Störungsverlauf von Okta

1. 3. September 2026 um 10:42 UTCresolved

   Das Engineering-Team untersucht weiterhin das Problem Fehler 500 in OP1. Während dieser Zeit können Benutzer intermittierende Probleme in unserem System auftreten. Wir werden innerhalb der nächsten 30 Minuten ein weiteres Update bereitstellen, oder früher, wenn zusätzliche Informationen verfügbar sind.

2. 3. September 2026 um 11:02 UTCresolved

   Das Engineering-Team untersucht weiterhin das Problem Fehler 500 in OP1. Während dieser Zeit können Benutzer intermittierende Probleme in unserem System auftreten. Wir werden innerhalb der nächsten 30 Minuten ein weiteres Update bereitstellen, oder früher, wenn zusätzliche Informationen verfügbar sind.

3. 3. September 2026 um 11:34 UTCresolved

   Das Engineering-Team untersucht weiterhin das Problem Fehler 500 in OP1. Während dieser Zeit können Benutzer intermittierende Probleme in unserem System auftreten. Wir werden innerhalb der nächsten 30 Minuten ein weiteres Update bereitstellen, oder früher, wenn zusätzliche Informationen verfügbar sind.

4. 3. September 2026 um 12:00 UTCresolved

   Das Engineering-Team untersucht weiterhin das Problem Fehler 500 in OP1. Während dieser Zeit können Benutzer intermittierende Probleme in unserem System auftreten. Wir werden innerhalb der nächsten 30 Minuten ein weiteres Update bereitstellen, oder früher, wenn zusätzliche Informationen verfügbar sind.

5. 3. September 2026 um 12:30 UTCresolved

   Das Engineering-Team untersucht weiterhin das Problem Fehler 500 in OP1. Während dieser Zeit können Benutzer intermittierende Probleme in unserem System auftreten. Wir werden innerhalb der nächsten 30 Minuten ein weiteres Update bereitstellen, oder früher, wenn zusätzliche Informationen verfügbar sind.

6. 3. September 2026 um 13:03 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering konnte die notwendigen Maßnahmen ergreifen, um das Problem zu mildern, und überwacht derzeit die Stabilität. Die Ursache des Problems und Einzelheiten zu den ergriffenen Maßnahmen werden auf der Trust-Seite veröffentlicht.

7. 3. September 2026 um 14:09 UTCresolved

   Nach einer längeren Überwachung haben wir bestätigt, dass das Problem nicht erneut aufgetreten ist. Eine Root Cause Analysis (RCA) wird hier innerhalb von fünf Werktagen veröffentlicht. Wir entschuldigen uns aufrichtig für die Auswirkungen, die dies auf Sie und Ihre Benutzer hatte.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 14. August 2026 um 15:23 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering is investigating and has determined that the incident is currently impacting email delivery to a subset of customers. During this time, customers may experience email delivery deferrals. We'll provide an update in 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

2. 14. August 2026 um 15:39 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering has determined that certain third-party providers were failing to receive emails from Okta. Our monitoring shows delivery rates are recovering to normal conditions and will continue to monitor until full resolution. Our next update will be in 30 minutes or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. 14. August 2026 um 16:50 UTCresolved

   Our monitoring indicates that email deferrals to the impacted third-party email service have returned to the expected baseline. Additional information will be available within 5 Business days.

4. 21. August 2026 um 16:04 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Okta detected an increase in customer support tickets regarding email delivery issues. Customers using custom email domains routed through Proofpoint experienced email delivery deferrals. During this period, affected end users were unable to receive system-generated emails, including One-Time Passwords (OTPs), account activation emails, password reset emails, factor enrollment emails, and other automated notifications. Root Cause Summary: Third-party provider Proofpoint experienced a service disruption, causing issues with email deliverability. When Okta services attempted to send emails to recipient domains whose MX records pointed to Proofpoint's infrastructure, the delivery attempts failed due to connection errors, resulting in deferred delivery. Okta's email sending infrastructure operated normally throughout the event. Remediation Steps: Okta Engineering monitored service telemetry and confirmed that email delivery returned to normal pre-incident baselines once Proofpoint restored stability to its infrastructure. Preventive Actions: Okta is defining automated alerting thresholds for email-bound and deferral rates to decrease detection time and updating runbooks to allow faster diagnosis of downstream provider disruptions. Timing: Incident start: August 14, 2026, at 5:00 AM PDT Incident resolved: August 14, 2026, at 10:04 AM PDT. Duration (# of minutes): 304 minutes Based on details provided by https://www.proofpoint.com/us/support-services

1. 24. Juli 2026 um 13:55 UTCresolved

   Nach einer Phase der Stabilität und Überwachung können wir nun bestätigen, dass das Serviceproblem vollständig gelöst wurde. Zusätzliche Ursacheninformationen werden innerhalb von fünf Werktagen verfügbar sein.

2. 1. August 2026 um 03:28 UTCresolved

   Wir entschuldigen uns aufrichtig für die Auswirkungen, die dieser Vorfall auf Sie, Ihr Unternehmen und Ihre Kunden hat. Bei Okta sind Vertrauen und Transparenz unsere obersten Prioritäten. Im Folgenden sind die Fakten zu diesem Vorfall skizziert. Wir verpflichten uns, Verbesserungen an unseren Dienstleistungen umzusetzen, um zukünftige Ereignisse zu verhindern. Detection and Impact Am 24. Juli 2026, um etwa 3:55 Uhr PDT, beobachtete Okta Service-Degradation für OK7, OK12, OK14 und OP3. Der Vorfall betraf speziell Kunden, die AD/LDAP-delegierte Authentifizierung und OAuth-Token-Endpunkt-Clients in der AWS-Region us-west-2 nutzten. Während des gesamten Ereignisses sind Benutzer auf Fehler beim Zugriff auf Ressourcen, Authentifizierungsfehler, Agentenverbindungs-Timeouts, Latenz und OAuth-Tokenanforderungen gestoßen. Wurzelursache Zusammenfassung Die Ursache stammt aus Fehlern innerhalb eines Cloud-Dienstleisters für die betroffene Region. Sanierungsschritte Der Cloud-Service-Provider stellte die Konnektivität wieder her, und der Okta-Service stabilisierte sich um ca. 4:10 Uhr PDT, und unsere Teams bestätigten um 4:19 Uhr PDT eine vollständige Rückkehr zum Basisbetrieb. Preventative Actions Okta überprüft und führt mehrere Initiativen aktiv durch, um zukünftige Ereignisse zu verhindern. Diese Maßnahmen umfassen: Auditierung und Verbesserung unserer Incident-Response-Prozesse bei erweiterten Problemen innerhalb einer Region und Verfeinerung unserer Überwachung und Alarmierung auf der Grundlage dieses Vorfalls. Gesamtdauer Gesamtdauer (Minuten): 15 Minuten Startzeit: 3:55 Uhr PDT Endzeit: 4:10 Uhr PDT Dauer (Anzahl der Minuten): 15

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 22. Juli 2026 um 15:14 UTCresolved

   Bitte beachten Sie, dass unsere geplante Wartung derzeit noch läuft und die Okta Engineering-Teams aktiv engagiert sind. Während dieses erweiterten Fensters können bei Kunden Fehler beim Anmelden bei Okta Workflows auftreten. Wir schätzen Ihre Geduld, da unsere Teams daran arbeiten, diesen Vorgang so schnell und sicher wie möglich abzuschließen.   Um zu verstehen, wie sich dies auf Ihr Unternehmen auswirken könnte, und um empfohlene Workarounds anzuzeigen, lesen Sie bitte unseren ausführlichen Support-Artikel:  https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/okta-workflows-cell-migration-expected-behaviors-and-workarounds?language=en US . Wir werden weitere Updates in 30 Minuten oder früher bereitstellen, wenn mehr Informationen verfügbar sind.

2. 22. Juli 2026 um 15:49 UTCresolved

   Die Wartungsaktivitäten laufen noch, da wir sicherstellen, dass die Migration sicher und erfolgreich abgeschlossen wird. Wir werden weiterhin Updates in 30 Minuten oder früher teilen, sobald sie verfügbar sind. In der Zwischenzeit lesen Sie bitte den Support-Artikel unten für die neueste Anleitung zu Workarounds und erwartetem Verhalten: https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/okta-workflows-cell-migration-expected-behaviors-and-workarounds?language=en US

3. 22. Juli 2026 um 16:19 UTCresolved

   Wir beobachten jetzt eine stabile Systemleistung nach den Migrationsaktivitäten. Unsere Engineering-Teams sind weiterhin aktiv an der Überwachung aller Dienstleistungen beteiligt. Die Kernworkflows erholen sich, und die Kunden sollten weitere Verbesserungen sehen. Wir werden unser nächstes Update in 30 Minuten oder früher bereitstellen, wenn neue Informationen verfügbar sind.

4. 22. Juli 2026 um 16:59 UTCresolved

   Nach einer Phase der Stabilität und Überwachung können wir nun bestätigen, dass das Serviceproblem vollständig gelöst wurde. Zusätzliche Ursacheninformationen werden innerhalb von fünf Werktagen verfügbar sein.

5. 29. Juli 2026 um 23:34 UTCresolved

   Wir entschuldigen uns aufrichtig für die Auswirkungen, die dieser Vorfall auf Sie, Ihr Unternehmen und Ihre Kunden hat. Bei Okta sind Vertrauen und Transparenz unsere obersten Prioritäten. Im Folgenden sind die Fakten zu diesem Vorfall skizziert. Wir verpflichten uns, Verbesserungen an unseren Dienstleistungen umzusetzen, um zukünftige Ereignisse zu verhindern. Wir erkennen an, dass diese Wartung über das ursprünglich kommunizierte Fenster hinauslief und dass unsere Statusaktualisierungen während dieser Erweiterung die Kunden nicht rechtzeitig informiert haben. Wir entschuldigen uns dafür; es zu verbessern ist Teil unserer vorbeugenden Maßnahmen unten. Am 22. Juli 2026, um 5:15 Uhr PDT, begann Okta Workflows in unserer Region Nordamerika (FL1-Zelle) Probleme zu haben, die Workflows-Benutzer in den US-Zellen 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 und 11 betrafen. Während dieser Zeit sind einige Workflow-Ausführungen fehlgeschlagen oder vorzeitig beendet, und Benutzer haben Fehler beim Laden der Workflows-Konsole festgestellt. Darüber hinaus funktionierten einige app-verbindungen nicht mehr, so dass benutzer manuell neu authentifiziert werden mussten, um die funktionalität wiederherzustellen. Wurzelursache Zusammenfassung Das Problem trat während eines geplanten Systemupgrades auf. Ein Defekt in der Software eines Drittanbieters führte dazu, dass das Upgrade deutlich länger als erwartet lief. Bei der Migration zu einem neuen Datenspeichersystem verhinderte ein Kommunikationsfehler zwischen den Systemkomponenten, dass der Dienst innerhalb des erwarteten Fensters in seinen Normalzustand zurückkehrte. Während dieser Zeit verschlechterte sich die Workflows-Konsole nicht anmutig, wenn der zugrunde liegende Datenspeicher nicht verfügbar war; stattdessen tauchten Fehler direkt bei den Benutzern auf. Darüber hinaus wurden App-Verbindungen, deren Anmeldeinformationen während der Störung nicht aktualisiert werden konnten, in einem fehlgeschlagenen Zustand belassen und nicht automatisch aktualisiert, weshalb einige Fehler nach Abschluss des Upgrades fortgesetzt wurden, bis die betroffene Verbindung erneut autorisiert wurde. Sanierungsschritte Der Drittanbieter bestätigte, dass sich der Cluster um 8:34 Uhr PDT stabilisiert hat. Nach der Stabilisierung stellte Okta Engineering die betroffenen Dienste wieder her, um veraltete Konfigurations-Caches zu löschen. Alle Kunden, die während dieses Zeitraums OAuth-Token-Aktualisierungsfehler hatten, mussten alle App-Verbindungen manuell neu autorisieren. Die volle Funktionalität wurde durch 9:33 Uhr PDT wiederhergestellt. Wenn Sie weiterhin betroffen sind: Autorisieren Sie die betroffenen Verbindungsanmeldeinformationen in der Workflows-Konsole manuell erneut (siehe KB: Okta Workflows: Erwartete Verhaltensweisen und Workarounds für die Zellmigration). Workflow-Ausführungen, die während des Fensters fehlgeschlagen sind, können mit Ihrem normalen Prozess erneut ausgeführt werden; wenden Sie sich an Okta Support, wenn Sie Hilfe bei der Identifizierung betroffener Ausführungsvorgänge wünschen. Präventivmaßnahmen Um ähnliche Vorfälle zu verhindern, hat Okta die folgenden Schritte unternommen. Wir haben einen flottenweiten Zugriff auf alle weiteren Datenspeicher-Engine-Migrationen durchgesetzt, bis unser Drittanbieter eine Korrektur für den bestätigten Defekt einsetzt und bestätigt, dass es sicher ist, fortzufahren. Wir aktualisieren auch die Workflows-Konsole, um schnell auszufallen und automatisch wiederherzustellen, wenn die Infrastruktur vorübergehend nicht verfügbar ist, wodurch sichergestellt wird, dass Benutzer einen Wiederverbindungszustand anstelle von rohen Systemfehlern sehen. Parallel dazu fügen wir eine direkte automatisierte Überwachung und Alarmierung für Cluster-Konvergenzfehler hinzu, um eine schnellere Erkennung während Wartungsfenstern zu gewährleisten. Schließlich verbessern wir die Art und Weise, wie wir während einer Wartung kommunizieren, die lange dauert, einschließlich einer zeitnahen Statusseite und Fortschritts- / Fertigstellungsupdates. Bei Fragen zur Zuverlässigkeit von Workflows oder zur Roadmap kann Ihnen Ihr Okta-Kontoteam helfen. Gesamtdauer Gesamtdauer (Minuten): 258 Minuten (4 Stunden und 18 Minuten) Startzeit: 5:15 Uhr PDT Endzeit: 9:33 Uhr PDT Dauer (Anzahl der Minuten): 258 Minuten

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 13. Juli 2026 um 21:23 UTCresolved

   Unser Engineering-Team hat eine mögliche Korrektur für die betroffene Vorschauumgebung angewendet und überwacht das System aktiv auf Wiederherstellung. Wir werden innerhalb von 30 Minuten oder früher ein weiteres Update bereitstellen, wenn neue Informationen verfügbar sind. Wir entschuldigen uns aufrichtig für jegliche Unannehmlichkeiten.

2. 13. Juli 2026 um 21:39 UTCresolved

   Unser Engineering-Team hat einen Fix angewendet, und wir beobachten die Servicewiederherstellung in unserer OP2-Vorschauumgebung. Wir beobachten das System genau und werden innerhalb von 30 Minuten ein weiteres Update bereitstellen.

3. 13. Juli 2026 um 21:53 UTCresolved

   Wir haben bestätigt, dass sich die OP2-Vorschauumgebung vollständig stabilisiert hat und das frühere Problem vollständig behoben ist. Zusätzliche Ursacheninformationen werden innerhalb von fünf Werktagen verfügbar sein.

4. 21. Juli 2026 um 01:57 UTCresolved

   Wir entschuldigen uns aufrichtig für die Auswirkungen, die dieser Vorfall auf Sie, Ihr Unternehmen und Ihre Kunden hat. Bei Okta sind Vertrauen und Transparenz unsere obersten Prioritäten. Im Folgenden sind die Fakten zu diesem Vorfall skizziert. Wir verpflichten uns, Verbesserungen am Service umzusetzen, um zukünftige Ereignisse dieses Vorfalls zu verhindern. Erkennung und Auswirkungen: Am 13. Juli 2026 um 13:01 Uhr PT alarmierte Okta unser Team über erhöhte Fehler in der EMEA Preview Cell-Umgebung. In diesem Zeitraum waren alle Kunden in der EMEA Preview Cell-Umgebung betroffen, da Authentifizierungsfehler und Service-Langsamkeit auftraten. Administratoren und endbenutzer sind möglicherweise auf interne serverfehler und andere fehler gestoßen, wenn sie versuchen, sich anzumelden oder auf okta-dienste zuzugreifen. Root Cause Summary: Der Vorfall wurde während eines geplanten Service-Upgrades ausgelöst. Eine Fehlkonfiguration führte dazu, dass das EMEA Preview Cell Cluster versehentlich eine falsche Version einer kritischen Infrastruktur-Routing-Komponente erhielt. Dieses Update brach das interne Netzwerk-Routing, was die Kommunikation zwischen ansonsten gesunden Infrastrukturkomponenten verhinderte. Da Anfragen die Kernanwendung nicht erreichen konnten, führte dies zu weit verbreiteten Servicefehlern und Authentifizierungsfehlern. Sanierungsschritte: Oktas Engineering-Team identifizierte das Problem und begann sofort mit der Bereitstellung der vorherigen, stabilen Version der Routing-Konfiguration. Nach dem Rollback starteten die Ingenieure die betroffenen Dienste (einschließlich Gateways und Proxies) systematisch neu, um die interne Konnektivität wiederherzustellen. Diese Maßnahmen lösten das Problem erfolgreich, und die Auswirkungen der Kunden wurden durch 2:20 Uhr PT vollständig gemindert. Präventive Maßnahmen: Wir verfeinern unsere operativen Prozesse, um die Servicestabilität zu verbessern. Dazu gehören laufende Arbeiten zur Verbesserung der Funktionen zur automatischen Erkennung und Überwachung, die uns helfen, potenzielle Probleme effektiver zu identifizieren und anzugehen. Gesamtdauer (Minuten): 79 Minuten (1 Stunde 19 Minuten) Startzeit: 1:01 PM PT Endzeit: 2:20 PM PT

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 7. Juli 2026 um 20:50 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering hat ein Problem identifiziert, das Okta Workflows betrifft, und unternimmt derzeit Schritte zur Behebung. Kunden können 500 Fehler oder Timeouts in der Okta Workflows-Konsole, API-Endpunkten und eingehenden Webhooks sehen. Wir werden innerhalb der nächsten 30 Minuten ein weiteres Update bereitstellen, oder früher, wenn zusätzliche Informationen verfügbar sind.

2. 7. Juli 2026 um 21:03 UTCresolved

   Das Problem mit Okta Workflows wurde behoben. Alle Workflows werden jetzt normal verarbeitet. Eine Root Cause Analysis (RCA) wird hier innerhalb von fünf Werktagen veröffentlicht. Wir entschuldigen uns für alle Unannehmlichkeiten, die dies verursacht haben könnte.

3. 15. Juli 2026 um 15:22 UTCresolved

   Wir entschuldigen uns aufrichtig für alle Auswirkungen, die dieser Vorfall auf Sie, Ihr Unternehmen oder Ihre Kunden haben könnte. Bei Okta sind Vertrauen und Transparenz unsere obersten Prioritäten. Im Folgenden sind die Fakten zu diesem Vorfall skizziert. Wir verpflichten uns, Verbesserungen am Service umzusetzen, um zukünftige Ereignisse dieses Vorfalls zu verhindern. Detection and Impact: Am 7. Juli 2026, um 13:01 Uhr PDT, warnten Okta interne Überwachung und Kundenberichte unser Team vor Problemen mit Benutzern, die auf Workflows auf der Okta-Zelle OK14 in Nordamerika zugreifen. In diesem Zeitraum haben Kunden auf FL14 möglicherweise HTTP 500-, 503- oder 504-Gateway-Timeout-Fehler beim Navigieren zu Workflows vom Admin-Portal aus oder beim Versuch, sich über SSO in der Workflows-Konsole anzumelden. Bestehende Sitzungen können intermittierend fehlgeschlagen sein. Geplante und On-Demand-Workflows, Inline-Hooks und Webhooks haben möglicherweise Fehler und Timeouts erfahren. Darüber hinaus erlebten Hinrichtungen während des Fluges Timeouts. Zusammenfassung der Wurzelursache: Dieser Vorfall ereignete sich während des geplanten Einsatzes von Release 2027.07.0 in der FL14-Zelle. Im Zuge des Deployments wurde ein für die Ausführung von Schema-Updates zuständiger Service-Pod vorzeitig beendet. Diese vorzeitige Beendigung führte zu unerwarteten, langlebigen Datenbankverbindungen, die letztlich zu einer Erschöpfung der Verbindung in der primären Datenbank der Zelle führten. Sanierungsschritte: Nach Erhalt von Benachrichtigungen und Kundenberichten begann das Team um 12:44 Uhr mit der Diagnose. Bis 13:30 Uhr PDT isolierten und entfernten sie die Service-Pod-Schema-Updates. Dies ermöglichte es, die Datenbankverbindungen zu löschen und den vollen Service um 1:45 Uhr PDT wiederherzustellen. Präventive Maßnahmen: Um zukünftige Ereignisse zu verhindern, setzt sich Okta dafür ein, die Stabilität unserer Infrastruktur zu stärken und unsere Überwachungskapazitäten zu verbessern. Wir implementieren derzeit strategische Verbesserungen an unseren Bereitstellungsprozessen und Alarmsystemen, um eine schnellere Erkennung, Reaktion und größere Widerstandsfähigkeit in unseren Diensten zu gewährleisten. Gesamtdauer: 67 Minuten

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 26. Juni 2026 um 15:22 UTCresolved

   Our Engineering team has identified the issue, and we will continue monitoring the issue. We will provide another update within the next 15 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

2. 29. Juni 2026 um 23:50 UTCresolved

3. 30. Juni 2026 um 15:01 UTCresolved

   The Root Cause Analysis (RCA) details previously posted in this update were published in error and belonged to a separate incident that occurred on June 22nd (I-10858). We sincerely apologize for any confusion this may have caused. Our formal RCA process for this OK11 custom domains incident (I-10874) is still actively underway. We remain committed to transparency and will provide an accurate, dedicated RCA for this disruption within 5 business days (expected late July 6, 2026). Thank you for your patience.

4. 6. Juli 2026 um 22:01 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 26th at 7:43 AM (PT), Okta was alerted to customer reports of connection issues and authentication failures when accessing custom domains. The incident was isolated to OK11 and normal connectivity was restored at 7:53 AM (PT). Root Cause Summary: Okta Engineering identified that the root cause of the issue originated during a custom domain traffic migration in OK11 on June 25th at 10:47 AM (PT), the new routing infrastructure became resource-constrained under increased traffic volume the next day. This resulted in TCP connection resets and errors sent to clients attempting to access custom domains. Remediation Steps: Once the source of the issue was identified, Okta engineering immediately mitigated the issue by reverting custom domain traffic back to the previous infrastructure, restoring normal connectivity within minutes. Preventative Actions: To prevent future incidents, the routing infrastructure was scaled to prevent recurrence. Okta will work to implement enhanced monitoring and alerting, as well as updated auto-scaling policies to ensure routing infrastructure maintains adequate capacity during traffic fluctuations and future infrastructure improvements. Duration (# of minutes): Total Duration (Minutes): 53 minutes Actual Time: 7:00 AM - 7:53 AM PT

1. 22. Juni 2026 um 22:02 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team has taken steps to mitigate the issue. We have observed that the errors have been reduced and is continuing to subside. We are monitoring the situation closely and will provide further updates in 15-30 minutes as we move toward full mitigation.

2. 22. Juni 2026 um 22:33 UTCresolved

   Internal monitoring confirmed that the EU1 environment has fully recovered and is operating normally. A full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be made available within 5 business days. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.

3. 30. Juni 2026 um 14:43 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 22nd, 2026, at 2:08 PM PDT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team to errors in the EU environment. During this period, administrators and end users may have experienced intermittent 500 Internal Server Error and 429 Rate Limit responses when attempting to access Okta services. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by an unexpected scaling down of the application cluster during scheduled maintenance of the environment. This change accidentally overwrote the custom capacity settings for several of our applications. This caused the system to automatically revert to its lowest default capacity, drastically reducing the amount of user traffic it could handle simultaneously. As a result, the remaining servers were immediately overwhelmed by the normal volume of user requests, leading to system slowdowns, errors, and "too many requests" blockages for our customers in the impacted cell. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering team identified the root cause issue at 2:44 PM PDT. The team mitigated the issue by scaling up resource capacity, completely stabilizing service health back to normal levels by 2:48 PM PDT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: - Strengthen guardrails by improving our validation tools and multi-environment review processes to automatically detect and flag unexpected server capacity changes before they're applied. - Accelerate system monitoring by implementing enhanced monitoring thresholds to instantly detect and report infrastructure capacity drops before they can impact end users. - Optimize failover protocols by auditing critical alert paths for maximum reliability while establishing a clear, structured communication plan for when automated backup systems are triggered. These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again. Duration (# of minutes):40 minutes

1. 2. Juni 2026 um 11:21 UTCresolved

   Engineering is still investigating the issue, recent actions that were taken show errors subsiding.

2. 2. Juni 2026 um 11:40 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team has observed that the errors have been reduced. We are monitoring the situation closely and will provide further updates as we move toward full mitigation.

3. 2. Juni 2026 um 12:07 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering has confirmed that the issue has been resolved. An RCA will be provided in five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

4. 10. Juni 2026 um 02:19 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 2nd, 2026, at 2:36 AM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team to elevated errors in the OK9 environment. During this period, administrators and end users may have experienced intermittent 500 Internal Server errors when trying to access Okta services. Additionally, Admins may have encountered error messages when fetching certain records. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by a misconfiguration introduced during a scheduled maintenance of the environment. This maintenance introduced an error that caused connectivity issues within specific infrastructure components. Only a small percentage of the infrastructure was affected during this period. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering team identified and isolated impacted infrastructure at 4:01AM PT. These actions successfully addressed the issue, and normal operations were restored by 4:17 AM PT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: Incident response processes, procedures, and investigation tools to more rapidly diagnose similar issues in the future. Risk evaluation processes to include expanding error types and adding additional appropriate corresponding alerts and monitoring associated with vulnerability updates. These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again and, in cases like these, allow Okta to respond faster when possible. Duration (# of minutes): 100

1. 1. Mai 2026 um 00:28 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team has successfully resolved the service instability that was causing system timeouts. Okta engineering has confirmed that errors have subsided, and we have transitioned into a monitoring phase to ensure continued stability. We sincerely appreciate your patience while our team worked to identify and resolve the issue.

2. 1. Mai 2026 um 01:01 UTCresolved

   Internal monitoring confirmed that the OP1 environment has fully recovered and is operating normally. A full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be made available within 5 days. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.

3. 8. Mai 2026 um 02:51 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On April 30th, 2026, at 10:57 AM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team of login issues for users accessing Okta Preview Cell 1. During this period, customers may have received 500 errors for query timeouts and were unable to log in. Root Cause Summary: The incident stemmed from a database query change. The updated query intermittently exceeded its timeout limit across several login endpoints. Consequently, users experienced 500 errors and were unable to log in. Remediation Steps: Upon receiving the alerts, Okta Engineering immediately launched an investigation. By 1:02 PM PT, the team took initial mitigation steps to resolve the issue, however these steps did not resolve the issue. The incident response team continued to triage and diagnose the issue and identified the root cause related to the updated database query change at 4:50 PM PT. The team reverted the new query behavior at 5:00 PM PT in Preview Cell 1, and full service functionality was restored by 5:05 PM PT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: -Reviewing incident response processes and investigation tools to more rapidly diagnose similar issues in the future -Risk evaluation processes associated with query updates -Alerts and monitors associated with the database proxy These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again and, in cases like these, allow Okta to respond faster when possible. Duration (# of minutes): 375

1. 29. April 2026 um 22:42 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Customers using the third-party service Kolide began reporting that attempts to sign in to their orgs redirected to an unrelated tenant and received an HTTP 400 error with the message “Login Failed - 400: Bad Request Error Code: GENERAL_NONSUCCESS” Root Cause Summary: Kolide has confirmed for Okta that an incident occurred with their Device Trust SAML authentication system, resulting in some users being redirected to an incorrect service provider after completing authentication. This resulted in users receiving a 400 error. Kolide reported that users were unable to access their intended application, any unauthorized applications, or any unauthorized environments. Remediation Steps: Okta Support advised customers that they could temporarily disable their Kolide integrations to allow their users to successfully access their services. Timing: Kolide reports: Incident start: April 22, 2026, at 8:24 AM PDT Incident resolved: April 22, 2026, at 8:30 AM PDT Duration (# of minutes): 6 Minutes

1. 13. April 2026 um 20:33 UTCresolved

   Okta has identified the issue impacting Access Request job processing and Engineering Teams are working to restore the service. We are rolling out the fix for this issue in 30 minutes and will provide another update once the fix is rolled out.

2. 13. April 2026 um 20:59 UTCresolved

   Okta has identified the root cause of the issue affecting Access Request job processing as of 1:00 PM PT. A resolution was implemented at 1:45 PM PT, and the service is now fully operational for new submissions. The engineering team is currently working to restore and process any requests submitted during the disruption period. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. 13. April 2026 um 21:29 UTCresolved

   While new Access Request job processing has been restored, Okta is also working to resolve the issue affecting in-flight Access Request job requests processed during the disruption period.  The fix for this issue is expected to be implemented around 5:00pm PT.  Okta will provide another update at 5:00pm PT or sooner if one becomes available.

4. 14. April 2026 um 00:25 UTCresolved

   The issue with in-flight Access Request job requests processed during the disruption period has also been resolved. All Access Request jobs are now processing normally. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

5. 21. April 2026 um 23:16 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this kind. Detection and Impact: On April 13, 2026, at 11:51 AM PST, an incident was reported where Okta Identity Governance (OIG) access requests stalled in the "In Progress" state indefinitely across all environments. The system accepted initial submissions and first-level approvals, but failed to trigger subsequent automated tasks like assigning users to apps/groups or running delegated workflows. . Root Cause Summary: During a recent update deployment, new tasks inadvertently moved to a 'LOCKED' status without implementing the necessary logic to transition them back to 'OPEN.' This caused the tasks to become permanently hidden, preventing the automated execution of the action associated with them. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering teams promptly responded, initiating immediate detection and diagnosis. Corrective measures, including a code fix deployed to all cells, were implemented to prevent any new access requests from becoming stuck. A remediation migration successfully transitioned most affected requests to a fixed state. Normal functionality was fully restored by April 13, 2026, at 5:18 PM PST, following the completion of a final migration to unblock remaining requests.On April 14, 2026, Okta took further steps to resolve in-flight requests that were stuck, moving them to a final, terminal state. Preventative Actions: Okta is taking several steps to prevent this issue from recurring. These include enhanced testing, deployment of safeguards, and improvements to our monitoring and alerting systems. Duration (# of minutes): 434

1. 24. März 2026 um 23:32 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Okta internal monitoring alerted our engineering team to disruptions to the Okta status page and the commercial support portal. Okta Engineering identified a service disruption with our third-party provider and confirmed the impact. During the disruption, customer admins were unable to access the Okta Support Center (support.okta.com) to log support cases or view the primary status page (status.okta.com). Root Cause Summary: Okta's third-party provider, responsible for hosting the Okta Support Center and status page, experienced a service disruption. The third-party provider identified a version mismatch between their application and database layers as the technical trigger. This mismatch resulted in internal server errors and login failures, rendering the Okta Support Center and status page inaccessible for a portion of their disruption. Remediation Steps: Okta teams posted an admin banner within the Okta Admin Console to provide visibility into the disruption and offer a phone number for customers who needed to log support cases manually while the Okta Support Center was unavailable. Services were fully restored after the third-party provider successfully deployed a fix-forward release to the impacted infrastructure, which restored login access. Preventive Actions: As part of Okta's commitment to operational resilience, we have optimized our vendor engagement matrix to accelerate incident mitigation and downstream coordination. We are also conducting an expanded audit of external dependencies to formalize alternative response procedures within our disaster recovery plans. Simultaneously, Engineering has enhanced real-time monitoring and alerting for service endpoints, enabling faster detection and resolution. Timing: Incident start: March 16, 2026, at 08:58 PM PDT Incident resolved: March 16, 2026, at 11:34 PM PDT Duration (# of minutes): 156 minutes

1. 13. März 2026 um 18:48 UTCresolved

   At around 11:20AM PT, Okta Engineering has confirmed that the issue has been resolved in both cells, EU1 and OK1. An RCA will be provided in five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

2. 20. März 2026 um 20:35 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this kind. Detection and Impact On March 13, 2026, at 10:49 AM PT, Okta detected a service degradation that prevented some customers on the OK1 and EU1 cells from performing directory operations, viewing or searching for users, groups, and devices in the Okta Admin Console. Customers may have experienced "Invalid search query" messages or 5xx errors. This issue also affected several API endpoints related to users, groups, and devices, which may have impacted customer integrations relying on this functionality. End-user authentication was not impacted. Root Cause Summary The root cause of this incident was a planned configuration change that exposed a bug in the underlying service, resulting in system errors and disrupting both directory-based APIs. Remediation Steps Upon detection, Okta's engineering teams initiated incident response procedures. Once the problematic configuration change was identified as the source of the errors, it was immediately reverted. After the reversion was applied and verified, full functionality was restored to all impacted customers. Preventative Actions Okta is taking steps to prevent future occurrences of this kind, including enhancing our testing processes, hardening and improving our configuration rollout strategy, and upgrading our monitoring and alerting systems for enhanced detection. Start Time: 03/13/2026 10:17 AM PT End Time: 03/13/2026 11:21 AM PT Duration (# of minutes): 64

1. 4. Februar 2026 um 12:37 UTCresolved

   Okta has implemented a fix for the LDAP issue affecting the OK9 environment. We are observing signs of service recovery and confirmed improvements from customers. We will continue to monitor the situation closely to ensure full resolution. We are monitoring the situation closely and will provide further updates within the next 30 minutes.

2. 4. Februar 2026 um 12:50 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved. Internal monitoring and customer reports confirm that the LDAPi system in OK9 has fully recovered and is operating normally. We will continue to closely monitor the service to ensure stability. A full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be made available within 5 days. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.

3. 11. Februar 2026 um 18:45 UTCresolved

   On February 4th, 2026, at 3:33 AM PT, Okta received customer reports of authentication failures within the OK9 (EMEA) cell. Customers attempting to access LDAP interface services encountered certificate validation errors related to hostname mismatches, preventing successful authentication. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by a misconfiguration introduced during a scheduled update of our LDAP interface to a new configuration source on February 4th 2:24 AM PT. This update inadvertently applied an incorrect SSL certificate profile to the LDAP interface within the OK9 environment. This misconfiguration caused certificate validity errors, resulting in connection issues when attempting to use LDAP services. Remediation Steps: Once the source of the issue was identified, Okta engineering team rolled back changes at 4:07 AM PT. These actions successfully addressed the issue and restored normal operations by 4:26 AM PT. Preventative Actions: To prevent future incidents, Okta has updated synthetic tests and enhanced monitoring. Teams also plan to add new tooling to improve changes to the LDAP service certificates. In addition, we are reviewing our internal processes and procedures, refining our automated rollback processes to further reduce the customer impact time for similar issues in the future. Duration (# of minutes): Total Duration (Minutes): 122 minutes Actual Time: 02:24 AM PT - 04:26 AM PT

1. 28. Januar 2026 um 19:24 UTCresolved

   We are seeing significant and steady system stability as our third-party provider recovery continues in the EU-West-1 region. We will continue monitoring the service to ensure a full recovery. We will provide another update in 60 minutes or as soon as more information becomes available.

2. 28. Januar 2026 um 19:36 UTCresolved

   The third-party provider has confirmed that the issue has been resolved. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within five business days.

3. 5. Februar 2026 um 01:26 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On January 29th, 2026, at 8:28 AM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team of intermittent connectivity issues accessing Okta Cell 9 (EMEA). During this period, customers may have experienced intermittent errors establishing network connections and latency when trying to access Okta services. Clients configured to retry failed connections likely saw successful connectivity on secondary attempts. Root Cause Summary: The incident stemmed from a failure of a component that manages configuration changes to the networking infrastructure with our Cloud Service Provider (CSP) in the region hosting Okta Cell 9. Remediation Steps: Immediately upon receiving the alerts, Okta Engineering began investigating several isolated spikes but determined that cell health was stable. At 9:35 AM PT, Okta Engineering received more alerts and immediately initiated incident response procedures. At 9:51 AM PT, Okta Engineering began working with the CSP to diagnose the issue. At 10:13 AM PT, the latency began to stabilize. At 11:22 AM PT, the issue was resolved. Preventative Actions: To prevent similar incidents from recurring, Okta Engineering is improving our monitoring, working with our CSP to enhance their monitoring, and reviewing incident response processes associated with this event. Duration (# of minutes): 186

4. 11. Februar 2026 um 18:40 UTCresolved

1. 22. Januar 2026 um 21:46 UTCresolved

   We are continuing to monitor the third-party email service provider's progress toward a resolution. At this time, we have not received an estimated time for recovery (ETR). If you are attempting to sign in and have configured alternative MFA factors (such as Okta Verify, SMS, or Security Keys/Biometrics), we recommend using those options to avoid delays associated with email delivery. Our engineering teams remain on standby to verify service restoration the moment it begins. We will continue to provide updates as soon as the impacted provider shares new information.

2. 22. Januar 2026 um 23:24 UTCresolved

   We're continuing to track the ongoing service disruption with the third-party email provider. We appreciate your patience while we await the provider's resolution of the root cause. We'll post our next update in 90 minutes or as soon as we have a significant change in status.

3. 23. Januar 2026 um 00:46 UTCresolved

   The third-party email provider has identified the root cause as a service infrastructure issue within the North America region. They are currently implementing load-balancing configurations to stabilize the environment. While recovery is underway, users may continue to experience intermittent delays or failures in receiving emails. We are monitoring the provider's progress and will provide another update as they move toward full resolution.

4. 23. Januar 2026 um 03:55 UTCresolved

   The third-party provider continues to see improvements across their impacted North American infrastructure. While our internal systems remain healthy, our team is on standby to validate the restoration of all external dependencies. We will provide a final update once the provider confirms that their services have fully returned to normal operations.

5. 23. Januar 2026 um 06:46 UTCresolved

   The third-party provider has confirmed that a fix has been successfully deployed. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within ten business days. We sincerely apologize for the impact this had on you and your users.

6. 30. Januar 2026 um 22:34 UTCresolved

   Following is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service Timing: Incident start: January 22, 2026, at 10:55 AM PST Incident resolved: January 22, 202,6 at 7:50 PM PST Detection: The issue was initially identified through customer reports that they were not receiving expected email notifications. Okta Engineering confirmed the service disruption after internal monitoring indicated a high volume of deferred email delivery attempts to specific third-party domains. Impact: Customers across all Okta cells with email addresses hosted by Microsoft Exchange Online may have experienced intermittent delays or failures in receiving automated email notifications, such as Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) codes and enrollment links. Okta services remained healthy and attempted to resend deferred messages. Root Cause: Microsoft reports that it experienced a service issue within its North American data centers during a planned maintenance activity. As a result, emails sent from Okta to the affected provider resulted in “soft bounce” errors, indicating that the provider's servers were temporarily unable to accept the messages. Remediation Steps: To mitigate the impact on users attempting to sign in, Okta recommended using alternative MFA factors, such as Okta Verify, security keys, or SMS, to bypass delays associated with email delivery. Okta Engineering continuously monitored the third-party provider's recovery efforts and validated that mail delivery returned to baseline levels once the provider stabilized their environment.

1. 20. Januar 2026 um 16:04 UTCresolved

   We've identified that the service interruption is due to an issue with a third-party provider. We are actively working with the provider to ensure a swift resolution and are closely monitoring progress. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

2. 20. Januar 2026 um 16:35 UTCresolved

   We are continuing to monitor progress with our third-party provider. The provider is currently implementing mitigation steps, and we are seeing signs of recovery. Several customers have already confirmed that service has been restored on their end. We are working to ensure this resolution is consistent across all accounts. We will provide the next updates within 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. 20. Januar 2026 um 17:10 UTCresolved

   Our third-party provider is continuing their recovery efforts. While we are no longer seeing active errors, we remain in a period of close monitoring as they work toward a final resolution. We recognize that some users may still experience residual effects; our Support teams are working with them to resolve these errors. Our next update will be in 60 minutes or sooner if additional information becomes available.

4. 20. Januar 2026 um 17:21 UTCresolved

   Our third-party provider has confirmed that a fix has been successfully deployed. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within ten business days. We sincerely apologize for the impact this had on you and your users.

5. 26. Januar 2026 um 18:31 UTCresolved

   Following is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. Timing: Incident start: January 19, 2026, at 10:10 AM PST Incident resolved: January 20, 2026, at 11:49 AM PST Detection: Okta teams were notified via customer cases and an increase in Google Workspace import errors. Impact: Any customers performing Google Workspace imports during the incident window may have encountered an error stating “UserImportJob: Failed to download users. Json field=primaryEmail does not exist for object=[...]” Root Cause: Google Workspaces, a third-party provider, confirmed that a faulty code change introduced caused certain fields, such as primary email addresses, to be missing in API call results. As a result, Okta imports from Google Workspace could not complete, leading to import failures. Google provides additional details for this disruption: https://www.google.com/appsstatus/dashboard/incidents/9q5n4sfDnxYzHj8FxEua Remediation Steps: Okta teams soon identified that a provider-side disruption was the cause of the incident and opened a formal support case to track the resolution. The third-party provider resolved the incident by rolling back a faulty code change and restoring the missing metadata. Recovery occurred in stages, with some customers successfully remediated before others. Okta teams monitored the recovery in real-time and confirmed successful import signals across multiple impacted customers before standing down.

1. 3. Januar 2026 um 01:52 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this kind. Detection and Impact: On December 26, 2025, at 3:27 AM PST, Okta engineering was alerted to increased errors in US Cell 6. During this time, US Cell 6 experienced errors, connection timeouts, and slow responses while attempting to access resources. Admins would have seen a banner on the admin portal stating that the cell was in read-only mode. Root Cause Summary: Okta has determined that the issue was caused by an outage with our cloud service provider. All instances fully recovered by 5:43 AM PT. Remediation Steps: Upon detection, Okta's engineering teams immediately began diagnosing the issue and worked with our cloud service provider to resolve the issue. In addition, the Incident response teams continued to review and analyze the incident, applying additional measures to improve service availability for end-user authentications. Preventative Actions: Okta is taking steps to prevent a recurrence of this issue. We are making improvements to our monitoring and response procedures to more quickly diagnose and recover from this kind of failure in the future. Total Duration: 2 hours and 16 minutes Start Time: December 26, 2025, 03:27 AM PT End Time: December 26, 2025, 05:43 AM PT

1. 14. Dezember 2025 um 16:40 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team is continuing to work with our third-party vendor and addressing this issue with urgency related to the custom domain email delivery issues.

2. 14. Dezember 2025 um 16:42 UTCresolved

   The next update will be posted in the next 60 minutes.

3. 14. Dezember 2025 um 17:50 UTCresolved

   Our Engineering team is continuing to work with the third-party provider on mitigation actions to help resolve this outstanding issue. We are treating the issue with the utmost urgency to restore our services as soon as possible. The next update will be provided within the next 60 minutes or sooner, if additional information becomes available.

4. 14. Dezember 2025 um 18:48 UTCresolved

   We have identified a potential root cause of this issue, and are currently investigating next steps towards resolution. We will provide the next update in 60 minutes, unless new information becomes available.

5. 14. Dezember 2025 um 19:39 UTCresolved

   This issue has been successfully resolved as of 11:07AM PDT. All services have been restored. If you continue to see issues, please update your support case for assistance. Additional root cause information will be available within 5 Business days.

6. 23. Dezember 2025 um 14:49 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar future occurrences. Detection and Impact: On December 14, 2025, at 3:01 a.m. PST, Okta detected an issue that prevented email delivery for customers using custom email domains. This affected end-users' ability to receive emails for Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), password resets, registration activation, account lockout notifications, and other notification emails, such as rate-limit notifications for administrators. Root Cause Summary: Okta has determined that the issue was caused by an unintended configuration change on our Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs). This change incorrectly routed emails from custom domains without proper DMARC sender authentication. As a result, email service providers rejected the emails, causing the delivery failures. Remediation Steps: Upon detection, Okta's engineering teams immediately began diagnosing the delivery failures. After identifying the incorrect routing, we updated the configuration to ensure emails were sent through the appropriate authenticated channels. Normal email functionality was fully restored after the updated configuration was applied. Preventative Actions: Okta is taking several steps to prevent a recurrence of this issue. We are enhancing our monitoring and alerting for email services and improving our configuration management tools to add further safeguards. Duration (# of minutes):1140