Störungsverlauf von Circleapp

1. 5. Oktober 2026 um 09:44 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen derzeit dieses Problem.

2. 5. Oktober 2026 um 10:21 UTCresolved

   Dieser Vorfall wurde behoben. Der Vorfall wurde durch eine fehlende Konfiguration in der Anwendung verursacht, mit der wir Codeänderungen an der Circle-Anwendung bereitstellen. Nach der Untersuchung haben wir sofort einen temporären Patch angewendet, um die Verfügbarkeit wiederherzustellen. Wir haben dann die Ursache identifiziert und einen permanenten Fix implementiert. Alle Dienste funktionieren normal.

3. 5. Oktober 2026 um 15:46 UTCpostmortem

   Zusammenfassung Circle Anwendung erlebte einen Vorfall zwischen 5:44 und 5:57 Uhr EST Es tut uns leid für die Störung Was passiert ist \(High Level\) Der Vorfall wurde durch eine fehlende Konfiguration in der Anwendung verursacht, mit der wir neue Codeänderungen an der Circle-Anwendung bereitstellen Mitigation und sofortige Fixes Bei der Untersuchung des Problems haben wir diese Anwendung sofort mit einer vorübergehenden Änderung gepatcht, die die Verfügbarkeit der Anwendung wiederhergestellt hat. Später heute haben wir die Ursache identifiziert und eine endgültige Lösung angewendet. Status Alle Dienste funktionieren derzeit normal.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 3. Oktober 2026 um 08:13 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen derzeit dieses Problem.

2. 3. Oktober 2026 um 08:18 UTCresolved

   Dieser Vorfall wurde behoben.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 1. September 2026 um 13:59 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen derzeit dieses Problem.

2. 1. September 2026 um 15:43 UTCresolved

   Früher heute erlebten wir eine kurze Service-Störung von 9:59-10:50 Uhr ET während eines geplanten Sicherheitsupdates. Der Service wurde vollständig wiederhergestellt, und wir haben Sicherheitsvorkehrungen getroffen, um zu verhindern, dass sich dies wiederholt. Wir entschuldigen uns für jegliche Unannehmlichkeiten.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 27. August 2026 um 22:25 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen derzeit dieses Problem.

2. 27. August 2026 um 22:30 UTCresolved

   Dieser Vorfall wurde behoben.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 20. August 2026 um 17:51 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen derzeit dieses Problem.

2. 20. August 2026 um 17:54 UTCresolved

   Dieser Vorfall wurde behoben.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 20. August 2026 um 13:04 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen derzeit dieses Problem.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 19. August 2026 um 08:52 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen derzeit dieses Problem.

2. 19. August 2026 um 09:15 UTCresolved

   Dieser Vorfall wurde behoben.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 28. Mai 2026 um 16:44 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 28. Mai 2026 um 17:12 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 28. Mai 2026 um 18:46 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 28. Mai 2026 um 20:12 UTCresolved

   The issue has been fully resolved and all systems are operating normally. A detailed post-mortem report will be published here shortly. Thank you for your patience and cooperation.

5. 1. Juni 2026 um 15:06 UTCpostmortem

   ## Delays in Asynchronous Actions and Workflows ‌ **Issue Summary** On May 28, 2026, we experienced an incident that caused delays in asynchronous actions and automated workflows. **Timeline \(UTC\)** * **11:29** – The issue began, causing delays in newly scheduled automated workflows. * **15:51** – Our engineering team identified the root cause of the scheduling interruption. * **16:42** – A fix was deployed, restoring normal operations to the background processing framework. * **18:45** – The resulting backlog of delayed tasks was completely cleared and normal service was confirmed. **Root Cause** A routine system update included a software dependency upgrade that unexpectedly conflicted with our background processing framework. This conflict prevented scheduled background jobs from moving into the active processing queue. As a result, automated workflows and other asynchronous actions were delayed, though no underlying data was lost or corrupted during this time. **Resolution** Upon investigating the anomaly in the scheduling queue, our engineering team determined that the recent dependency upgrade was responsible. We immediately reverted the update, which restored the flow of scheduled tasks. To resolve the issue as swiftly as possible, we temporarily scaled up our infrastructure's processing capacity to rapidly clear the backlog of delayed actions. **Preventative Measures** To prevent this type of issue from occurring in the future, we are planning on implementing the following improvements: * **Enhanced Alerting:** We are deploying strict, automated alerts specifically designed to detect anomalies in scheduled task queues, drastically reducing our time to detection. * **Upgraded Telemetry:** We are adding granular, time-series visualizations to our monitoring systems to better track the exact states of background jobs \(scheduled, enqueued, and processed\) in real time. We sincerely apologize for any disruption this may have caused to your operations. The issue was fully mitigated, and all backlogged tasks have been successfully processed.

1. 22. Mai 2026 um 13:26 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 22. Mai 2026 um 19:20 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 20. Mai 2026 um 16:12 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 20. Mai 2026 um 16:15 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 9. Mai 2026 um 03:12 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 9. Mai 2026 um 03:43 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 30. April 2026 um 18:00 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30. April 2026 um 19:43 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

3. 30. April 2026 um 19:43 UTCpostmortem

   Some users experienced an issue where app.circle.so was unavailable. This was caused by the Redis cluster reaching 100% CPU due to a large volume of workflow jobs being re-enqueued. We identified the root cause, scaled down the background deployment pods to relieve the load, and restored service within approximately 3 minutes. We are continuing to investigate and address the underlying issue.

1. 30. April 2026 um 14:35 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30. April 2026 um 15:39 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 30. April 2026 um 11:36 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30. April 2026 um 12:19 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 30. April 2026 um 10:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30. April 2026 um 11:03 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19. April 2026 um 16:50 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 19. April 2026 um 18:32 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19. April 2026 um 01:01 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 19. April 2026 um 05:23 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 17. April 2026 um 18:53 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 17. April 2026 um 19:01 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 15. April 2026 um 20:01 UTCresolved

   Search functionality was degraded starting at approximately 6:52 PM EDT on April 14. The issue was caused by Elasticsearch cluster degradation. An incident report was filed internally. This issue should have had a status page entry since customers reported broken search. Customers checking [status.circle.so](http://status.circle.so) saw 'All Systems Operational' during this period.

2. 15. April 2026 um 20:01 UTCpostmortem

   Search functionality was degraded starting at approximately 6:52 PM EDT on April 14. The issue was caused by Elasticsearch cluster degradation. An incident report was filed internally. This issue should have had a status page entry since customers reported broken search. Customers checking [status.circle.so](http://status.circle.so/) saw 'All Systems Operational' during this period.

1. 14. April 2026 um 04:17 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 14. April 2026 um 04:36 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

3. 15. April 2026 um 19:50 UTCpostmortem

   Communities experienced approximately 19 minutes of downtime starting at 12:17 AM EDT. The database crashed due to an out-of-memory error at the infrastructure level, a known AWS RDS bug. Our team raised a second escalation to AWS \(case 177616832700336\), and both cases have been escalated to AWS's highest priority tier. We are actively working with AWS to resolve the underlying infrastructure issue and have additional safeguards in place.