Knowbe4 driftsforstyrrelser

1. 4. september 2026 kl. 10.53 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports of an issue with delivery of Email verification MFA for Workspace. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 4. september 2026 kl. 14.24 UTCmonitoring

   We have received reports that the issue with delivery of Email verification MFA for Workspace has been mitigated by Microsoft, and we are monitoring the results.

3. 7. september 2026 kl. 08.25 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 26. august 2026 kl. 16.19 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified an issue where users may experience delays in messages being processed, and our engineering team is looking into a fix.

2. 26. august 2026 kl. 16.46 UTCmonitoring

   Our engineering team has implemented a fix for the issue that causing message processing delays in PhishER, and we are monitoring the results.

3. 26. august 2026 kl. 19.51 UTCresolved

   Our engineering team has implemented a fix for the issue that causing message processing delays in PhishER.

1. 21. august 2026 kl. 08.52 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports that the Gmail Phish Alert Button shows the error "[reportPhishAttempt()] An internal error has occurred. Please try again." when reporting phish. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 21. august 2026 kl. 12.03 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 21. august 2026 kl. 13.08 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 21. august 2026 kl. 14.57 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

5. 26. august 2026 kl. 15.55 UTCpostmortem

   On Friday, August 21, 2026, from approximately 05:20 to 12:55 \(UTC\), some customers experienced intermittent failures when using the Gmail Phish Alert Button add-in to report suspicious emails, receiving the "An internal error has occurred" message instead of a successful report confirmation. The issue affected customers across all regions, with the highest error volumes concentrated in the EU-West and US-East service regions. This issue was caused by a disruption in a caching service on Google's Apps Script platform, which the add-in relies on to store per-user session configuration. The service began intermittently returning empty results on read while still accepting new writes, causing affected report submissions to fail. KnowBe4 engaged Google directly and filed a formal bug report between approximately 12:19 and 12:39 \(UTC\). Error volume declined sharply shortly after as the vendor-side condition cleared, and the Gmail Phish Alert Button returned to normal performance by approximately 12:55 \(UTC\). To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are continuing to work with Google to track the resolution of the underlying caching defect. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 18. august 2026 kl. 14.29 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue causing a Non-Delivery Report (NDR) to be returned when a message is reported via the Phish Alert Button and "Send Us a Copy" is enabled in Account Settings

2. 18. august 2026 kl. 15.26 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 18. august 2026 kl. 20.14 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 5. august 2026 kl. 19.29 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting Google PhishRIP queries, which may cause them to fail.

2. 5. august 2026 kl. 21.24 UTCmonitoring

   Based on our investigation into the recent errors affecting Google PhishRIP queries, it appears these may be related to suspended Gmail accounts. We are continuing to monitor the issue.

3. 6. august 2026 kl. 21.56 UTCresolved

   Upon further investigation we have determined that the errors affecting Google PhishRIP queries were related to individual issues on Google accounts.

1. 4. august 2026 kl. 19.19 UTCidentified

   We have identified an issue preventing account settings from loading in the SAT console.

2. 4. august 2026 kl. 19.51 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 5. august 2026 kl. 12.17 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 28. juli 2026 kl. 20.00 UTCinvestigating

   Vi undersøger et problem i forbindelse med e-mails, der blev sat i karantæne af PhishRIP uventet

2. 28. juli 2026 kl. 20.35 UTCmonitoring

   En rettelse er blevet gennemført for dette spørgsmål, og PhishRIP forespørgsler er ikke længere i karantæne meddelelser uventet. Vi undersøger stadig spørgsmål, der kan være blevet påvirket

3. 29. juli 2026 kl. 18.58 UTCresolved

   Denne hændelse er blevet løst.

4. 30. juli 2026 kl. 16.38 UTCpostmortem

   # * * Oversigt * * Den 28. juli 2026, en opdatering til PhishRIP-tjenesten forårsagede nogle PhishRIP søgning forespørgsler til at matche mere bredt, end de burde have. Benigne e-mails, der ikke opfyldte de konfigurerede afsenderkriterier, blev sat i karantæne på tværs af nogle kundekonti. Automatiseret overvågning og kundesupport billetter dukkede problemet hurtigt op. Engineering vendt ændringen inden for cirka 25 minutter efter at erklære hændelsen og stoppet den utilsigtede karantæne. Engineering derefter manuelt restaureret forkert karantæne e-mails til kundernes indbakker. # * * Root cause * * Den 28. juli 2026, vi indsat en vedligeholdelse opdatering til forespørgsel service bag PhishRIP. Opdateringen var designet til at forbedre håndteringen af ugyldige afsenderadresser ved at tillade systemet at falde tilbage til søgning kun domænet del af adressen. Imidlertid anvendte eksisterende valideringslogik et regulært udtryk, der krævede et "@" -symbol i afsenderfeltet. Når en forespørgsel brugte et bare domæne, såsom [example.com] (http: / / example.com) uden brugernavn eller "@" symbol, markerede regex domænet som ugyldigt. Denne konflikt mellem den eksisterende validering og domæne søgningsopdateringen fik systemet til at droppe afsenderkriterier helt. Forespørgslen kørte mod indbakker ved hjælp af kun sine resterende parametre, matchende og karantæne e-mails godt uden for den tilsigtede afsender. # * * * Tidslinje * * Alle tidspunkter er i UTC. * * tid * * tid * * begivenhed * * begivenhed * * ECB 's Styrelsesråd ; 124; 19: 36; 124; Vores automatiserede overvågning opdaget unormal forespørgsel udførelse mønstre og advarede vores ingeniører, der straks begyndte at undersøge.; ; 124; 19: 51; 124; Emnet blev eskaleret til en høj sværhedsgrad produktion hændelse, og et svar team blev samlet.; Vores support team eskalerede de første kunde billetter, der rapporterede uventede karantæne, bekræfter overvågning alarm. ; 124; 19: 54; 124; Rodårsagen blev sporet til en nylig forespørgsler API implementering, og ingeniørarbejde begyndte at vende ændringen. Der blev sendt meddelelser til vores statusside med PhishRIP markeret som Degraderet. 124; 20: 16; deployeringen var fuldt vendt. ; 124; 20: 35; Produktionskontrol bekræftede, at emne og domæne forespørgsler igen var matchende kun deres tilsigtede mål, og at ingen yderligere meddelelser blev sat i karantæne ved en fejl. Vores statusside blev opdateret i overensstemmelse hermed.; ; 20: 39; Engineering begyndte at genoprette forkert karantæne e-mails. Der blev gennemført restaureringer for alle kundesøgningssæt logget gennem vores supporthold. # * * Mitigation og oprydning * * * * Kode tilbage. * * Vi vejede stop aktive PhishRIP operationer mid- køre mod at vende koden. At stoppe baggrundsopgaverne ville have forstyrret legitime sikkerhedsarbejdsgange for hver lejer, så det var bedre at vende tilbage. kodens tilbagevenden blev indsat og verificeret i produktionen inden for ca. 40 minutter efter eskalering. * * Email restaurering. * * For at undgå at frigive ægte ondsindede e-mails tilbage til kundemiljøer, vi manuelt restaurerede dem snarere end i bulk. Engineering brugt interne admin værktøjer til at gendanne e-mails i partier, og arbejdede med Support til at kontrollere hver konto ID, forespørgsel ID, og modtage kundegodkendelse først. Alle indberettede konti blev genoprettet natten over. # # * * Forebyggende foranstaltninger * * * * * Regressionsdækning * *: Vi tilføjer enhed og integration test for domæne-kun, ikke-standard, og bare- streng afsender forespørgsler til at fange disse input-sager før implementering. * * * Forespørgsel guardrails * *: Vi tilføjer en check i forespørgslen motor, der blokerer forespørgsler fra at køre, hvis deres centrale filtreringsparametre er faldet under evalueringen. # * * Konklusion * * En enkelt valideringsregel forårsagede dette: en regex, der antog alle afsenderfelter indeholdt et '@'. Når forespørgsler brugt en bare domæne, denne antagelse faldt afsenderen filter og forespørgsler matchede langt mere post end planlagt. Fixet var ligetil, da vi fandt det, og tilbagefald stoppede skaden inden for omkring 25 minutter efter at erklære hændelsen. Gendannelse i karantæne mail var en hårdere proces: vi kunne ikke gendanne e-mails i bulk uden at risikere virkelig ondsindede e-mails, der går tilbage til indbakker. Vores team valgte at gå forsigtigt frem, arbejde konto for konto med Support hele natten. To forebyggende foranstaltninger ville have fanget dette tidligere: en test, der dækker domæne-kun afsender forespørgsler, og en gardrail, der nægter at køre en forespørgsel, når dens afsender filter er blevet fjernet. Begge er nu planlagt. Det umiddelbare problem er løst, og alle indberettede konti er blevet genoprettet. # # * * Ordliste * * * * * PhishRIP: * * En Phisher funktion, der lader administratorer søge efter og karantæne matchende phishing e-mails på tværs af hver bruger indbakke i en organisation. * * * Regex\ (regulært udtryk\): * * Et mønster, der bruges i software til at søge tekst og validere input, såsom kontrol af, at en e-mail-adresse er formateret korrekt. * * * Kode tilbage: * * Backing ud en software opdatering til at vende tilbage til den tidligere stabile version.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 17. juli 2026 kl. 13.18 UTCinvestigating

   Vi undersøger brugere bliver ude af stand til at købe Beskyt licenser på store.knobe4.com. Vi vil opdatere denne side, når vi har flere oplysninger.

2. 17. juli 2026 kl. 18.55 UTCmonitoring

   Vi har implementeret et fix, og vi overvåger resultaterne for at sikre, at der ikke opstår flere problemer.

3. 20. juli 2026 kl. 18.24 UTCinvestigating

   Vi har modtaget rapporter om, at kunderne ikke er i stand til at købe Beskyt licenser på store.knowbe4.com. Vi undersøger dette spørgsmål og vil opdatere denne side, når vi har flere oplysninger.

4. 29. juli 2026 kl. 18.40 UTCmonitoring

   Vi har implementeret et fix til online butikken og vi overvåger resultaterne for at sikre, at der ikke opstår yderligere problemer.

5. 17. august 2026 kl. 21.02 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor the implemented fix for the online store, to ensure that no further issues occur.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 16. juli 2026 kl. 19.48 UTCinvestigating

   Vi har identificeret et problem, hvor brugerne kan modtage en omdirigering, når de logger ind på Defend, og vores ingeniørhold undersøger en rettelse.

2. 16. juli 2026 kl. 20.09 UTCidentified

   Et fix er blevet identificeret, og vi vil overvåge resultaterne, mens det ruller ud.

3. 16. juli 2026 kl. 21.20 UTCresolved

   Denne hændelse er blevet løst.

4. 20. august 2026 kl. 21.32 UTCpostmortem

   On Thursday, July 16, 2026, from approximately 19:57 to 21:12 \(UTC\), some customers experienced difficulty logging in to the Defend console, seeing a **Find Out More** screen instead of console access. This issue was caused by a synchronization issue between Salesforce and our internal licensing systems, which incorrectly set some customer license counts to zero. As a result, affected customers were unable to log in. To resolve this issue, our team applied a temporary license override to restore access for affected customers while correcting the underlying licensing records in Salesforce. Once corrected, the systems automatically synchronized the accurate values, and the Defend console access returned to normal performance by approximately 21:12 \(UTC\). To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are implementing improvements to the Salesforce synchronization process to ensure accurate license counts. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 15. juli 2026 kl. 16.51 UTCinvestigating

   Vi undersøger brugere bliver ude af stand til at købe Beskyt licenser på store.knobe4.com. Vi vil opdatere denne side, når vi har flere oplysninger.

2. 15. juli 2026 kl. 16.54 UTCinvestigating

   Vi fortsætter med at undersøge dette spørgsmål.

3. 16. juli 2026 kl. 01.23 UTCmonitoring

   Et fix er blevet gennemført, og vi overvåger resultaterne.

4. 16. juli 2026 kl. 14.04 UTCresolved

   Denne hændelse er blevet løst.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 22. juli 2026 kl. 21.01 UTCresolved

   En opstrøms funktion flag service problem nedbrudt model routing i samarbejde-inferens, forårsager PhishML evalueringer til at returnere 0 / 0 / 0 standardfejl. Tredjemand indsat en rettelse, og en kode opdatering blev indsat til produktion tilføje statisk fallback routing. Alle tjenester er kommet sig og fungerer normalt.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 1. juli 2026 kl. 14.40 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports that users are experiencing issues when logging into the US instance. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 1. juli 2026 kl. 16.02 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 1. juli 2026 kl. 18.01 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 8. juli 2026 kl. 18.52 UTCpostmortem

   ## **Executive Summary** On July 1, 2026, the KnowBe4 Security Awareness Training \(KSAT\) platform experienced a period of degraded performance resulting in intermittent login errors and high latency for users on our United States \(US\) instance. The issue was initiated following a routine platform deployment that introduced an unoptimized database query. This query placed an excessive operational load on our primary database reader cluster, causing database sessions to saturate and subsequent login requests to queue up. Engineering teams promptly identified the degradation, reverted the deployment, and systematically cleared the backlogged database sessions to restore optimal performance. The issue did not affect data integrity or security, and service was fully stabilized. ## **Technical Root Cause** The root cause was determined to be a newly introduced query within a standard application update. Upon deployment, this specific query pattern bypassed optimal indexing strategies, resulting in full table scans and highly extended execution times on the database reader infrastructure. As a high volume of authentication and application requests arrived concurrently, the database reader quickly exhausted its available connection pool due to these long-running, unmitigated database sessions. This resource starvation immediately manifested as severe application latency and intermittent timeouts during the user authentication process. ## **Timeline of Events** The incident began in the mid-morning hours and progressed through identification, remediation, and verification stages over a period of approximately 152 minutes. An internal high-severity incident response group was established immediately following automated monitoring alerts indicating that health checks targeting our application programming interface \(API\) routing layer were failing from regional cloud monitoring nodes. This behavior was confirmed by concurrent engineering analysis of user HTTP Archive files, which demonstrated severe latency spikes specifically isolated to the authentication endpoints. Within three minutes of establishing the response team, cross-referencing recent system changes pointed to a recent application deployment as the primary catalyst. Engineers immediately initiated the rollback process, drafting and approving a revert modification to extract the problematic code from the deployment pipeline. The deployment of the reverted codebase to the US production cluster commenced shortly thereafter. While the deployment processed over the subsequent twenty-five minutes, technical personnel prepared direct database interventions to clear the residual system strain. Once the stable code version was completely active across the fleet, engineers began systematically terminating the lingering, long-running database sessions that had been spawned by the unoptimized query. To ensure a pristine state, the database reader infrastructure was cycled twice. Following these administrative infrastructure restarts, operational telemetry showed the database reader load dropping significantly to a healthy baseline of approximately thirty-six percent. System performance normalized, and administrative logging verified that authentication requests were processing within standard latency thresholds. After monitoring the environment to confirm sustained stability, engineers officially marked the incident as mitigated, later shifting the status to fully resolved following an extended window of zero performance spikes and complete passes on all automated sanity test suites. ## **Mitigation** To alleviate the immediate infrastructure distress and restore user access, the engineering team executed a multi-phased mitigation strategy: * **Codebase Rollback:** The changes introduced in the recent deployment were immediately isolated, reverted, and redeployed to production to prevent any further generation of the unoptimized query. * **Database Session Termination:** Internal engineering tools were utilized to explicitly terminate active, long-running database queries that were blocking the connection pools. * **Infrastructure Cycling:** The database reader instances were restarted twice in succession to flush out stale memory allocations and guarantee that all orphaned database sessions were permanently cleared. ## **Preventative Measures** To prevent a recurrence of this specific issue and mitigate the impact of similar query-based database bottlenecks in the future, KnowBe4 is implementing the following actions: * **Enhanced Query Linting and Analysis:** Integrate automated query execution plan analysis into our continuous integration and continuous deployment pipelines to flag unindexed or high-cost queries before they reach production environments. * **Database Connection Pooling Guardrails:** Adjust database timeouts and implement aggressive circuit-breaker thresholds for user authentication paths to prevent single, long-running query patterns from exhausting the entire connection pool. * **Load Shedding Policies:** Implement strict application-level timeouts on read-heavy database calls to ensure they fail gracefully rather than degrading the overall availability of the core login workflows. ## **Conclusion** We sincerely apologize for the inconvenience and friction this performance degradation caused our customers and partners. KnowBe4 is dedicated to maintaining high availability and reliability across our product suites. By refining our pre-deployment automated query validation and bolstering our database connection resiliency, we are actively working to ensure the continuous, seamless operation of the KSAT platform. ## **Glossary of Technical Terms** * **API \(Application Programming Interface\):** A set of protocols that allows different software applications to communicate with one another. In this context, it routes authentication requests from the user interface to the backend servers. * **Database Reader:** A dedicated database instance or cluster responsible for handling read-only queries \(such as fetching user profiles or validating login configurations\), separating this traffic from write operations to optimize performance. * **HAR \(HTTP Archive\) File:** A JSON-formatted log file that records a web browser's interaction with a website, used by engineers to diagnose performance and network latency issues. * **Latency:** The time delay or duration it takes for a data packet or request to travel from its source to its destination and return a response. * **Sanity Suite:** A collection of automated tests executed against a deployment environment to quickly verify that the core functionality of an application is working correctly.

1. 30. juni 2026 kl. 16.14 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports that emails sent to Defend are experiencing delays being delivered to inboxes using SMTP. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 30. juni 2026 kl. 19.46 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

3. 3. juli 2026 kl. 15.23 UTCpostmortem

   #### Summary On June 30, 2026, customers using the Defend US service experienced delays in email processing. The incident began at approximately 14:00 UTC and was fully resolved by 19:45 UTC. ‌ #### What Happened A scheduled maintenance operation began in the early morning of June 30. As this operation progressed, it placed an unexpectedly high load on our infrastructure, which caused email processing to slow down across our US service. ‌ Our team identified the issue and declared an incident at 16:00 UTC. Steps were taken to reduce the load and restore normal processing speeds, including pausing non-essential background activity and engaging our infrastructure provider for additional support. ‌ By 17:45 UTC, email delivery delays had been fully resolved. Email analysis continued to recover and was back to normal by 19:45 UTC. ‌ #### Customer Impact Email delivery \(SMTP customers\): Emails were delayed in transit by up to 30 minutes between approximately 14:00 UTC and 17:45 UTC. All emails were delivered; no messages were lost. ‌ Email analysis \(Microsoft 365 / Graph API customers\): Email analysis was delayed by an average of 30 minutes before emails were analysed, between approximately 14:00 UTC and 19:45 UTC. Email delivery to end users was not affected. ‌ #### What We Are Doing We have rescheduled the maintenance operation that triggered this incident to run during an overnight, low-traffic window, giving it sufficient time to complete without affecting the live service. ‌ We are also investing in infrastructure improvements to better isolate maintenance operations from customer-facing workloads, so that future maintenance cannot affect email processing in this way.

1. 30. juni 2026 kl. 14.18 UTCinvestigating

   Vi har identificeret et problem, hvor PhishML evalueringer er årsag til, at "PML: BYPASSAT" tag skal anvendes.

2. 30. juni 2026 kl. 15.42 UTCmonitoring

   Vi har implementeret et fix til Phisher og vi overvåger resultaterne for at sikre, at der ikke opstår yderligere problemer. Implementerede meddelelser kan genspilles gennem alle regler og handlinger. Vær opmærksom på, at dette kan medføre, at der sendes duplikerede svar, hvis en handling blev gennemført med succes under denne hændelse. Hvis du har yderligere spørgsmål eller problemer, bedes du kontakte vores supportteam direkte: https: / / support.knobe4.com / hc / en- us / requests / new Følgende videnbase Artikel indeholder instruktioner om, hvordan man genafspille beskeder: https: / / support.Knobe4.com / hc / en- us / artikler / 13169303385619- Phisher-Inbox- Guide # h _ 01HCNEBF8CJQ98GE9PGM7HGDZ0

3. 30. juni 2026 kl. 19.11 UTCresolved

   Denne hændelse er blevet løst.

4. 22. juli 2026 kl. 13.20 UTCpostmortem

   Tirsdag den 30. juni 2026, fra ca. 07: 40 til 19: 15\ (UTC\), oplevede kunderne forkerte resultater fra Phisher 's PhishML scoring. Berørte e-mails modtaget en PML: BYPASSED tag i stedet for en legitim PhishML klassificering, og tillid scorer manglede fra ramte meddelelser. Regler og handlinger, der afhænger af PhishML resultater også ikke aktiveret. Dette spørgsmål var forårsaget af en kode refaktor indført omkring to uger tidligere. Denne refaktor indført en defekt opdatering, der udelod væsentlige drivere kræves for PhishML scoring at køre. Men problemet forblev i dvale, indtil en anden opdatering udløste en ny PhishML model implementering, som fik scoring problemet til at dukke op. For at løse dette problem, vores team rullede tilbage til den sidste stabile implementering og tilføjet mere kapacitet til at behandle den resulterende backlog af e-mail evalueringer. Phisher 's PhishML scoring vendte tilbage til normal ydeevne med 19: 15\ (UTC\). For at forhindre denne type problemer i fremtiden har vi forbedret sundhedskontrollen ved at indføre et nyt endepunkt for røgtest af nye modeller før ibrugtagning.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.

1. 24. juni 2026 kl. 15.48 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified an issue where users may receive a 500 error upon logging into KCM GRC, and our engineering team is looking into a fix.

2. 24. juni 2026 kl. 22.06 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified an issue where users may receive a 500 error upon logging into KCM GRC. A fix has been implemented, and we will continue to monitor this issue.

3. 25. juni 2026 kl. 13.10 UTCresolved

   We have identified an issue where users may receive a 500 error upon logging into KCM GRC. A fix has been implemented, and users should be able to login without error.

4. 4. august 2026 kl. 14.50 UTCpostmortem

   From Tuesday, June 23, 2026, at approximately 10:03 \(UTC\) to Thursday, June 25, 2026, at approximately 11:54 \(UTC\), some US and EU customers experienced intermittent 502 errors when logging in to KCM GRC. This issue was caused by network traffic attempting to connect to invalid multilevel subdomains, which overwhelmed the cache serving KCM GRC and resulted in login errors. Our team initially updated the configuration of our content delivery network, which temporarily resolved the errors, but they returned later that day. After further investigation, we identified the caching issue as the root cause and deployed an infrastructure-level fix to prevent multi-level subdomain traffic from affecting the cache. KCM GRC returned to normal performance by 11:54 \(UTC\) on June 25, 2026. To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are evaluating additional protections to guard against similar traffic that could affect the cache. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 18. juni 2026 kl. 21.14 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports of the Phishing test reports tab currently being unavailable. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 18. juni 2026 kl. 21.16 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 18. juni 2026 kl. 22.42 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 19. juni 2026 kl. 14.01 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

5. 7. juli 2026 kl. 19.45 UTCpostmortem

   From Tuesday, June 16, 2026, at approximately 17:34 \(UTC\), to Thursday, June 18, 2026, at approximately 22:41 \(UTC\), some customers experienced intermittent unavailability of the **Phishing Security Test Reports** page in the KnowBe4 console. This issue was caused by a code change that introduced a conflict between two methods for processing phishing campaign data. As a result, phishing campaigns still using legacy phishing categories were unable to load the **Phishing Security Test Reports** page. To resolve this issue, we updated the code to process campaigns correctly under both classification systems, and the **Phishing Security Test Reports** page returned to normal performance by June 18, 2026, at 22:41 \(UTC\). No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 18. juni 2026 kl. 15.13 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports that the Human Risk Managment widget is showing no results in the KnowBe4 Security Center. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 18. juni 2026 kl. 15.43 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix for the Human Risk Management widget and we’re monitoring the results to make sure no further issues occur.

3. 18. juni 2026 kl. 19.12 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 8. september 2026 kl. 15.44 UTCpostmortem

   From Wednesday, June 17, 2026, at approximately 19:00 \(UTC\), to Thursday, June 18, 2026, at approximately 18:20 \(UTC\), some customers were unable to view results in the KnowBe4 Security Center’s Human Risk Management widget. ‌ This issue was caused by a recent infrastructure migration that left an internal service connection pointing to an outdated endpoint. Though the underlying data processing was unaffected, the Human Risk Management widget could not retrieve data or display results. To resolve this issue, our team updated and reapplied the connection configuration, and the KnowBe4 Security Center returned to normal performance by approximately 18:20 \(UTC\) on June 18, 2026. To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are improving our migration process to ensure that all endpoints are valid after a migration. We are also strengthening known-good rollback procedures in cases where a migration cannot be completed as planned. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 16. juni 2026 kl. 22.23 UTCinvestigating

   We've identified an issue that has resulted in inconsistent reporting, and our engineering team is looking into a fix.

2. 17. juni 2026 kl. 12.48 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 17. juni 2026 kl. 20.19 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 21. august 2026 kl. 18.00 UTCpostmortem

   From Tuesday, June 16, 2026, at approximately 22:23 \(UTC\), to Wednesday, June 17, 2026, at approximately 20:19 \(UTC\), some customers experienced inaccurate user counts in KSAT reporting. Downstream features that rely on this data were also affected, including AIDA Orchestration, Risk Score, and ModStore recommendations. This issue was caused by an incomplete rebuild of the users' data table. A data storage policy removed historical data earlier than intended, so when a full table rebuild ran, some older data was unavailable, causing user counts to drop. To resolve this issue, our team performed a full data migration sync on the users' table and retriggered the dependent data pipelines to update downstream systems. We then tested and confirmed that user counts were returning correct results, and the KSAT console returned to normal performance by June 17, 2026, at 20:19 \(UTC\). To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are correcting the underlying data storage policy to ensure complete historical data is retained for the full rebuild process. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 15. juni 2026 kl. 16.56 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

2. 20. august 2026 kl. 19.41 UTCpostmortem

   On Monday, June 15, 2026, from approximately 15:30 to 16:34 \(UTC\), some customers experienced processing delays with phishing and training campaigns in the KnowBe4 console. This issue was caused by an update that introduced an incompatible software version. This software prevented our background processing service from completing queued tasks. As a result, training enrollments, notification sending, and SmartGgroup enrollments were delayed. To resolve this issue, our team deployed a fix that reverted the affected dependency and restored normal job processing. Once the fix was deployed, the affected queues cleared, and the KnowBe4 console returned to normal performance by 16:34 \(UTC\). To prevent this issue in the future, we have implemented additional testing layers for similar deployments. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 3. juni 2026 kl. 15.07 UTCinvestigating

   Vi har modtaget rapporter om 500 fejl opstår, når navigering til brugerprofiler. Vi undersøger dette spørgsmål og vil opdatere denne side, når vi har flere oplysninger.

2. 3. juni 2026 kl. 16.16 UTCmonitoring

   Et fix er blevet gennemført, og vi overvåger resultaterne.

3. 3. juni 2026 kl. 18.14 UTCresolved

   Denne hændelse er blevet løst.

4. 15. juli 2026 kl. 15.23 UTCpostmortem

   Onsdag den 3. juni 2026, fra ca. 14: 49 til 16: 09\ (UTC\), oplevede kunderne fejl ved adgang til * * Brugerdetaljer * * siden i KSAT konsollen. Dette spørgsmål var forårsaget af en opdatering, der indførte manglende felter, som forhindrede * * Brugerdetaljer * * siden fra indlæsning. For at løse dette problem opdaterede vores team igen konsollen for at genoprette de manglende felter, og KSAT konsollen vendte tilbage til normal præstation med ca. 16: 09\ (UTC\). For at undgå lignende problemer i fremtiden blev der tilføjet yderligere automatiserede test. Intet tab af data opstod som følge af dette problem.

Automatisk oversat fra den officielle hændelsesopdatering.