58 Cloudamqp incidents · december 2024 — official updates, affected components, duration and resolution details.
We're investigating connectivity issues affecting some servers in Azure West Europe. We'll post an update as soon as we know more.
Connectivity to servers in southeast Asia has been restored.
Vi undersøger problemer med forbindelse, der påvirker nogle servere i Google europe- west2. Vi sender en opdatering, så snart vi ved mere.
Vi fortsætter med at undersøge dette spørgsmål.
Hændelse er begrænset til servere i europe- west2- b
GCE er stadig rapportering spørgsmål, men vi ser nogle API opkald lykkes.
GCE har bekræftet, at en strømafbrydelse i Europa-west2- b forårsagede afbrydelsen. Strømproblemet er blevet mindsket, og fuld inddrivelse af berørte arbejdsbyrder forventes forsigtigt ved 13: 00 UTC i dag. Vi fortsætter med at overvåge opsvinget.
Vi fortsætter med at overvåge for yderligere spørgsmål.
Denne hændelse er blevet løst.
Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.
Vi undersøger konnektivitetsspørgsmål, der påvirker nogle servere i Azure West Europe. Vi sender en opdatering, så snart vi ved mere.
Azure er klar over dette spørgsmål og er aktivt ved at undersøge. Vi sender en ny opdatering, så snart vi ved mere.
Azure har identificeret dette problem. De har indsnævret spørgsmålet om adgang til oplagring i regionen. Deres hold udfører aktivt genopretningsaktioner på den berørte infrastruktur og fortsætter med at undersøge den underliggende årsag. Vi overvåger fremskridt i inddrivelsen og arbejder på at genoprette de berørte ressourcer.
Vi har kunnet etablere kommunikation med tilfælde i Azure Vesteuropa. Flertallet af tilfældene er i gang igen. Azure har stadig nogle VM 'er at løse.
Alle CloudAMQP tilfælde er i gang i Azure Vesteuropa.
* * Oversigt * * CloudAMQP mistede forbindelse med en delmængde klynger i Azure West Europe tilgængelighed zone 2 den 9. oktober. Single node klynger i AZ2 var mest påvirket af hændelsen. Name * * Indvirkning * * Kunderne var ude af stand til at få adgang til data eller mange knuder påvirket under hændelsen. Tidsplan for begivenhederne fra Azure. * 12: 25 UTC den 09 oktober 2026 - Vi identificerede dette problem via vores interne service overvågning advarsler. * 12: 29 UTC den 09 oktober 2026 - Kundepåvirkning begyndte, med VM disk fejl opdaget i den berørte West Europe storage skala enhed. * 2: 30 UTC den 09 oktober 2026 - Undersøgelsen identificerede tab af hjerteslag på tværs af flere lagerknudepunkter og fejldomæner, hvilket resulterer i lagerskalaenheden til at gå i nød tilstand. * 15: 32 UTC den 09 oktober 2026 - Vi tog storage skala enhed ud af nød tilstand, isolere diske på de ramte lagerservere for at muliggøre inddrivelse af de resterende diske. På dette tidspunkt begyndte de fleste af de berørte kunder at se bedring. * 21: 00 UTC den 09 oktober 2026 - Datacenter og Storage ingeniører fortsatte gennemførelsen af genopretningsplanen på flere lagerknudepunkter. * 23: 27 UTC den 09 oktober 2026 - Bestræbelser på at inddrive de berørte lagerknuder var vellykket, og arbejde på at inddrive de virtuelle diske fortsatte. De efterfølgende inddrivelsesforanstaltninger omfattede genanvendelse på nodeniveau og genopretning af berørte lagerressourcer. * 03: 00 UTC den 10 oktober 2026 - Service funktionalitet genvundet, og kundens indvirkning blev mindsket. * * Rodårsag * * Azure oplevede en platform problem resulterede i en indvirkning på Azure Virtual Machines lagerdiske i Vesteuropa region AZ 2. Imponerede kunder kan have oplevet konnektivitet fejl, uventede genstarter, eller Virtual Machines ind i en mislykket tilstand i regionen. Name * * Opløsning * * Machine adgang blev genoprettet af Azure i omkring 3 timer. CloudAMQP var i stand til at genoprette kommunikationen med de ramte knuder. Vi fortsatte med at overvåge opdateringer fra Azure for at sikre noder ikke længere var påvirket.
Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.
Vi ser nedbrudt netværksforbindelse mellem nogle ikke-Azure netværk og Azure UAE North (azure- arm:: uaenorth), forårsaget af en routing problem på en opstrøms transit udbyder. Alle servere i regionen er op og behandle beskeder, og overvågning, målinger og logfiler fungerer som normalt. Kunder, hvis kunder forbinder fra netværk, der er berørt af denne routing problem kan også se forbindelse timeouts. Vi har rapporteret problemet til udbyderen og er at routere vores egen management trafik omkring det.
Routing er normal igen.
Denne hændelse er blevet løst.
Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.
Vi undersøger i øjeblikket dette spørgsmål.
Spørgsmålet er blevet identificeret, og et fix er ved at blive gennemført.
Et fix er blevet gennemført, og vi overvåger resultaterne.
Denne hændelse er blevet løst.
Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.
DigitalOcean oplever i øjeblikket problemer med sin API og kontrolpanel, og du kan løbe ind i fejl og højere latency, mens problemet fortsætter
Denne hændelse er blevet løst.
Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.
Vi har modtaget forskellige advarsler om, at et par servere på Azure West US ikke kan nås. Dette synes tilsyneladende at være relateret specifikt til denne region påvirker 25% af serverne.
Microsoft Azure bekræftede, at de havde netværksproblemer på West US-regionen. De fleste servere er operationelle. Vi holder øje i de følgende timer.
Denne hændelse er blevet løst.
Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.
We are currently investigating this issue.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
**Summary** Between June 25 and June 26, our monitoring system incorrectly reported some dedicated servers as unreachable and sent "server down" notifications for servers that were in fact operating normally. This was a monitoring-side issue only — no customer servers or services were actually down, and no data or message delivery was affected. **Impact** Affected customers received one or more alerts indicating their dedicated server was down. These alerts were false positives. The servers themselves remained healthy and fully available throughout the incident. **Root cause** Before connecting to a server, our monitoring system performs a network authorization step. A defect in how one component handled a transient network hiccup could leave a monitoring process unable to complete that step, after which it failed to connect to the servers it was responsible for checking. The servers themselves stayed healthy and available throughout — the monitoring process had simply lost its ability to reach them, and reported them as down. **Resolution** We identified the affected monitoring processes, confirmed the root cause in production, and deployed a fix that makes this authorization step resilient to such transient failures and able to recover automatically. After deploying, we monitored the system to confirm that notifications returned to normal. We apologize for the confusion these false notifications may have caused.
Between 17:30 and 20:00 UTC on 2026-05-30, our server monitoring system generated a large number of false "server_unreachable" alerts. Clusters were operational and healthy throughout this period — no customer data or message delivery was affected. The alerts were caused by a rolling restart of our monitoring service, during which individual monitoring workers went offline mid-cycle and lost state. This caused the workers to report connection timeouts for servers they could no longer reach — even though those servers were fully healthy. We apologize for any concern this may have caused.
This incident has been resolved.
We are investigating connectivity issues affecting some CloudAMQP instances in Azure West Europe. Affected instances may see connection failures or unexpected restarts. The root cause is an ongoing Microsoft Azure platform incident in the West Europe region (started 14:31 UTC, 23 May 2026). Microsoft is investigating.
Resolved — Microsoft has confirmed that the Azure West Europe Virtual Machines incident is resolved. The impact window was 14:09–14:13 UTC on 23 May 2026, during which a limited number of customers may have experienced connection failures or unexpected Virtual Machine restarts. The Azure environment self-healed and the service has been confirmed restored. Affected CloudAMQP instances should now be operating normally.
Since around 8pm UTC last night, some metrics are not being forwarded to legacy integration. Prometheus integrations not affected. We are investingating.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
# Legacy host metrics integrations degraded Incident window: 2026-05-21 18:37 UTC – 2026-05-22 04:05 UTC \(9h 28m\) Affected service: Legacy metric integrations \(CloudWatch, Datadog, Librato, New Relic, Splunk, Stackdriver\). Host metrics affected, not broker metrics, nor was internal monitoring or console graphs. ## Summary For ~9.5 hours, the service that collects host-level metrics \(CPU, memory, disk, network\) for legacy third-party integrations entered a crash loop and stopped shipping data. ## Root Cause An internal credential-signing service was migrated to a new container runtime the afternoon before. Due to a bug with environment variables the collector could not renew it's credentials. The collector's existing credential remained valid for several hours, so the failure only surfaced when it tried to renew. ## Resolution On-call staff detected the failure early morning, developers helped restore the service and collector recovered at 04:05 UTC. ## Prevention * All services, both signing and collector report failed authentication attempts earlier and with higher severity * Metrics pipeline alarm thresholds was tightened so a similar drop in data triggers alarms faster.
We are currently experiencing issues with our backend services handling account and server creation. This does not affect any running customer servers but might delay provisioning new servers.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently experiencing issues with our backend services handling account and server creation. This does not affect any running customer servers but might delay provisioning new servers.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
Still seeing slow requests, doing another investigation.
Looks like we're back at full performance now.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently investigating this issue.
Servers in Azure West Europe can experience connection issues due to underlying issues at provider. Latest update from Azure "Current Status: We continue to investigate an availability issue caused by a subset of unhealthy backend storage infrastructure supporting Azure Virtual Machines and Azure Direct Drive in West Europe."
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently experiencing issues with our backend services handling account and server creation. This does not affect any running customer servers but might delay provisioning new servers.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
We had an abnormal increase in traffic causing timeouts and slow responses for customer.cloudamqp.com, we increased capacity and are back to normal. This did not affect any running clusters, just provisioning and configuration updates.
We are getting indications of instances being down in Azure region westus. We are investigating the issue.
This incident has been resolved.
Servers in Azure West US 3 can experience connection issues due to underlying issues at provider. We monitor and will update when we know more.
This incident has been resolved.
There appears to be an issue regarding sending metrics to all Legacy metrics integrations. Alarms based on broker metrics also got affected. We are currently investigating the issue Prometheus based metrics (Datadog v3 etc) not affected.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
Broker metrics and metrics integrations degradation Window: 2026-04-23 03:25 – 05:35 UTC \(2h 10m\) ## Impact Broker metrics \(connections, channels, queues, consumers, message rates, node and netsplit state\) were degraded, progressively dropping until recovery at 05:35 UTC. Downstream effects: * Queue, Consumer, Connection, Channel, Connection flow, and Netsplit alarms: threshold breaches during the window may not have triggered, or triggered late. Alarms already tripped before 03:25 UTC kept their state. * Metrics Integrations \(Datadog, CloudWatch, New Relic, Splunk, Dynatrace, etc.\): delivery of broker metrics was reduced for the duration of the window. Alarms configured on the receiving side may likewise have missed or lagged. Not affected: server metrics \(CPU, memory, disk\) and their corresponding alarms, Notice alarms, broker availability, and the metric graphs shown in the CloudAMQP console \(these use a separate data path and continued to update normally\). ## Timeline \(UTC\) * 03:25 — broker-metrics collection begins degrading * 03:35 — ~30% of broker-metric samples missing * 03:50 — ~50% plateau * 05:25 — collector workers cycled and re-initialised * 05:35 — full throughput restored ## Root cause Broker metrics are polled from each cluster's management HTTP API by a pool of collector workers and published to an internal message bus that both the Alarms service and Metrics Integrations consume from. At 03:25 UTC this service became unresponsive without raising an error. Affected workers silently stopped polling while remaining alive to the platform, so automatic restart did not trigger. On-call staff began investigating around 05:00 UTC; force-restarting the service restored metric flow. The exact trigger has not been identified. Our focus is on ensuring the condition is detected and handled promptly if it recurs. ## What we are changing * Added metrics and alarms specific to this service, with high-urgency paging for on-call. * Reliability improvements in the service itself to detect and restart stalled work. ## What you can do CloudAMQP offers a new generation of metrics integrations based on Prometheus, with a re-engineered pipeline that does not rely on these centralised services — each server forwards data directly to your endpoint. These have been running in production for some time and have proved very reliable. * [https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/prometheus-metrics-integrations.html](https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/prometheus-metrics-integrations.html) * [https://www.cloudamqp.com/docs/monitoring\_metrics\_datadog\_v3.html](https://www.cloudamqp.com/docs/monitoring_metrics_datadog_v3.html) * Background: [https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/decentralized-observability-with-open-telemetry-part-1.html](https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/decentralized-observability-with-open-telemetry-part-1.html)
One of our backend components suffered a small outage due to an unexpected full services restart. Connectivity with the servers were broken and service triggered alarms for many clusters. We apologize for the inconvenience. All clusters were operational and healthy within the incident/alarms timespan.
Customers are experiencing Management UI being unavailable with 502 Bad Gateway. Timeline: - 14:16 UTC -> The issue was identified - 14:30 UTC -> Recent code changes were reverted. No relationship with incident noted.
The Management UI and brokers are serving traffic normally. You can still use the Management UI by using the Broker URL and properly typing User and Password. The impact is related to our backend service logs into Management UI via CloudAMQP SSO.
We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.
The Management UI SSO shortcut is back to service. Impacted Clusters: All customers with clusters created more than 6 months ago Cause: Some code changes unexpectedly changed the communication schema between our backend services and the SSO component on the clusters. The proxy configuration conflicted with those changes causing the 502 Bad Gateway error to show up. Impact: Only the SSO via CloudAMQP Console was impacted given it required communication with our backend components. The AMQP Clusters were healthy and servicing traffic via both AMQP and HTTP on Management UI and API. Logging into the Management UI via Credentials and all Authentications Backends was functioning normally.
