Störungsverlauf von Tink

1. 16. Juli 2026 um 08:17 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen derzeit ein Problem, das mehrere Tink-Produkte betrifft. Siehe Details für die vollständige Liste der betroffenen Produkte.

2. 16. Juli 2026 um 08:42 UTCidentified

   Das Problem wurde identifiziert und wir arbeiten derzeit an einer Lösung.

3. 16. Juli 2026 um 08:55 UTCidentified

   Wir arbeiten weiter an einer Lösung für dieses Problem.

4. 16. Juli 2026 um 09:11 UTCmonitoring

   Der Service erholt sich derzeit und wir beobachten die Situation aktiv.

5. 20. Juli 2026 um 12:47 UTCresolved

   Dieses Problem ist gelöst. Wir entschuldigen uns für die Unannehmlichkeiten.

6. 22. Juli 2026 um 13:26 UTCpostmortem

   ## Einführung Am 16. Juli zwischen 09:54 und 10:56 Uhr MESZ Tink hatte ein technisches Problem, das Tink Console, Tink Link, Payment Initiation Services, Account Information Services und ausgewählte Risikoprodukte für alle europäischen Märkte betraf. Während des Vorfalls hatten Endbenutzer Probleme mit dem Starten oder Abschluss von Authentifizierungs-, Einwilligungs-, Kontoinformationen und Zahlungsauslösereisen und konnten sich nicht bei der Tink Console anmelden, um ihre Integrationen mit der Tink-Plattform zu verwalten. ## Wurzelursachenanalyse Nach einer gründlichen Untersuchung wurde festgestellt, dass eine externe Infrastrukturabhängigkeit, die vom Cloud-Provider von Tink bereitgestellt wurde, der für das Routing des kundenorientierten Datenverkehrs verwendet wurde, nicht funktionierte, was zu einer Unterbrechung der Tink Link-basierten Benutzerreisen und einer vorübergehenden Nichtverfügbarkeit des Tink Console-Zugangs für einige Kunden führte. ## Sanierung Sobald das Problem identifiziert wurde, leitete Tink den betroffenen Datenverkehr durch eine alternative Konfiguration und stellte die betroffenen Dienste wieder in den normalen Betrieb. ## Folgemaßnahmen Um ähnliche Probleme in Zukunft zu vermeiden, wird Tink die folgenden Maßnahmen umsetzen: 1. Verbesserung der Überwachung und Alarmierung auf kritische externe Infrastrukturabhängigkeiten. 2. Dokumentation und Validierung von Wiederherstellungsverfahren für die Weiterleitung ähnlicher Fehler. 3. Durchführung zusätzlicher Schulungen zur schnelleren Identifizierung und Behandlung vergleichbarer infrastrukturbezogener Probleme.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 7. Juli 2026 um 13:39 UTCinvestigating

   Wir untersuchen derzeit ein Problem, das mehrere Tink-Produkte betrifft. Siehe Details für die vollständige Liste der betroffenen Produkte.

2. 7. Juli 2026 um 13:54 UTCmonitoring

   Der Service erholt sich derzeit und wir beobachten die Situation aktiv.

3. 8. Juli 2026 um 13:37 UTCresolved

   Dieses Problem ist gelöst. Wir entschuldigen uns für die Unannehmlichkeiten.

4. 9. Juli 2026 um 14:31 UTCpostmortem

   **Einführung** Am 2026-07-07 zwischen 15:26 und 15:51 Uhr MESZ hatte Tink ein technisches Problem, das die API-Verfügbarkeit für einige unserer Kunden beeinträchtigte. Während des Vorfalls hatten Endbenutzer Probleme mit dem Zugriff auf betroffene Tink-Dienste. ** Wurzelursachenanalyse** Nach einer gründlichen Untersuchung wurde das Ereignis, das das temporäre API-Verfügbarkeitsproblem ausgelöst hat, identifiziert und erfolgreich behoben. **Abhilfe ** Sobald das Problem identifiziert wurde, stellte Tink die Verfügbarkeit des Dienstes wieder her und implementierte zusätzliche Schutzmaßnahmen, um die Widerstandsfähigkeit gegen ähnliche Ereignisse zu verbessern. **Follow-up Aktionen** Um ähnliche Probleme in Zukunft zu vermeiden, wird Tink die folgenden Maßnahmen umsetzen: 1. Verstärkte Schutzkontrollen in allen relevanten Produktionsumgebungen. 2. Verbesserung der Überwachungs- und Reaktionsverfahren für hochwirksame Verfügbarkeitsereignisse. 3. Überprüfung und Verbesserung der Widerstandsfähigkeit der Dienste, um die Auswirkungen ähnlicher Vorfälle zu verringern.

Automatisch aus der offiziellen Störungsmeldung übersetzt.

1. 22. Juni 2026 um 15:13 UTCresolved

   Between June 20th, 02:00 CEST and June 22nd, 13:40 CET Tink has experienced degraded performance with webhooks. We have pinpointed the root cause of the issue and resolved it. We are sorry any issues this may have caused.

1. 16. Juni 2026 um 10:15 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and we are currently working on a solution.

2. 16. Juni 2026 um 11:32 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 2. Juni 2026 um 09:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with Payment Initiation.

2. 2. Juni 2026 um 10:25 UTCmonitoring

   Service is currently recovering and we are actively monitoring the situation.

3. 3. Juni 2026 um 08:31 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 1. Juni 2026 um 00:35 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and we are currently working on a solution.

2. 1. Juni 2026 um 04:53 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 28. Mai 2026 um 16:47 UTCidentified

   We have identified and are currently investigating an issue with our provider which is affecting inbound Faster Payments Service (FPS), which may result in delays.

2. 28. Mai 2026 um 18:02 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 21. Mai 2026 um 21:52 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with payments in German market.

2. 21. Mai 2026 um 22:47 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 19. Mai 2026 um 09:53 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified and are currently investigating an issue with our provider which is affecting both outbound and inbound SEPA payments, which may result in delays.

2. 21. Mai 2026 um 13:29 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to monitor an issue affecting both outbound and inbound SEPA payments. While some payments are processing, we cannot yet confirm full service restoration. We are actively investigating and will provide a further update as soon as possible. We apologise for the inconvenience.

3. 22. Mai 2026 um 07:39 UTCresolved

   We can confirm that the previously identified issue affecting inbound and outbound SEPA payments has now been resolved. Payments are processing as expected. We apologise for the inconvenience caused and thank you for your patience.

1. 11. Mai 2026 um 13:32 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with the account exclusion functionality, as accounts are not being excluded as intended. Further updates will be provided as soon as possible.

2. 11. Mai 2026 um 14:19 UTCresolved

   The issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 25. März 2026 um 09:15 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with Bulk Payments in Sweden.

2. 25. März 2026 um 10:04 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 19. März 2026 um 21:16 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently looking into an issue with Nordea bulk payments. The initiation for the SE market has been failing for about 3 hours.

2. 20. März 2026 um 08:12 UTCresolved

   The issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 5. März 2026 um 09:48 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with Payment initiations across multiple markets.

2. 5. März 2026 um 10:19 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

3. 10. März 2026 um 11:34 UTCpostmortem

   **Introduction**  On 5 March, between 10:31 CET and 10:59 CET, Tink experienced a technical issue that impacted the Payment Initiation service across multiple markets. The issue was detected immediately, and mitigation actions were taken promptly to limit the impact. During the incident window, some end users experienced difficulties when initiating payments.  **Root Cause Analysis**  Following a thorough investigation, it was determined that a recently introduced change contained a defect that caused unexpected request failures within the Payment Initiation service. This resulted in a temporary disruption to payment initiation flows in the affected markets.  **Remediation**  As soon as the issue was identified, the affected deployment was immediately rolled back. This action mitigated the impact and restored normal service functionality.  **Follow-up actions**  To reduce the risk of similar incidents in the future, Tink is taking the following actions:  1. **Extend test coverage for payment initiation scenarios** Further strengthen the pre-deployment validation for payment flows by expanding our end-to-end test coverage for payment flows.

1. 3. März 2026 um 13:03 UTCresolved

   We experienced a technical issue between 2 March 11:30 CET and 3 March 13:42 CET that caused degraded performance of Transactions and Risk reporting. During this time, some users may have experienced empty reports or missing data when viewing or downloading Transactions and Risk reports. Performance has since returned to normal. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 3. Februar 2026 um 15:53 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with Analytics in Tink Console.

2. 4. Februar 2026 um 08:09 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 3. Februar 2026 um 10:42 UTCresolved

   We experienced a technical issue between 10:43 CET and 11:18 CET that caused a degraded performance of the Payment product. During this time some users in the FI and DE markets may have experienced issues with initiating payments. Performance has since returned to normal. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 2. Februar 2026 um 17:15 UTCinvestigating

   We’re currently experiencing a major outage impacting Payments since 17:48 CET. Our team is investigating the issue, and we’ll share updates here as soon as possible.

2. 2. Februar 2026 um 18:17 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved as of 19:01 CET. We apologize for the inconvenience.

3. 5. Februar 2026 um 14:21 UTCpostmortem

   # Introduction  On 2 February 2026, between 17:48 and 19:01 CET, Tink experienced a technical issue that affected the availability of all Payments products across all markets. During this period of the incident, end‑users were unable to successfully initiate one‑time or bulk payments.  # Root Cause Analysis  Following a detailed investigation, it was determined that the incident was caused by an availability issue affecting a critical database table. As this table is a required dependency for multiple service flows, all flows relying on it were unable to function during the incident.   # Remediation  Once the issue was identified, a new copy of the database table was created to minimize the total duration of unavailability of our PIS \(Payment Initiation Service\) and restore normal service.  # Follow-up actions  To prevent similar issues in the future, Tink will be implementing the following actions:  1. Review alerting and improve monitoring of database table parameters

1. 21. Januar 2026 um 09:33 UTCinvestigating

   We’re currently experiencing degraded performance affecting multiple products since 10:01 CET. Some users may encounter issues with availability.

2. 21. Januar 2026 um 09:47 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 8. Dezember 2025 um 10:14 UTCresolved

   We experienced Temporary outage on data enrichment service between 10.20 and 10:40 CET This resulted in increased of Http 503 responses. Performance has since returned to normal. We apologise for the inconvenience.

1. 24. November 2025 um 14:29 UTCresolved

   We experienced a technical issue between 15:06 CET and 15:24 CET. During this time users had issues with availability of Tink products. Status has since returned to normal. We apologise for the inconvenience.

2. 26. November 2025 um 15:50 UTCpostmortem

   # Introduction On 24th November between 15:06 and 15:30 CET Tink experienced a technical issue which impacted all products in all European markets. During the time of the incident, end-users were experiencing issues with initiating payments, fetching transactions, performing account and balance checks, generating risk reports. # Root Cause Analysis After a thorough investigation, it was found that the issue was caused by an attempt to resume a failed backup job on our main production database. Initiating a command to verify data integrity caused a lock on the database. # Remediation Once the issue was identified, the process which was causing the lock was terminated. # Follow-up actions To prevent similar issues in the future, Tink will be implementing the following actions: 1. We are strengthening our internal processes so that any resource-intensive commands meant to be run on production databases should go through internal review with full risk assessment and run on replicas and/or non-production environments first