Störungsverlauf von Confluence

1. 27. August 2026 um 04:22 UTCinvestigating

   Unsere Teams haben festgestellt, dass dieses Problem auch Auswirkungen auf das Jira Service Management hat. Wir werden so schnell wie möglich weiter aktualisieren.

2. 27. August 2026 um 04:25 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen ein Problem mit dem Zugriff auf Produkte, das sich auf Kunden von Confluence, Jira Cloud und Jira Serivce Management auswirkt. Unser Team untersucht dieses Problem dringend und wir werden weitere Details innerhalb einer Stunde oder früher zur Verfügung stellen, wenn Informationen verfügbar sind.

3. 27. August 2026 um 04:33 UTCidentified

   Unsere Teams haben eine mögliche Lösung für die Probleme identifiziert, die Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management und Confluence betreffen. Dies wird jetzt in den betroffenen Regionen eingeführt und wir werden innerhalb einer Stunde oder früher aktualisieren, wenn weitere Informationen verfügbar sind.

4. 27. August 2026 um 04:51 UTCmonitoring

   Die Probleme im Zusammenhang mit dem Laden von Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management und Confluence befinden sich nun in der Erholung. Wir werden weiterhin genau beobachten, um die Stabilität zu bestätigen und ein Update innerhalb einer Stunde oder früher bereitzustellen, wenn mehr Informationen verfügbar sind.

5. 27. August 2026 um 05:16 UTCresolved

   Am 27. August 2026 UTC erlebten Atlassian-Produkte wie Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management und Confluence eine Störung, und Dienste waren für betroffene Benutzer nicht verfügbar. Das Problem wurde nun behoben und der Service funktioniert normal für alle betroffenen Kunden. Ein öffentlicher Postmortem für diesen Vorfall wird auf dieser Seite zur Verfügung gestellt, wenn unsere vollständige Untersuchung des Vorfalls abgeschlossen ist.

6. 7. September 2026 um 02:53 UTCpostmortem

   **Zusammenfassung ** Am 27. August 2026, zwischen 03:51 und 04:35 UTC, konnten Atlassian-Kunden in den Regionen Westeuropa und Südost-APAC Atlassian Cloud-Produkte nicht erreichen, darunter Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search und Talent. Das Ereignis wurde durch einen defekten Codewechsel in der Routing-Schicht einer unserer Proxy-Flotten ausgelöst. Dies führte dazu, dass HTTP 404-Fehler für den gesamten Kundenverkehr über diese Proxy-Flotten in Westeuropa und Südost-APAC-Regionen bereitgestellt wurden. Der Vorfall wurde innerhalb von 1 Minute von unseren automatisierten Überwachungssystemen erkannt und durch Zurücksetzen auf die vorherige Konfigurationsversion gemindert, wodurch die Proxy-Flotte in einen bekannten guten Zustand versetzt wurde. Nachdem sich die Proxy-Flotte erholt hatte, erhielten einige Jira- und Confluence-Kunden (unabhängig vom Standort) zwischen 04:33 und 04:53 UTC HTTP 503-Fehler, da sich die Serverflotten an den Datenverkehrszustrom angepasst hatten. **IMPACT** Die Gesamtwirkung wurde in zwei diskrete Perioden aufgeteilt: - Zuerst, am 27. August 2026, zwischen 03:51 und 04:35 UTC über Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search und Talent. Der Vorfall führte zu einer Unterbrechung des Kundenverkehrs aus Westeuropa und den südöstlichen APAC-Regionen, wobei HTTP 404-Fehler zurückgegeben wurden. Es gab keine Auswirkungen auf den API-Datenverkehr des Kunden, unabhängig vom Herkunftsort. Zweitens, am 27. August 2026, zwischen 04:33 und 04:53 UTC, erhielten einige Jira- und Confluence-Kunden unabhängig vom Standort HTTP 503-Fehler, nachdem die HTTP 404-Fehler gelöst wurden: ~32% der Anfragen in ap-südost-2, ~4% der Anfragen in eu-west-1, ~2,5% der Anfragen in us-west-2 und ap-südost-1 und <1% der Anfragen in allen verbleibenden globalen Regionen. **URSACHE ** Das Ereignis wurde durch einen Codewechsel zu einer unserer Proxy-Flotten ausgelöst. Es gab jedoch einen Fehler im eingesetzten Code, der durch manuelle und automatisierte Tests nicht erkannt wurde. Dies führte zu einer Fehlkonfiguration einer Mandanten-Lookup-Funktionalität in der Proxy-Ebene, was dazu führte, dass der Datenverkehr keinen gültigen Netzwerkpfad hatte, was dazu führte, dass HTTP 404-Fehler für den gesamten Kundenverkehr über diese Proxy-Flotten in Westeuropa und Südost-APAC-Regionen bereitgestellt wurden. Nachdem sich die Auswirkungen der Proxy-Stufe erholt hatten, wurde für einige Jira- und Confluence-Kunden eine zweite Phase der Auswirkungen verursacht. Aufgrund der Verringerung des Datenverkehrs, der von der Proxy-Flotte an Jira und Confluence geliefert wurde, hatten sich die Jira- und Confluence-Dienstebenen automatisch in der Anzahl der Server skaliert, die den Kundenverkehr bedienen. Sobald die Proxy-Flottenfunktionalität wiederhergestellt war, überwältigte der Anstieg des Datenverkehrs die Jira-Dienstebene, die eine erhöhte Rate von HTTP 503s zurückgab, bis sie automatisch wieder skaliert wurde. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** Wir wissen, dass Ausfälle Ihre Produktivität beeinflussen. Während wir eine Reihe von Test- und Präventivprozessen haben, wurde dieses spezielle Problem nicht identifiziert, da die Änderung mit einer sehr spezifischen Art von Edge Case zusammenhing, die nicht von unseren automatisierten Continuous Deployment Suiten und manuellen Testskripten aufgenommen wurde. Wir priorisieren die folgenden Verbesserungsmaßnahmen, um eine Wiederholung dieser Art von Vorfällen zu vermeiden: - **Weitere Deployment-Sicherheitsmaßnahmen hinzufügen:** Die Deployment-Pipeline für die Konfiguration der betroffenen Proxy-Ebene verwendete ein Legacy-System und verfügte nicht über die geeigneten langsamen regionalen Rollout-Funktionen, die korrekt konfiguriert waren. Wir haben bereits die richtigen Sicherheitsvorkehrungen hinzugefügt, und wir verschieben dies in unsere Standard-Bereitstellungspipeline des Unternehmens, die alle standardmäßig aktivierten Sicherheitskontrollen enthält. Wir prüfen auch alle Netzwerkdienste, um zu bestätigen, dass sie sich alle auf dem neuen Standard-Pipeline-Bereitstellungsdienst befinden. - **Verbesserung der Flottenskalierungsrichtlinien:** Die automatische Skalierungskonfiguration für unsere Jira- und Confluence-Serviceflotten wurde zu aggressiv konfiguriert. Wir überprüfen und aktualisieren gründlich alle komplexen Jira- und Confluence-Auto-Skalierungsrichtlinien, um sicherzustellen, dass dies nicht erneut geschieht. Wir entschuldigen uns bei Kunden, deren Dienste während dieses Vorfalls betroffen waren; wir unternehmen sofortige Schritte, um die Leistung und Verfügbarkeit der Plattform zu verbessern. Danke, Atlassian Kundensupport

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 25. August 2026 um 08:42 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen aktiv Berichte über Leistungseinbußen, die zu einer erhöhten Latenz für E-Mail-, Mobile- und Slack-Benachrichtigungen für Jira, JSM und Confluence führen. Unsere Teams untersuchen das Problem und weitere Informationen werden innerhalb der nächsten 1 Stunde geteilt.

2. 25. August 2026 um 09:44 UTCinvestigating

   Unsere Teams haben die betroffenen Regionen identifiziert und arbeiten aktiv daran, das Problem zu mildern. Wir werden weitere Updates innerhalb einer Stunde zur Verfügung stellen, oder früher, wenn wir erhebliche Fortschritte zu teilen haben.

3. 25. August 2026 um 10:49 UTCinvestigating

   Unsere Teams haben nur wenige Korrekturmaßnahmen ergriffen, um das Problem in einer der betroffenen Regionen zu mildern, und beobachten einige Verbesserungen. Wir beobachten die Situation weiterhin und werden die notwendigen Maßnahmen ergreifen, bis der Vorfall vollständig wiederhergestellt ist. Wir werden weitere Updates innerhalb der nächsten zwei Stunden zur Verfügung stellen, oder früher, wenn wir erhebliche Fortschritte zu teilen haben.

4. 25. August 2026 um 13:01 UTCmonitoring

   Unsere Teams mildern das Problem weiterhin und beobachten einige Verbesserungen. Wir beobachten die Situation weiterhin und werden die notwendigen Maßnahmen ergreifen, bis der Vorfall vollständig wiederhergestellt ist. Wir werden weitere Updates innerhalb der nächsten zwei Stunden zur Verfügung stellen, oder früher, wenn wir erhebliche Fortschritte zu teilen haben.

5. 25. August 2026 um 14:33 UTCresolved

   Am 25. August 2026 haben einige Benutzer möglicherweise eine erhöhte Latenz in E-Mail-, mobilen und Slack-Benachrichtigungen erlebt. Das Problem wurde nun behoben und der Service funktioniert normal für alle Kunden.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 24. August 2026 um 19:22 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen aktiv Berichte über Leistungsminderungen, die zu einer erhöhten Latenz für E-Mail-, Mobile- und Slack-Benachrichtigungen für JIRA, JSM und Confluence führen. Wir werden Updates hier teilen, da weitere Informationen verfügbar sind.

2. 24. August 2026 um 20:25 UTCinvestigating

   Unsere Teams haben drei betroffene Regionen identifiziert und untersuchen weiterhin die erhöhte Latenz, die sich auf E-Mail-, Mobil- und Slack-Benachrichtigungen für JIRA, JSM und Confluence auswirkt.

3. 24. August 2026 um 21:30 UTCidentified

   Wir haben die wahrscheinliche Ursache des Problems identifiziert, und unsere Teams arbeiten fleißig an einer Minderung. Betroffene Benutzer können eine erhöhte Latenz in E-Mail-, mobilen und Slack-Benachrichtigungen für JIRA, JSM und Confluence erleben. Wir werden hier weiterhin zusätzliche Updates teilen, da weitere Informationen verfügbar sind.

4. 24. August 2026 um 23:15 UTCresolved

   Am 24. August 2026 haben einige JIRA-, JSM- und Confluence-Benutzer möglicherweise Leistungseinbußen erfahren, die zu einer erhöhten Latenz in E-Mail-, mobilen und Slack-Benachrichtigungen führen. Das Problem wurde für neu erstellte Benachrichtigungen behoben, und der Dienst funktioniert normal. Möglicherweise werden ältere Benachrichtigungen verarbeitet, und wir erwarten, dass sie in den nächsten Stunden abgeschlossen werden.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 21. August 2026 um 07:16 UTCidentified

   Wir haben die Ursache eines Problems identifiziert, das sich auf Marketplace App Makros in Confluence auswirkt. Benutzer können feststellen, dass Makros nicht korrekt rendern oder Fehler anzeigen. Unser Ingenieurteam hat die Ursache identifiziert und die Sanierung ist im Gange. Wir werden in den nächsten 60 Minuten weitere Updates bereitstellen.

2. 21. August 2026 um 08:15 UTCidentified

   Ein Fix wurde identifiziert und wird derzeit bereitgestellt. Benutzer sollten beginnen, die betroffene MarketPlace App zu sehen - Verbinden Sie Makros, um mit dem korrekten Rendern zu beginnen, sobald der Fix vollständig verbreitet wurde. Wir werden innerhalb der nächsten 2 Stunden weitere Updates bereitstellen.

3. 21. August 2026 um 10:10 UTCresolved

   Am 21. August 2026, zwischen 04:26 UTC und 09:33 UTC, haben einige Benutzer möglicherweise Probleme mit Makros, die in Confluence nicht korrekt dargestellt wurden. Das Problem wurde nun behoben und der Service funktioniert normal für alle Kunden.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 12. August 2026 um 20:11 UTCidentified

   Some Confluence Cloud users visiting public links saw a Something went wrong error page. The issue affected anonymous access paths for public links, and some related Confluence areas could also show the same error message.

2. 12. August 2026 um 22:13 UTCresolved

   On August 12, 2026 some Confluence users utilizing anonymous access via public links, may have experienced a 'Something went wrong' error message. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 6. Juli 2026 um 09:23 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen Probleme, die sich auf Ihre Dienste auswirken. Wir arbeiten aktiv daran, die Ursache zu identifizieren und das Problem zu lösen. Wir werden innerhalb einer Stunde weitere Updates bereitstellen.

2. 6. Juli 2026 um 10:04 UTCmonitoring

   Wir haben den Fix erfolgreich angewendet und sehen eine Erholung. Die Automatisierungsfunktionen werden wiederhergestellt und sollten in Zukunft normal funktionieren. Datenverarbeitungsanfragen, die während des Ausfallzeitraums eingereicht wurden, wurden aufgrund der Nichtverfügbarkeit des Dienstes nicht abgeschlossen. Wir beobachten die Situation weiter und erwarten eine vollständige Erholung innerhalb der nächsten Stunde. Wir werden zusätzliche Updates in der nächsten Stunde oder früher zur Verfügung stellen.

3. 6. Juli 2026 um 11:46 UTCinvestigating

   Wir sehen immer noch einige Probleme mit User-Suche, User-Picker und Assets in der gesamten EU-Region. Wir untersuchen die Situation weiter und werden in der nächsten Stunde oder früher zusätzliche Updates bereitstellen.

4. 6. Juli 2026 um 12:25 UTCmonitoring

   Wir haben den Fix angewendet, um das Problem zu mildern und sehen eine Erholung. Wir beobachten die Situation weiterhin und sollten bald vollständig erholt sein. Wir sollten in der Lage sein, weitere Updates in der nächsten Stunde oder früher bereitzustellen.

5. 6. Juli 2026 um 13:04 UTCresolved

   Am 6. Juli 2026, zwischen 06:51 UTC und 09:39 UTC, haben einige Benutzer möglicherweise Probleme mit der Automatisierung und zwischen 08:10 UTC und 11:50 UTC haben einige Benutzer möglicherweise Probleme mit der Benutzersuche, dem Benutzer-Picker und den Vermögenswerten in der EU-Region. Die Probleme sind nun gelöst und die Dienste funktionieren normal für alle Kunden.

6. 17. Juli 2026 um 16:59 UTCpostmortem

   ## Zusammenfassung Am 6. Juli 2026, zwischen 06:51 und 20:17 UTC, erlebten Atlassian-Kunden, die Cloud-Produkte in europäischen (EU) Regionen nutzten, Serviceunterbrechungen, die sich auf die Ausführung von Automatisierungsregeln, die Benutzersuche, den Benutzerwähler und die damit verbundenen Workflows auswirkten. Der Vorfall begann, als ein zentraler Identitätsdienst eine Datenbanksättigung in EU-Regionen erlebte, was zu Latenz- und Fehlerraten führte. Während die Responder an der Wiederherstellung der Kapazität arbeiteten, wurde eine Notfallminderung angewendet, die den Zugriff auf den Identitätsendpunkt auf Automatisierungsregeln blockierte. Parallel dazu trug die erhöhte Identitätslatenz zu einem Kaskadierungsfehler in einem nachgelagerten Benutzersuchdienst bei, was die Benutzersuche und die Benutzerauswahl über mehrere Produkte hinweg beeinträchtigte. Der Dienst wurde schrittweise wiederhergestellt, nachdem zusätzliche Datenbanklesekapazität hinzugefügt, die Notfallblockade entfernt und der Benutzersuchdienst manuell hochskaliert wurde. ## Auswirkungen Der Vorfall betraf Kunden mehrerer Atlassian-Produkte in EU-Regionen am 6. Juli 2026 zwischen 06:51 und 20:17 UTC. - **Core Identity Service Degradation:** Erhöhte intermittierende Zugangsverweigerungsraten wurden für Produkte in EU-Regionen beobachtet. - **Ausführung von Automatisierungsregeln: Automatisierungsregeln mit dem Standardbenutzer (Automation for Jira) in Jira, Jira Service Management und Jira Product Discovery in EU-Regionen sind mit einem Berechtigungsfehler fehlgeschlagen. - **User-Such- und User-Picker-Ausfälle:**Die Erfolgsquoten der User-Suche sind in den EU-Regionen deutlich gesunken, wobei die User-Picker-Fähigkeit produktübergreifend weitgehend nicht verfügbar ist. ## Wurzelursache Der Vorfall entstand aus einer kürzlichen Konfigurationsänderung, die die Cache-Lebensdauer für einen zentralen Identitätsdienst reduzierte. Da der EU-Arbeitstagsverkehr am 6. Juli 2026 zunahm, begann ein größerer Anteil der Anfragen, direkt in die Backing-Datenbank zu gelangen, anstatt aus dem Cache bedient zu werden. Die EU-Datenbanken verfügten nicht über ausreichende regionale Kapazitäten, um die erhöhte Last zu absorbieren, und die Datenbank-CPU erreichte die Sättigung, was zu erhöhten intermittierenden Zugangsverlustraten führte. Als Teil der Minderung wurde eine Notfallblockade angewendet, um die Belastung der gesättigten Identitätsdienstdatenbank zu reduzieren und die Wiederherstellung des Kernidentitätsdienstes zu priorisieren. Dies verhinderte versehentlich, dass Automatisierungsregeln ihre Berechtigungsprüfungen vor der Ausführung bestanden, wodurch sie fehlschlugen. Die verlängerte Dauer war in erster Linie auf eine sekundäre Welle von Automatisierungsregelfehlern zurückzuführen, die durch die Verarbeitungsgrenzdrosselung verursacht wurden. Parallel dazu führte die anhaltende Degradation zu erhöhten Latenzzeiten und intermittierenden Ausfällen bei Produkten, die von diesen Prüfungen abhängen, und trug zu einem kaskadierenden Ausfall in einem nachgelagerten Benutzersuchdienst bei. Infolgedessen wurden Benutzersuche und Benutzerauswahl in EU-Regionen weitgehend nicht mehr verfügbar, bis der Berechtigungsdienst wiederhergestellt und der Benutzersuchdienst hochskaliert wurde, um die Kapazität wiederherzustellen. ## Plan für Abhilfemaßnahmen und nächste Schritte Wir wissen, dass Ausfälle die Produktivität der Kunden beeinflussen. Atlassian priorisiert die folgenden Maßnahmen, um ähnliche Vorfälle in Zukunft zu verhindern: - **Verbessern Sie die Sicherheitsvorkehrungen für hochwirksame Notfallmaßnahmen:** Verhärten Sie die operativen Tools, so dass Minderungsschritte, die kundenorientierte Workflows deaktivieren könnten, eine zusätzliche Überprüfung erfordern. - **Kapazität der Identitätsinfrastruktur stärken und Sicherheit ändern:** Überprüfen Sie die regionale Datenbankgrößen- und Kapazitätsreserve, um das Risiko einer Sättigung während der Hauptverkehrszeiten zu verringern, und verfeinern Sie den Bewertungsprozess für Konfigurationsänderungen, damit die Auswirkungen auf die nachgelagerte Last vor dem Rollout der Produktion bewertet werden. - **Resilienz gegen kaskadierende Ausfälle aus vorgelagerter Degradation stärken:** Prüfen Sie die Rückdruckbehandlung, die Konfiguration des Leistungsschalters und das Autoskalierungsverhalten in Diensten, damit die vorgelagerte Degradation keine breiteren Produktauswirkungen auf die Benutzersuche, den Benutzerwähler und die damit verbundenen Erfahrungen verursacht. - **Harden Replay-Mechanismen für Automatisierungsregelfehler:** Erhöhen Sie die Widerstandsfähigkeit von Automatisierungsregeln, um die Auswirkungen von Vorfällen in Abhängigkeiten zu reduzieren. Wir erkennen, wie wichtig zuverlässige Produkt-Workflows für unsere Kunden sind, und wir entschuldigen uns bei Kunden, die von diesem Vorfall betroffen waren. Danke, Atlassian Kundensupport

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 16. Juni 2026 um 13:46 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is investigating degraded performance affecting your service. We are actively working to identify the cause and resolve the issue. We will provide further updates within one hour.

2. 16. Juni 2026 um 14:28 UTCidentified

   We have identified the source of degraded performance affecting some Confluence Cloud users. A subset of users may experience errors or slowness when viewing or editing pages. Our team has initiated a remediation and is actively monitoring recovery. We will provide another update within one hour or once the issue is fully resolved.

3. 16. Juni 2026 um 14:53 UTCmonitoring

   We have been able to apply the fix to mitigate the issue and we are seeing recovery. We continue to monitor the situation and should be fully recovered soon. We should be able to provide more updates in the next one hour or earlier.

4. 16. Juni 2026 um 15:56 UTCresolved

   On June 16, 2026, Confluence Cloud users for some customers may have experienced performance degradation of view and edit page experiences. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23. Juni 2026 um 18:25 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary ### On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT ### The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ### ROOT CAUSE ### 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ### We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. We have already deployed the following fix: - Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: - Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. - Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12. Juni 2026 um 07:39 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing experiencing degraded performance in Confluence Cloud affecting view page and edit page functionality. Our teams are actively investigating and will be sharing more updates in next 1 hour or sooner.

2. 12. Juni 2026 um 08:45 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing degraded performance with view content, create and edit functionality on Confluence Cloud primarily in the EU region. Our teams are actively working to identify the root cause of the issue. We will share additional updates in next 2 hours or sooner as more information is available.

3. 12. Juni 2026 um 10:29 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause of this issue and implemented a fix. We are beginning to observe signs of recovery, with some affected users regaining access to view, create, and edit content on Confluence Cloud. We will provide a further update within one hour, or sooner if we confirm full recovery for all affected customers.

4. 12. Juni 2026 um 11:15 UTCresolved

   On June 12th 2026, between 07:04 to 11:06 UTC, some Confluence users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23. Juni 2026 um 18:28 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ‌ ### ROOT CAUSE ‌ 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ‌ ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ‌ We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. ‌ We have already deployed the following fix: * Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: * Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. * Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ ‌ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 10. Juni 2026 um 06:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating reports of extended delays being experienced across tasks such as processing of Incoming Emails, Notifications relating to changes or creation of Work Items, in addition to delays in processing Scheduled Triggers from Marketplace apps. Our team is looking into this with urgency and we will provide further update within one hour as our investigation continues.

2. 10. Juni 2026 um 06:14 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause for this issue and has now deployed a fix that is rolling out across impacted products. At this time we are monitoring for the recovery of these events across Jira Service Management, Jira Cloud and Ecosystem app Scheduled Triggers. We will provide further update within one hour or when we have seen a full recovery of all task processing across these products.

3. 10. Juni 2026 um 06:14 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has now determined that performance has returned to expected levels for those impacted by this incident. Additional products that are now known to have been impacted by this incident are Confluence, Customer Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery. These products would have seen similar impact where email notifications or processing of events may have been delayed while this incident was underway. We are now monitoring for the full recovery of performance across all products and will update when we are confident this issue is fully resolved, or within one hour, whichever is sooner.

4. 10. Juni 2026 um 06:31 UTCresolved

   We are now confident that any of the tasks that were impacted by this incident and were delayed should now be operating as expected. We apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.

1. 27. Mai 2026 um 06:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where customers attempting to view Calendars receive an error message on Confluence Cloud pages. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 27. Mai 2026 um 07:06 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause and are in process of deploying a fix. We will share further updates in next 1 hours, or sooner if we have any meaningful developments to report.

3. 27. Mai 2026 um 07:48 UTCresolved

   Between 00:50 UTC and 07:30 UTC on 27 May 2026, some users were facing errors when attempting to view Calendars in Confluence. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and this incident has been fully restored.

1. 26. Mai 2026 um 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where some custom extensions may fail to load when editing Confluence Cloud pages. Affected users may see 'Error loading the extension!' messages or notice that certain macros are missing from the editor's extension selection menu. Viewing published pages is not affected. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 26. Mai 2026 um 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating an issue affecting the editing macros in Confluence Cloud editor. Our team is working to identify the root cause. We will provide an update within approximately one hour.

3. 26. Mai 2026 um 13:55 UTCresolved

   Between 08:30 UTC and 13:51 UTC on 26 May 2026, some users were unable to load or edit certain macros in the Confluence Cloud page editor. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and macro functionality has been fully restored.

1. 14. Mai 2026 um 04:54 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue with multiple Atlassian products that is impacting a large number of Confluence and Jira Cloud customers. We are continuing to investigate and will add further details about additional impact as our investigation continues. We will provide more details within the next hour or sooner if further information becomes available

2. 14. Mai 2026 um 05:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware that the current issues with accessing Atlassian products are impacting additional products. We have now expanded the impact of the incident to cover the known impacted products at this time. We will provide further update within one hour or sooner as information is available.

3. 14. Mai 2026 um 05:11 UTCidentified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

4. 14. Mai 2026 um 05:24 UTCidentified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

5. 14. Mai 2026 um 05:34 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

6. 14. Mai 2026 um 05:43 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

7. 14. Mai 2026 um 06:40 UTCmonitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

8. 14. Mai 2026 um 06:41 UTCmonitoring

   We are approaching full system recovery at this time, and are performing final confirmations that services are restored.

9. 14. Mai 2026 um 06:48 UTCresolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

10. 19. Mai 2026 um 19:04 UTCpostmortem

    ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 8. Mai 2026 um 01:31 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 8. Mai 2026 um 04:10 UTCidentified

   We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

3. 8. Mai 2026 um 04:10 UTCidentified

   Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

4. 8. Mai 2026 um 04:10 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

5. 8. Mai 2026 um 05:53 UTCmonitoring

   The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

6. 8. Mai 2026 um 08:03 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

7. 8. Mai 2026 um 11:12 UTCmonitoring

   Our services are now fully operational. We continue to replay any events that were missed during the incident, and are making good progress. We will provide a further update once replays are complete. If you experience any ongoing issues, please contact our support team. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

8. 8. Mai 2026 um 19:45 UTCresolved

   On May 8, 2026, some customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

9. 20. Mai 2026 um 06:55 UTCpostmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support.

1. 14. April 2026 um 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a partial service disruption affecting Rovo, specifically for customers using automation rules that invoke Rovo agents. Some customers may find that these automations are not completing as expected. We'll share updates here as more information becomes available.

2. 14. April 2026 um 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified that this incident also affects automation rules in Confluence that use Rovo agents. We are investigating and will provide updates as we learn more.

3. 14. April 2026 um 14:11 UTCidentified

   We have identified the issue, and our teams are working to resolve it and restore normal operations as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as they become available.

4. 14. April 2026 um 15:46 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

5. 14. April 2026 um 16:11 UTCresolved

   On April 14, 2026, affected users may have experienced some service disruption with automation rules that use Rovo agents. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 13. April 2026 um 07:29 UTCmonitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 13. April 2026 um 08:33 UTCmonitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 13. April 2026 um 10:17 UTCresolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 21. April 2026 um 02:33 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 8. April 2026 um 06:01 UTCinvestigating

   The impact of this incident is now understood to also be impacting search in Jira and Confluence, as well as additional downstream impacts to Rovo Chat, User Management, Administration and Guard. Our team is continuing to investigate with urgency and we will provide further update within 1 hour.

2. 8. April 2026 um 06:25 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is aware that users are currently experiencing errors while attempting to search in Confluence and Jira. Our team is investigating with urgency and will be providing an update within 1 hour.

3. 8. April 2026 um 07:40 UTCidentified

   Confluence and Jira search reliability is improving, and we expect full recovery shortly; we will continue to closely monitor the services to ensure they remain stable.

4. 8. April 2026 um 08:33 UTCidentified

   We have restored core search functionality and services are operating again, but some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour while new data continues to be indexed. We are actively working to complete reindexing and will update this page as performance fully recovers.

5. 8. April 2026 um 09:03 UTCidentified

   We are also aware of impact as a result of these search failures to Customer Service Management, Asset Reports, Jira Service Management and dashboards within Focus. Our team have identified the potential root cause of the issue and our teams are working with urgency on a resolution. We will provide further update within 1 hour.

6. 8. April 2026 um 09:03 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally. Some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour, while new data continues to be indexed. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

7. 8. April 2026 um 11:43 UTCresolved

   The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

8. 17. April 2026 um 16:24 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. A configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high‑density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers. The root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC. ### **IMPACT** During the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period. Impacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context. **Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions. **Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue. **Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC. **Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC. **Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC. ### **ROOT CAUSE** Atlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. An infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \(CPU & Memory\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products. The change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst‑affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: * **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types** Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly. * **Strengthen automated pre‑deploy validation for resource changes** Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads. * **Improve post‑deploy verification and alerting** Enhance monitoring and post‑deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod‑IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out. * **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits** Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts. * **Enhance recovery automation** Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12. März 2026 um 13:38 UTCinvestigating

   Confluence Cloud users may experience errors when accessing certain Marketplace macros. Affected customers are seeing the message Error rendering macro 'static-macro': Page loading failed. Our team is actively investigating this issue. We will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner.

2. 12. März 2026 um 13:38 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the cause of this issue, and a fix is currently being deployed. We are monitoring the deployment, and we will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner if needed.

3. 13. März 2026 um 00:26 UTCresolved

   On March 12, 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 10. März 2026 um 00:15 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of customers experiencing delays with their automations within Jira, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Jira Product Discovery and Confluence. Our team is investigating with urgency and we will provide an update within one hour.

2. 10. März 2026 um 00:15 UTCidentified

   Our team has now identified the cause of this issue relating to delayed automation events and has put a hotfix in place to help restore automation performance. We will continue to monitor performance as the backlog of issues is now being processed.

3. 10. März 2026 um 00:51 UTCmonitoring

   The performance degradation of automations has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. 10. März 2026 um 00:59 UTCresolved

   On 9 March UTC, Automation users in the APAC region may have experienced performance degradation within Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Confluence. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 20. Februar 2026 um 04:14 UTCidentified

   Customers using Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours as we continue our investigation.

2. 20. Februar 2026 um 12:26 UTCidentified

   We understand that customers using Customer Service Management, Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours or sooner based on significant progress.

3. 20. Februar 2026 um 12:26 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved and all services are functional.

1. 19. Februar 2026 um 15:44 UTCmonitoring

   We have received and investigated reports of a partial service disruption affecting Confluence Cloud for some customers in AP South, APSE, APSE2, East, and Central. The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

2. 19. Februar 2026 um 17:47 UTCresolved

   On February 19 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption in AP South, APSE, APSE2, East, and Central regions. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.