions affected:** Only customers on the USA/Global region were affected. Other regions were not impacted. ## What Happened? We deployed a change to how our services signal their readiness to serve requests, which contained a latent defect. * **Timeline of events:** * **2026-04-27 14:15 UTC** - Load increase triggers issues. * **2026-04-27 14:29 UTC** - Incident declared; response team mobilized. * **2026-04-27 15:41 UTC** - Issue identified and fix deployed. * **2026-04-28 18:06 UTC** - Incident formally resolved following monitoring. ## How Was It Resolved? Our on-call engineering team identified the scaling logic as the cause of the cascading failure and disabled it via a configuration change. Once disabled, capacity was restored, and traffic recovered. A subsequent configuration change was made to prevent this logic from being re-enabled in production environments. ## What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents * **Immediate fix:** We disabled the defective health check logic and locked the configuration to prevent it from being re-enabled in production. * **Retrospective:** We are conducting a full retrospective with the incident responders to identify further improvements to our systems and our response processes. ## Next Steps and Communication * No action is required from our customers at this time. We are committed to providing a reliable and stable service, and we are taking the necessary steps to learn from this event and prevent it from happening again. Thank you for your patience and understanding. Sincerely, The 1Password Team

1. 22. april 2026 kl. 15.18 UTCinvestigating

   We’re aware of an issue affecting sign-in to 1Password SaaS Manager. Our teams are actively investigating and working to resolve this as quickly as possible.

2. 22. april 2026 kl. 15.27 UTCmonitoring

   The issue affecting sign-in to 1Password SaaS Manager has been mitigated. Our teams are continuing to monitor the situation to ensure stability.

3. 22. april 2026 kl. 16.06 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 14. april 2026 kl. 17.25 UTCinvestigating

   The 1Password Hosted Service in the US is experiencing high latency and errors. The response team is currently investigating.

2. 14. april 2026 kl. 17.46 UTCinvestigating

   The 1Password engineering team is investigating an issue where customers may be unable to sign in to 1Password. This issue may also prevent changes from syncing between 1Password clients. This issue impacts the 1Password.com (US) service.

3. 14. april 2026 kl. 18.00 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 15. april 2026 kl. 01.54 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved. We will publish a postmortem as soon as one is completed.

5. 6. maj 2026 kl. 15.31 UTCpostmortem

   # 2026-04-14 SEV1 Incident Postmortem - Hosted Service in the US experiencing high latency and errors # Incident Postmortem - Elevated Application Error **Date of Incident:** 2026-04-14 **Time of Incident \(UTC\):** 17:25 - 18:00 **Service\(s\) Affected:** Sign in, Admin console **Impact Duration:** Approximately 35 minutes ## Summary On April 14, 2026, [1Password.com](http://1Password.com) experienced elevated error rates due to an increase in traffic to our USA/Global infrastructure. Requests arrived more quickly than they could be serviced in our USA/global region. Customers experienced errors and high latency. This was not a security incident, and there was no loss of data. ## Impact on Customers * **Sign-in and account access:** Some customers in the USA/Global region experienced errors when attempting to sign in or access their 1Password accounts between 17:25 and 18:00 UTC on April 14, 2026. * **All 1Password clients:** The disruption applied to all client types, including the web app, browser extensions, and desktop and mobile applications, for customers connecting through the USA/Global region. * **Number of affected requests:** Approximately 2.95% of requests over the incident window to [1Password.com](http://1Password.com) \(USA/Global\) during the incident window resulted in errors or timeouts, though for some brief spikes up to 45% of requests failed. * **Geographic regions affected:** Customers on our USA/Global only, other regions were not affected. ## What Happened? An unusually high volume of traffic exceeded the capacity of our controls, and triggered latency and errors in the underlying applications. * **Timeline of events:** * **2026-04-14 17:25** - Start of incident. * **2026-04-14 17:36** - Issue identified. * **2026-04-14 17:51** - Fix implemented. * **2026-04-14 18:01** - Recovery complete. * **Root cause analysis:** An increase in traffic exceeded the capacity of our traffic management layer, causing degraded service for customers in the USA/Global region. ## How Was It Resolved? * Established runbooks for load shedding and system upgrades mitigated the issue. ## What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents * **Resolution:** We made two key changes to prevent recurrence: 1. **Increased capacity of internal systems** 2. **Upgraded traffic controls at the network edge** * **Verification:** Since implementing these changes, we have observed several additional instances of unusually high traffic matching this incident. In each case, the new controls handled the traffic automatically with no impact to customers or our systems. ## Next Steps and Communication * No action is required from our customers at this time. We are committed to providing a reliable and stable service, and we are taking the necessary steps to learn from this event and prevent it from happening again. Thank you for your understanding. Sincerely, The 1Password Team

1. 13. april 2026 kl. 17.24 UTCmonitoring

   SSO is experiencing degraded functionality because of an upstream provider. We are monitoring, and users may need to retry when authenticating with their IdP.

2. 17. april 2026 kl. 15.07 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

3. 22. april 2026 kl. 15.17 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 1. april 2026 kl. 14.13 UTCidentified

   Teams accounts are currently unable to access their Environments. Our engineering team has identified the issue and are working towards deploying a fix.

2. 1. april 2026 kl. 17.52 UTCmonitoring

   Our engineering team has deployed a fix and we are monitoring the results.

3. 2. april 2026 kl. 14.23 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 31. marts 2026 kl. 21.28 UTCinvestigating

   Users with Individual and Family accounts are currently unable to access their Environments. The impact is scoped to individual account holders and family account users. Our engineering team is actively investigating.

2. 31. marts 2026 kl. 22.01 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and our engineering team are working towards deploying a fix.

3. 1. april 2026 kl. 00.43 UTCresolved

   A fix has been deployed and this issue is now resolved.

1. 16. marts 2026 kl. 17.11 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is investigating an issue where features have been turned off for some customers.

2. 16. marts 2026 kl. 17.26 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 16. marts 2026 kl. 17.43 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 12. marts 2026 kl. 17.53 UTCresolved

   Users were unable to retrieve documents across multiple platforms. This included degraded performance or failures when attempting to access documents via the CLI as well as through other interfaces.