Jumpcloud driftsforstyrrelser

1. 23. oktober 2026 kl. 15.55 UTCinvestigating

   Vi er i øjeblikket ved at undersøge rapporter om fejl, når du indlæser JumpCloud User eller Admin Portal. Vi vil opdatere med yderligere oplysninger inden for 30 minutter.

2. 23. oktober 2026 kl. 16.00 UTCmonitoring

   Vi identificerede fejl i forbindelse med en tredjeparts tjeneste. Fejlprocenterne er faldet, og vi overvåger fortsat.

3. 23. oktober 2026 kl. 16.11 UTCmonitoring

   Vi fortsætter med at overvåge for yderligere spørgsmål.

4. 23. oktober 2026 kl. 16.24 UTCmonitoring

   Mellem ca. 15: 20 og 15: 50 UTC den 23. oktober 2026, nogle kunder var ude af stand til pålideligt at indlæse JumpCloud Admin Portal og User Portal. Berørte brugere kan have set fejl sider eller langsom, ufuldstændige sidebelastninger. Årsagen var et netværk afbrydelse på en af vores tredjeparts indhold levering og sikkerhed udbydere, som påvirkede trafikken gennem nogle af deres østlige amerikanske steder. Når deres netværk er stabiliseret, er adgangen til begge portaler vendt tilbage til normal, og vi har bekræftet, at problemet er blevet løst fuldt ud. Vi ved, hvor meget du er afhængig af pålidelig adgang til JumpCloud til at administrere din organisation, og vi er ked af forstyrrelsen dette forårsagede dig og dine brugere. Selv når en afbrydelse starter med en udbyder, holde dig forbundet er vores ansvar. Vi har allerede redundans på plads til denne form for begivenhed, og vi styrker den aktivt, således at en fiasko sker hurtigere og mere automatisk i fremtiden. Vi udfører en fuld gennemgang af denne hændelse og vil offentliggøre en post-hændelse anmeldelse her med en detaljeret tidslinje, rod årsag, og de skridt, vi tager for at forhindre en gentagelse.

5. 23. oktober 2026 kl. 18.25 UTCresolved

   Denne hændelse er blevet løst.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 22. oktober 2026 kl. 16.21 UTCinvestigating

   Vi har identificeret et problem, der påvirker udstedelse og fornyelse af enhedscertifikater for kunder i vores amerikanske region, begyndende ca. 9: 26 AM MT (15: 26 UTC). I denne periode kan anordninger, der anmoder om et nyt eller fornyet udstyrscertifikat, være ude af stand til at opnå et sådant. Dette påvirker primært nyindskrevet udstyr og udstyr, hvis certifikater skal fornyes. Anordninger med eksisterende gyldige certifikater påvirkes ikke og fungerer fortsat normalt.

2. 22. oktober 2026 kl. 16.44 UTCidentified

   Spørgsmålet er blevet identificeret, og et fix er ved at blive gennemført.

3. 22. oktober 2026 kl. 16.50 UTCmonitoring

   Et fix er blevet gennemført, og vi overvåger resultaterne.

4. 22. oktober 2026 kl. 17.00 UTCresolved

   Denne hændelse er blevet løst.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 25. september 2026 kl. 17.27 UTCinvestigating

   Vi undersøger i øjeblikket rapporter om forringet ydeevne med opdatering af detaljer eller associationer til kommandoer i Admin Portal. Vi undersøger årsagen til de spørgsmål, der i øjeblikket, og vil opdatere status begivenhed, når løst.

2. 25. september 2026 kl. 17.29 UTCidentified

   Spørgsmålet er blevet identificeret, og et fix er ved at blive gennemført.

3. 25. september 2026 kl. 17.55 UTCmonitoring

   Et fix er blevet gennemført, og vi overvåger resultaterne.

4. 25. september 2026 kl. 18.33 UTCresolved

   Denne hændelse er blevet løst.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 25. september 2026 kl. 17.22 UTCinvestigating

   Vi undersøger i øjeblikket rapporter om forringet ydeevne med opdatering af detaljer eller associationer til kommandoer i Admin Portal. Vi undersøger årsagen til de spørgsmål, der i øjeblikket, og vil opdatere status begivenhed, når løst.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 14. september 2026 kl. 13.33 UTCinvestigating

   Vi er i øjeblikket undersøge et problem, hvor efter en adgangskode nulstilles, nogle RADIUS signs (VPN / Wi-Fi) kan mislykkes med den nye adgangskode. Men - påvirkede brugere kan stadig logge ind med gammel adgangskode. Vi er ved at undersøge årsagen til de spørgsmål, der i øjeblikket, og vil give en opdatering inden for en time.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 14. september 2026 kl. 13.25 UTCinvestigating

   Vi er i øjeblikket undersøge et problem, hvor efter en adgangskode nulstilles, nogle RADIUS signs (VPN / Wi-Fi) kan mislykkes med den nye adgangskode. Men - påvirkede brugere kan stadig logge ind med gammel adgangskode. Vi er ved at undersøge årsagen til de spørgsmål, der i øjeblikket, og vil give en opdatering inden for en time.

2. 14. september 2026 kl. 13.58 UTCmonitoring

   Et fix er blevet gennemført, og vi overvåger resultaterne.

3. 14. september 2026 kl. 14.38 UTCresolved

   Denne hændelse er nu løst.

4. 21. september 2026 kl. 20.49 UTCpostmortem

   ! [] (https: / / jumpcloud.com / wp- content / themes / jumpcloud / assets / images / logos / jumpcloud- logo- tm- oceanblue.svg) * * * Hændelsesrapport * * * * Dato * *: Sep 21, 2026 * * hændelsesdato: * * Sep 14, 2026 * * Beskrivelse * *: Root Cause Analyse for RADIUS autentificering fejl påvirker EU-brugere * * Region: * * Den Europæiske Union Name * * Oversigt: * * Den 14. september 2026 identificerede JumpCloud et problem, der påvirker RADIUS-godkendelse af brugere i EU-regionen. Brugere, der for nylig havde ændret deres password var ude af stand til at logge ind med deres nye password, mens deres tidligere password fortsatte med at arbejde. Emnet opstod med en database kopi i EU-regionen, der stoppede med at modtage opdateringer fra den primære database efter en planlagt infrastrukturopgradering. Som følge heraf blev RADIUS-autentifikationen i EU-regionen serveret fra en forældet kopi af mappedata, og de seneste kontoændringer blev ikke afspejlet der. JumpCloud genoprettede tjenesten ved at omdirigere EU 's RADIUS-godkendelse til sunde databasekopier i andre regioner og siden genopbygge og resynkronisere den berørte EU-kopi. Autentifikationen i EU-regionen blev fuldstændig genoprettet samme dag. * * Hvad skete der: * * Som led i en planlagt opgradering af infrastrukturen blev databaseinstanserne til støtte for RADIUS-godkendelse opgraderet. I EU-regionen genoptog databaseaflæsningen ikke replikationen efter opgraderingen og ophørte med at modtage opdateringer fra den primære database fra den 10. september 2026. Ækvivalente replikaer i andre regioner kom sig normalt; kun EU-replika blev påvirket. Da RADIUS-autentifikationen i EU-regionen blev serveret fra denne kopi, var den baseret på en kopi af mappedata, som kun var gældende indtil den 10. september. Enhver kontoændring efter dette punkt blev ikke afspejlet i EU-regionen, før spørgsmålet blev løst. Den mest synlige symptom var password ændringer - en nyligt indstillet password ville mislykkes, mens den tidligere password stadig virkede. Som følge heraf har kontoændringer i EU-regionen i løbet af det berørte vindue muligvis ikke haft virkning der, herunder ændringer, der har til formål at fjerne eller suspendere en brugers adgang. Når problemet blev løst og replika resynkroniseret, alle verserende ændringer blev anvendt og EU-bibliotek data returneres til en fuldt aktuel tilstand. * * Bidragende faktor: * * Forsinkelsen i detektionen mellem den 10. september og den 14. september fandt sted, fordi den berørte database instance fortsatte med at rapportere en sund status på infrastrukturniveau, selv om replikation var stoppet. Vores advarsel var orienteret omkring disse instance- niveau tilgængelighed målinger og ikke dække denne særlige replikation betingelse, så den stoppede replikation ikke udløse en automatiseret alarm, maskering af det underliggende problem. Lukning af denne detektionskløft er fokus for de korrigerende foranstaltninger nedenfor. * * Korrigerende aktioner: * * JumpCloud tager følgende forholdsregler for at forhindre gentagelse: 1. Vi tilføjer automatisk alarm, der registrerer, når en database replika stopper replikere, uafhængig af sin generelle tilgængelighed status, så denne klasse af fiasko er fanget med det samme. Status: I gang. 2. * * Stærkere godkendelse af autentifikationstrafik. * * Vi styrker vores sundhedskontrol, så en kopi, der ikke er fuldt synkroniseret, automatisk fjernes fra tjenesten autentificering trafik, sikre anmodninger bliver besvaret kun fra up-to-date data. Status: Planlagt. 3. * * Forsinket udrulning med replikation validering for infrastrukturændringer. * * Vi opdaterer vores procedurer for databaseændringer, så de anvendes én region ad gangen, med udtrykkelig kontrol af, at replikation er kommet sig fuldt ud, før de går videre til den næste region. Status: I gang.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 3. september 2026 kl. 06.07 UTCinvestigating

   JumpCloud oplever i øjeblikket forsinkelser i tildeling af brugere og systemer til dynamiske grupper. Administratorer kan se forsinkelser i disse gruppemedlemskab opdateringer, og dermed forsinkelser i levering til forbundne ressourcer.

2. 3. september 2026 kl. 06.14 UTCidentified

   Spørgsmålet er blevet identificeret, og et fix er ved at blive gennemført.

3. 3. september 2026 kl. 08.56 UTCidentified

   Vi fortsætter med at arbejde på en løsning på dette problem.

4. 3. september 2026 kl. 10.05 UTCmonitoring

   Et fix er blevet gennemført, og vi overvåger resultaterne.

5. 3. september 2026 kl. 10.54 UTCmonitoring

   Vi fortsætter med at overvåge for yderligere spørgsmål.

6. 3. september 2026 kl. 12.22 UTCresolved

   Denne hændelse er blevet løst.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 22. juni 2026 kl. 14.21 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating delays or timeouts loading the user console. We are investigating the cause of the issues currently, and will provide an update within one hour.

2. 22. juni 2026 kl. 15.08 UTCidentified

   We have identified that a third party outage is impacting our service. More information can be found at https://www.cloudflarestatus.com/incidents/v3yl7jqmqj51

3. 22. juni 2026 kl. 16.39 UTCresolved

   The third party issue impacting our service has been resolved. Our internal monitoring is showing service states returned to normal.

4. 25. juni 2026 kl. 20.00 UTCpostmortem

    ‌ **Date**: Jun 25, 2026 **Date of Incident:** Jun 22, 2026 **Description**: RCA for Third-Party CDN Network Disruption — Cloudflare / Zayo Fiber Cut ‌ #### **Summary:** On June 22, 2026, beginning at approximately 13:25 UTC, some JumpCloud customers experienced degraded access to web-facing services including the Admin Console, User Portal, API endpoints, and SSO authentication flows. Customers connecting through North America or accessing services routed through North American infrastructure were most affected. The root cause was a fiber cut in Eastern North America, a physical break in underground or undersea cables carrying internet traffic. Cloudflare attributed the disruption to Zayo, a network transit provider, experiencing an outage on some of its network routes, which caused reachability issues for services routing through those paths. Because JumpCloud's traffic transits the Cloudflare network before reaching JumpCloud's origin infrastructure, degradation at the Cloudflare/Zayo layer directly impacted our customers' ability to reach JumpCloud services. By late morning, most affected platforms had stabilized, with Cloudflare indicating its fix was being actively rolled out. JumpCloud's backend services and data plane remained fully operational throughout the event. The issue was isolated to the traffic path between end users and JumpCloud's origin infrastructure. ‌ #### **What Happened:** JumpCloud utilizes Cloudflare as the security and networking layer in front of all its global infrastructure. All HTTP/HTTPS requests to JumpCloud's web services traverse the Cloudflare network before reaching JumpCloud's origin infrastructure. ‌ #### **Provider Root Cause:** Cloudflare engineers first detected elevated error rates and latency at approximately 13:25 UTC on June 22, 2026. By 14:37 UTC, they had traced the root cause to a fiber cut in Eastern North America. Cloudflare confirmed that Zayo, a network provider, was experiencing an outage on some of its network routes, causing sites and services routing through those paths to become unreachable. Cloudflare's status page indicated that customers connecting through North America or accessing services in Europe may have seen increased latencies and timeouts as Cloudflare engineers worked to mitigate the issue. Traffic engineering efforts successfully mitigated the majority of congestion and packet drops, with services reported as largely stable with only minor residual impact remaining. Cloudflare's scheduled Newark \(EWR\) datacenter maintenance overlapped in timing but was a separate event - it was not the root cause of the fiber cut outage. ‌ #### **Corrective Actions \(Target End-of-July 2026\)**: While this incident was caused by a third-party provider we recognize the impact it had on our customers. JumpCloud is committed to reducing our exposure to single-provider failures and improving our resilience posture. The following corrective actions are actively underway: * **Multi-CDN Redundancy:** Cloudflare remains part of our architecture. We are adding a parallel, independently operated CDN path with weighted routing and security parity across both, so traffic can shift automatically if one path degrades. When complete, JumpCloud's edge will be capable of routing around a complete outage of any single CDN provider without customer action or service interruption. This work is in active delivery within our Platform Engineering organization. * **Resilient DNS Management:** We are modernizing how we manage DNS with phased, automated changes and rollback capabilities, reducing the risk that DNS operations themselves become a source of disruption. * **Validated Failover:** We are running controlled failover exercises including a production-scale test before relying on this redundancy in production. * **Enhanced Third-Party Monitoring & Automated Alerting:** We are expanding our monitoring to include automated detection of third-party provider degradation, enabling faster incident declaration and more rapid customer communication. This includes synthetic monitoring from multiple geographic regions that can differentiate between JumpCloud-origin issues and upstream provider issues ‌ #### **Provider Remediation:** Cloudflare has communicated the following remediation actions: * **Transit Path Restoration:** Cloudflare is coordinating with Zayo and fiber providers to repair the affected Eastern North American routes and restore full transit capacity. * **Traffic Engineering Response:** Cloudflare's traffic engineering teams implemented manual rerouting to redistribute load across unaffected network paths during the incident window. * **Ongoing Investigation:** Cloudflare has indicated a full post-incident review is underway to assess automated failover capabilities for large-scale transit provider failures. ‌ JumpCloud takes the reliability and availability of our platform seriously. We understand that our customers depend on JumpCloud for critical identity and device management operations, and any disruption, regardless of its origin, impacts their business. We are actively investing in infrastructure resilience to ensure that our dependency on any single third-party provider does not create an unacceptable risk to service availability.

1. 8. maj 2026 kl. 06.41 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating delays or timeouts loading the devices page in the admin console. We are investigating the cause of the issues currently, and will provide an update within one hour.

2. 8. maj 2026 kl. 06.44 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and the team is working on the fix.

3. 8. maj 2026 kl. 06.51 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented. We are currently monitoring the results.

4. 8. maj 2026 kl. 08.28 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 28. april 2026 kl. 08.01 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently aware of reports with agent Installation failing, this is affecting MacOS, Windows and Linux. We are investigating the cause of the issues currently, and will provide an update within one hour.

2. 28. april 2026 kl. 08.57 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix will be implemented soon.

3. 28. april 2026 kl. 09.00 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented, and Agent installations should now be functioning as expected. Our team is actively monitoring the situation to ensure continued stability.

4. 28. april 2026 kl. 09.55 UTCresolved

   The incident has been resolved.

1. 2. april 2026 kl. 17.08 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating a delay in LDAP directory synchronizations. While updates are processing, changes to user attributes and passwords may take longer than expected to propagate. The team is actively working to increase processing capacity and accelerate synchronizations.

2. 2. april 2026 kl. 17.16 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 2. april 2026 kl. 17.23 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 2. april 2026 kl. 17.55 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 31. marts 2026 kl. 00.32 UTCidentified

   JumpCloud is currently experiencing dispatch delays for core Directory services. Administrators may experience delays updating associations for users, groups, policies, directories, and commands. We have identified the cause of the issue and are actively implementing a fix.

2. 31. marts 2026 kl. 02.38 UTCidentified

   We have made progress in reducing the backlog affecting Directory services and are continuing to work through the remaining queue. Administrators may still experience delays when updating associations for users, groups, policies, directories, and commands. The team is actively implementing additional changes to increase processing capacity and accelerate resolution. We will provide further updates in one hour.

3. 31. marts 2026 kl. 03.42 UTCidentified

   The backlog affecting Directory services has been significantly reduced and continues to decrease. Administrators may still experience delays when updating associations for users, groups, policies, directories, and commands. The team continues to work on additional changes to accelerate processing. We will provide further updates in an hour.

4. 31. marts 2026 kl. 05.00 UTCmonitoring

   The backlog affecting Directory services continues to decrease and we are approaching resolution. Administrators may still experience some delays when updating associations. The team is continuing to monitor, and our next update will be to confirm full resolution.

5. 31. marts 2026 kl. 06.24 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

6. 7. april 2026 kl. 14.56 UTCpostmortem

    **Date**: Apr 7, 2026 **Date of Incident:** Mar 30, 2026 **Description**: RCA for Directory Association Processing Delays ‌ **Summary:** Starting March 30th at approximately 15:40 MDT, JumpCloud customers experienced significant delays in directory-related updates. This included latency in password changes, user-to-group associations, and outbound provisioning reflecting in downstream systems. The root cause was identified as a specific code deployment in our Devices service that inadvertently flooded a background processing queue with unpartitioned messages, causing a bottleneck that prevented updates from processing in real-time. The issue was fully resolved by 00:25 MDT on March 31, 2026. ‌ **What Happened:** The incident was caused by a change in how the JumpCloud agent retrieves software application configurations. 1. **Traffic Spike:** The new code shifted the "source of truth" for these configurations to a new database. If a device polled the system and did not find its record in the new database, the code automatically enqueued a "track collect" request to sync the data. 2. **Unexpected Volume:** We anticipated a "lazy backfill" \(where records are created over time\), but underestimated the number of devices that had no existing software bindings. This resulted in an immediate, massive spike of nearly 280,000 messages. 3. **The Bottleneck \(Partitioning\):** Crucially, these specific messages were enqueued without a "Partition ID." In our high-scale FIFO \(First-In-First-Out\) queue architecture, messages without a partition ID are processed one-by-one rather than in parallel. This effectively "serialized" the queue, preventing us from scaling up workers to process the backlog faster and causing the observed latency. ‌ **Resolution and Recovery**: Once the offending code was rolled back, the "tap" was turned off, and no further unpartitioned messages were added to the queue. Because the bottleneck was caused by the lack of partitioning, simply scaling horizontally could not speed up the processing of the existing backlog. The team monitored the queue throughput and determined that the safest and fastest path to recovery was allowing the worker to process the existing messages sequentially rather than risking further disruption by attempting to manually manipulate the production queue. ‌ **Corrective Actions**: To ensure this type of bottleneck does not occur again, we have committed to the following: * Improving pre-production testing to better simulate the scale and conditions that can occur in production queue processing * Reviewing other areas of the platform where similar patterns could produce unexpected request spikes * Enhancing monitoring and alerting thresholds to enable faster detection and response when queue backlogs begin to form * Strengthening our deployment validation process to more thoroughly account for background data migrations before releasing dependent code changes

1. 12. marts 2026 kl. 16.54 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with delays in syncing user, commands, and policy information with the JumpCloud Devices Agent backend service. We are investigating the cause of the issues currently, and will provide an update within one hour. Agent / Device logins are operating as expected.

2. 12. marts 2026 kl. 19.24 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate an issue with delays in syncing user, commands, and policy information with the JumpCloud Devices Agent backend service. Local Agent / Device logins without MFA or leveraging TOTP are operating as expected.

3. 12. marts 2026 kl. 20.26 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and we have implemented a fix. We are starting to see some recovery with many agents checking in. We will update as our agent traffic normalizes.

4. 12. marts 2026 kl. 21.08 UTCmonitoring

   Agent traffic is reaching normal levels, and the majority of customers are seeing full service restoration. Our engineering teams continue to actively monitor backend stability and traffic patterns. We expect to move to 'Resolved' status shortly as final systems stabilize.

5. 12. marts 2026 kl. 21.48 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

6. 17. marts 2026 kl. 21.25 UTCpostmortem

    ‌ **Date**: Mar 17, 2026 **Date of Incident:** Mar 12, 2026 **Description**: RCA for Agent Backend \(HAProxy\) System Degradation ‌ **Summary:** On March 12, 2026, from 10:05 AM to 2:45 PM MDT, JumpCloud experienced a significant service degradation affecting Agent-related activities. During this window, agent updates, including syncing users, passwords, policies and other agent data, as well as new agent installations were unavailable. This was caused by a "thundering herd" event triggered by a backend traffic-shaping change. We have since identified the root causes and implemented infrastructure changes to prevent a recurrence. ‌ **What Happened?** At 10:00 AM MDT, our engineering team enabled a feature flag \(a "circuit breaker"\) designed to protect our System Insights API from high load by returning `503 Service Unavailable` responses for certain non-critical requests. While the flag performed its intended function, it had an unforeseen secondary effect on the JumpCloud Agent’s connection logic. Because the agents could not reuse existing connections for these specific failed requests, hundreds of thousands of agents in our main production environment attempted to establish new mTLS \(mutual TLS\) connections simultaneously. This created a "Thundering Herd" event that saturated our HAProxy ingress layer, exhausting CPU resources and causing a cascade of connection failures. ‌ **Root Cause:** The prolonged nature of this incident was the result of three distinct, overlapping bottlenecks that our team had to isolate and resolve one by one: 1. **CPU-Intensive SSL Handshaking:** Establishing an mTLS connection is a CPU-intensive process. The sheer volume of simultaneous connection attempts pushed our HAProxy pods to their resource limits. This caused the pods to become unresponsive, leading to "Out of Memory" \(OOM\) kills and failed health probes. 2. **Health Check Death Spiral:** Our internal health checks initially relied on a Layer 7 SSL validation. Because the CPU was 100% occupied with agent reconnections, the pods couldn't respond to their own health checks in time. This caused the system to erroneously mark healthy pods as "down”, removing them from the rotation and further overwhelming the remaining pods. 3. **Load Balancer Handshake Saturation:** As we attempted to scale our infrastructure, the Application Load Balancer \(ALB\) encountered a throughput bottleneck specifically related to the rate of new connection establishments. The surge of agents attempting to negotiate new SSL handshakes at the same time exceeded the ALB's burst capacity, temporarily preventing even healthy backend pods from receiving and processing traffic. ‌ **Why It Took Time to Resolve:** While reverting the flag was the correct first step, the agents were already in an aggressive retry loop that continued even after the 503 errors stopped.  We had to experiment with several configurations \(adjusting health check intervals and timeout windows\) to find a balance that allowed pods to stay "alive" long enough to process the backlog. Stability was achieved only once we implemented Concurrency Control. By lowering the maximum allowed concurrent connections per pod, we stopped the CPU from over-committing to handshakes, allowing the system to reliably process a controlled flow of traffic until the global queue cleared. ‌ **Corrective Actions / Risk Mitigation:** **1.\) Edge Infrastructure Hardening** We are standardized on a new high-availability configuration for our HAProxy ingress layer. * **Concurrency Governance**: We have implemented a strict maxconn limit per pod. This acts as a "pressure valve," ensuring that the CPU remains available to process existing requests rather than becoming saturated by new connection attempts. * **Dynamic Capacity Management via Autoscaling**: We are implementing Horizontal Pod Autoscaling \(HPA\) for our HAProxy ingress layer, calibrated to trigger based on both CPU utilization and active connection counts.  This ensures we can absorb sudden traffic fluctuations and also maintain a controlled flow of requests to our backend services. **2.\) Agent Connectivity Optimization** We are updating the JumpCloud Agent’s communication layer to be more "network-aware" during degraded states: * **Enhanced Connection Pooling**: We are reconfiguring the agent's HTTP transport logic to maximize the reuse of existing idle connections. This significantly reduces the "Connection Tax" on our backend during high-traffic events. * **Streamlined Resource Handling**: We are implementing stricter protocols for draining and closing HTTP response bodies, ensuring that pooled connections are returned to the rotation immediately and reliably. **3.\) Adaptive Retry Logic \(Jitter\)** To further break up "synchronized" traffic spikes: * **Introduction of Jitte**r: While our agents currently use exponential backoff for poll requests, we are adding randomized "jitter" to our retry intervals. This spreads reconnection attempts across a wider window, preventing large blocks of agents from hitting the service at the exact same millisecond. * **Standardizing Resilient Retry Logic:** We are transitioning the Agent’s default HTTP client to a unified **exponential backoff** model for all request types. * **Controlled Rollou**t: This update will be managed via a staged rollout to monitor for any unforeseen side effects on fleet-wide connectivity patterns.

1. 21. november 2025 kl. 12.34 UTCinvestigating

   We had reports of delays or timeouts when accessing the Admin and User Portal consoles but now recovering. This issue has been traced to an ongoing network problem within the Asia region reported by Cloudflare. We are closely monitoring the situation and will provide an update as soon as new information becomes available.

2. 21. november 2025 kl. 12.44 UTCmonitoring

   Per the latest update from CloudFlare, a fix has been implemented and results are being monitored. https://www.cloudflarestatus.com/incidents/5p8c3l54b5cl

3. 21. november 2025 kl. 14.30 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19. november 2025 kl. 06.46 UTCinvestigating

   We're currently investigating reports of intermittent access issues with JumpCloud's Console Service for administrator at https://console.jumpcloud.com/. We are investigating the cause of the issues currently, and will update the status event once resolved.

2. 19. november 2025 kl. 07.00 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 19. november 2025 kl. 07.16 UTCresolved

   Issue is resolved and closed.

4. 21. november 2025 kl. 18.25 UTCpostmortem

    ‌ **Date**: Nov 21, 2025 **Date of Incident:** Nov 19, 2025 **Description**: RCA for Admin Portal Login Errors ‌ **Summary:** On November 19, 2025, starting at approximately 04:30 UTC, between 1-5% of requests experienced intermittent failures to successfully authenticate to the Admin Console, lasting until roughly 06:30 UTC.  Users attempting to authenticate received an “unexpected” error message during this window, but subsequent retries may have been successful. **Root Cause:** This issue was triggered during a standard infrastructure update and traffic shift intended to move services to a new, updated cluster.  The core issue was a combination of an infrastructure configuration mismatch and gaps in our detection and validation processes. 1. Configuration Drift: The new infrastructure cluster \(Green Cluster\), intended to host the service, was missing a single but essential configuration value used by the control plane’s service mesh. This value had been recently applied to the existing cluster \(old cluster\) but was inadvertently excluded when the new cluster's baseline configuration was created and branched.  When production traffic began routing to the new cluster, the missing configuration caused some access components to fail, leading to the login errors. 2. Detection Gaps: The application logged the configuration failure as a _Warning_ message, rather than a critical error. This meant our automated monitoring system did not trigger an immediate alert or rollback when the issue first occurred. The team quickly isolated the issue to the new Green Cluster, and an emergency process was initiated to immediately revert all production traffic back to the stable old cluster. ‌ **Corrective Actions / Risk Mitigation:** 1. Automated Configuration Diff Check - Implementing an automated process to continuously compare and ensure 100% configuration parity between old and new production clusters during all transition phases. 2. Clear Rule Enforcement - Reinforcing and automating the process to ensure all configuration changes are applied consistently across all active and future clusters. 3. Multi-Layer Error Monitoring - Implementing error rate monitoring at every layer of the network and application stack to ensure no failure goes undetected.

1. 11. november 2025 kl. 08.17 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating reports of intermittent issues with launching Remote Assist tool. We are investigating the cause of the issue currently, and will provide an update within one hour.

2. 11. november 2025 kl. 08.40 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 11. november 2025 kl. 09.12 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 11. november 2025 kl. 09.41 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 6. november 2025 kl. 12.28 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with the authentication on SSO OIDC applications. We have already identified the cause and will provide an update within one hour.

2. 6. november 2025 kl. 12.33 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 6. november 2025 kl. 13.10 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 6. november 2025 kl. 13.47 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

5. 13. november 2025 kl. 23.33 UTCpostmortem

    ‌ **Date**: Nov 13, 2025 **Date of Incident:** Nov 6, 2025 **Description**: RCA for SSO/OIDC Service Degradation ‌ **Summary:** On November 6, 2025, starting at approximately 12:00 UTC, customers experienced failures to launch any application relying on JumpCloud's OIDC-based Single Sign-On \(SSO\), lasting for roughly one hour. ‌ **Root Cause:** The outage was caused by a combination of two errors during a scheduled compliance procedure: 1. Faulty Password Generation: Our automated system for rotating database passwords created a new credential that contained unsafe special characters. 2. Missing Special Character Logic: The entrypoint script for our core SSO service was missing logic to handle these special characters before using the password to construct a database connection string. When the SSO service attempted to restart and use the newly rotated password, the presence of the unsafe characters caused the connection string to be misinterpreted as invalid, leading to a parsing failure and service degradation. This issue stemmed from a latent configuration bug that was masked by prior rotation processes. Previously, database passwords were rotated manually using an older system \(`random_password` IAC resource\) which was explicitly configured to only generate alphanumeric characters. These characters are inherently safe in a URL context, so the underlying bug in the SSO service's connection logic was never exposed.  When the credential management was successfully migrated to the new, more robust rotation process, the new function began generating highly complex passwords, including special characters, for the first time. This immediately triggered the latent parsing flaw in the SSO service’s entrypoint script. ‌ **Corrective Actions / Risk Mitigation:** 1. Hardening code logic - All services that construct database connection strings will be audited and updated to explicitly encode the password component eliminating character misinterpretation. 2. Enhanced rotation alerting -  New monitoring and alerting dashboards are in place to track the health and success schedule of all automated credential rotation jobs, providing an immediate alert if a rotation creates an invalid credential. 3. Update password generation logic - The automated credential rotation function has been updated to explicitly generate passwords that are safe, avoiding complex, reserved characters.

1. 4. november 2025 kl. 11.40 UTCinvestigating

   We are seeing issues with SSO authentication. We are investigating this currently and will update within 1 hour

2. 4. november 2025 kl. 11.47 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 4. november 2025 kl. 12.20 UTCidentified

   We have identified an issue that is causing intermittent login issues with the JumpCloud User Portal and Admin Portal. We have also identified issues with JumpCloud MFA, LDAP, RADIUS, and authentication with SSO. We are working on implementing a fix and will provide another update as soon as possible.

4. 4. november 2025 kl. 12.59 UTCidentified

   We continue to see intermittent issues with accessing the JumpCloud User and Admin Portal, MFA, LDAP, RADIUS, and SSO. During this time access attempts to LDAP and RADIUS are only impacted if a user is authenticating with MFA. Our team is working on implementing a fix and will provide another update as quickly as possible.

5. 4. november 2025 kl. 13.17 UTCmonitoring

   We have implemented a fix and users should now be able to access the User and Admin Console, MFA, LDAP, RADIUS, and SSO without issue.  We will continue to monitor the results of the fix.

6. 4. november 2025 kl. 14.19 UTCresolved

   Services have been fully restored and this incident has been resolved. We will provide a formal postmortem as a follow up.

7. 7. november 2025 kl. 17.47 UTCpostmortem

    ‌ **Date**: Nov 7, 2025 **Date of Incident:** Nov 4, 2025 **Description**: RCA for Auth Database Degradation ‌ **Summary:** On November 4, 2025, a number of customers experienced intermittent failures, timeouts and increased latency when attempting to authenticate to multiple JumpCloud Services, including consoles, LDAP, RADIUS and SAML, or use Multi-Factor Authentication. ‌ **Root Cause:** The incident was triggered by an issue in the deployment process involving a database schema change and a subsequent application code release. During this deployment, a planned database change unintentionally removed several database indexes required by the existing application code. The sequence of failure was as follows: 1. Deployment Order Error: The database schema change \(which removed necessary indexes\) was applied to the production database before the new application code \(which did not require those indexes\) was deployed. 2. Performance Collapse: The existing, high-volume authentication code \(used for functions like TOTP and push authentication\) was forced to run against the now-inefficient database structure. Queries that normally took milliseconds suddenly took several seconds. 3. Connection Exhaustion: These slow queries held database connections open for extended periods, quickly overwhelming the database server's available connection pool. 4. Full Outage: With no available connections, the main authentication API could not communicate with the database, leading to 100% CPU utilization on the database server and triggering the intermittent timeouts and failures experienced by our customers. ‌ **Why Testing Did Not Catch This:** The issue was not identified during testing in our Development or Staging environments due to insufficient Load Simulation. The resource consumption issues and connection exhaustion only manifest under the extreme pressure of peak production traffic volume. The simulated load profiles in our lower environments were not sufficient to expose this specific failure mode. ‌ **Corrective Actions / Risk Mitigation:** 1. Mandatory schema change review - All database schema changes must now undergo an additional level of review to explicitly assess index dependencies and impact. 2. New deployment phasing - We are implementing new tools and checks to enforce that application code dependent on a schema change is deployed before a database change is executed. 3. Enhance alerting -  We are implementing new monitors and alerts specifically for the Auth-API's database connection pool health and CPU utilization. 4. Enhanced load testing - We are revisiting the load profiles used in our staging environments looking for opportunities to more accurately simulate peak production traffic.

1. 20. oktober 2025 kl. 15.44 UTCinvestigating

   Due to an issue with our Cloud Provider, JumpCloud is experiencing intermittent issues with our PAM service and some Support tools which may affect case creation. We are investigating this with our provider and will update this incident as we know more.

2. 20. oktober 2025 kl. 15.50 UTCidentified

   We are monitoring our services and continue to work with our provider to restore full functionality.

3. 20. oktober 2025 kl. 17.43 UTCmonitoring

   We've seen an increase in recovery and are monitoring

4. 20. oktober 2025 kl. 21.46 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

5. 27. oktober 2025 kl. 19.21 UTCpostmortem

    **Date**: Oct 27, 2025 **Date of Incident:** Oct 20, 2025 **Description**: RCA for Service Degradation Linked to AWS US-EAST-1 Regional Disruption ‌ **Summary:** On October 20, 2025, between approximately 07:00 UTC and 10:00 UTC, the JumpCloud platform experienced significant performance degradation. This primarily affected the responsiveness of our core APIs, administrative console access, user console access, single sign-on \(SSO\) functions for customers, failed trial creation, user updates, and the potential loss of some Directory Insights events.  Residual performance degradation, affecting services like our Privileged Access Management \(PAM\) feature and specific Support Portal APIs, persisted until approximately 17:00 UTC, at which point all services were fully restored. ‌ The degradation was not caused by a failure within the JumpCloud platform code or infrastructure configuration, but was a direct consequence of a severe, cascading failure within the Amazon Web Services \(AWS\) US-EAST-1 region. Although many of our services are deployed across multiple Availability Zones \(AZs\) within the region for resilience, the nature of the AWS issue - impacting fundamental regional services - compromised inter-AZ communication preventing some of our standard failover mechanisms from operating successfully. Services returned to full operational status after AWS reported stability with the impacted foundational services. ‌ **Root Cause:** Based on the [post-incident analysis of AWS,](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/) the service disruption was not a single event but a sequence of cascading failures across three fundamental AWS services. ‌ 1. DynamoDB Failure Due to Latent DNS Race Condition \(Initial Trigger\) 2. EC2 Launch Congestion and Network Propagation Delays \(Sustained Impact\) 3. Network Load Balancer \(NLB\) Health Check Instability \(Final Phase\) ‌ All affected service teams were paged by our monitoring and alerting systems, and our incident management team was engaged to coordinate efforts and assess areas where we could throttle traffic to stabilize remaining capacity. ‌ ‌ **Corrective Actions / Risk Mitigation:** 1. While our current architecture mitigates some single-Availability Zone \(AZ\) failures, our primary focus is to eliminate single-region dependency entirely. JumpCloud is actively engaged in strategic engineering initiatives to further strengthen the platform's foundation. We are conducting a thorough review of cross-region dependencies and replication strategies to enhance our service's resilience against widespread environmental disruptions, always striving to meet the highest standards of availability.

1. 20. oktober 2025 kl. 07.52 UTCinvestigating

   Due to an issue with our Cloud Provider, JumpCloud is experiencing intermittent issues with multiple services. We are investigating this with our provider and will update this incident as we know more.

2. 20. oktober 2025 kl. 09.11 UTCidentified

   We are monitoring our services, and starting to see some recovery.

3. 20. oktober 2025 kl. 10.02 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor as we see further recovery with all services.

4. 20. oktober 2025 kl. 10.14 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

5. 27. oktober 2025 kl. 19.18 UTCpostmortem

    **Date**: Oct 27, 2025 **Date of Incident:** Oct 20, 2025 **Description**: RCA for Service Degradation Linked to AWS US-EAST-1 Regional Disruption ‌ **Summary:** On October 20, 2025, between approximately 07:00 UTC and 10:00 UTC, the JumpCloud platform experienced significant performance degradation. This primarily affected the responsiveness of our core APIs, administrative console access, user console access, single sign-on \(SSO\) functions for customers, failed trial creation, user updates, and the potential loss of some Directory Insights events.  Residual performance degradation, affecting services like our Privileged Access Management \(PAM\) feature and specific Support Portal APIs, persisted until approximately 17:00 UTC, at which point all services were fully restored. ‌ The degradation was not caused by a failure within the JumpCloud platform code or infrastructure configuration, but was a direct consequence of a severe, cascading failure within the Amazon Web Services \(AWS\) US-EAST-1 region. Although many of our services are deployed across multiple Availability Zones \(AZs\) within the region for resilience, the nature of the AWS issue - impacting fundamental regional services - compromised inter-AZ communication preventing some of our standard failover mechanisms from operating successfully. Services returned to full operational status after AWS reported stability with the impacted foundational services. ‌ **Root Cause:** Based on the [post-incident analysis of AWS,](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/) the service disruption was not a single event but a sequence of cascading failures across three fundamental AWS services. ‌ 1. DynamoDB Failure Due to Latent DNS Race Condition \(Initial Trigger\) 2. EC2 Launch Congestion and Network Propagation Delays \(Sustained Impact\) 3. Network Load Balancer \(NLB\) Health Check Instability \(Final Phase\) ‌ All affected service teams were paged by our monitoring and alerting systems, and our incident management team was engaged to coordinate efforts and assess areas where we could throttle traffic to stabilize remaining capacity. ‌ **Corrective Actions / Risk Mitigation:** 1. While our current architecture mitigates some single-Availability Zone \(AZ\) failures, our primary focus is to eliminate single-region dependency entirely. JumpCloud is actively engaged in strategic engineering initiatives to further strengthen the platform's foundation. We are conducting a thorough review of cross-region dependencies and replication strategies to enhance our service's resilience against widespread environmental disruptions, always striving to meet the highest standards of availability.