Störungsverlauf von Spreedly

1. 2. September 2026 um 15:11 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly hat ein Problem erkannt, das möglicherweise zu einer verschlechterten Leistung bei transaktionalen APIs führt. Während wir eine frühzeitige Benachrichtigung bereitstellen, um Sie so schnell wie möglich zu benachrichtigen, untersuchen wir weiterhin den tatsächlichen Umfang und die Auswirkungen und werden ein Update bereitstellen, sobald weitere Details verfügbar sind. Vielen Dank für Ihre Geduld.

2. 2. September 2026 um 15:57 UTCmonitoring

   Wir arbeiten daran, eine Leistungsverzögerung zu beheben, die sich auf einige Zahlungsabwicklungen (insbesondere Kauf, Erfassung und Erstellung von Zahlungsmethoden) im Zusammenhang mit der letzten Datenbankwartung auswirkt. Ein Fix ist im Gange, und unser Team überwacht das System aktiv. Bitte überprüfen Sie hier für Echtzeit-Updates.

3. 2. September 2026 um 21:32 UTCresolved

   Dieser Vorfall wurde behoben.

4. 9. September 2026 um 21:50 UTCpostmortem

   ### September 9, 2026 — Erhöhte Fehlerraten, die sich auf die Transaktionsverarbeitung auswirken ### High Level Zusammenfassung Am 2. September 2026, zwischen 14:35 und 15:19 UTC, erlebte Spreedly eine Periode erhöhter Fehlerraten, die eine Teilmenge von Transaktionsanforderungen über Endpunkte hinweg beeinflussten. Das Problem dauerte etwa 44 Minuten und wurde durch ein Problem auf Infrastrukturebene mit unserer Datenbankplattform verursacht. Unser Team identifizierte und löste das Problem am selben Tag. ### Was geschah Während einer Routine-Schema-Aktualisierung führte ein Defekt in unserer zugrunde liegenden Datenbankplattform dazu, dass einer unserer Datenbankknoten nicht mehr verfügbar war. Dies reduzierte vorübergehend die Redundanz für einen Teil unserer Transaktionsdaten, was dazu führte, dass einige Anfragen entweder eine Timeout- oder eine Systemfehlerantwort (HTTP 500) erhielten, anstatt sie normal zu verarbeiten. Unser Team arbeitete direkt mit unserem Datenbankanbieter zusammen, um die Ursache zu identifizieren und die vollständige Wiederherstellung der betroffenen Infrastruktur zu bestätigen. ### Nächste Schritte Wir haben die zugrunde liegende Ursache als bekanntes Problem in der Software unseres Datenbankanbieters identifiziert. Ein vom Anbieter bereitgestellter Fix soll während der normalen geplanten Wartung angewendet werden. Parallel dazu fügen wir zusätzliche Überwachung hinzu, um diese Problemklasse früher zu erkennen, und passen unsere internen Verfahren für Datenbankwartungsarbeiten an, um das Risiko eines ähnlichen Vorfalls weiter zu reduzieren. Das Spreedly Team

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 14. August 2026 um 16:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an increase in 5xx errors on the Core Transactional API. Some transactions may be failing or returning unexpected error responses during this time. We will provide an update as soon as we have more information.

2. 14. August 2026 um 16:34 UTCresolved

   A fix has been implemented and error rates have returned to normal. Some transactions may have failed or returned errors during the affected window. We're continuing to monitor and will follow up with a more detailed post-incident summary.

3. 3. September 2026 um 20:55 UTCpostmortem

   ### Service Disruption on Transaction Endpoints ### ‌High Level Summary On August 14, 2026, Spreedly experienced a brief service disruption affecting some transaction-related API endpoints for approximately 20 minutes \(4:06 PM – 4:26 PM ET\). During this window, some requests to endpoints involving transaction lookups, captures, voids, credits, and payment method operations may have received error responses. The issue was identified and resolved quickly by our engineering team. ### What Happened A routine database schema update caused a subset of existing database connections to reference outdated schema information, resulting in intermittent errors on affected requests. Once identified, our team refreshed the affected database connections, which fully resolved the issue. ### Next Steps We are reviewing our schema migration process to add additional safeguards that will prevent this class of issue from recurring, and are improving automated testing coverage for this scenario. We have added auto-retry and recovery mechanisms so that if a connection does reference an outdated schema it will not affect transactions going forward.

1. 27. Juli 2026 um 13:50 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen derzeit dieses Problem.

2. 27. Juli 2026 um 14:00 UTCidentified

   Das Problem wurde identifiziert und ein Fix wird implementiert.

3. 27. Juli 2026 um 15:00 UTCmonitoring

   Spreedly erkannte ein Problem, das sich auf die Performance von Kerntransaktionen ausgewirkt haben könnte. Während das Problem jetzt gelöst zu sein scheint, überwacht unser Team aktiv Systeme, um eine anhaltende Stabilität zu gewährleisten. Wir werden ein endgültiges Update bereitstellen, sobald unsere Untersuchung des vollen Umfangs und der Auswirkungen abgeschlossen ist. Bitte folgen Sie weiterhin unserer StatusPage für das neueste Update.

4. 27. Juli 2026 um 21:41 UTCresolved

   Nach genauer Überwachung und Bestätigung, dass alle Systeme stabilisiert sind und wie erwartet funktionieren, gilt dieser Vorfall als behoben. Es werden keine weiteren Auswirkungen auf die Kunden erwartet. Wir schließen unsere Untersuchung über die Ursachen des Vorfalls und etwaige verbleibende Auswirkungen ab. Wir entschuldigen uns für Unannehmlichkeiten oder Störungen.

5. 3. September 2026 um 20:57 UTCpostmortem

   ### High Level Zusammenfassung Am 27. Juli 2026 erlebte Spreed intermittierende Fehler bei einer Teilmenge von Transaktionsanfragen, einschließlich Käufen, Autorisierungen und Webhooks. ### Was geschah Eine Datenbankmigration aktualisierte das Schema eines internen Dienstes, der gespeicherte Zahlungsmethoden verwaltet. Dies führte zu Fehlern bei bestehenden Verbindungen, die auf einen veralteten Cache verweisen. Wir haben die Änderung zurückgenommen und diese Verbindungen zyklisiert, um das Problem vollständig zu lösen. ### Nächste Schritte Wir überprüfen unseren Schema-Migrationsprozess, um zusätzliche Sicherheitsvorkehrungen hinzuzufügen, die verhindern, dass sich diese Klasse von Problemen wiederholt, und verbessern die automatisierte Testabdeckung für dieses Szenario. Wir haben automatische Wiederholungs- und Wiederherstellungsmechanismen hinzugefügt, so dass, wenn eine Verbindung auf ein veraltetes Schema verweist, dies keine Auswirkungen auf die künftigen Transaktionen hat.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 11. Juli 2026 um 14:33 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen erhöhte Fehlerquoten, die sich auf bestimmte API-Anforderungen auswirken. Einige Listen- und Abrufendpunkte können intermittierende 500-Antworten zurückgeben, während wir daran arbeiten, die Ursache zu identifizieren.

2. 11. Juli 2026 um 15:38 UTCresolved

   Wir haben das Problem identifiziert und behoben, das intermittierende 500-Antworten auf bestimmten Listen- und Abrufendpunkten verursacht hat. Ein Konfigurationsupdate wurde bereitgestellt, um zu verhindern, dass Anfragen vorzeitig beendet werden, und wir überwachen den Dienst weiterhin.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 8. Juli 2026 um 15:22 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly hat ein Problem entdeckt, das möglicherweise zu einer verschlechterten Performance bei Cybersource Credit-Transaktionen führt. Während wir diese frühzeitige Benachrichtigung bereitstellen, um Sie so schnell wie möglich zu informieren, untersuchen wir immer noch den tatsächlichen Umfang und die Auswirkungen. Wir werden ein Update bereitstellen, sobald weitere Details verfügbar sind.

2. 8. Juli 2026 um 16:08 UTCidentified

   Wir haben einen transienten internen DNS-Auflösungsfehler identifiziert, der zwischen 15:00 und 15:05 UTC aufgetreten ist und ausgewählte 500-Fehler bei Spreedly-Diensten verursacht hat. Wir untersuchen weiterhin die volle Wirkung und werden zusätzliche Informationen bereitstellen, sobald sie verfügbar sind.

3. 8. Juli 2026 um 16:54 UTCresolved

   Nach genauer Überwachung und Bestätigung, dass alle Systeme stabilisiert sind und wie erwartet funktionieren, gilt dieser Vorfall als behoben. Es werden keine weiteren Auswirkungen auf die Kunden erwartet. Wir schließen unsere Untersuchung über die Ursachen des Vorfalls und etwaige verbleibende Auswirkungen ab. Wir entschuldigen uns für Unannehmlichkeiten oder Störungen.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 17. Juni 2026 um 14:55 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly hat ein Problem erkannt, das möglicherweise zu einer verschlechterten Performance bei asynchronen Transaktionen führt. Während wir eine frühzeitige Benachrichtigung bereitstellen, um Sie so schnell wie möglich zu benachrichtigen, untersuchen wir weiterhin den tatsächlichen Umfang und die Auswirkungen und werden ein Update bereitstellen, sobald weitere Details verfügbar sind. Vielen Dank für Ihre Geduld.

2. 17. Juni 2026 um 15:00 UTCmonitoring

   Wir haben einen Fix implementiert und die asynchronen Transaktionen stabilisiert. Unser Team beobachtet die Situation genau, um sicherzustellen, dass es keine zusätzlichen Auswirkungen gibt. Bitte folgen Sie weiterhin unserer StatusPage für das neueste Update.

3. 17. Juni 2026 um 16:03 UTCmonitoring

   Wir beobachten genau auf weitere Probleme oder zusätzliche Auswirkungen. Bitte folgen Sie weiterhin unserer StatusPage für die neuesten Updates.

4. 17. Juni 2026 um 21:42 UTCresolved

   Nach einer Überwachungsperiode haben wir bestätigt, dass das Problem behoben wurde und die Systeme normal funktionieren. Wenn Sie weiterhin Probleme haben, wenden Sie sich bitte an den Support.

5. 24. Juni 2026 um 20:10 UTCpostmortem

   24. Juni 2026 - Asynchrone Transaktionsverarbeitungsstörung ** Hochrangige Zusammenfassung** Am 17. Juni 2026 von ca. 10:02 Uhr bis 10:41 Uhr UTC erlebte Spreedly eine Störung, die asynchrone Gateway-Transaktionen und 3DS-Authentifizierungsströme beeinflusste. Während des 39-Minuten-Fensters wurden etwa 1.634 Transaktionen ohne bestätigtes Ergebnis in einem anhängigen Zustand belassen, was weniger als 1% des gesamten Transaktionsvolumens in diesem Zeitraum entspricht. **Was geschah ** Eine Codebereitstellung führte zu einem Kompatibilitätsproblem zwischen neu bereitgestellten und zuvor ausgeführten Anwendungsinstanzen. Während eines Rollback-Prozesses wurden einige Anforderungen über gemischte Codeversionen geleitet, was zu Fehlern bei der Verarbeitung asynchroner Transaktionsstatusaktualisierungen führte. Zu den betroffenen Transaktionstypen gehören asynchrone Gateway-Transaktionen (gatewayspezifische 3DS und andere asynkrone Verifizierungen, Autorisierungen und Käufe) und 3DS Globale Authentifizierung. Transaktionen, die während dieses Fensters in den betroffenen Fluss eingegeben wurden, können ein unbestimmtes Ergebnis widerspiegeln, der Transaktionszustand an Ihrem Gateway kann von dem abweichen, was Spreedly berichtet. **Nächste Schritte** Wir empfehlen die Überprüfung von Transaktionen aus dem 10:02-10:41 UTC-Fenster am 17. Juni, die in einem anhängigen Zustand bleiben: Überprüfungen können sicher wiederholt werden. Berechtigungen sollten vor dem erneuten Versuch am Gateway ungültig gemacht werden. Einkäufe bergen das Risiko von Duplikationen, wir empfehlen die Rückerstattung vor dem erneuten Versuch. Bitte wenden Sie sich an Spreedly Support, wenn Sie Hilfe benötigen, um betroffene Transaktionen zu identifizieren oder den geeigneten Sanierungspfad zu ermitteln. Wir arbeiten aktiv daran, diese Klasse von Problemen durch verbesserte Bereitstellungssicherheiten und automatisierte Rollback-Erkennung zu verhindern. Das Spreedly Team

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 8. Mai 2026 um 18:00 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring results.

2. 8. Mai 2026 um 18:05 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19. März 2026 um 15:13 UTCidentified

   We are currently investigating performance of the Dodgeball service.

2. 19. März 2026 um 15:30 UTCidentified

   We are working to resolve an issue with delayed processing of requests to the Dodgeball services.

3. 19. März 2026 um 15:55 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the Dodgeball component that was experiencing a partial outage. We are continuing to monitor

4. 19. März 2026 um 16:07 UTCmonitoring

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

5. 19. März 2026 um 16:09 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 16. März 2026 um 17:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating elevated errors on API endpoints

2. 16. März 2026 um 17:51 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring to ensure services are operating correctly

3. 16. März 2026 um 18:07 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

4. 19. März 2026 um 19:07 UTCpostmortem

   ### Mar 18th 2026 — _Decryption Errors on API endpoints_ ### Summary Between 5:40 PM and 5:43 PM UTC on March 16, 2026, we experienced a brief issue during a key rotation that caused a small subset of API requests to fail due to decryption errors. These errors occurred within our system before any external processing took place. The issue was quickly identified, and traffic was immediately redirected to a stable environment, restoring normal service. ### What Happened At 5:36 PM UTC, we routed traffic to a newly deployed cluster of our encryption service running with the latest security keys. Shortly after, we observed decryption errors affecting a small subset of records, which resulted in some requests returning 500 error responses. We promptly redirected traffic back to the existing cluster, restoring normal operation. Further investigation determined that these records were still associated with a key in the process of rotation, and we updated them as a follow-up action to prevent the issue from recurring. ### Next Steps We have enhanced our process to ensure that a key’s usage is fully verified before it is removed from the encryption service. -The Spreedly Team

1. 26. Februar 2026 um 16:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting customers using Dodgeball. The production database backing Dodgeball has reached critically low available storage, which is expected to result in elevated error rates. Customers may begin experiencing errors within the next 10 minutes as the system’s ability to process requests degrades. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working to restore normal capacity as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

2. 26. Februar 2026 um 16:59 UTCmonitoring

   The engineering team has successfully resolved the storage issue affecting the Dodgeball production PostgreSQL instance. Capacity has been restored and the system is now operating normally. At this time, we are not observing any elevated error rates for customers using Dodgeball. We will continue to monitor the system closely to ensure stability. Further updates will be provided if necessary.

3. 26. Februar 2026 um 18:44 UTCresolved

   The storage issue affecting the Dodgeball production instance has been fully resolved. Capacity has been restored and systems are operating normally. We are no longer observing elevated error rates for customers using Dodgeball. Thank you for your patience while we worked to resolve this issue.

1. 25. Februar 2026 um 19:18 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating performance of the Dodgeball service.

2. 25. Februar 2026 um 19:48 UTCidentified

   We are working to resolve an issue with processing of Checkpoints that is causing latency and errors for requests to the Dodgeball services.

3. 25. Februar 2026 um 20:35 UTCmonitoring

   Service has resumed and we are monitoring for further impact. We apologize for any inconvenience this has caused

4. 25. Februar 2026 um 21:52 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

1. 5. Februar 2026 um 15:56 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue where credit transactions referencing Capture transactions are failing in production. Some customers may see errors when attempting to issue credits against Capture transactions. Capture transactions themselves are processing successfully. Our engineering team is actively investigating this behavior to determine the cause and confirm whether this is a regression or an unintended change. We will provide updates as soon as more information is available.

2. 5. Februar 2026 um 16:25 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve deployed a revert to address the issue where credit transactions referencing Capture transactions were failing. We’re actively monitoring to ensure credit requests referencing Captures are processing as expected. At this time, we’re not seeing further errors related to this behavior.

3. 5. Februar 2026 um 17:01 UTCresolved

   After monitoring the system post-deploy, we’re no longer seeing errors related to credits referencing Capture transactions, and processing has returned to normal. Thank you for your patience.

4. 10. Februar 2026 um 17:22 UTCpostmortem

   ### February 10, 2026 — Credits Referencing Capture Transactions Failing ### ‌High Level Summary Between approximately 1:56 PM UTC and 4:15 PM UTC on February 5, 2026, credit transactions where the reference transaction was a capture failed with the error "The specified `reference_token` corresponds to a transaction which cannot be used as a reference." ### What Happened At approximately 1:56 PM UTC on February 5, 2026, Spreedly rolled out a change to support credits on the CyberSource Rest gateway. This included a change in the way we validated reference transaction types used in credits. Specifically, there was an unintended side-effect which caused captures to no longer be treated as a valid reference type for credits on gateways other than CyberSource Rest. Once this was discovered, the code was reverted at 4:01PM UTC. By 4:15 PM UTC, credit requests against captures were fully functional. ### Next Steps * Any credit attempts that failed with this error are safe to retry * We are making improvements to our code review processes and regression test suite to ensure we catch similar errors before they make it into production * We have identified a gap in our observability surrounding validation errors that we will be prioritizing ‌ -The Spreedly Team

1. 4. Februar 2026 um 18:15 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue that is affecting multiple customers using Payflow Pro where some transactions fail with the error: “Invalid Request. Malicious string found in XML document”. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 4. Februar 2026 um 19:52 UTCmonitoring

   We are no longer seeing errors at this time, and the issue appears to have subsided. We are working with Payflow Pro to identify the root cause. Our team continues to monitor the situation closely to ensure stability. Please continue to follow our StatusPage for the latest updates.

3. 4. Februar 2026 um 19:56 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 27. Januar 2026 um 19:59 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue related to a dodgeball component experiencing a partial outage. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 27. Januar 2026 um 20:12 UTCresolved

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the Dodgeball component that was experiencing a partial outage. After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

1. 27. Januar 2026 um 19:08 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue potentially resulting in a high number of pending 3DS2 Global transactions. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 27. Januar 2026 um 19:25 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the 3DS2 Global transactions. Our team is monitoring the situation closely to ensure there are no additional impacts. Please continue to follow our StatusPage for the latest update.

3. 27. Januar 2026 um 19:29 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

4. 3. Februar 2026 um 15:38 UTCpostmortem

   ### February 3rd, 2026 — 3DS2 Global Transactions Pending ‌ Between 5:40 pm UTC and 7:24 PM UTC on January 27, 2026 the latest version of the Spreedly iFrame \(`iframe-v1`\) was configured to use version 1.180 which contained a bug related to the handling of device fingerprinting for `Sca::Authentications` in an end user's browser. As a result there was an elevated number of `Sca::Authentications` stuck in a pending flow with a `required_action` of `device_fingerprint`. These transactions were held in a pending state and never completed. Our team identified the issue and updated the version of iFrame \(`iframe-v1`\) to utilize `1.179`. ### What Happened At 5:40 pm UTC on January 27th, 2026 a new version of iFrame was released \(1.180\) and updated the version to be used in the `iframe-v1.min.js` asset to point to `1.180`. This change was meant to improve the error handling for the loading of 3rd party critical SDKs however it caused the SDK to enter a permanently error-ed state when attempting to perform device fingerprinting due to a race condition with loading the SDKs. At 7:20 pm UTC on January 27th, 2026 the change was rolled back and by 7:24 pm UTC, 2026 the `iframe-v1.min.js` asset globally was pointing to version `1.179`. ### Next Steps We have identified a gap in our observability and alerting within the iFrame service related to the managing of 3DS lifecycle flows that we will be prioritizing. -The Spreedly Team

1. 9. Januar 2026 um 18:46 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 9. Januar 2026 um 18:52 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 9. Januar 2026 um 19:07 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been deployed and we are seeing systems recover. We will continue to monitor to ensure stability and will provide further updates as needed.

4. 9. Januar 2026 um 19:10 UTCresolved

   After a period of monitoring, we have confirmed that the issue has been resolved and systems are operating normally. If you continue to experience any issues, please reach out to Support.

1. 29. Dezember 2025 um 16:50 UTCresolved

   Between 7:00 PM EST on Saturday, December 27th, and 1:00 AM EST on Sunday, December 28th, we identified a period of higher-than-normal latency caused by a pre-planned customer event that resulted in a significant traffic spike. Although we did not observe any service failures or timeouts, our systems experienced degraded service due to the increased latency. Systems recovered quickly once peak traffic subsided and are now operating normally. We expect performance to remain stable moving forward.

1. 16. Dezember 2025 um 21:56 UTCresolved

   Between 3:59 and 4:03 EST, customers may have experienced degraded performance when processing transactions that required 3D Secure (3DS) authentication via our Global 3DS service. Performance has since returned to normal, and no further impact has been observed. If you have any questions about potential impact to your transactions during this time window, please reach out to Spreedly Support for assistance.

2. 18. Dezember 2025 um 21:26 UTCpostmortem

   # _December 18, 2025 — Delayed Processing of Some 3DS Global Transactions_ ‌ _A targeted update intended for Gateway-Specific 3DS processing impacted a subset of 3DS Global transactions. This caused a small number of transactions to remain in a "Pending" state rather than progressing to completion._ ### What Happened Between 08:59 PM and 09:03 PM UTC on December 16, 2025, a deployment intended to update Gateway-Specific 3DS logic inadvertently affected the processing of 3DS Global transactions. As a result, 52 transactions failed to reach a final state and remained "pending." During this 4-minute window, customers attempting a 3DS-authenticated operation would have encountered an interruption, preventing their transactions from completing. Our team identified the impact immediately and rolled back the change to restore normal service. ### Next Steps _We have successfully identified and corrected the underlying logic error within the change. We are also enhancing our automated deployment tests to better catch cross-module dependencies of this nature. We sincerely apologize for any disruption this caused to your operations._ ‌ — The Spreedly Team

1. 9. Dezember 2025 um 15:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where roughly 30–40% of transactions are not appearing in Spreedly reporting since 12/03. Primary datastores and secondary services show no data loss, indicating the issue lies within the reporting ingestion process. Please reach out to Spreedly Support if you need assistance.

2. 10. Dezember 2025 um 06:53 UTCinvestigating

   Our team continues to investigate the root cause of the missing transaction data appearing in Spreedly reporting. All primary datastores and transactional processing are functioning normally, and there is no indication of data loss at the source. The issue appears to be isolated to the reporting ingestion process.

3. 10. Dezember 2025 um 14:42 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified and fixed the issue that was causing some transaction data to be missing from Spreedly reporting. Our team is now working on backfilling the missing reporting data to ensure completeness and accuracy. All primary processing systems continue to operate normally, and there is no impact to transaction processing.

4. 10. Dezember 2025 um 20:04 UTCresolved

   Our team has completed the backfill process, and all missing transaction data has now been fully restored in Spreedly reporting. Transaction reporting is up to date and functioning as expected. All primary processing systems continued to operate normally throughout this incident, and no transaction processing impact occurred.

5. 2. Januar 2026 um 21:44 UTCpostmortem

   ### _Postmortem: January 2, 2026_ — _Transaction Reporting Degraded_ ### ‌High Level Summary Select data related to transactions did not make it into our downstream systems, causing inaccurate reports in [app.spreedly.com](http://app.spreedly.com) ### What Happened After completing system updates on December 3, 2025, approximately 30-40% of data related to transactions did not make it into our reporting tools due to a latent bug in one of our supporting applications. This caused inaccurate reports in [app.spreedly.com](http://app.spreedly.com). This did not impact any primary system functionality and no data was lost. ### Next Steps * Our team has since identified and fixed the affected application. The missing data was backfilled and subsequent data continues to flow normally * We are adding additional monitoring in order to more quickly flag discrepancies * We are continuing to make updates to simplify our data pipeline that will prevent similar issues in the future -The Spreedly Team

1. 20. Oktober 2025 um 15:41 UTCidentified

   The major AWS outage on October 20, 2025, has been largely resolved for most affected services, though some residual issues may persist. Spreedly’s core platform remains stable and fully available. However, due to downstream impact from the AWS outage, some of Spreedly’s indexing endpoints and callback processing are experiencing delays. This is related to dependencies on third-party systems that were affected by the outage and are still undergoing recovery. As a result, you may continue to see intermittent latency or delayed responses for API requests involving these systems. We are actively monitoring the situation as AWS and its downstream services continue recovery efforts. For ongoing updates, please refer to the AWS status page here

2. 20. Oktober 2025 um 20:22 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected.

3. 23. Oktober 2025 um 18:27 UTCpostmortem

   ### Postmortem: October 24, 2025 — _AWS outage_ Monday's AWS outage had downstream impact on some 3rd-party systems utilized by Spreedly's platform. Namely, our indexing endpoints and callbacks lagged behind due to the outage and recovery steps. ### What Happened Spreedly's 3DS global service and legacy smart routing product both faced a period of failures due to 3rd-party systems relying on AWS. ### Next Steps Spreedly will improve its response to our alerts platform, and are actively working on multi-region support slated for 2026, which should mitigate the impact of similar events going forward. -The Spreedly Team