55 Circleapp incidents · Oktober 2025 — official updates, affected components, duration and resolution details.
Wir untersuchen derzeit dieses Problem.
Früher heute erlebten wir eine kurze Service-Störung von 9:59-10:50 Uhr ET während eines geplanten Sicherheitsupdates. Der Service wurde vollständig wiederhergestellt, und wir haben Sicherheitsvorkehrungen getroffen, um zu verhindern, dass sich dies wiederholt. Wir entschuldigen uns für jegliche Unannehmlichkeiten.
Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.
Wir untersuchen derzeit dieses Problem.
Dieser Vorfall wurde behoben.
Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.
Wir untersuchen derzeit dieses Problem.
Dieser Vorfall wurde behoben.
Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.
Wir untersuchen derzeit dieses Problem.
Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.
Wir untersuchen derzeit dieses Problem.
Dieser Vorfall wurde behoben.
Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.
We are currently investigating this issue.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
The issue has been fully resolved and all systems are operating normally. A detailed post-mortem report will be published here shortly. Thank you for your patience and cooperation.
## Delays in Asynchronous Actions and Workflows **Issue Summary** On May 28, 2026, we experienced an incident that caused delays in asynchronous actions and automated workflows. **Timeline \(UTC\)** * **11:29** – The issue began, causing delays in newly scheduled automated workflows. * **15:51** – Our engineering team identified the root cause of the scheduling interruption. * **16:42** – A fix was deployed, restoring normal operations to the background processing framework. * **18:45** – The resulting backlog of delayed tasks was completely cleared and normal service was confirmed. **Root Cause** A routine system update included a software dependency upgrade that unexpectedly conflicted with our background processing framework. This conflict prevented scheduled background jobs from moving into the active processing queue. As a result, automated workflows and other asynchronous actions were delayed, though no underlying data was lost or corrupted during this time. **Resolution** Upon investigating the anomaly in the scheduling queue, our engineering team determined that the recent dependency upgrade was responsible. We immediately reverted the update, which restored the flow of scheduled tasks. To resolve the issue as swiftly as possible, we temporarily scaled up our infrastructure's processing capacity to rapidly clear the backlog of delayed actions. **Preventative Measures** To prevent this type of issue from occurring in the future, we are planning on implementing the following improvements: * **Enhanced Alerting:** We are deploying strict, automated alerts specifically designed to detect anomalies in scheduled task queues, drastically reducing our time to detection. * **Upgraded Telemetry:** We are adding granular, time-series visualizations to our monitoring systems to better track the exact states of background jobs \(scheduled, enqueued, and processed\) in real time. We sincerely apologize for any disruption this may have caused to your operations. The issue was fully mitigated, and all backlogged tasks have been successfully processed.
We are currently investigating this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently investigating this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently investigating this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently investigating this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
Some users experienced an issue where app.circle.so was unavailable. This was caused by the Redis cluster reaching 100% CPU due to a large volume of workflow jobs being re-enqueued. We identified the root cause, scaled down the background deployment pods to relieve the load, and restored service within approximately 3 minutes. We are continuing to investigate and address the underlying issue.
We are currently investigating this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently investigating this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently investigating this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently investigating this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently investigating this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently investigating this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
Search functionality was degraded starting at approximately 6:52 PM EDT on April 14. The issue was caused by Elasticsearch cluster degradation. An incident report was filed internally. This issue should have had a status page entry since customers reported broken search. Customers checking [status.circle.so](http://status.circle.so) saw 'All Systems Operational' during this period.
Search functionality was degraded starting at approximately 6:52 PM EDT on April 14. The issue was caused by Elasticsearch cluster degradation. An incident report was filed internally. This issue should have had a status page entry since customers reported broken search. Customers checking [status.circle.so](http://status.circle.so/) saw 'All Systems Operational' during this period.
We are currently investigating this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
Communities experienced approximately 19 minutes of downtime starting at 12:17 AM EDT. The database crashed due to an out-of-memory error at the infrastructure level, a known AWS RDS bug. Our team raised a second escalation to AWS \(case 177616832700336\), and both cases have been escalated to AWS's highest priority tier. We are actively working with AWS to resolve the underlying infrastructure issue and have additional safeguards in place.
We are currently investigating this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
Communities experienced approximately 27 minutes of downtime starting at 9:50 PM EDT. The primary database crashed and went fully offline. Our infrastructure team performed a manual failover to a standby database in a different availability zone to restore service. The crash was caused by an AWS RDS bug that we had already escalated to AWS support. We are working with AWS to prevent recurrence and have additional monitoring in place to detect database instability earlier.
We are currently investigating this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
Communities experienced approximately 6 minutes of degraded availability at 5:14 PM EDT. This was a continuation of database load from the previous incident caused by an unoptimized query. The fix was deployed shortly after and resolved both issues.