Confluence driftsforstyrrelser

1. 1. oktober 2026 kl. 02.55 UTCinvestigating

   Jobbehandling og jobplanlægning er nedbrudt, hvilket påvirker planmæssigt og asynkron arbejde på tværs af flere produkter, herunder Jira, Confluence og Bitbuck Cloud. Berørte brugere kan se forsinket eller manglende jobudførelse, herunder forsinket e- mail- to- billet behandling og skemaer, der ikke kører som forventet.

2. 1. oktober 2026 kl. 03.47 UTCidentified

   Vores hold har identificeret årsagen til denne hændelse og arbejder nu aktivt på at mildne problemet. Vi vil levere yderligere opdateringer inden for en time eller før, hvis vi har nogen væsentlige fremskridt at dele.

3. 1. oktober 2026 kl. 04.03 UTCidentified

   Vores hold har taget korrigerende skridt for at mindske problemet og observerer nogle forbedringer. Vi fortsætter med at overvåge situationen og vil træffe de nødvendige foranstaltninger, indtil hændelsen er fuldt ud genvundet.

4. 1. oktober 2026 kl. 05.00 UTCidentified

   Vores hold fortsætter med at arbejde på helbredelse indtil hændelsen er helt løst. Vi vil give yderligere opdateringer, hvis vi har betydelige fremskridt at dele. Sammen med virkningen til planlagt og asynkron arbejde på tværs af flere produkter, vi også identificeret SLA komponent i Jira Service Management vises ikke som forventet.

5. 1. oktober 2026 kl. 07.01 UTCidentified

   Vores hold fortsætter med at arbejde på helbredelse indtil hændelsen er helt løst. Vi vil give yderligere opdateringer, hvis vi har betydelige fremskridt at dele. Der er også en indvirkning på de nye supportbilletter skabt i form af manglende SLA-komponent, meddelelser, der kan påvirke svartider og backlog forvaltning af nogle billetter.

6. 1. oktober 2026 kl. 07.51 UTCresolved

   Den 01. okt 2026, mellem 01: 00 UTC og 07: 25 UTC, brugere kan have set manglende job udførelse, herunder forsinket email-to-billet behandling og skemaer, der ikke kører som forventet. Vi har nu implementeret et fix og tjenester er blevet genoprettet til normal drift for berørte kunder. Virkningen af at støtte billetter med manglende SLA-komponent og forsinkede anmeldelser har også bekræftet inddrivelse. Bemærk: For Bitskovl kunder, hvis der var nogen planlagte rørledninger, der ikke kørte under hændelsesvinduet, kan du vente på den næste planlagte udførelse eller udløse dem manuelt.

7. 9. oktober 2026 kl. 18.24 UTCpostmortem

   # # # Oversigt Den 1. oktober 2026, mellem 01: 00 og 07: 25 UTC, nedbrudt job forarbejdning og planlægning påvirket Atlantisk produkter, herunder Bitbuck Cloud, Confluence, Forge apps, Jira, og Jira Service Management i alle kommercielle cloud-regioner. Dette forårsagede forsinkede eller manglende baggrundsopgaver, såsom e- mail- to- ticket behandling og planlagte rørledninger; interaktiv produktbrug blev ikke påvirket. Arrangementet blev udløst, da en uventet mængde af planlagte opgaver blev forfaldet samtidig, overvældende vores fælles job planlægning platform. Automatisk overvågning opdagede hændelsen inden for tre minutter. Inddrivelse begyndte omkring 03: 45 UTC som ingeniør skaleret kapacitet og platformen arbejdede gennem backlog, med fuld opløsning nået i 6 timer og 25 minutter. # # IMPACT De fleste planlagte opgaver stoppede kl 01: 00 UTC og genoptaget fra omkring 03: 45 UTC. De fleste forsinkede arbejder havde indhentet omkring 06: 00 UTC, og de resterende forsinkelser havde ryddet af 07: 25 UTC. på tværs af berørte produkter: - Gendannelse af planlagte opgaver sprang over eller forsinkede kørsler skyldes i løbet af hændelsen; skippede kørsler blev ikke automatisk re- køre, og opgaver genoptages på deres næste planlagte tidspunkt. - De fleste engangs planlagte opgaver løb for sent; et lille antal kan ikke have kørt. - Automation regler, herunder planlagte regler, kørte normalt, undtagen som nævnt nedenfor. Bitskovl Cloud Planlagte rørledninger til mellem 01: 00 og ca. 03: 50 UTC ikke køre. Hvis en planlagt rørledning ikke kørte under hændelsen, kan du vente på den næste planlagte udførelse eller udløse den manuelt. Andre rørledninger blev ikke påvirket. Sammenhæng Nogle kalender begivenhed påmindelser skyldes mellem 01: 00 og omkring 03: 45 UTC blev ikke sendt. Forge- apps Skemalagte udløsere stoppet kl 01: 00 UTC og genoptaget fra omkring 04: 00 UTC; mistede invasioner blev ikke spillet igen. Mål Start af måneden e-mail påmindelser om at opdatere mål kunne blive forsinket. Jira og Jira Service Management Indkommende e-mails opholdt sig i deres postkasser og blev behandlet automatisk efter inddrivelse. Planlagte meddelelser, såsom filterabonnementer, blev forsinket. I nogle serviceprojekter, automatisering regler og meddelelser udløst af SLA 'er eller tid i status løb sent. SLA timdata forblev intakte. Atlantisk støtte Indtil 07: 25 UTC kan problemer med vores supportværktøjer have bremset nogle af vores svar. Baseret på vores undersøgelse til dato, har vi ikke identificeret tab af arbejde poster, sider, datalagre, eller indgående e-mails. # # ROOT CAUSE Vores fælles jobplanlægningsplatform fungerer i høj skala under normale forhold. En af platformens forbrugere planlagt en unormalt høj mængde af opgaver, der skal udføres på samme tid den 1. oktober kl 01: 00 UTC. Denne stigning i ordrestørrelsen oversteg vores arkitektoniske og skaleringsmæssige grænser, hvilket skaber en efterslæb på tværs af afhængige tjenester. Engineering manuelt øget kapacitet til at håndtere den unormale belastning, hvilket gør det muligt for tjenesten at behandle backlog og vende tilbage til normale operationer. # # # REMEDIALE AKTIONER PLAN & NEXT STEPS Vi ved, at forsinket og savnet arbejde påvirker din produktivitet. Vi prioriterer disse foranstaltninger for at bidrage til at mindske sandsynligheden for og virkningen af lignende hændelser: - * * øge arbejdsbyrden isolation: * * Implementere fair planlægning guardrails så volumen bølger fra en enkelt kilde ikke sulte eller forsinke opgaver på tværs af andre produkter. - * * Styrker overgangskontrol: * * Tilføje operationelle kapaciteter til hurtig gasgivning eller pause planlagte arbejdsbelastninger fra specifikke kilder under uventede trafikstigninger. - * * Forbedre systemets skalering og genopretning: * * Forbedre platformens kapacitet og optimere skaleringen af processer til at håndtere ekstreme efterspørgsel spikes og komme sig hurtigere. Vi undskylder til kunder, hvis tjenester blev påvirket under denne hændelse. Tak. Atlantisk

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 27. august 2026 kl. 04.22 UTCinvestigating

   Vores hold har identificeret dette spørgsmål er også påvirke Jira Service Management. Vi vil opdatere så hurtigt som muligt.

2. 27. august 2026 kl. 04.25 UTCinvestigating

   Vi undersøger et problem med adgang til produkter, der påvirker Confluence, Jira Cloud og Jira Serivce Management kunder. Vores team undersøger omgående dette spørgsmål, og vi vil fremlægge yderligere oplysninger inden for en time eller før, hvis der foreligger oplysninger.

3. 27. august 2026 kl. 04.33 UTCidentified

   Vores hold har identificeret en mulig løsning på de problemer, der påvirker Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management og Confluence. Dette er nu ved at blive rullet ud til ramte regioner, og vi vil opdatere inden for en time, eller før, hvis yderligere oplysninger er tilgængelige.

4. 27. august 2026 kl. 04.51 UTCmonitoring

   Problemerne med at indlæse Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management og Confluence er nu i bedring. Vi vil fortsætte med at overvåge tæt for at bekræfte stabilitet og give en opdatering inden for en time, eller før der bliver mere information til rådighed.

5. 27. august 2026 kl. 05.16 UTCresolved

   Den 27. august 2026 UTC, Atlantiske produkter, herunder Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management og Confluence oplevede en afbrydelse, og tjenester var ikke tilgængelige for berørte brugere. Spørgsmålet er nu løst, og tjenesten fungerer normalt for alle berørte kunder. En offentlig post mortem for denne hændelse vil blive gjort tilgængelig på denne side, når vores fulde undersøgelse af hændelsen er afsluttet.

6. 7. september 2026 kl. 02.53 UTCpostmortem

   * * RESUMÉ * * Den 27. august 2026, mellem 03: 51 og 04: 35 UTC, Atlantiske kunder i Vesteuropa og Sydøst APAC-regioner var ude af stand til at nå Atlantisk Cloud produkter, herunder Atlantisk Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, og Talent. Arrangementet blev udløst af en defekt kode ændring til routing lag af en af vores proxy flåder. Dette førte til HTTP 404 fejl bliver serveret til al kundetrafik gennem disse proxy flåder i Vesteuropa og Sydøst APAC regioner. Hændelsen blev opdaget inden for 1 minut af vores automatiske overvågningssystemer, og mindsket ved at rulle tilbage til den tidligere konfiguration udgivelse, som sætter proxyflåden i en kendt god tilstand. Efter proxy flåde genvundet, nogle Jira og Confluence kunder (uanset placering) modtog HTTP 503 fejl mellem 04: 33 og 04: 53 UTC som server flåder tilpasset tilstrømningen af trafik. * * IMPACT * * Den samlede virkning blev opdelt i to adskilte perioder: - Først, den 27 august 2026, mellem 03: 51 og 04: 35 UTC på Atlantisk Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, og Talent. Hændelsen forårsagede afbrydelse af kundetrafikken fra Vesteuropa og Sydøst APAC-regioner, med HTTP 404 fejl returneret. Der var ingen indvirkning på kunde API trafik, uanset oprindelse placering. - For det andet, den 27 august 2026, mellem 04: 33 og 04: 53 UTC, nogle Jira og Confluence kunder uanset placering modtaget HTTP 503 fejl efter HTTP 404 fejl blev løst: ~ 32% af anmodninger i ap- southest-2, ~ 4% af anmodninger i eu- west-1, ~ 2,5% af anmodninger i us- west-2 og ap- southest-1, og < 1% af anmodninger i alle resterende globale regioner. * * ROOT CAUSE * * Arrangementet blev udløst af en kodeændring til en af vores proxyflåder. Der var imidlertid en fejl i den anvendte kode, som ikke blev opdaget ved manuel og automatisk afprøvning. Dette førte til en forkert konfiguration af en lejer lookup funktionalitet i proxy-niveau, hvilket førte til trafik ikke har en gyldig netværkssti, hvilket resulterer i HTTP 404 fejl bliver serveret til al kundetrafik gennem disse proxy-flåder i Vesteuropa og Sydøst APAC-regioner. Efter at proxy tier virkning genvundet, en anden periode af virkning blev forårsaget for nogle Jira og Confluence kunder. På grund af reduktionen af trafikken til Jira og Confluence af proxy flåde, Jira og Confluence service niveauer havde automatisk skaleret i antallet af servere, der betjener kundetrafik. Når proxy flåde funktionalitet blev genoprettet, den bølge af trafik overvældet Jira serviceniveau, som returnerede en forhøjet sats af HTTP 503s indtil det automatisk skaleret ud igen. * * MIDLERTIDIGE FORANSTALTNINGER Vi ved, at udfald påvirker din produktivitet. Mens vi har en række test og forebyggende processer på plads, blev dette specifikke problem ikke identificeret, fordi ændringen var relateret til en meget specifik form for kant sag, der ikke blev hentet af vores automatiserede kontinuerlig implementering suiter og manuelle test scripts. Vi prioriterer følgende forbedringstiltag for at undgå at gentage denne type hændelser: - * * Tilføjelse af yderligere foranstaltninger: * * Implementeringsrørledningen til konfigurationen af det angrebne proxy-niveau brugte et nedarvet system og havde ikke de relevante langsomme regionale udrulningsfunktioner konfigureret korrekt. Vi har allerede tilføjet de korrekte sikkerhedsforanstaltninger, og vi flytter dette til vores virksomhed standard implementering rørledning, der omfatter alle vores sikkerhedskontrol aktiveret som standard. Vi reviderer også alle netværkstjenester for at bekræfte, at de alle er på den nye standard rørledning implementering service. - * * Forbedring af serviceflådens skaleringspolitik: * * Automatisk skalering konfiguration for vores Jira og Confluence service flåder var konfigureret til at skalere i for aggressivt. Vi er grundigt gennemgå og opdatere alle de komplekse Jira og Confluence auto skalering politikker for at sikre, at dette ikke sker igen. Vi undskylder til kunder, hvis tjenester blev påvirket under denne hændelse; vi tager øjeblikkelige skridt til at forbedre platformens ydeevne og tilgængelighed. Tak. Atlantisk kundesupport

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 25. august 2026 kl. 08.42 UTCinvestigating

   Vi er aktivt ved at undersøge rapporter om forringelse af ydeevne resulterer i øget latency for e-mail, mobil, og slack notifikationer for Jira, JSM og Confluence. Vores hold undersøger problemet og flere oplysninger vil blive delt inden for den næste 1 time.

2. 25. august 2026 kl. 09.44 UTCinvestigating

   Vores hold har identificeret de ramte regioner og arbejder aktivt på at afbøde problemet. Vi vil levere yderligere opdateringer inden for en time, eller før, hvis vi har betydelige fremskridt at dele.

3. 25. august 2026 kl. 10.49 UTCinvestigating

   Vores hold har truffet få korrigerende foranstaltninger for at mindske problemet i en af de ramte regioner og observerer nogle forbedringer. Vi fortsætter med at overvåge situationen og vil træffe de nødvendige foranstaltninger, indtil hændelsen er fuldt ud genvundet. Vi vil levere yderligere opdateringer inden for de næste to timer, eller før, hvis vi har betydelige fremskridt at dele.

4. 25. august 2026 kl. 13.01 UTCmonitoring

   Vores hold fortsætter med at mindske problemet og observerer nogle forbedringer. Vi fortsætter med at overvåge situationen og vil træffe de nødvendige foranstaltninger, indtil hændelsen er fuldt ud genvundet. Vi vil levere yderligere opdateringer inden for de næste to timer, eller før, hvis vi har betydelige fremskridt at dele.

5. 25. august 2026 kl. 14.33 UTCresolved

   Den 25. aug 2026, nogle brugere kan have oplevet øget latency i e-mail, mobil og slap meddelelser. Spørgsmålet er nu løst, og tjenesten fungerer normalt for alle kunder.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 24. august 2026 kl. 19.22 UTCinvestigating

   Vi er aktivt undersøge rapporter om performance nedbrydning resulterer i øget latency for e-mail, mobil, og Slack meddelelser til JIRA, JSM, og Confluence. Vi vil dele opdateringer her som mere information er tilgængelig.

2. 24. august 2026 kl. 20.25 UTCinvestigating

   Vores hold har identificeret tre ramte regioner, og fortsætter med at undersøge den øgede latency påvirker e-mail, mobil, og Slack meddelelser til JIRA, JSM, og Confluence.

3. 24. august 2026 kl. 21.30 UTCidentified

   Vi har identificeret den sandsynlige årsag til problemet, og vores hold arbejder ihærdigt på en afbødning. Berørte brugere kan opleve øget latency i e-mail, mobil, og Slack meddelelser til JIRA, JSM, og Confluence. Vi vil fortsætte med at dele yderligere opdateringer her, da mere information er tilgængelig.

4. 24. august 2026 kl. 23.15 UTCresolved

   Den 24. august 2026, nogle JIRA, JSM, og Confluence brugere kan have oplevet performance nedbrydning resulterer i øget latency i e-mail, mobil, og Slack meddelelser. Spørgsmålet er løst for nyoprettede anmeldelser, og tjenesten fungerer normalt. Der kan være ældre anmeldelser, der behandles, og vi forventer, at de bliver afsluttet inden for de næste par timer.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 21. august 2026 kl. 07.16 UTCidentified

   Vi har identificeret årsagen til et problem, der påvirker Marketplace App makroer i Confluence. Brugere kan opleve makroer, der ikke gør det korrekt, eller vise fejl. Vores ingeniørhold har identificeret årsagen og oprydning er i gang. Vi vil levere yderligere opdateringer i de næste 60 minutter.

2. 21. august 2026 kl. 08.15 UTCidentified

   Et fix er blevet identificeret og er ved at blive indsat. Brugerne skal begynde at se den ramte MarketPlace App - Connect makroer til at begynde at rengøre korrekt, når fix er blevet fuldt formeret. Vi vil levere yderligere opdateringer inden for de næste 2 timer.

3. 21. august 2026 kl. 10.10 UTCresolved

   Den 21. aug 2026, mellem 04: 26 UTC og 09: 33 UTC, nogle brugere kan have oplevet problemer med makroer ikke rendering korrekt i Confluence. Spørgsmålet er nu løst, og tjenesten fungerer normalt for alle kunder.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 12. august 2026 kl. 20.11 UTCidentified

   Some Confluence Cloud users visiting public links saw a Something went wrong error page. The issue affected anonymous access paths for public links, and some related Confluence areas could also show the same error message.

2. 12. august 2026 kl. 22.13 UTCresolved

   On August 12, 2026 some Confluence users utilizing anonymous access via public links, may have experienced a 'Something went wrong' error message. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 6. juli 2026 kl. 09.23 UTCinvestigating

   Vi undersøger problemer, der påvirker dine tjenester. Vi arbejder aktivt på at identificere årsagen og løse problemet. Vi vil levere yderligere opdateringer inden for en time.

2. 6. juli 2026 kl. 10.04 UTCmonitoring

   Vi har anvendt fixet med succes og ser bedring. Automatiseringskapaciteten genoprettes og bør fungere normalt fremad. Databehandlingsanmodninger, der blev indgivet i løbet af afbrydelsesperioden, blev ikke afsluttet på grund af manglende adgang til tjenesten. Vi fortsætter med at overvåge situationen og forventer fuld bedring inden for den næste time. Vi vil levere yderligere opdateringer inden for den næste time eller før.

3. 6. juli 2026 kl. 11.46 UTCinvestigating

   Vi ser stadig nogle problemer med brugersøgning, brugerplukker og aktiver i hele EU-regionen. Vi fortsætter med at undersøge situationen og vil give yderligere opdateringer i den næste time eller før.

4. 6. juli 2026 kl. 12.25 UTCmonitoring

   Vi har anvendt fixet til at mindske problemet og ser bedring. Vi fortsætter med at overvåge situationen og bør snart blive fuldt tilbagebetalt. Vi bør kunne levere flere opdateringer inden for den næste time eller tidligere.

5. 6. juli 2026 kl. 13.04 UTCresolved

   Den 6. juli 2026, mellem 06: 51 UTC til 09: 39 UTC nogle brugere kan have oplevet problemer relateret Automation, og mellem 08: 10 UTC til 11: 50 UTC nogle brugere kan have oplevet problemer relateret til brugersøgning, bruger-picker og aktiver i EU-regionen. Problemerne er nu løst, og tjenesterne fungerer normalt for alle kunder.

6. 17. juli 2026 kl. 16.59 UTCpostmortem

   # # Summary Den 6. jul 2026, mellem 06: 51 og 20: 17 UTC, Atlantiske kunder, der bruger cloud-produkter i europæiske (EU) regioner oplevede serviceforstyrrelser påvirker automatisering regel udførelse, brugersøgning, bruger picker, og relaterede arbejdsgange. Hændelsen begyndte, da en central identitetstjeneste oplevede databasemætning i EU 's regioner og øgede latens- og fejlrater. Mens respondenterne arbejdede på at genoprette kapaciteten, blev der anvendt en nødafbødning, som forhindrede automatiseringsregler fra adgang til identitetsendepunktet. Parallelt, den forhøjede identitet latency bidraget til en cascading fiasko i en downstream bruger søgetjeneste, nedværdigende bruger søgning og bruger picker erfaringer på tværs af flere produkter. Service blev gradvist restaureret efter yderligere database læse kapacitet blev tilføjet, nødblokken blev fjernet, og brugersøgetjenesten blev manuelt skaleret op. # Impact Hændelsen berørte kunder på tværs af flere atlantiske produkter i EU-regioner d. 6. jul 2026 mellem 06: 51 og 20: 17 UTC. - * * Nedbrydning af kerneidentitetsservice: * * Der blev observeret forhøjede intermitterende adgangshastigheder for produkter i EU 's regioner. - * * Automation regel udførelse fejl: * * automatisering regler ved hjælp af standard bruger (Automation for Jira) i Jira, Jira Service Management, og Jira Produkt Discovery i EU regioner mislykkedes med en tilladelse fejl. - * * User search and user picker failts: * * bruger søgning succesrater faldt betydeligt i EU-regioner, med bruger picker kapacitet stort set ikke tilgængelig på tværs af produkter. # Root Cause Hændelsen opstod fra en nylig konfiguration ændring, der reducerede cache levetid for en kerne identitet service. Da trafikken på EU 's arbejdsdage steg den 6. juli 2026, begyndte en større del af anmodningerne at nå frem til backing databasen direkte i stedet for at blive serveret fra cache. EU-databaserne havde ikke tilstrækkelig regional kapacitet til at absorbere den øgede belastning, og databasen CPU nåede mætning, hvilket forårsagede forhøjede intermitterende adgangshastigheder nægtet. Som en del af afbødningen blev der indført en nødspærring for at reducere belastningen af den mættede identitetstjenestedatabase og prioritere genoprettelsen af den centrale identitetstjeneste. Dette forhindrede utilsigtet automatisering regler fra at passere deres præ-udførelse tilladelse kontrol, hvilket får dem til at mislykkes. Den forlængede varighed skyldtes først og fremmest en sekundær bølge af automatiseringsregelsvigt forårsaget af den procesbegrænsende begrænsning. Parallelt hermed forårsagede den vedvarende nedbrydning øget latens og intermitterende svigt på tværs af produkter, der er afhængige af disse kontroller, og bidrog til en cascading fiasko i en downstream bruger søgetjeneste. Som følge heraf blev brugersøgnings- og brugerplukkeroplevelser stort set utilgængelige i EU-regioner, indtil tilladelsestjenesten blev genvundet, og brugersøgetjenesten blev skaleret for at genoprette kapaciteten. # # Respial Actions Plan & Next Steps Vi ved, at udfald påvirker kundernes produktivitet. Atlassian prioriterer følgende foranstaltninger for at hjælpe med at forhindre lignende hændelser i fremtiden: - * * Forbedre sikkerhedsforanstaltningerne for nødhjælp med høj virkning: * * Hårdt operationelt værktøj, så afbødning trin, der kunne deaktivere customer-vender arbejdsgange kræver yderligere gennemgang. - * * Styrke identitetskapaciteten i infrastrukturen og ændre sikkerheden: * * Gennemgå regional database størrelse og kapacitet headroom for at reducere risikoen for mætning i spidsbelastningsperioder, og forfine vurderingsprocessen for konfigurationsændringer, så downstream belastning indvirkning evalueres før produktionen udrulning. - * * Styrke modstandsdygtigheden mod kaskadebrud fra opstrøms nedbrydning: * * Revision backpressure håndtering, kredsløb bryder konfiguration, og autoskalering adfærd i tjenester, så opstrøms nedbrydning ikke forårsage bredere produkt indvirkning på tværs af brugersøgning, bruger picker, og relaterede erfaringer. - * * Hårde replay mekanismer for Automation regel svigt: * * øge modstandsdygtigheden af automatisering regler for at reducere virkningen forbundet med hændelser, der opstår i afhængigheder.. Vi anerkender, hvor kritiske pålidelige produktarbejdsgange er for vores kunder, og vi undskylder til kunder, der blev påvirket af denne hændelse. Tak. Atlantisk kundesupport

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 16. juni 2026 kl. 13.46 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is investigating degraded performance affecting your service. We are actively working to identify the cause and resolve the issue. We will provide further updates within one hour.

2. 16. juni 2026 kl. 14.28 UTCidentified

   We have identified the source of degraded performance affecting some Confluence Cloud users. A subset of users may experience errors or slowness when viewing or editing pages. Our team has initiated a remediation and is actively monitoring recovery. We will provide another update within one hour or once the issue is fully resolved.

3. 16. juni 2026 kl. 14.53 UTCmonitoring

   We have been able to apply the fix to mitigate the issue and we are seeing recovery. We continue to monitor the situation and should be fully recovered soon. We should be able to provide more updates in the next one hour or earlier.

4. 16. juni 2026 kl. 15.56 UTCresolved

   On June 16, 2026, Confluence Cloud users for some customers may have experienced performance degradation of view and edit page experiences. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23. juni 2026 kl. 18.25 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary ### On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT ### The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ### ROOT CAUSE ### 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ### We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. We have already deployed the following fix: - Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: - Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. - Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12. juni 2026 kl. 07.39 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing experiencing degraded performance in Confluence Cloud affecting view page and edit page functionality. Our teams are actively investigating and will be sharing more updates in next 1 hour or sooner.

2. 12. juni 2026 kl. 08.45 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing degraded performance with view content, create and edit functionality on Confluence Cloud primarily in the EU region. Our teams are actively working to identify the root cause of the issue. We will share additional updates in next 2 hours or sooner as more information is available.

3. 12. juni 2026 kl. 10.29 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause of this issue and implemented a fix. We are beginning to observe signs of recovery, with some affected users regaining access to view, create, and edit content on Confluence Cloud. We will provide a further update within one hour, or sooner if we confirm full recovery for all affected customers.

4. 12. juni 2026 kl. 11.15 UTCresolved

   On June 12th 2026, between 07:04 to 11:06 UTC, some Confluence users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23. juni 2026 kl. 18.28 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ‌ ### ROOT CAUSE ‌ 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ‌ ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ‌ We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. ‌ We have already deployed the following fix: * Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: * Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. * Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ ‌ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 10. juni 2026 kl. 06.14 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating reports of extended delays being experienced across tasks such as processing of Incoming Emails, Notifications relating to changes or creation of Work Items, in addition to delays in processing Scheduled Triggers from Marketplace apps. Our team is looking into this with urgency and we will provide further update within one hour as our investigation continues.

2. 10. juni 2026 kl. 06.14 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause for this issue and has now deployed a fix that is rolling out across impacted products. At this time we are monitoring for the recovery of these events across Jira Service Management, Jira Cloud and Ecosystem app Scheduled Triggers. We will provide further update within one hour or when we have seen a full recovery of all task processing across these products.

3. 10. juni 2026 kl. 06.14 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has now determined that performance has returned to expected levels for those impacted by this incident. Additional products that are now known to have been impacted by this incident are Confluence, Customer Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery. These products would have seen similar impact where email notifications or processing of events may have been delayed while this incident was underway. We are now monitoring for the full recovery of performance across all products and will update when we are confident this issue is fully resolved, or within one hour, whichever is sooner.

4. 10. juni 2026 kl. 06.31 UTCresolved

   We are now confident that any of the tasks that were impacted by this incident and were delayed should now be operating as expected. We apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.

1. 27. maj 2026 kl. 06.03 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where customers attempting to view Calendars receive an error message on Confluence Cloud pages. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 27. maj 2026 kl. 07.06 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause and are in process of deploying a fix. We will share further updates in next 1 hours, or sooner if we have any meaningful developments to report.

3. 27. maj 2026 kl. 07.48 UTCresolved

   Between 00:50 UTC and 07:30 UTC on 27 May 2026, some users were facing errors when attempting to view Calendars in Confluence. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and this incident has been fully restored.

1. 26. maj 2026 kl. 11.58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where some custom extensions may fail to load when editing Confluence Cloud pages. Affected users may see 'Error loading the extension!' messages or notice that certain macros are missing from the editor's extension selection menu. Viewing published pages is not affected. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 26. maj 2026 kl. 11.58 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating an issue affecting the editing macros in Confluence Cloud editor. Our team is working to identify the root cause. We will provide an update within approximately one hour.

3. 26. maj 2026 kl. 13.55 UTCresolved

   Between 08:30 UTC and 13:51 UTC on 26 May 2026, some users were unable to load or edit certain macros in the Confluence Cloud page editor. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and macro functionality has been fully restored.

1. 14. maj 2026 kl. 04.54 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue with multiple Atlassian products that is impacting a large number of Confluence and Jira Cloud customers. We are continuing to investigate and will add further details about additional impact as our investigation continues. We will provide more details within the next hour or sooner if further information becomes available

2. 14. maj 2026 kl. 05.03 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware that the current issues with accessing Atlassian products are impacting additional products. We have now expanded the impact of the incident to cover the known impacted products at this time. We will provide further update within one hour or sooner as information is available.

3. 14. maj 2026 kl. 05.11 UTCidentified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

4. 14. maj 2026 kl. 05.24 UTCidentified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

5. 14. maj 2026 kl. 05.34 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

6. 14. maj 2026 kl. 05.43 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

7. 14. maj 2026 kl. 06.40 UTCmonitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

8. 14. maj 2026 kl. 06.41 UTCmonitoring

   We are approaching full system recovery at this time, and are performing final confirmations that services are restored.

9. 14. maj 2026 kl. 06.48 UTCresolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

10. 19. maj 2026 kl. 19.04 UTCpostmortem

    ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 8. maj 2026 kl. 01.31 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 8. maj 2026 kl. 04.10 UTCidentified

   We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

3. 8. maj 2026 kl. 04.10 UTCidentified

   Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

4. 8. maj 2026 kl. 04.10 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

5. 8. maj 2026 kl. 05.53 UTCmonitoring

   The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

6. 8. maj 2026 kl. 08.03 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

7. 8. maj 2026 kl. 11.12 UTCmonitoring

   Our services are now fully operational. We continue to replay any events that were missed during the incident, and are making good progress. We will provide a further update once replays are complete. If you experience any ongoing issues, please contact our support team. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

8. 8. maj 2026 kl. 19.45 UTCresolved

   On May 8, 2026, some customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

9. 20. maj 2026 kl. 06.55 UTCpostmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support.

1. 14. april 2026 kl. 12.25 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a partial service disruption affecting Rovo, specifically for customers using automation rules that invoke Rovo agents. Some customers may find that these automations are not completing as expected. We'll share updates here as more information becomes available.

2. 14. april 2026 kl. 12.25 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified that this incident also affects automation rules in Confluence that use Rovo agents. We are investigating and will provide updates as we learn more.

3. 14. april 2026 kl. 14.11 UTCidentified

   We have identified the issue, and our teams are working to resolve it and restore normal operations as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as they become available.

4. 14. april 2026 kl. 15.46 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

5. 14. april 2026 kl. 16.11 UTCresolved

   On April 14, 2026, affected users may have experienced some service disruption with automation rules that use Rovo agents. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 13. april 2026 kl. 07.29 UTCmonitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 13. april 2026 kl. 08.33 UTCmonitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 13. april 2026 kl. 10.17 UTCresolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 21. april 2026 kl. 02.33 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 8. april 2026 kl. 06.01 UTCinvestigating

   The impact of this incident is now understood to also be impacting search in Jira and Confluence, as well as additional downstream impacts to Rovo Chat, User Management, Administration and Guard. Our team is continuing to investigate with urgency and we will provide further update within 1 hour.

2. 8. april 2026 kl. 06.25 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is aware that users are currently experiencing errors while attempting to search in Confluence and Jira. Our team is investigating with urgency and will be providing an update within 1 hour.

3. 8. april 2026 kl. 07.40 UTCidentified

   Confluence and Jira search reliability is improving, and we expect full recovery shortly; we will continue to closely monitor the services to ensure they remain stable.

4. 8. april 2026 kl. 08.33 UTCidentified

   We have restored core search functionality and services are operating again, but some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour while new data continues to be indexed. We are actively working to complete reindexing and will update this page as performance fully recovers.

5. 8. april 2026 kl. 09.03 UTCidentified

   We are also aware of impact as a result of these search failures to Customer Service Management, Asset Reports, Jira Service Management and dashboards within Focus. Our team have identified the potential root cause of the issue and our teams are working with urgency on a resolution. We will provide further update within 1 hour.

6. 8. april 2026 kl. 09.03 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally. Some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour, while new data continues to be indexed. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

7. 8. april 2026 kl. 11.43 UTCresolved

   The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

8. 17. april 2026 kl. 16.24 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. A configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high‑density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers. The root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC. ### **IMPACT** During the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period. Impacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context. **Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions. **Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue. **Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC. **Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC. **Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC. ### **ROOT CAUSE** Atlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. An infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \(CPU & Memory\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products. The change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst‑affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: * **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types** Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly. * **Strengthen automated pre‑deploy validation for resource changes** Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads. * **Improve post‑deploy verification and alerting** Enhance monitoring and post‑deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod‑IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out. * **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits** Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts. * **Enhance recovery automation** Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12. marts 2026 kl. 13.38 UTCinvestigating

   Confluence Cloud users may experience errors when accessing certain Marketplace macros. Affected customers are seeing the message Error rendering macro 'static-macro': Page loading failed. Our team is actively investigating this issue. We will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner.

2. 12. marts 2026 kl. 13.38 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the cause of this issue, and a fix is currently being deployed. We are monitoring the deployment, and we will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner if needed.

3. 13. marts 2026 kl. 00.26 UTCresolved

   On March 12, 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 10. marts 2026 kl. 00.15 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of customers experiencing delays with their automations within Jira, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Jira Product Discovery and Confluence. Our team is investigating with urgency and we will provide an update within one hour.

2. 10. marts 2026 kl. 00.15 UTCidentified

   Our team has now identified the cause of this issue relating to delayed automation events and has put a hotfix in place to help restore automation performance. We will continue to monitor performance as the backlog of issues is now being processed.

3. 10. marts 2026 kl. 00.51 UTCmonitoring

   The performance degradation of automations has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. 10. marts 2026 kl. 00.59 UTCresolved

   On 9 March UTC, Automation users in the APAC region may have experienced performance degradation within Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Confluence. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 20. februar 2026 kl. 04.14 UTCidentified

   Customers using Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours as we continue our investigation.

2. 20. februar 2026 kl. 12.26 UTCidentified

   We understand that customers using Customer Service Management, Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours or sooner based on significant progress.

3. 20. februar 2026 kl. 12.26 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved and all services are functional.