Historial de interrupciones de Amazon Web Services

1. 3 de septiembre de 2026 a las 21:49 UTCresolved

   A partir de las 2:12 PM PDT, comenzamos a experimentar mayores índices de error de API para STS y Iniciar sesión al utilizar SAML en la Región US-WEST-2. Nuestro equipo de ingeniería se comprometió automáticamente a las 2:19 PM para comenzar a investigar la causa raíz. No hay trabajo disponible en este momento. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para las 3:30 PM PDT.

2. 3 de septiembre de 2026 a las 22:26 UTCresolved

   Estamos viendo señales tempranas de recuperación y seguimos monitoreando para la recuperación completa. Proporcionaremos otra actualización a las 4:15 PM, o antes si tenemos información adicional para compartir.

3. 3 de septiembre de 2026 a las 23:20 UTCresolved

   Seguimos viendo que la recuperación se mantiene estable para el STS AssumeRoleConSAML y AssumeRoleCon API de identidad web en la región US-WEST-2. Las tasas de error están ahora de vuelta a los niveles anteriores al evento, y seguimos monitoreando activamente para confirmar la recuperación completa. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para las 5:15 PM o antes.

4. 4 de septiembre de 2026 a las 0:07 UTCresolved

   Entre 2:12 PM y 3:18 PM PDT, experimentamos mayores tasas de error de API que afectan a la STS AssumeRoleConSAML y AssumeRoleCon APIs de Identidad en la Región US-WEST-2. The root cause was determined to be due to an issue with an STS subsystem responsible for communicate with external identity providers. Otros Servicios AWS que dependen de estos protocolos de federación de identidad también fueron afectados. A las 3:18 PM, observamos señales de recuperación y continuamos monitoreando para asegurar la estabilidad y la recuperación completa. El problema se resuelve y el servicio funciona normalmente en este momento.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 21 de agosto de 2026 a las 2:02 UTCresolved

   AP-NORTHEAST-1 El texto de los resultados y escritos, merecedores supuestamente representados juntos. Estamos experimentando mayores tasas de error que afectan las métricas en tiempo real en la región AP-NORTHEAST-1. Los clientes pueden experimentar datos métricos perdidos o retrasados en tiempo real.

2. 21 de agosto de 2026 a las 2:40 UTCresolved

   日本UNCA DE EMPRESA 8:58 10:13 AM 緩Ё適יをיייοיοοοיοοיייοcta, 10:34 AM непеннненнннияннныхининиканиканиянининия. Entre 4:58 PM y 6:34 PM PDT, experimentamos mayores retrasos que afectan a las métricas en tiempo real para Amazon Connect en la región AP-NORTH que resultan desaparecidos. Durante este tiempo, los clientes pueden haber experimentado datos perdidos dentro de informes analíticos, y pueden haber observado problemas si acceden a métricas en tiempo real dentro de Flows de contacto, como la dotación de personal de agente de control. Identificamos la causa raíz para ser un problema con el subsistema responsable de la entrega métrica de eventos. Empezamos a aplicar las atenuaciones a las 6:13 PM y mitigamos la cuestión a las 6:34 PM. La cuestión se ha resuelto y el servicio funciona normalmente.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 19 de agosto de 2026 a las 15:15 UTCresolved

   Estamos investigando un tema que está impactando en el lanzamiento de nuevas instancias y recursos de EC2 en una Zona de Disponibilidad recién lanzada (euw2-az4) en la Región UE-EST-2. Durante este tiempo, los clientes afectados pueden experimentar problemas al crear o modificar recursos en la Región. También puede afectarse a otros servicios de AWS. Para la recuperación inmediata, recomendamos que los clientes utilicen Zonas de Disponibilidad alternativas (euw2-az1, euw2-az2, y euw2-az3) cuando corresponda. Los casos actuales y los recursos no se ven afectados. Proporcionaremos otra actualización antes de las 10:00 AM PDT, o antes si tenemos información adicional para compartir.

2. 19 de agosto de 2026 a las 17:03 UTCresolved

   El 18 de agosto lanzamos una nueva Zona de Disponibilidad (euw2-az4) en la Región UE-EST-2. Después del lanzamiento, comenzamos a experimentar errores lanzando instancias EC2 en la nueva Zona de Disponibilidad cuando una subred predeterminada no está presente. Podemos confirmar que las instancias y los recursos existentes no están afectados. Los flujos de trabajo que obtienen automáticamente una lista de Zonas de Disponibilidad en la Región vía DescribeAvailabilityZones API y luego intentan lanzar nuevas instancias o crear recursos en la nueva Zona de Disponibilidad pueden encontrar errores. Para las fallas de lanzamiento de la instancia EC2, estamos tomando medidas atenuantes para crear automáticamente subnetes predeterminados, donde uno ya no está presente, cuando un lanzamiento de instancia EC2 está apuntando a la nueva Zona de Disponibilidad. Para clientes y flujos de trabajo que requieran la inmediata remediación ■a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/work-with-default-vpc.html#create-default-subnet"⁄4 usted puede crear un subnet por defecto seleccionado/a usuario en la nueva Zona de Disponibilidad. Esto permitirá que los lanzamientos de instancia EC2 se completen con éxito. Para otros recursos, como funciones de Lambda, donde actualmente no se admite la nueva Zona de Disponibilidad, recomendamos que los clientes actualicen sus flujos de trabajo para excluir la Zona de Disponibilidad recién lanzada y continuar la creación de recursos utilizando las otras Zonas de Disponibilidad de la Región. Si bien no tenemos una estimación exacta para cuánto tiempo tomarán nuestros esfuerzos de mitigación, le mantendremos al día sobre nuestro progreso y le proporcionaremos otra actualización para las 1:00 PM PDT o antes cuando se disponga de nueva información.

3. 19 de agosto de 2026 a las 18:47 UTCresolved

   Entre el 18 de agosto 5:00 PM y el 19 de agosto de 11:00 AM PDT, experimentamos errores elevados lanzando instancias EC2 en una zona de disponibilidad recién lanzada (euw2-az4) en la región UE-WEST-2. Después del nuevo lanzamiento de la Zona de Disponibilidad, comenzamos a experimentar errores al utilizar un VPC predeterminado. Descubrimos la causa raíz del tema el 19 de agosto a las 9:00 AM y empezamos a implementar un cambio para resolver el problema a las 9:30 AM. Mientras el cambio estaba en marcha, comenzamos a ver mejoras incrementales en los lanzamientos de nuevas instancias, con plena recuperación a las 11:00 AM. Los casos y recursos existentes no se vieron afectados. Algunos servicios regionales, como las funciones de Lambda o las bases de datos de Aurora, no estaban disponibles en el lanzamiento de la nueva Zona de Disponibilidad y disponibilidad de servicios se añadirán con el tiempo. Los clientes que intentan crear recursos antes de que los servicios estén disponibles verán un mensaje que indica que no está apoyado en la Zona de Disponibilidad. La cuestión se ha resuelto y el servicio funciona normalmente.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 15 de agosto de 2026 a las 3:42 UTCresolved

   Estamos investigando una mayor pérdida de paquetes, lo que impacta la conectividad directa de AWS para algunos clientes en la región UE-CENTRAL-1.

2. 15 de agosto de 2026 a las 4:42 UTCresolved

   Podemos confirmar la pérdida de paquetes que impacta las conexiones Direct Connect en la región UE-CENTRAL-1. Los ingenieros fueron contratados automáticamente e inmediatamente comenzaron a trabajar para identificar la causa raíz, e identificar múltiples caminos paralelos para mitigar el problema. En este momento, estamos viendo señales tempranas de recuperación. Proporcionaremos otra actualización en 60 minutos, o antes si tenemos información adicional para compartir.

3. 15 de agosto de 2026 a las 5:55 UTCresolved

   A partir de las 7:33 PM PDT, empezamos a experimentar una mayor pérdida de paquetes que impacta la conectividad directa AWS para algunos clientes de la región UE-CENTRAL-1. Si bien hemos progresado, las conexiones con la siguiente ubicación Direct Connect siguen siendo deficientes: Equinix FR5, Frankfurt, DEU. Los clientes que tienen redundancia multi-sitio configurada con sus rutas Direct Connect no deben observar impacto en este momento. Los clientes que sólo tienen conexiones en el centro de Equinix FR5, Frankfurt, DEU continuarán experimentando problemas de conectividad. Estamos trabajando activamente para mitigar el impacto y trabajar hacia la recuperación completa, pero esperamos que la recuperación completa está a varias horas de distancia. Proporcionaremos una actualización en 90 minutos, o antes si tenemos información adicional para compartir.

4. 15 de agosto de 2026 a las 7:24 UTCresolved

   Estamos trabajando activamente para restaurar la conectividad a través de la ubicación Direct Connect: Equinix FR5, Frankfurt, DEU. Los clientes que sólo tienen conexiones en el centro de Equinix FR5, Frankfurt, DEU continuarán experimentando problemas de conectividad. Para una solución de trabajo, se recomienda que los clientes afectados que tienen la opción disponible para la failover a VPN lo hagan para lograr la recuperación. Para los clientes que utilizan la pasarela Direct Connect y la pasarela Transit, recomendamos crear una VPN AWS Site-to-Site y adjuntarla a su Transit Gateway, consulte los pasos: " href= " https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/dx-configure-dx-and-vpn-failover-tgw/ > > > Para otros clientes recomendamos establecer una VPN AWS Site-to-Site como una ruta de copia de seguridad temporal, referir pasos ■a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpn/latest/s2svpn/SetUpVPNConnections.html" garantizó/a relativo. A partir de este momento, esperamos que la recuperación esté a varias horas de distancia. Proporcionaremos otra actualización en 90 minutos, o antes si tenemos información adicional para compartir.

5. 15 de agosto de 2026 a las 9:08 UTCresolved

   Seguimos trabajando hacia la recuperación de conectividad para conexiones AWS Direct Connect en Equinix FR5, Frankfurt, DEU. La causa raíz está relacionada con un problema de infraestructura de instalaciones en el lugar que está afectando la infraestructura de red. Los clientes con conexiones solamente en esta ubicación continuarán experimentando pérdida de paquetes o degradación de conectividad. Los clientes con configuraciones multisitios o redundantes en otros lugares no están afectados. Para una solución de trabajo, se recomienda a los clientes impactados que tienen la opción disponible para la failover a VPN. Para los clientes que utilizan la pasarela Direct Connect y la pasarela Transit, recomendamos crear una VPN AWS Site-to-Site y adjuntarla a su Transit Gateway, consulte los pasos "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/dx-configure-dx-and-vpn-failover-tgw/"here. Para otros clientes recomendamos establecer un sitio de AWS-to-Site VPN como una ruta de copia de seguridad temporal, referirnos a los pasos que se indican a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpn/latest/s2svpn/SetUpVPNConnections.html" garantizó/a título. A partir de este momento, esperamos que la recuperación esté a varias horas de distancia. Proporcionaremos otra actualización dentro de 2 horas o tan pronto tengamos más información para compartir.

6. 15 de agosto de 2026 a las 11:10 UTCresolved

   AWS Direct Connect connectivity remains impaired for customers with connections at the Equinix FR5 location in Frankfurt, DEU. Los clientes con configuraciones multisitios o redundantes en otros lugares siguen sin verse afectados. Los ingenieros están trabajando activamente para restaurar la conectividad, con esfuerzos en curso en múltiples flujos de trabajo para resolver el problema de las instalaciones subyacentes y poner de nuevo en servicio el equipo de red impactado. Seguimos esperando que la recuperación esté a varias horas de distancia. Para una solución de trabajo, se recomienda que los clientes afectados que tienen la opción de fallar a VPN lo hagan. Para los clientes que utilizan la pasarela Direct Connect y la pasarela Transit, recomendamos crear una VPN AWS Site-to-Site y adjuntarla a su Transit Gateway, consulte los pasos "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/dx-configure-dx-and-vpn-failover-tgw/"here. Para otros clientes recomendamos establecer un sitio de AWS-to-Site VPN como una ruta de copia de seguridad temporal, referirnos a los pasos que se indican a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpn/latest/s2svpn/SetUpVPNConnections.html" garantizó/a título. Proporcionaremos otra actualización dentro de 2 horas o tan pronto tengamos más información para compartir.

7. 15 de agosto de 2026 a las 13:17 UTCresolved

   Los ingenieros continúan trabajando para restaurar la conectividad en la ubicación de Equinix FR5 en Frankfurt, DEU. Nuestro socio de ubicación conjunta está trabajando para resolver el problema de infraestructura de instalaciones subyacentes y, si bien las mejoras aún no son visibles al cliente, estamos progresando positivamente hacia la resolución. Para los clientes que requieren recuperación inmediata, recomendamos que no se supere a VPN, como se describe en nuestras actualizaciones anteriores. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para las 9:30 AM PDT, o antes si tenemos información adicional para compartir.

8. 15 de agosto de 2026 a las 16:27 UTCresolved

   Nuestro socio de ubicación conjunta sigue trabajando para resolver el problema de infraestructura de instalaciones subyacentes en la ubicación de Equinix FR5 en Frankfurt, DEU. El acceso a la zona afectada está actualmente restringido debido a preocupaciones de seguridad, lo que está afectando nuestra capacidad de evaluar la condición física del equipo de red y proporcionar un cronograma de recuperación más preciso. Sobre la base de la información actual, no se espera una recuperación completa a corto plazo y puede extenderse más allá de hoy. Las conexiones AWS Direct Connect en esta ubicación siguen siendo deficientes. Los clientes con conexiones redundantes a través de otros lugares no se ven afectados. Para los clientes que utilizan la pasarela Direct Connect y la pasarela Transit, recomendamos crear una VPN AWS Site-to-Site y adjuntarla a su Transit Gateway, consulte los pasos "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/dx-configure-dx-and-vpn-failover-tgw/"here. Para otros clientes recomendamos establecer un sitio de AWS-to-Site VPN como una ruta de copia de seguridad temporal, referirnos a los pasos que se indican a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpn/latest/s2svpn/SetUpVPNConnections.html" garantizó/a título. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para las 3:30 PM PDT, o antes si tenemos información adicional para compartir.

9. 15 de agosto de 2026 a las 22:26 UTCresolved

   Nuestro socio de ubicación conjunta continúa trabajando para restaurar el acceso seguro a la zona afectada en la ubicación de Equinix FR5 en Frankfurt, DEU. Una vez asegurado el acceso seguro, nuestros ingenieros podrán evaluar los dispositivos de red afectados. Seguimos siguiendo de cerca el progreso y compartiremos una actualización para las 9:30 PM PDT, o antes cuando se disponga de nueva información.

10. 16 de agosto de 2026 a las 4:37 UTCresolved

    Estamos activamente comprometidos con nuestro socio de ubicación conjunta para restaurar la conectividad en la ubicación de Equinix FR5 en Frankfurt, DEU. Desde nuestra última actualización, hemos avanzado progresivamente para restaurar el acceso seguro a la zona afectada en la ubicación de Equinix FR5 en Frankfurt, DEU. Paralelamente, hemos priorizado el orden en que se restaurarán los estantes críticos y de alta prioridad, como parte de los esfuerzos de mitigación. Sobre la base de nuestra evaluación actual, la recuperación total no se espera a corto plazo y puede extenderse más allá de hoy. Las conexiones AWS Direct Connect en esta ubicación siguen siendo deficientes. Los clientes con conexiones exclusivamente en esta ubicación continuarán experimentando la pérdida de paquetes. Los clientes con configuraciones multisitios o redundantes en otras ubicaciones de Direct Connect no se ven afectados. Para una solución de trabajo, se recomienda a los clientes impactados que tienen la opción disponible para la failover a VPN. Para los clientes que utilizan la pasarela Direct Connect y la pasarela Transit, recomendamos crear una VPN AWS Site-to-Site y adjuntarla a su Transit Gateway, consulte los pasos "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/dx-configure-dx-and-vpn-failover-tgw/"here. Para otros clientes recomendamos establecer un sitio de AWS-to-Site VPN como una ruta de copia de seguridad temporal, referirnos a los pasos que se indican a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpn/latest/s2svpn/SetUpVPNConnections.html" garantizó/a título. Seguimos siguiendo de cerca el progreso y compartiremos una actualización para el 16 de agosto 3:30 AM PDT, o antes cuando se disponga de nueva información.

11. 16 de agosto de 2026 a las 10:25 UTCresolved

    Continuamos trabajando con nuestro socio de ubicación conjunta para restaurar la conectividad en la ubicación de Equinix FR5 en Frankfurt, DEU. Desde nuestra última actualización, hemos avanzado significativamente hacia la restauración del acceso seguro a la zona afectada. El procedimiento de aislamiento eléctrico está en marcha, con nuestros equipos en la sala eléctrica ejecutando la des-energización de la infraestructura afectada. Una vez que el aislamiento sea verificado y confirmado seguro, los ingenieros comenzarán una inspección física del equipo de red impactado para determinar el alcance del reemplazo requerido. Sobre la base de nuestra evaluación actual, no se prevé una recuperación plena a corto plazo debido al alcance de los posibles efectos en el equipo. Las conexiones AWS Direct Connect en esta ubicación siguen siendo deficientes. Los clientes con conexiones exclusivamente en esta ubicación continuarán experimentando la pérdida de paquetes. Los clientes con configuraciones multisitios o redundantes en otras ubicaciones de Direct Connect no se ven afectados. Para una solución de trabajo, se recomienda a los clientes impactados que tienen la opción disponible para la failover a VPN. Para los clientes que utilizan la pasarela Direct Connect y la pasarela Transit, recomendamos crear una VPN AWS Site-to-Site y adjuntarla a su Transit Gateway, consulte los pasos "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/dx-configure-dx-and-vpn-failover-tgw/"here. Para otros clientes recomendamos establecer un sitio de AWS-to-Site VPN como una ruta de copia de seguridad temporal, referirnos a los pasos que se indican a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpn/latest/s2svpn/SetUpVPNConnections.html" garantizó/a título. Seguimos siguiendo de cerca el progreso y compartiremos una actualización para el 16 de agosto de 9:30 AM PDT, o antes cuando se disponga de nueva información.

12. 16 de agosto de 2026 a las 16:30 UTCresolved

    El aislamiento eléctrico en Equinix FR5 en Frankfurt, DEU ahora está completo y nuestros ingenieros han comenzado a inspeccionar físicamente el equipo de red impactado. Aún no tenemos un plazo para la plena resolución mientras seguimos evaluando el alcance de los efectos en el equipo. Las conexiones directas de conexión en esta ubicación siguen siendo deficientes. Los clientes con conexiones exclusivamente en esta ubicación continuarán experimentando la pérdida de paquetes. Los clientes con configuraciones multisitios o redundantes en otras ubicaciones Direct Connect no se ven afectados. Recomendamos que los clientes afectados fallan a VPN hasta que tengamos más claridad en los próximos pasos y una línea de tiempo de recuperación. Para los clientes que utilizan la pasarela Direct Connect y la pasarela Transit, puede crear una VPN de AWS Site-to-Site y adjuntarla a su Transit Gateway, consulte los pasos <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/dx-configure-dx-and-vpn-failover-tgw/"herecto/ Para otros clientes, recomendamos que se establezca un sitio de AWS a Site VPN como una ruta de copia de seguridad temporal, haga referencia a los pasos que se indican a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpn/latest/s2svpn/SetUpVPNConnections.html" relativohere efectuado/a confidencial. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para el 16 de agosto 5:30 PM PDT, o antes cuando se disponga de nueva información.

13. 16 de agosto de 2026 a las 22:51 UTCresolved

    Hemos completado nuestra evaluación del equipo de red impactado en la ubicación de Equinix FR5 en Frankfurt, DEU y ahora tenemos una clara comprensión del alcance del impacto. Estamos progresando hacia la restauración de la conectividad y tomaremos un enfoque gradual de la remediación. Los clientes con conexiones exclusivamente en esta ubicación continuarán experimentando la pérdida de paquetes hasta que la rehabilitación esté completa. Los clientes con configuraciones multisitios o redundantes en otras ubicaciones Direct Connect no se ven afectados. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para el 16 de agosto 10:30 PM PDT, o antes cuando se disponga de nueva información.

14. 17 de agosto de 2026 a las 5:38 UTCresolved

    Seguimos progresando en nuestra rehabilitación gradual en la ubicación de Equinix FR5 en Frankfurt, DEU. Desde nuestra última actualización, se ha restaurado alguna infraestructura de red dependiente. Se está remediando la infraestructura restante, ya que una parte de la recuperación depende de la entrega de equipo de reemplazo. El enfriamiento ha sido totalmente restaurado, con condiciones ambientales estables dentro de los umbrales normales de operación. Los clientes con conexiones exclusivamente en este lugar continuarán experimentando la pérdida de paquetes a medida que avanza la remediación. Los clientes con configuraciones multisitios o redundantes en otras ubicaciones Direct Connect no se ven afectados. En este momento no se han modificado las orientaciones y recomendaciones de mitigación previamente comunicadas. Proporcionaremos otra actualización antes del 17 de agosto de las 4:30 AM PDT, o antes a medida que avance la rehabilitación.

15. 17 de agosto de 2026 a las 11:22 UTCresolved

    Seguimos progresando en nuestra rehabilitación gradual en la ubicación de Equinix FR5 en Frankfurt, DEU. La infraestructura de red y los sistemas dependientes siguen mejorando a medida que traemos hardware afectado en línea. Se ha entregado algún equipo de reemplazo y se está procediendo a la instalación a medida que los componentes llegan in situ. Paralelamente, estamos cambiando el tráfico de red para permitir que los dispositivos restaurados comiencen a servir a los clientes a medida que vienen en línea. A medida que avanzamos a través de la recuperación, los clientes observarán la restauración que ocurre en dos etapas. En la primera etapa, las sesiones de BGP se restablecerán pero aún no se anunciarán prefijos de IP, lo que indica que la recuperación sigue en curso y que la infraestructura subyacente aún no está lista para transportar tráfico. En la segunda etapa, el anuncio de prefijo IP se reanudará, en cuyo momento la infraestructura se remedia completamente y se restablece la conectividad. Si bien actualmente no tenemos un ETA para la recuperación completa, seguimos trabajando lo más rápido y seguro posible para mitigar el impacto para los clientes. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para el 17 de agosto 10:30 AM PDT, o antes a medida que avance la rehabilitación.

16. 17 de agosto de 2026 a las 16:25 UTCresolved

    Seguimos trabajando en la rehabilitación gradual en la ubicación de Equinix FR5 en Frankfurt, DEU. Estamos viendo señales tempranas de recuperación mientras seguimos remediando completamente la cuestión. Estamos trabajando activamente para traer el hardware afectado restante en línea y proporcionaremos otra actualización para 12:30 PM PDT, o antes a medida que avance la remediación.

17. 17 de agosto de 2026 a las 17:59 UTCresolved

    Estamos viendo amplios signos de recuperación en la ubicación de Equinix FR5 en Frankfurt, DEU. Hemos restaurado la conectividad para la mayoría del hardware afectado y la mayoría de las conexiones se recuperan y estable. Hay un pequeño número de clientes que permanecerán afectados hasta que los dispositivos restantes estén completamente restaurados. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para las 2:00 PM PDT, o antes a medida que avance la rehabilitación.

18. 17 de agosto de 2026 a las 21:00 UTCresolved

    Seguimos trabajando en traer hardware afectado de vuelta en línea. Desde nuestra última actualización hemos hecho progresos que no serán visibles para los clientes, pero es necesario para la recuperación. Trabajamos en paralelo para traer todos los dispositivos en línea lo más seguro posible. Se espera que este trabajo tome varias horas para completar y validar. Para clientes que requieren soluciones de trabajo, recomendamos que considere la posibilidad de fallar a VPN. Para los clientes que utilizan la pasarela Direct Connect y la pasarela Transit, puede crear una VPN de AWS Site-to-Site y adjuntarla a su Transit Gateway, consulte los pasos <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/dx-configure-dx-and-vpn-failover-tgw/"herecto/ Para otros clientes, recomendamos que se establezca un sitio de AWS a Site VPN como una ruta de copia de seguridad temporal, haga referencia a los pasos que se indican a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpn/latest/s2svpn/SetUpVPNConnections.html" relativohere efectuado/a confidencial. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para las 7:00 PM PDT o antes cuando se disponga de nueva información.

19. 18 de agosto de 2026 a las 1:50 UTCresolved

    Estamos viendo una recuperación significativa para la mayoría de las conexiones de clientes en esta etapa. Si bien todavía no estamos totalmente recuperados, los esfuerzos de restauración están progresando según lo previsto en la ubicación de Equinix FR5 en Frankfurt, DEU. La rehabilitación de la infraestructura restante implica la terminación de los reemplazos de hardware y la validación del tráfico, ambos en marcha. Prevemos una recuperación más visible para el cliente, ya que la infraestructura restante se vuelve a poner en servicio. Los clientes con conexiones exclusivamente en esta ubicación continuarán experimentando la pérdida de paquetes hasta que la rehabilitación esté completa. En este momento no se han modificado las orientaciones y recomendaciones de mitigación previamente comunicadas. Proporcionaremos otra actualización antes del 17 de agosto de las 11:00 PM PDT o antes.

20. 18 de agosto de 2026 a las 4:01 UTCresolved

    A partir del 14 de agosto 7:33 PM PDT, experimentamos una mayor pérdida de paquetes que impacta la conectividad AWS Direct para clientes con conexiones en la ubicación de Equinix FR5 en Frankfurt, DEU. Los ingenieros fueron contratados automáticamente a las 7:45 PM el 14 de agosto e inmediatamente comenzaron a investigar las atenuaciones. A las 8:30 PM, identificamos que el equipo de red en la ubicación de FR5 estaba deteriorado debido a la entrada de agua en el centro de colocación. Como resultado, el sistema de refrigeración se vio deteriorado, lo que dio lugar a que los dispositivos se recalentaran y se apagaran. El agua también afectó los sistemas de distribución de energía que desactivaron la potencia para los dispositivos de red. Los esfuerzos iniciales de recuperación se retrasaron a medida que las condiciones ambientales dentro de la instalación requerían estabilización antes de que los ingenieros pudieran acceder con seguridad a la zona afectada. A lo largo del 15 y 16 de agosto, nuestros ingenieros trabajaron en coordinación con el operador de instalaciones para restaurar dispositivos de red deteriorados mientras se abordaba el problema de infraestructura subyacente. Para las 7:26 p.m. el 17 de agosto, se restableció con éxito todo el equipo de red deteriorado y se comprobó que la conectividad con la ubicación era totalmente operacional con recuperación sostenida. No esperamos que este tema vuelva a ocurrir. Los clientes con conexiones redundantes en otras ubicaciones de Direct Connect mantuvieron conectividad a través de sus caminos alternativos a lo largo de este evento y no requieren ninguna acción adicional. Los clientes que implementaron la falla VPN como solución de trabajo ahora pueden volver a sus principales rutas Direct Connect. La conectividad se ha verificado como estable y plenamente operacional. Los clientes que necesiten más asistencia pueden ponerse en contacto con AWS Support a través de la Consola de Gestión de AWS o el Centro de Apoyo de AWS (AWS) (https://console.aws.amazon.com).

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 31 de julio de 2026 a las 17:33 UTCresolved

   Podemos confirmar la elevada pérdida de paquetes de red, impactando la conectividad AWS Direct Connect en la región AP-SOUTH-1. Nuestro equipo de ingeniería se comprometió automáticamente a las 9:54 AM para comenzar a investigar el problema. No hay soluciones de trabajo disponibles en este momento. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para las 11:30 AM PDT.

2. 31 de julio de 2026 a las 18:27 UTCresolved

   Hemos identificado la causa raíz para estar relacionada con un cambio hecho a un sistema de configuración responsable de asignar rutas a los dispositivos. Hemos comenzado el trabajo para reducir la pérdida de paquetes que está impactando AWS Direct Connect en la región AP-SOUTH-1, y esperamos que la recuperación se realice gradualmente durante los próximos 30 minutos. A medida que tengamos confianza en estos esfuerzos, trataremos de paralelizar nuestros esfuerzos para acelerar la recuperación. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para las 12:00 PM PDT.

3. 31 de julio de 2026 a las 18:54 UTCresolved

   Entre las 9:42 AM y las 11:44 AM PDT, experimentamos una elevada pérdida de paquetes de red que impactó la conectividad AWS Direct Connect en la región AP-SOUTH-1. Nuestro equipo de ingeniería se comprometió automáticamente a las 9:46 AM para comenzar a investigar. Para las 10:51 AM, entendemos que la causa raíz es un cambio de configuración hecho a un sistema responsable de asignar rutas a dispositivos. A medida que ganamos confianza en nuestros pasos de mitigación, paralelizamos nuestros esfuerzos para reducir aún más la pérdida de paquetes. La cuestión se resuelve y el servicio funciona normalmente.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 24 de julio de 2026 a las 11:40 UTCresolved

   Estamos investigando problemas de connecividad que afectan a múltiples servicios de AWS en la Región US-WEST-2.

2. 24 de julio de 2026 a las 11:56 UTCresolved

   Estamos viendo signos iniciales de recuperación y seguimos trabajando hacia la recuperación completa.

3. 24 de julio de 2026 a las 12:30 UTCresolved

   Seguimos viendo signos significativos de recuperación como resultado de nuestros esfuerzos de mitigación para los problemas de conectividad que afectan a múltiples servicios de AWS en la Región US-WEST-2. Hemos identificado la causa raíz como un problema con un dispositivo de red responsable de la routa de red de la Región al Metro de Seattle. Los ingenieros han terminado todo el trabajo de mitigación. A medida que las rutas siguen siendo restauradas, los clientes deben ver una reducción continua de las tasas de error y los plazos para conectarse a los servicios afectados. Estamos monitoreando el progreso de recuperación de cerca y continuaremos trabajando hasta que todas las rutas hayan sido completamente restauradas y las métricas de servicio vuelvan a niveles pre-evento. Proporcionaremos otra actualización en los próximos 30-45 minutos.

4. 24 de julio de 2026 a las 13:01 UTCresolved

   Entre las 3:55 AM y las 4:15 AM PDT, experimentamos problemas de conectividad que impactaron la conectividad con la Región US-WEST-2. Esto impactó varios servicios AWS en la Región. Algunos clientes también pueden haber experimentado problemas accediendo a la Consola de Gestión AWS, con tiempo de conexión y páginas sin respuesta. La conectividad dentro de la Región no se vio afectada. Nuestros ingenieros fueron contratados automáticamente a las 4:01 AM PDT, e inmediatamente comenzaron a investigar este asunto. Identificamos la causa raíz como un problema con dispositivos de red responsables de la routa de red de la Región al Metro de Seattle, y empezamos a trabajar en paralelo en múltiples caminos para mitigar el impacto. Tomamos medidas de mitigación que llevaron a la recuperación inicial a las 4:15 AM PDT. A medida que la red siguió estabilizando nuestras acciones de mitigación, se produjo un breve evento de reconvergencia entre las 4:47 AM y 4:59 AM PDT. Durante este período de reconvergencia, algunos clientes pueden haber experimentado problemas de conectividad intermitente a la Región a medida que se restablecieron las rutas de red. Para las 4:59 AM PDT, todas las rutas habían sido completamente restauradas y las métricas de servicio retornaron a niveles pre-evento. Clientes que utilizan AWS Direct Connect a través de EqSe2, Westin Building Exchange, Seattle experimentó una ventana de impacto extendida de 3:55 AM a 5:12 AM PDT. Estos clientes habrían experimentado problemas de conectividad hasta que las rutas de red para este camino específico fueran completamente restauradas a las 5:12 AM PDT. Los clientes conectados de forma redundante a través de otras ubicaciones de AWS Direct Connect no fueron impactados por este evento. La cuestión se ha resuelto y todos los servicios de AWS funcionan normalmente.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 17 de julio de 2026 a las 8:33 UTCresolved

   Estamos investigando problemas con Cost Explorer que refleja datos de facturación estimados inexactos.

2. 17 de julio de 2026 a las 9:07 UTCresolved

   A partir del 16 de julio de las 7:38 PM PDT, empezamos a mostrar datos de facturación incorrectos estimados en la Consola de Facturación y Gestión de Costos. Nuestros equipos de ingeniería están comprometidos e investigan la causa raíz. Proporcionaremos otra actualización antes de las 3:00 AM PDT o antes si hay más información disponible.

3. 17 de julio de 2026 a las 10:03 UTCresolved

   Seguimos trabajando para resolver la cuestión que afecta a los datos estimados sobre costos y uso que se muestran en la Consola de Facturación y Gestión de Costos. Hemos identificado la causa raíz como un problema con la fijación de precios unitarios dentro del subsistema de cálculo de facturación estimado y estamos trabajando en una mitigación. Las estimaciones de facturación mostradas no reflejan el uso y los cargos reales. No se requieren acciones de clientes en este momento. Una vez que el problema se ha mitigado, esperamos que la resolución completa tome varias horas mientras trabajamos recomponiendo los datos de facturación estimados. Proporcionaremos otra actualización antes de las 4:00 AM PDT o antes si hay más información disponible.

4. 17 de julio de 2026 a las 10:52 UTCresolved

   Seguimos trabajando para resolver la cuestión que afecta a los datos estimados sobre costos y uso que se muestran en la Consola de Facturación y Gestión de Costos. Como se compartió anteriormente, hemos identificado la causa raíz como un problema con los precios unitarios dentro del subsistema de cálculo de facturación estimado. Para evitar que se muestren nuevas estimaciones de facturación inexactas, hemos pausado cálculos de facturación estimados. Los clientes que actualmente están viendo las estimaciones normales de la factura continuarán viendo esas estimaciones, y los clientes que están viendo estimaciones infladas no las verán aumentar más mientras trabajamos hacia la resolución. Las estimaciones de facturación mostradas no reflejan el uso y los cargos reales. Seguimos trabajando para mitigar plenamente la cuestión. Una vez que el problema se ha mitigado, esperamos que la resolución completa tome varias horas mientras trabajamos recomponiendo los datos de facturación estimados. No se requieren acciones de clientes en este momento. Proporcionaremos otra actualización antes de las 5:00 AM PDT o antes si hay más información disponible.

5. 17 de julio de 2026 a las 11:58 UTCresolved

   Seguimos trabajando para resolver la cuestión que afecta a los datos estimados sobre costos y uso que se muestran en la Consola de Facturación y Gestión de Costos. Estamos trabajando activamente en múltiples vías de mitigación en paralelo. El primer camino implica revertir el último cálculo de facturas bien estimado conocido. Con este enfoque, los clientes sólo verán datos de costos y uso hasta el 15 de julio, sin embargo, los datos de costos inflados serán eliminados. El segundo camino implica revertir un cambio reciente al subsistema de computación de facturación. Las estimaciones de facturación mostradas no reflejan el uso y los cargos reales. No se requieren acciones de clientes en este momento. Una vez que el problema se ha mitigado, esperamos que la resolución completa tome varias horas mientras trabajamos recomponiendo los datos de facturación estimados. Proporcionaremos otra actualización antes de las 6:00 AM PDT o antes si hay más información disponible.

6. 17 de julio de 2026 a las 12:54 UTCresolved

   Seguimos trabajando en múltiples vías de mitigación paralelamente para resolver la cuestión que afecta a los datos estimados sobre costos y uso que se muestran en la Consola de Facturación y Gestión de Costos, incluido el Informe sobre Costos y Usos. Estamos evaluando resumir cálculos estimados de facturación, ya que nuestro monitoreo interno indica que el subsistema de facturación de computación está produciendo estimaciones precisas. Estamos realizando una validación adicional antes de proceder con este camino. Las estimaciones de facturación mostradas no reflejan el uso y los cargos reales. No se requieren acciones de clientes en este momento. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para las 8:00 AM PDT o antes si hay más información disponible.

7. 17 de julio de 2026 a las 14:53 UTCresolved

   Seguimos trabajando para resolver la cuestión que afecta a los datos estimados sobre costos y uso que se muestran en la Consola de Facturación y Gestión de Costos, incluido el Informe sobre Costos y Usos. The rollback of a recent change did not resolve the issue and we are continuing to investigate multiple mitigation paths. Las actualizaciones de facturas estimadas siguen siendo pausadas. Estamos en proceso de revertir los últimos datos de facturación estimados precisos. Las estimaciones de facturación mostradas no reflejan el uso y los cargos reales. No se requieren acciones de clientes en este momento. Esperamos que esta mitigación tome varias horas para completar mientras trabajamos recomputando los datos de facturación estimados. Proporcionaremos otra actualización antes de las 10:00 AM PDT o antes si hay más información disponible.

8. 17 de julio de 2026 a las 16:59 UTCresolved

   Hemos identificado la causa raíz y mitigado el problema subyacente causando datos incorrectos estimados de costo y uso que se mostrarán en la Consola de Facturación y Gestión de Costos y Informes de Costo y Uso. Hemos empezado a rellenar datos para corregir los datos de costos para todos los clientes. Esperamos que algunos clientes comiencen a ver la recuperación dentro de las próximas tres horas, y la recuperación completa para todos los clientes antes del 18 de julio 12:00 PDT. Hasta que el backfill esté completo, algunos clientes pueden ver datos incorrectos de coste y uso. Las estimaciones de facturación mostradas no reflejan el uso y los cargos reales. No se requieren acciones de clientes en este momento. Proporcionaremos otra actualización antes de las 1:00 PM, o antes si la información está disponible.

9. 17 de julio de 2026 a las 19:56 UTCresolved

   Aún estamos en marcha nuestros esfuerzos por corregir los datos estimados de costos y uso. Estamos progresando más despacio de lo previsto. Mientras estamos viendo que algunas cuentas se recuperan con los datos de costo y uso correctos, esperamos que todas las cuentas afectadas sean recuperadas antes del 19 de julio de 12:00 AM PDT. Hasta que el backfill esté completo, algunos clientes pueden ver datos incorrectos de coste y uso. Las estimaciones de facturación mostradas no reflejan el uso y los cargos reales. No se requieren acciones de clientes en este momento. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para las 7:00 PM, o antes si la información está disponible.

10. 18 de julio de 2026 a las 1:38 UTCresolved

    Seguimos avanzando constantemente hacia la solución de la cuestión que afecta a los datos estimados sobre costos y uso que se muestran en la Consola de Facturación y Gestión de Costos. Nuestros esfuerzos para recuperar los datos corregidos siguen en curso, y esperamos que todas las cuentas afectadas sean recuperadas completamente para el 19 de julio de 12:00 AM PDT. Hasta que el backfill esté completo, algunos clientes pueden seguir observando datos incorrectos sobre costos y uso en la Consola de Facturación y Gestión de Costos y Informes de Uso. Estas estimaciones no reflejan el uso o los cargos reales. Los clientes que configuraron su Informe de Costo y Uso con la opción "Overwrite" no requieren acción; su informe se actualizará automáticamente con datos corregidos una vez que el backfill complete. Los clientes que configuraron su Informe de Costo y Uso con la opción "Crear nuevas versiones de informes" conservan todas las entregas de informes anteriores en su cubo S3. La versión reportada durante la ventana afectada puede contener datos inexactos. Una vez que el backfill de datos esté completo, una versión de informe corregida será entregada bajo un nuevo assemblyId. Los clientes que usen esta configuración deben actualizar cualquier proceso de aguas abajo (Tablas de Atenea, oleoductos Redshift, Amazon QuickSight o ETL personalizado) para hacer referencia a la última versión de montaje para el período de facturación afectado, y pueden eliminar o archivar la versión de informe impactada para evitar el procesamiento de datos estadísticos. Para identificar el último informe, los clientes pueden seguir los pasos de nuestro <a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cur/latest/userguide/view-latest-cur.html" confidencialdocumentation seleccionado/a título. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para el 18 de julio, 1:00 AM PDT, o antes si se dispone de información adicional.

11. 18 de julio de 2026 a las 8:05 UTCresolved

    Seguimos avanzando sustancialmente hacia la solución de la cuestión que afecta a los datos estimados sobre costos y uso que se muestran en la Consola de Facturación y Gestión de Costos. Nuestros esfuerzos de mitigación están trabajando como se espera y estamos viendo un número creciente de cuentas que reflejan los datos correctos de costos y uso. Esperamos que todas las cuentas afectadas sean recuperadas completamente para el 19 de julio, 12:00 AM PDT. Hasta que el backfill esté completo, algunos clientes pueden seguir observando datos incorrectos sobre costos y uso en la Consola de Facturación y Gestión de Costos y Informes de Uso. Estas estimaciones no reflejan el uso o los cargos reales. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para el 18 de julio, 7:00 AM PDT, o antes si se dispone de información adicional.

12. 18 de julio de 2026 a las 13:57 UTCresolved

    Entre el 16 de julio a las 7:38 PM PDT y el 18 de julio a las 6:00 AM PDT, comenzamos a mostrar datos de facturación incorrectos estimados en la Consola de Facturación y Gestión de Costos, incluyendo el Informe de Costo y Uso. Los clientes pueden haber recibido alertas erróneas de detección de presupuestos y costos de anomalía, y observado datos de costos y uso calculados inflados. El 16 de julio a las 7:46 PM PDT, nuestras alarmas detectaron anomalías de costes pero no pudieron detener el proceso estimado de generación de facturas o alertar a nuestros equipos de ingeniería. Fuimos alertados a este tema el 17 de julio a las 12:19 AM PDT por las escaladas de clientes, e inmediatamente comenzó a investigar. Primero informamos a los clientes a través de AWS Health el 17 de julio a las 1:33 AM. A las 8:24 AM PDT detuvimos nuevas actualizaciones sobre datos estimados de facturación y apagamos las alertas presupuestarias y costosas como medida cautelar. Identificamos la causa raíz el 17 de julio a las 12:00 PM PDT como un cambio de configuración en nuestro sistema de cálculo de facturas. Este sistema se basa en datos de conversión de unidades para calcular los cargos de ítem de línea. El cambio de configuración causó que fallaran las actualizaciones de los datos de conversión de la unidad, lo que dio lugar a costos de partida inflados, que se propagaron a la consola de facturación y gestión de costos y desencadenaron alertas presupuestarias y de anomalías de costos. Mitigamos la cuestión el 17 de julio a las 12:30 PM PDT que corrigió la configuración de conversión de la unidad, y comenzó a reprocesar los datos de costos y uso para todas las cuentas de clientes. Comenzamos a observar la recuperación a las 4:19 PM PDT, y la mayoría de las cuentas fueron recuperadas completamente para el 18 de julio a las 6:00 AM PDT. Hay un pequeño número de cuentas todavía procesando y publicaremos actualizaciones para estas cuentas en el panel de salud personal. Hemos corregido nuestras alarmas para detener inmediatamente el procesamiento y notificar a nuestros equipos de ingeniería cuando ocurren anomalías. Nos disculpamos por la alarma que este incidente causó a nuestros clientes y estamos llevando a cabo una retrospectiva exhaustiva para evitar que eventos como este vuelvan a ocurrir, así como mejorar nuestra respuesta cuando se producen incidentes de facturación. La cuestión se ha resuelto y todos los servicios de AWS están operando normalmente.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 16 de julio de 2026 a las 8:44 UTCresolved

   Estamos investigando errores de 5xx incrementados para los clientes de Cloudfront utilizando conectividad VPC Origins.

2. 16 de julio de 2026 a las 9:21 UTCresolved

   A partir de las 12:45 AM PDT, estamos experimentando mayores errores de 5xx para los clientes de CloudFront utilizando conectividad VPC Origins. Hemos confirmado que los clientes que utilizan otros tipos de origen no están afectados por este problema. Nuestros ingenieros están comprometidos y están trabajando activamente para mitigar el impacto. Como solución de trabajo, los clientes que no requieren VPC Origins pueden cambiar su tipo de origen para resolver los errores. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para 3:15 AM PDT, o antes si hay más información disponible.

3. 16 de julio de 2026 a las 10:18 UTCresolved

   Seguimos trabajando para resolver el aumento de errores de 5xx para los clientes de CloudFront utilizando la conectividad VPC Origins. Los clientes que utilizan otros tipos de origen no se ven afectados por este problema. Sobre la base de nuestra investigación, creemos que la causa raíz está relacionada con un subsistema de procesamiento de paquetes responsable de las solicitudes de enrutamiento de CloudFront hacia los recursos dentro de VPCs de clientes. Seguimos recomendando que los clientes que son capaces de hacerlo cambien temporalmente su tipo de origen para resolver los errores. Proporcionaremos otra actualización para 4:15 AM PDT, o antes si se dispone de información adicional.

4. 16 de julio de 2026 a las 11:16 UTCresolved

   Seguimos trabajando para resolver el aumento de errores de 5xx para los clientes de CloudFront utilizando la conectividad VPC Origins. Los clientes que utilizan otros tipos de origen no se ven afectados por este problema. Hemos abordado aún más la cuestión hasta la capacidad de mesa de enrutamiento dentro del subsistema de procesamiento de paquetes responsable de las solicitudes de enrutamiento de las ubicaciones de bordes de CloudFront a recursos dentro de VPCs clientes. Hemos identificado y actualmente estamos probando una estrategia de mitigación para resolver la cuestión. Una vez que se completen las pruebas, desplegaremos la mitigación en un enfoque gradual. Basándonos en los resultados de estas pruebas, proporcionaremos un tiempo estimado más claro para la resolución en nuestra próxima actualización. Seguimos recomendando que los clientes que son capaces de hacerlo cambien temporalmente su tipo de origen para resolver los errores. Proporcionaremos otra actualización antes de las 5:15 AM PDT, o antes si se dispone de información adicional.

5. 16 de julio de 2026 a las 11:27 UTCresolved

   Estamos viendo signos iniciales de recuperación y seguimos trabajando hacia la recuperación completa.

6. 16 de julio de 2026 a las 11:57 UTCresolved

   Seguimos viendo señales significativas de recuperación como resultado de nuestros esfuerzos de mitigación, con la recuperación total esperada en los próximos 45 minutos.

7. 16 de julio de 2026 a las 12:21 UTCresolved

   Entre las 12:45 AM y las 4:18 AM PDT, experimentamos mayores errores de 5xx para los clientes de CloudFront utilizando conectividad VPC Origins. Nuestros ingenieros fueron contratados automáticamente e inmediatamente comenzaron a investigar la causa raíz. Para las 2:57 AM PDT, identificamos la causa raíz de la cuestión como una limitación interna de la flota que gestiona las conexiones con los orígenes privados de VPC. Cuando se alcanzó esta limitación, el sistema responsable de distribuir la configuración de enrutamiento a nuestros procesadores de red no pudo cargar correctamente los datos de configuración actualizados, afectando la enrutamiento de las conexiones VPC Origin. A las 3:52 AM PDT, tomamos múltiples acciones de mitigación que llevaron a la recuperación completa a las 4:18 AM PDT. Ahora que el problema ha sido mitigado, los clientes que cambiaron temporalmente su tipo de origen pueden revertir con seguridad estos cambios. Los clientes que utilizan otros tipos de origen no se vieron afectados por este problema. La cuestión se ha resuelto y el servicio funciona normalmente.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 15 de julio de 2026 a las 23:11 UTCresolved

   Estamos investigando problemas de conectividad elevados con una única zona de Avalability (euc1-az2) en la Región UE-CENTRAL-1.

2. 15 de julio de 2026 a las 23:36 UTCresolved

   Estamos viendo señales tempranas de recuperación y seguimos trabajando hacia la plena resolución. Seguiremos proporcionando actualizaciones.

3. 16 de julio de 2026 a las 1:24 UTCresolved

   Entre las 2:56 PM y las 6:07 PM PDT, experimentamos problemas de conectividad a un subconjunto de instancias EC2 en una zona de disponibilidad única (euc1-az2) en la región UE-CENTRAL-1. Durante este tiempo, los clientes también podrían haber experimentado mayores tasas de error y retrasos para los lanzamientos de nuevas instancias en la zona afectada, junto con algunas API de AWS que utilizan los casos EC2 afectados. Algunos AWS Services también experimentaron problemas de conectividad y aumento de las tasas de error en la zona afectada. Los ingenieros fueron contratados automáticamente e inmediatamente comenzaron a investigar. Como parte de nuestro esfuerzo de recuperación, desplazamos el tráfico lejos de la zona de disponibilidad impactada para los servicios afectados a las 3:04 PM. A las 3:05 PM identificamos la causa raíz como un cambio reciente de redes que causa el impacto. Los ingenieros comenzaron inmediatamente a revertir este cambio que terminó a las 4:28 PM. Esto dio lugar a la restauración de la conectividad de red a la zona afectada a las 4:30 PM. Continuamos trabajando hasta que recuperamos completamente los impactos a las 6:07 PM. No esperamos que este asunto vuelva a ocurrir. La cuestión se ha resuelto y el servicio funciona normalmente.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 6 de julio de 2026 a las 12:45 UTCresolved

   We are investigating increased error rates when calling EC2 Launch Template APIs in US-EAST-1 Region. During this time, affected customers may experience errors when creating, modifying, or referencing launch templates. Other AWS services that rely on launch templates may also be impacted. We will provide another update by 6:30 AM PDT or sooner, if we have additional information to share.

2. 6 de julio de 2026 a las 13:34 UTCresolved

   Starting at 2:56 AM PDT, we began experiencing increased error rates when calling EC2 Launch Template APIs in the US-EAST-1 Region. Our engineers have been engaged and are actively working to mitigate the impact. Additionally, Amazon Elastic Kubernetes (EKS) customers may experience errors when creating or updating clusters, or when launching and scaling nodes via Managed Node Groups, EKS Auto Mode, or Karpenter; this issue does not impact existing clusters and nodes. We have identified the root cause to be a congestion issue within an EC2 internal subsystem responsible for processing EC2 launch template workflows. We are pursuing multiple mitigation paths. We recommend that customers retry any failed requests during the impact window. While we do not currently have an ETA for full recovery, we are prioritizing this issue and will provide another update by 7:15 AM PDT or sooner if we have additional information to share.

3. 6 de julio de 2026 a las 14:12 UTCresolved

   We are seeing initial signs of recovery and continue to work toward full recovery.

4. 6 de julio de 2026 a las 14:53 UTCresolved

   Between 2:56 AM and 6:54 AM PDT, we experienced increased error rates when calling EC2 Launch Template APIs in the US-EAST-1 Region. During this time, affected customers may have experienced errors when creating, modifying, or describing Launch Templates. Other AWS services that rely on Launch Templates were also impacted. Amazon EC2 instances and Amazon EKS workloads already running on provisioned nodes continued to operate normally. Cluster modification operations, and Managed Node Group creation were also impacted. For EKS Auto Mode, impact was limited to operations requiring new capacity or changes, including node provisioning and pod scheduling. Our engineers were automatically engaged and immediately began investigating the root cause. We identified the root cause as a congestion issue within an EC2 internal subsystem responsible for processing EC2 launch template workflows. At 3:26 AM PDT, we took mitigation actions by introducing throttling for the affected APIs and we saw some recovery which was communicated directly with a subset of customers via the 'Your Account view' of the AWS Health Dashboard. We took multiple additional mitigation paths, incrementally lifting these throttle limits, and by 6:54 AM PDT, the issue was fully mitigated. We recommend that customers retry any failed requests. The issue has been resolved and all AWS services are now operating normally.

1. 30 de junio de 2026 a las 21:02 UTCresolved

   We are investigating increased launch errors and API errors in the EU-NORTH-1 Region. Existing instances are not affected by this issue.

2. 30 de junio de 2026 a las 21:21 UTCresolved

   We can confirm increased error rates for the EC2 APIs, as well as errors launching new EC2 instances in the EU-NORTH-1 Region. Other AWS Services that launch new instances or call the EC2 APIs as part of their workflows may also be affected by this issue. During this time, customers may receive an Internal Server Error in the Management Console and APIs. Engineers were automatically engaged and began investigating the issue. We are actively working on identifying the root cause. Existing instances are unaffected by this issue. We will provide an update by 3:15 PM, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

3. 30 de junio de 2026 a las 21:29 UTCresolved

   We are seeing early signs of recovery and continue to work toward full recovery.

4. 30 de junio de 2026 a las 21:53 UTCresolved

   Between 1:42 PM and 2:25 PM PDT we experienced increased error rates and latencies for EC2 APIs in the EU-NORTH-1 Region. This issue also affected new instance launches. Other AWS Services that launch new instances or call EC2 APIs as part of their workflows were also affected by this issue. Existing EC2 instances were unaffected by this issue. During this time, customers would have received an Internal Server Error in the Management Console and APIs. Engineers were automatically engaged and began investigating the root cause. We identified the root cause as a planned configuration change. This change was reverted and we began observing recovery at 2:19 PM. By 2:25 PM, the issue was fully mitigated. We do not expect this issue to reoccur. Since the issue was mitigated at 2:25 PM, we have been processing a backlog for ELB workflows and expect this backlog to complete within the next 30 minutes. We recommend customers retry requests that failed during this time. The issue has been resolved and all services are operating normally.

1. 13 de junio de 2026 a las 1:26 UTCresolved

   To support compliance with the US Government export control directive, Anthropic has asked us to revoke access to Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5 for all users in all regions. All other models, including Opus 4.8, are not affected and you can continue using them in full confidence. Please view the <a href="https://www.anthropic.com/news/fable-mythos-access">Anthropic statement</a> for further details.

2. 15 de junio de 2026 a las 18:13 UTCresolved

   Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5 models remain unavailable for all users in all regions. We are resolving this Health event. For further details please view the <a href="https://www.anthropic.com/news/fable-mythos-access">Anthropic statement</a>.

1. 6 de junio de 2026 a las 4:24 UTCresolved

   Between 5:50 PM and 7:15 PM PDT, we experienced connectivity issues that may have impacted Internet performance for some customers in the SA-EAST-1 Region. During this time, connectivity to instances and services within the Region was not affected. Our engineering team was automatically engaged at 5:51 PM PDT and immediately began investigating the issue. We identified the root cause and implemented a fix, which mitigated the issue at 7:15 PM PDT. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.

1. 22 de mayo de 2026 a las 23:38 UTCresolved

   We are investigating increased error rates for Route53 API calls.

2. 23 de mayo de 2026 a las 0:13 UTCresolved

   Between 4:00 PM and 4:46 PM, we experienced increased error rates for the Route53 APIs. This issue did not impact resolution of existing DNS records. Engineers were automatically engaged and immediately began investigating the issue. During this time, customers may have received 500s for Route53 APIs and the Route53 Management Console. We have identified the root cause and have mitigated this issue. Other AWS Services that call the Route53 APIs in their workflows may also have been impacted during this time. We recommend retrying any failed operations or stuck workflows. We do not expect this issue to reoccur. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.

1. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 0:25 UTCresolved

   We are investigating instance impairments in a single Availability Zone (use1-az4) in the US-EAST-1 Region. Other Availability Zones are not affected by the event and we are working to resolve the issue.

2. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 0:53 UTCresolved

   We continue to investigate instance impairments to a single Availability Zone (use1-az4) in the US-EAST-1 Region. We have experienced an increase in temperatures within a single data center, which in some cases has caused impairments for instances in the Availability Zone. EC2 instances and EBS volumes hosted on impacted hardware are affected by the loss of power during the thermal event. Other AWS services that depend on the affected EC2 instances and EBS volumes in this Availability Zone, may also experience impairments. We will continue to provide updates as recovery continues.

3. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 1:47 UTCresolved

   We continue to work towards mitigating the increased temperatures to its normal levels in the affected Availability Zone (use1-az4) in the US-EAST-1 Region. Other AWS services that depend on the affected EC2 instances and EBS volumes in this Availability Zone, may also experience impairments. We have weighed away traffic for most services at this time. We recommend customers utilize one of the other Availability Zones in the US-EAST-1 Region at this time, as existing instances in other AZ's remain unaffected by this issue. Customers may experience longer than usual provisioning times. We will provide an update by 7:45 PM PDT, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

4. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 3:06 UTCresolved

   We are actively working to restore temperatures to normal levels in the affected Availability Zone (use1-az4) in the US-EAST-1 Region, though progress is slower than originally anticipated. Since our last update we have made incremental progress to restore cooling systems within the affected AZ, which will not be visible to external customers but are required for the restoration of affected services. In the impacted Availability Zone, EC2 Instances, EBS Volumes, and other AWS Services are also experiencing elevated error rates and latencies for some workflows. As part of our recovery effort, we have shifted traffic away from the impacted Availability Zone for most services. We recommend customers utilize one of the other Availability Zones in the US-EAST-1 Region, as existing instances in other AZs remain unaffected by this issue. If immediate recovery is required, we recommend customers restore from EBS Snapshots and/or replace affected resources by launching new replacement resources in one of the unaffected zones. We will provide an update by 10:00 PM PDT, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

5. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:11 UTCresolved

   We are observing early signs of recovery. We continue to work towards restoring temperatures to normal levels and bring impacted racks back online in the affected Availability Zone (use1-az4) in the US-EAST-1 Region. We have been able to get additional cooling system capacity online, which has allowed us to recover some affected racks and are actively working to recover additional racks in a controlled and safe manner. In the impacted Availability Zone, EC2 Instances, EBS Volumes, and other AWS Services may continue to experience elevated error rates and latencies for some workflows until full recovery is achieved. We will provide an update by 11:30 PM PDT, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

6. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 6:38 UTCresolved

   We continue to make progress in resolving the impaired EC2 instances in the affected Availability Zone (use1-az4) in the US-EAST-1 Region, and are working towards full recovery. We are actively working to bring additional cooling system capacity online, which will enable us to recover the remaining affected racks in a controlled and safe manner. In the impacted Availability Zone, EC2 Instances, EBS Volumes, and other AWS Services may continue to experience elevated error rates and latencies for some workflows. Customers will continue to see some of their affected EC2 instances and EBS volumes as impaired until we achieve full recovery. We will provide an update by May 8, 1:30 AM PDT, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

7. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 8:32 UTCresolved

   Mitigation efforts remain underway to resolve the impaired EC2 instances and degraded EBS volumes in a single Availability Zone (use1-az4) in the US-EAST-1 Region. These EC2 instances and EBS volumes were impacted due to a loss of power during the thermal event. The work to bring additional cooling system capacity online, which will enable us to recover the remaining affected infrastructure in a controlled and safe manner, is taking longer than we had initially anticipated. Some services, such as IoT Core, ELB, NAT Gateway, and Redshift, have seen significant improvements in the recovery of their workflows. However, some customers will continue to see their affected EC2 instances and EBS volumes as impaired until we achieve full recovery. While we do not currently have an ETA for full recovery, we are prioritizing this issue and will provide another update by 3:30 AM PDT or sooner if additional information becomes available.

8. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 10:54 UTCresolved

   We continue to make progress towards resolving the impaired EC2 instances and degraded EBS volumes in a single Availability Zone (use1-az4) in the US-EAST-1 Region. At this time, we wanted to provide some more details on the issue. Beginning on May 7 at 4:20 PM PDT, we began experiencing an increase in instance impairments within the affected zone due to the loss of power during a thermal event. Engineers were automatically engaged within minutes and immediately began investigating multiple mitigations. By 9:12 PM PDT, we restored power to a subset of the affected infrastructure and observed some signs of recovery, which have remained stable. We continue working to bring additional cooling system capacity online, which will enable us to recover the remaining affected hardware in the impacted zone in a controlled and safe manner. Some AWS services, such as IoT Core, ELB, NAT Gateway, and Redshift, continue to see significant improvements in the recovery of their workflows. However, some customers will continue to see their affected EC2 instances and EBS volumes as impaired until we achieve full recovery. If immediate recovery is required, we recommend customers restore from EBS snapshots and/or replace affected resources by launching new replacement resources in one of the unaffected zones. Based on our current mitigation efforts, we expect full recovery to take several hours. We are prioritizing this issue and will provide another update by 6:30 AM PDT or sooner if additional information becomes available.

9. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 13:51 UTCresolved

   We continue working to resolve the impaired EC2 instances and degraded EBS volumes in a single Availability Zone (use1-az4) in the US-EAST-1 Region caused by a thermal event. During such an event, servers automatically shut down when the temperatures exceeded the operating thresholds in order to protect the hardware. We are actively working to bring additional cooling system capacity online, which will enable us to recover the remaining affected hardware in the impacted zone. Some customers will continue to see their affected EC2 instances and EBS volumes as impaired until we achieve full recovery. If immediate recovery is required, we recommend customers restore from EBS snapshots and/or replace affected resources by launching new replacement resources in one of the unaffected zones. In parallel, we are investigating increased error rates and query failures for Redshift clusters in the US-EAST-1 Region. During this time, affected customers may see errors for resume and restart workflows, as well as failover operations and availability issues. Our engineers are actively working to resolve this issue. Full recovery is still expected to take several hours. We are prioritizing this issue and will provide another update by 9:00 AM PDT or sooner if additional information becomes available.

10. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 15:58 UTCresolved

    We continue our efforts to work towards the recovery of the impaired EC2 instances and degraded EBS volumes in a single Availability Zone (use1-az4) in the US-EAST-1 Region. We are making progress towards the restoration of the cooling system capacity that is required to recover the affected hardware in the impacted zone. Some customers will continue to see their affected EC2 instances and EBS volumes as impaired until the affected racks are recovered. We continue to recommend that customers who require immediate recovery restore from EBS snapshots and/or replace affected resources by launching new replacement resources in one of the unaffected zones. As part of our parallel investigation, we have identified the root cause of the increased error rates and query failures for Redshift clusters in the US-EAST-1 Region. This has been confirmed to be related to impact from an upstream dependency. Affected customers may continue to see errors for resume and restart workflows, failover operations, and impact to general availability. We are actively working to resolve the issue. Our timeline for full recovery is still expected to take several hours and will be incremental as we bring racks online in phases. We will provide an additional update by 12:30 PM or sooner if we have new information to provide.

11. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 16:30 UTCresolved

    We have observed complete recovery of increased error rates and query failures for Redshift clusters in the US-EAST-1 Region. We were able to resolve the impact independently of the ongoing efforts to recover the affected hardware in the use1-az4 Availability Zone. The issue affecting Redshift has been resolved and the service is operating normally. We will provide an additional update regarding the efforts towards hardware restoration by 12:30 PM or sooner.

12. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 18:12 UTCresolved

    We are experiencing an increase in timeouts to Amazon Managed Streaming for Apache Kafka partitions on a subset of clusters as a result of the ongoing issue in a single Availability Zone (use1-az4) in the US-EAST-1 Region. We are working in parallel to determine a path towards mitigation for affected clusters. We will provide an additional update by 12:30 PM or sooner.

13. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 19:29 UTCresolved

    We continue to work towards the recovery of the impaired EC2 instances and degraded EBS volumes in a single Availability Zone (use1-az4) in the US-EAST-1 Region though efforts are slower than we had previously anticipated. We are taking measured steps to ensure that cooling capacity is brought online in a safe and controlled manner. As a result, EBS Volumes and EC2 instances affected by the issue will continue to experience impairments. We continue to recommend that customers who require immediate recovery restore from EBS snapshots and/or replace affected resourced by launching new replacement resources. Full recovery is still expected to take several hours. We will provide an additional update by 4:00 PM or sooner if we have new information to provide.

14. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 23:00 UTCresolved

    We have begun to see improvements in the overall number of affected EC2 instances and degraded EBS volumes in a single Availability Zone (use1-az4) in the US-EAST-1 Region. The steps taken to supply additional cooling capacity have been showing steady signs of progress. Some EBS Volumes and EC2 instances affected by the issue will continue to experience impairments while we continue to drive these efforts. We continue to recommend that customers who require immediate recovery restore from EBS snapshots and/or replace affected resources by launching new replacement resources. In parallel, we have seen some improvements in Amazon Managed Streaming for Apache Kafka as a result of the parallel mitigation efforts being performed. We are still experiencing timeouts to partitions but are seeing continued progress. We do anticipate that recovery will still take several hours. We will provide an additional update by 7:30 PM or sooner if we have new information to provide.

15. 9 de mayo de 2026 a las 3:04 UTCresolved

    Starting May 7 4:20 PM PDT, we experienced increased impaired EC2 instances and degraded EBS volumes in a single facility (data center) within a single Availability Zone (use1-az4) in the US-EAST-1 Region. The issue was caused by a thermal event resulting in a loss of power. As part of our recovery effort, we shifted traffic away from the impacted Availability Zone for most services at May 7 5:06 PM. AWS services, like Elastic Load Balancing, Elastic Kubernetes Service, ElastiCache, Redshift, OpenSearch, Managed Streaming for Apache Kafka among others, that depend on the affected EC2 instances and EBS volumes in this Availability Zone, also experienced elevated error rates and latencies for some workflows and/or configurations. Our main effort during the event mitigation strategy was to bring back our cooling systems capacity. By May 8 1:50 PM, we were able to stabilize cooling system capacity to pre-event levels, which helped us to restore the majority of the impaired EC2 instances and EBS volumes. A small number of instances and EBS volumes remain impaired and we continue to work to recover all affected remaining resources. We will communicate with customers who are still impacted via the Your Account view of the AWS Health Dashboard. Customers that require further assistance with this event may contact AWS Support through the AWS Management Console or the AWS Support Center.

1. 27 de abril de 2026 a las 11:27 UTCresolved

   We are investigating instance connectivity issues in a single Availability Zone (euw3-az2) in the EU-WEST-3 Region.

2. 27 de abril de 2026 a las 12:05 UTCresolved

   Between 3:58 AM and 4:40 AM PDT, we experienced increased error rates and increased launch failures for EC2 instances in a single Availability Zone (euw3-az2) in the EU-WEST-3 Region. During this time, customers attempting to launch new EC2 instances in the affected Availability Zone would have experienced launch failures. Additionally, a subset of existing EC2 instances and EBS volumes in this Availability Zone were impacted and became unreachable. We have identified the root cause to be a loss of power to infrastructure within the affected Availability Zone. Engineers were engaged at 4:02 AM and immediately began working to restore power and assess the scope of impact. By 4:20 AM, power was successfully restored to the affected infrastructure. We then focused our efforts on recovering impacted EC2 instances and EBS volumes. By 4:40 AM, all impacted EC2 instances and EBS volumes had been fully recovered and were operating normally. No additional action is required for EC2 instances and EBS volumes that were impacted during the power loss event, as these have been fully recovered. While EC2 and EBS have recovered, some AWS services may take additional time to fully recover as they process backlogs and complete their own recovery procedures. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.

1. 7 de marzo de 2026 a las 19:53 UTCresolved

   We are investigating increased error rates in the EU-CENTRAL-2 Region.

2. 7 de marzo de 2026 a las 20:17 UTCresolved

   We can confirm substantial error rates for PUT and GET requests to Amazon S3 in the EU-CENTRAL-2 Region. Engineers engaged immediately based on automated alarming. We have triangulated the issue to a subsystem responsible for assembling objects from bytes in storage. We have begun implementing mitigations, and are observing some improvement in error rates. We continue to work to identify the root cause, and are working on multiple parallel paths to fully mitigate the issue. Other AWS Services (such as EC2 launches) that rely on S3 are also affected by this issue. Existing EC2 instances are unaffected by this issue. We will provide another update by 12:45 PM PST, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

3. 7 de marzo de 2026 a las 20:28 UTCresolved

   We are seeing early signs of recovery and continue to monitor and work toward full recovery.

4. 7 de marzo de 2026 a las 21:04 UTCresolved

   Between 11:27 AM and 12:20 PM PST we experienced substantial error rates for S3 PUT/GET requests in EU-CENTRAL-2 Region. Engineers were engaged immediately based on automated alarming. We identified the root cause as an issue with a subsystem responsible for assembling objects bytes in storage. At 12:04 PM PST, we implemented mitigations and began observing early signs of recovery for S3. Error rates continued to improve, and other AWS Services continued to recover until 12:50 PM PST when we observed full recovery. We continue to work toward backfilling Cloudwatch logs, and expect that to continue over the next couple hours. We recommend customers retry any failed requests. The issue has been resolved and all services are operating normally.

1. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 5:56 UTCresolved

   We are investigating increased API error rates in a single Availability Zone (mes1-az2) in the ME-SOUTH-1 Region.

2. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 7:09 UTCresolved

   We are investigating connectivity and power issues affecting APIs and instances in a single Availability Zone (mes1-az2) in the ME-SOUTH-1 Region due to a localized power issue. Existing instances in this zone will also be affected. Other AWS Services may also be experiencing increased errors and latencies for their workflows, and we are working to route requests away from this affected Availability Zone. We recommend customers make use of other Availability Zones at this time. During this time, we are also experiencing delays in propagating DNS changes for Route53 to pops (Points of Presence) in ME-SOUTH-1.  Targeting new launches using RunInstances in the remaining AZs should succeed. Existing instances in the other AZs are not affected.

3. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 9:03 UTCresolved

   We continue to work on a localized power issue affecting a single Availability Zone (mes1-az2) in the ME-SOUTH-1 Region. In the impacted Availability Zone, EC2 Instances, DB Instances, EBS Volumes, and other AWS Services are also experiencing elevated error rates and latencies for some workflows. As part of our recovery effort, we have shifted traffic away from the impacted Availability Zone for most services. We recommend customers utilize one of the other Availability Zones in the ME-SOUTH-1 Region, as existing instances in other AZs remain unaffected by this issue. We are actively working to restore power and connectivity, at which time we will begin recovering affected resources. Currently, we expect recovery to take many hours. We will provide an update by 2:30 AM PST, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

4. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 10:41 UTCresolved

   We continue to work toward restoring power in the affected Availability Zone (mes1-az2) in the ME-SOUTH-1 Region. At this time, some AWS services have shifted traffic away from the affected Availability Zone and are seeing recovery for their affected operations and workflows. EC2 Instances, EBS Volumes, and other resources impacted in the affected Availability Zone will require a longer recovery timeline. Power has not yet been restored to the affected Availability Zone. If immediate recovery is required, we recommend customers restore from EBS Snapshots and/or launch replacement resources in one of the unaffected Availability Zones or an alternate Region. In parallel, we are actively working on reducing the error rates and latencies that some customers are experiencing with EC2 APIs. For now, we recommend continuing to retry any failed API requests. We will provide an update by 6:00 AM PST on March 2, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

5. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 14:23 UTCresolved

   We continue to work toward restoring power in the impacted Availability Zone (mes1-az2) in the ME-SOUTH-1 Region. Meanwhile, EC2 instance and networking APIs have been restored for the other Availability Zones. Additionally, we have made improvements to the availability of RDS multi-AZ databases while operating with the impaired Availability Zone. These improvements will help customers create database exports to preserve data, and we recommend customers with databases in the affected Availability Zone consider creating exports as a precautionary measure. EC2 Instances, EBS Volumes, and other resources impacted in the affected Availability Zone will require a longer recovery timeline, as power has not yet been restored. We are expecting recovery to take at least a day, as it requires repair of facilities, cooling and power systems, coordination with local authorities, and careful assessment to ensure the safety of our operators. If immediate recovery is required, we recommend customers restore from EBS Snapshots and/or launch replacement resources in one of the unaffected Availability Zones or an alternate AWS Region. We will provide an update by 11:00 AM PST on March 2, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

6. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 18:52 UTCresolved

   We continue to work towards restoring power in the affected Availability Zone (mes1-az2) in the ME-SOUTH-1 Region. We currently expect our recovery efforts to take at least a day. Our current guidance regarding immediate recovery remains unchanged from our previous update. Customers are able to disassociate Elastic IP addresses from resources in the affected Availability Zone and associate those with resources in the unaffected Availability Zones. This can be done by specifying --allow-reassociation when attempting to associate the Elastic IP to the new resource. We will provide you with further updates by 2:00 PM PST or sooner if new information becomes available.

7. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 22:29 UTCresolved

   We continue to work towards restoring power in the affected Availability Zone (mes1-az2) in the ME-SOUTH-1 Region. We have no updated guidance on expected recovery times, and still expect this to take at least a day to fully restore power and connectivity. We continue to advise customers to launch replacement resources in one of the unaffected Availability Zones or an alternate AWS Region. At this time we recommend that customers that are capable of backing up data outside of the region consider doing so. You can view the current status of affected AWS services below. We will provide you with another update by 7:00 PM PST, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

8. 3 de marzo de 2026 a las 0:22 UTCresolved

   We are providing an update on the ongoing service disruptions affecting the AWS Middle East (UAE) Region (ME-CENTRAL-1) and the AWS Middle East (Bahrain) Region (ME-SOUTH-1). Due to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, both affected regions have experienced physical impacts to infrastructure as a result of drone strikes. In the UAE, two of our facilities were directly struck, while in Bahrain, a drone strike in close proximity to one of our facilities caused physical impacts to our infrastructure. These strikes have caused structural damage, disrupted power delivery to our infrastructure, and in some cases required fire suppression activities that resulted in additional water damage. We are working closely with local authorities and prioritizing the safety of our personnel throughout our recovery efforts. In the ME-CENTRAL-1 (UAE) Region, two of our three Availability Zones (mec1-az2 and mec1-az3) remain significantly impaired. The third Availability Zone (mec1-az1) continues to operate normally, though some services have experienced indirect impact due to dependencies on the affected zones. In the ME-SOUTH-1 (Bahrain) Region, one facility has been impacted. Across both regions, customers are experiencing elevated error rates and degraded availability for services including Amazon EC2, Amazon S3, Amazon DynamoDB, AWS Lambda, Amazon Kinesis, Amazon CloudWatch, Amazon RDS, and the AWS Management Console and CLI. We are working to restore full service availability as quickly as possible, though we expect recovery to be prolonged given the nature of the physical damage involved. In parallel with efforts to restore the physical infrastructure at the affected sites, we are pursuing multiple software-based recovery paths that do not depend on the underlying facilities being fully brought back online. For Amazon S3 and Amazon DynamoDB, we are actively working to restore data access and service availability through software mitigations, including deploying updates to enable S3 to operate within the current infrastructure constraints and remediating impaired DynamoDB tables to restore read and write availability for dependent services. Our focus on restoring these foundational services is deliberate, as recovery of Amazon S3 and Amazon DynamoDB will in turn enable a broad range of dependent AWS services to recover. For other affected service APIs, we are deploying targeted software updates to reduce error rates and restore functionality where possible, independent of the physical recovery timeline. We are also working to restore access to the AWS Management Console and CLI through network-level changes that route traffic away from the affected infrastructure. While these software-based mitigations can address many of the service-level impacts, some recovery actions are constrained by the physical state of the affected facilities — meaning that full restoration of certain services will require the underlying infrastructure to be repaired and brought back online. Across all services, our teams are working in parallel on both the physical restoration of the affected facilities and these software-based mitigations, with the goal of restoring as much customer access as possible as quickly as possible, even ahead of full infrastructure recovery. In addition, we are prioritizing the restoration of services and tools that enable customers to back up and migrate their data and applications out of the affected regions. Finally, even as we work to restore these facilities, the ongoing conflict in the region means that the broader operating environment in the Middle East remains unpredictable. We recommend that customers with workloads running in the Middle East consider taking action now to backup data and potentially migrate your workloads to alternate AWS Regions. We recommend customers exercise their disaster recovery plans, recover from remote backups stored in other regions, and update their applications to direct traffic away from the affected regions. For customers requiring guidance on alternate regions, we recommend considering AWS Regions in the United States, Europe, or Asia Pacific, as appropriate for your latency and data residency requirements. We will continue to provide updates as recovery progresses and as the situation evolves. Our next update will be provided by 9:00 PM PST on March 2, 2026, or sooner if new information becomes available.

9. 3 de marzo de 2026 a las 6:27 UTCresolved

   We continue to work towards restoring power in the affected Availability Zone (mes1-az2) in the ME-SOUTH-1 Region. We have no updated guidance on expected recovery times, and still expect this to take at least a day to fully restore power and connectivity. AWS infrastructure is designed to be highly resilient, but given the uncertainty of the current situation, we encourage our customers to replicate Amazon S3 and critical data from the ME-SOUTH-1 Region to another AWS Region. For customers requiring guidance on alternate regions, we recommend considering AWS Regions in the United States, Europe, or Asia Pacific, as appropriate for your latency and data residency requirements. We will provide another update by March 3 at 3:00 AM PST, or sooner if new information becomes available. For more information on Cross-Region Replication, refer [1]. For more information on S3 Batch Replication, see [2]. For a simple script to quickly set up and start S3 Replication, see [3]. If you have questions or concerns, please contact AWS Support [4]. [1] <a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/replication.html">https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/replication.html</a> [2] <a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/s3-batch-replication-batch.html">https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/s3-batch-replication-batch.html</a> [3] <a href="https://github.com/awslabs/aws-support-tools/blob/master/S3/Setup_Replication/setup_replication.py">https://github.com/awslabs/aws-support-tools/blob/master/S3/Setup_Replication/setup_replication.py</a> [4] <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/support">https://aws.amazon.com/support</a>

10. 3 de marzo de 2026 a las 11:10 UTCresolved

    We continue to work toward restoring power in the affected Availability Zone (mes1-az2) in the ME-SOUTH-1 Region. The overall state of the region remains largely unchanged from our previous update. At this time, we have no updated guidance on expected timelines for fully restoring power and connectivity. We are taking all necessary steps to support the recovery process. While progress is being made, significant work remains before full restoration is complete. Given the ongoing uncertainty, we encourage customers to replicate their Amazon S3 data and other critical data from the ME-SOUTH-1 Region to another AWS Region, using the guidance provided in our previous update. We will continue to provide updates as recovery progresses and as the situation evolves. Our next update will be provided by 6:00 AM PST on March 3, or sooner if new information becomes available.

11. 3 de marzo de 2026 a las 14:02 UTCresolved

    Recovery efforts in the affected Availability Zone (mes1-az2) in the ME-SOUTH-1 Region are ongoing, with the situation remaining consistent with our last update. We have no change to expected timelines for fully restoring power and connectivity. While progress is being made, significant work remains before full restoration is complete. We continue to recommend customers launch replacement resources in one of the unaffected Availability Zones or an alternate AWS Region. Given the extended nature of this event, we continue to encourage customers to replicate Amazon S3 data and other critical workloads from ME-SOUTH-1 to another AWS Region using the guidance shared previously. We will provide our next update by 12:00 PM PST on March 3, or sooner if conditions change.

12. 3 de marzo de 2026 a las 16:40 UTCresolved

    We are providing an update on the ongoing service disruptions affecting the AWS Middle East (Bahrain) Region (ME-SOUTH-1). We continue to make progress on recovery efforts across multiple workstreams. With the immediate phase of this event now better understood, we are moving to a more targeted communication model. Going forward, updates will be delivered directly to affected customers through the AWS Personal Health Dashboard. Customers who require assistance with this event are encouraged to contact AWS Support through the AWS Management Console or the AWS Support Center. We continue to strongly recommend that customers with workloads running in the Middle East take action now to migrate those workloads to alternate AWS Regions. Customers should enact their disaster recovery plans, recover from remote backups stored in other Regions, and update their applications to direct traffic away from the affected Regions. For customers requiring guidance on alternate regions, we recommend considering AWS Regions in the United States, Europe, or Asia Pacific, as appropriate for your latency and data residency requirements.

13. 30 de abril de 2026 a las 7:07 UTCinvestigating

    We are providing an update on the ongoing service disruption. The Middle East (Bahrain) Region (ME-SOUTH-1) has suffered damage due to the conflict in the Middle East and is currently unavailable. Customers should recover their resources in other Regions from remote backups. Relevant billing operations are currently suspended while we restore normal operations in this AWS Region. This process is expected to take several months.

1. 1 de marzo de 2026 a las 12:51 UTCresolved

   We are investigating issues with AWS services in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region.

2. 1 de marzo de 2026 a las 13:19 UTCresolved

   We are investigating connectivity and power issues affecting APIs and instances in a single Availability Zone (mec1-az2) in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region due to a localized power issue. Existing instances in this zone will also be affected. Other AWS Services may also be experiencing increased errors and latencies for their workflows, and we are working to route requests away from this affected Availability Zone. We recommend customers make use of other Availability Zones at this time. Targeting new launches using RunInstances in the remaining AZs should succeed. Existing instances in the other AZs are not affected.

3. 1 de marzo de 2026 a las 14:09 UTCresolved

   We can confirm that a localized power issue has affected a single Availability Zone in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region (mec1-az2). EC2 Instances, DB Instances, EBS Volumes, and others resources are currently unavailable and will experience connectivity issues at this time. Other AWS Services are also experiencing error rates and latencies for some workflows. We have weighed away traffic for most services at this time. We recommend customers utilize one of the other Availability Zones in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region at this time, as existing instances in other AZ's remain unaffected by this issue. We are actively working to restore power and connectivity, at which time we will begin to work to recover affected resources. As of this time, we expect recovery is multiple hours away. We will provide an update by 7:15 AM PST, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

4. 1 de marzo de 2026 a las 15:09 UTCinvestigating

   We wanted to provide some additional information on the isolated power issue. At this time, most AWS Services have weighted away from the affected Availability Zone (mec1-az2) and are seeing recovery for their affected operations and workflows. For EC2 Instances, EBS Volumes, and other resources that are impacted in the affected Zone, we will have a longer tail of recovery. At this time, power has not yet been restored to the affected AZ. For now, we recommend continuing to retry any failed API requests. If immediate recovery is required, we recommend customers restore from EBS Snapshots and/or replace affected resources by launching replacement resources in one of the unaffected zones, or an alternate region. As of this time, recovery is still several hours away. We will provide an update by 8:30 AM PST, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

5. 1 de marzo de 2026 a las 16:59 UTCinvestigating

   We continue to work toward restoring power in the affected Availability Zone in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region (mec1-az2). In parallel, we are actively working on improving error rates and latencies that some customers are observing for EC2 Networking and EC2 Describe APIs. Due to increased demand in the unaffected Availability Zones, customers may experience longer than usual provisioning times or may need to retry requests for certain instance types, or pick an alternative instance type. We will provide an update by 10:30 AM PST, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

6. 1 de marzo de 2026 a las 17:41 UTCinvestigating

   We want to provide some additional information on the power issue in a single Availability Zone in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region. At around 4:30 AM PST, one of our Availability Zones (mec1-az2) was impacted by objects that struck the data center, creating sparks and fire. The fire department shut off power to the facility and generators as they worked to put out the fire. We are still awaiting permission to turn the power back on, and once we have, we will ensure we restore power and connectivity safely. It will take several hours to restore connectivity to the impacted AZ. The other AZs in the region are functioning normally. Customers who were running their applications redundantly across the AZs are not impacted by this event. EC2 Instance launches will continue to be impaired in the impacted AZ. We recommend that customers continue to retry any failed API requests. If immediate recovery of an affected resource (EC2 Instance, EBS Volume, RDS DB Instance, etc.) is required, we recommend restoring from your most recent backup, by launching replacement resources in one of the unaffected zones, or an alternate AWS Region. We will provide an update by 12:30 PM PST, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

7. 1 de marzo de 2026 a las 20:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware that some customers are experiencing errors when calling EC2 APIs, specifically networking related APIs (AllocateAddress, AssociateAddress, DescribeRouteTable, DescribeNetworkInterfaces). We are actively working on multiple paths to mitigate these issues. For customers experiencing throttling errors on the AllocateAddress APIs, we recommend retrying any failed API requests. We are deploying a configuration change to mitigate the AssociateAddress API errors and expect recovery in the next few hours. DescribeRouteTable and DescribeNetworkInterfaces API calls without specifying zone, Interface or Instance IDs are expected to fail until we restore the impacted zone. We recommend customers to pass these IDs explicitly in these API requests. For customers that can, we recommend considering using alternate AWS Regions. We will provide another update by 3:30 PM PST, or sooner if we have more to share.

8. 1 de marzo de 2026 a las 22:28 UTCinvestigating

   We are seeing positive signs of recovery for many of the EC2 APIs, such as Describes and AllocateAddress. We recognize that customers are still experiencing errors when attempting to call the AssociateAddress API, and are unable to disassociate addresses from resources that are affected by the underlying power issue. We continue to work on multiple parallel paths to mitigate both of these issues. We recommend continuing to retry requests wherever possible. We expect our current mitigation efforts for these specific issues to complete within the the two to three hours. As we progress with these mitigation efforts, customers will observe higher success rates for these operations. Additionally, we are investigating ways to speed up these specific mitigation efforts, but are ensuring we do so safely. As of this time, power restoration is still several hours away. We will provide another update by 5:30 PM PST, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

9. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 0:26 UTCinvestigating

   We are seeing significant signs of recovery for AssociateAddress requests, and continue to work toward fully mitigating this issue. This combined with the earlier recovery of the AllocateAddress API means customers can now successfully create and associate new network addresses in the unaffected AZs. Other AWS Services are also now observing sustained improvement as a result of the EC2 Networking APIs recovery. We are now focusing on implementing a change that will allow customers to Disassociate Elastic IP addresses from resources that are impacted by the underlying power issue. We expect this specific mitigation to take another hour to complete. We do not have an ETA for power restoration at this time. For customers that can, we recommend using alternate Availability Zones or other AWS Regions where applicable. We will provide another update by 6:30 PM, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

10. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 2:01 UTCinvestigating

    We confirm the recovery of the AssociateAddress API requests. We have also applied a change that enables customers to disassociate Elastic IP addresses from resources that are impacted by the underlying power issue. With these mitigations, customers can now successfully create and associate new network addresses in the unaffected AZs as well as re-associate Elastic IPs from resources in the affected zone to resources in the unaffected zones. We still do not have an ETA for power restoration at this time. For customers that can, we recommend using alternate Availability Zones or other AWS Regions where applicable. We will provide another update by 10:00 PM, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

11. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 5:59 UTCinvestigating

    We are investigating additional connectivity issues and error rates in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region.

12. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 6:46 UTCinvestigating

    We can confirm that a localized power issue has affected another Availability Zone in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region (mec1-az3). Customers are also experiencing increased EC2 APIs and instance launch errors for the remaining zone (mec1-az1). At this point it is not possible to launch new instances in the region, although existing instances should not be affected in mec1-az1. Other AWS Services, such as DynamoDB and S3 are also experiencing significant error rates and latencies. We are actively working to restore power and connectivity, at which time we will begin to work to recover affected resources. As of this time, we expect recovery is multiple hours away. For customers that can, we recommend failing away to another AWS Region at this time. We will provide an update by 12:00 AM PST, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

13. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 8:52 UTCinvestigating

    We continue to work on a localized power issue affecting multiple Availability Zones in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region (mec1-az2 and mec1-az3). Customers are experiencing increased EC2 API errors and instance launch failures across the region, and it is not currently possible to launch new instances; existing instances in mec1-az1 should not be affected. Amazon DynamoDB and Amazon S3 are also experiencing significant error rates and elevated latencies. We are actively working to restore power and connectivity, after which we will begin recovery of affected resources; full recovery is still expected to be many hours away. We recommend that affected customers failover, and backup any critical data, to another AWS Region. We will provide an update by 2:00 AM PST, or sooner if the situation changes.

14. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 10:53 UTCinvestigating

    We wanted to provide more information on Amazon S3 given that there are two impaired Availability Zones (mec1-az2 and mec1-az3) in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region. Amazon S3 is a regional service and designed to withstand the total loss of a single Availability Zone while maintaining S3's durability and availability. When the mec1-az2 AZ was powered off at approximately 4:00 AM PST on Sunday, March 1, S3 continued to operate normally. As the second AZ became impaired, S3 error rates increased. With two Availability Zones significantly impacted, customers are seeing high failure rates for data ingest and egress. We strongly advise customers to update their applications to ingest S3 data to an alternate AWS Region. As soon as practically possible, we will begin the restoration of our two Availability Zones which will include a careful assessment of data health and any repair of storage if necessary. In addition, we can confirm that the AWS Management Console and command line interface (CLI) are disrupted by the failure of two Availability Zones. We continue to work towards recovery across all services, and we will provide an update by 6:00 AM PST on March 2, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

15. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 14:22 UTCinvestigating

    We continue to work towards recovery of the two impaired Availability Zones (mec1-az2 and mec1-az3) in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region. We are expecting recovery to take at least a day, as it requires repair of facilities, cooling and power systems, coordination with local authorities, and careful assessment to ensure the safety of our operators. EC2, Amazon DynamoDB and other AWS Services continue to experience significant error rates and elevated latencies. We recommend customers enact their disaster recovery plans and recover from remote backups into alternate AWS Regions, ideally in Europe. Further, we strongly advise customers to update their applications to ingest S3 data to an alternate AWS Region. We will provide an update by 11:00 AM PST on March 2, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

16. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 17:59 UTCinvestigating

    We continue to work towards recovery of the two impaired Availability Zones (mec1-az2 and mec1-az3) in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region. The impact is causing elevated errors rates for both the Management Console and CLI. Our current expectation is that recovery will take at least a day to complete. We continue to recommend customers enact their disaster recovery plans and recover from remote backups into alternate AWS Regions. We will continue to provide periodic updates on recovery efforts. Our next update will be by 2:00 PM PST or sooner if new information becomes available.

17. 2 de marzo de 2026 a las 21:36 UTCinvestigating

    We continue to work towards recovery of the two impaired Availability Zones (mec1-az2 and mec1-az3) in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region. We have partially restored access to the AWS Management Console, however, some pages will continue to load unsuccessfully until we have recovered core services and power. In parallel to the power and recovery efforts, we are working to restore access to tools and utilities to allow customers to backup and migrate their data. We have no updated guidance on expected recovery times, and still expect this to take at least a day to fully restore power and connectivity. We continue advising customers enact their disaster recovery plans and recover from remote backups into alternate AWS Regions. We will provide you with another update by 6:00 PM PST, or sooner if new information becomes available.

18. 3 de marzo de 2026 a las 0:19 UTCinvestigating

    We are providing an update on the ongoing service disruptions affecting the AWS Middle East (UAE) Region (ME-CENTRAL-1) and the AWS Middle East (Bahrain) Region (ME-SOUTH-1). Due to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, both affected regions have experienced physical impacts to infrastructure as a result of drone strikes. In the UAE, two of our facilities were directly struck, while in Bahrain, a drone strike in close proximity to one of our facilities caused physical impacts to our infrastructure. These strikes have caused structural damage, disrupted power delivery to our infrastructure, and in some cases required fire suppression activities that resulted in additional water damage. We are working closely with local authorities and prioritizing the safety of our personnel throughout our recovery efforts. In the ME-CENTRAL-1 (UAE) Region, two of our three Availability Zones (mec1-az2 and mec1-az3) remain significantly impaired. The third Availability Zone (mec1-az1) continues to operate normally, though some services have experienced indirect impact due to dependencies on the affected zones. In the ME-SOUTH-1 (Bahrain) Region, one facility has been impacted. Across both regions, customers are experiencing elevated error rates and degraded availability for services including Amazon EC2, Amazon S3, Amazon DynamoDB, AWS Lambda, Amazon Kinesis, Amazon CloudWatch, Amazon RDS, and the AWS Management Console and CLI. We are working to restore full service availability as quickly as possible, though we expect recovery to be prolonged given the nature of the physical damage involved. In parallel with efforts to restore the physical infrastructure at the affected sites, we are pursuing multiple software-based recovery paths that do not depend on the underlying facilities being fully brought back online. For Amazon S3 and Amazon DynamoDB, we are actively working to restore data access and service availability through software mitigations, including deploying updates to enable S3 to operate within the current infrastructure constraints and remediating impaired DynamoDB tables to restore read and write availability for dependent services. Our focus on restoring these foundational services is deliberate, as recovery of Amazon S3 and Amazon DynamoDB will in turn enable a broad range of dependent AWS services to recover. For other affected service APIs, we are deploying targeted software updates to reduce error rates and restore functionality where possible, independent of the physical recovery timeline. We are also working to restore access to the AWS Management Console and CLI through network-level changes that route traffic away from the affected infrastructure. While these software-based mitigations can address many of the service-level impacts, some recovery actions are constrained by the physical state of the affected facilities — meaning that full restoration of certain services will require the underlying infrastructure to be repaired and brought back online. Across all services, our teams are working in parallel on both the physical restoration of the affected facilities and these software-based mitigations, with the goal of restoring as much customer access as possible as quickly as possible, even ahead of full infrastructure recovery. In addition, we are prioritizing the restoration of services and tools that enable customers to back up and migrate their data and applications out of the affected regions. Finally, even as we work to restore these facilities, the ongoing conflict in the region means that the broader operating environment in the Middle East remains unpredictable. We recommend that customers with workloads running in the Middle East consider taking action now to backup data and potentially migrate your workloads to alternate AWS Regions. We recommend customers exercise their disaster recovery plans, recover from remote backups stored in other regions, and update their applications to direct traffic away from the affected regions. For customers requiring guidance on alternate regions, we recommend considering AWS Regions in the United States, Europe, or Asia Pacific, as appropriate for your latency and data residency requirements. We will continue to provide updates as recovery progresses and as the situation evolves. Our next update will be provided by 9:00 PM PST on March 2, 2026, or sooner if new information becomes available.

19. 3 de marzo de 2026 a las 5:13 UTCinvestigating

    We continue to work towards recovery of the two impaired Availability Zones (mec1-az2 and mec1-az3) in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region with a focus on restoring functionality to foundational services. Since our last update we have made incremental progress in recovering the DynamoDB control plane which will not be visible to external customers but are required for the restoration of service. Similarly we have made progress with the S3 control plane. The recovery of these foundational services, when complete, will enable a broad range of dependent AWS services to recover. We still estimate that the recovery time is at least a day before we are able to fully restore power and connectivity. We will provide you with another update by March 3 2:00 AM PST, or sooner if new information becomes available.

20. 3 de marzo de 2026 a las 9:04 UTCinvestigating

    We are providing an update on the ongoing service disruptions affecting the AWS Middle East (UAE) Region (ME-CENTRAL-1). The overall state of the region remains largely unchanged from our previous update. We continue to work closely with local authorities and are prioritizing the safety of our personnel throughout our recovery efforts. Teams continue to assess the damage to the affected facilities and are working to restore infrastructure impacted by the event. With respect to Amazon S3, we are seeing improvement in PUT and LIST availability. We continue to work on improving GET error rates, but full recovery will be dependent on restoring the affected infrastructure, which our teams continue to work toward. For Amazon DynamoDB, error rates remain elevated and our teams continue to focus on recovery efforts. We have not yet seen meaningful improvement in DynamoDB availability, but expect conditions to improve over the coming hours as recovery work progresses. Amazon EC2 instance launches remain throttled in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region. We will begin relaxing these throttles as soon as we have fully recovered our foundational services and have sufficient capacity to support new launches safely. The AWS Management Console is now operational, though customers may continue to experience errors on certain pages and operations as the underlying services work through their recovery. We recommend customers continue to retry requests where possible. AWS Lambda, Amazon Kinesis, Amazon CloudWatch, Amazon RDS, and a number of other AWS services that were impacted by this event remain degraded. The availability of these services is dependent on the recovery of our foundational services — primarily Amazon S3 and Amazon DynamoDB — and we expect to see improvement across these services as that recovery progresses. Finally, even as we work to restore these facilities, the ongoing conflict in the region means that the broader operating environment in the Middle East remains unpredictable. We strongly recommend that customers with workloads running in the Middle East take action now to migrate those workloads to alternate AWS Regions. Customers should enact their disaster recovery plans, recover from remote backups stored in other regions, and update their applications to direct traffic away from the affected regions. For customers requiring guidance on alternate regions, we recommend considering AWS Regions in the United States, Europe, or Asia Pacific, as appropriate for your latency and data residency requirements. We will continue to provide updates as recovery progresses and as the situation evolves. Our next update will be provided by 5:00 AM PST on March 3, or sooner if new information becomes available.

21. 3 de marzo de 2026 a las 12:58 UTCinvestigating

    We are providing an update on the ongoing service disruptions affecting the AWS Middle East (UAE) Region (ME-CENTRAL-1). The overall state of the region remains largely unchanged, though our teams continue to make progress on recovery efforts across multiple workstreams. For Amazon S3, we are seeing continued improvement in PUT and LIST availability. Newly written objects are now able to be successfully retrieved, and we continue to work on reducing GET error rates for objects written prior to the event. Full recovery of GET operations for pre-existing data remains dependent on restoring the affected infrastructure. For Amazon DynamoDB, error rates remain elevated and our teams continue to focus on recovery; we expect to see improvement over the coming hours. As these foundational services recover, dependent services — including AWS Lambda, Amazon Kinesis, Amazon CloudWatch, and Amazon RDS will follow. Amazon EC2 instance launches remain throttled in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region and will be relaxed as foundational service recovery and capacity allow. The AWS Management Console is operational, though customers may continue to experience errors on certain pages as underlying services work through their recovery. We recommend that customers continue to retry requests where possible. We strongly recommend that customers with workloads running in the Middle East take action now to migrate those workloads to alternate AWS Regions. Customers should enact their disaster recovery plans, recover from remote backups stored in other Regions, and update their applications to direct traffic away from the affected Regions. For customers requiring guidance on alternate regions, we recommend considering AWS Regions in the United States, Europe, or Asia Pacific, as appropriate for your latency and data residency requirements. We will provide another update by March 3 at 10:00 AM PST, or sooner if new information becomes available.

22. 3 de marzo de 2026 a las 16:14 UTCinvestigating

    We are providing an update on the ongoing service disruptions affecting the AWS Middle East (UAE) Region (ME-CENTRAL-1). We continue to make progress on recovery efforts across multiple workstreams. For Amazon S3, we are seeing continued improvement in PUT and LIST availability. Newly written objects are now able to be successfully retrieved, and we continue to work on reducing GET error rates for objects written prior to the event. Full recovery of GET operations for pre-existing data remains dependent on restoring the affected infrastructure. For Amazon DynamoDB, error rates remain elevated and our teams continue to focus on recovery; we expect to see improvement over the coming hours. As these foundational services recover, dependent services — including AWS Lambda, Amazon Kinesis, Amazon CloudWatch, and Amazon RDS — will follow. Amazon EC2 instance launches remain throttled in the ME-CENTRAL-1 Region and will be relaxed as foundational service recovery and capacity allow. The AWS Management Console is operational, though customers may continue to experience errors on certain pages as underlying services work through their recovery. With the immediate phase of this event now better understood, we are moving to a more targeted communication model. Going forward, updates will be delivered directly to affected customers through the AWS Personal Health Dashboard. Customers who require assistance with this event are encouraged to contact AWS Support through the AWS Management Console or the AWS Support Center. We continue to strongly recommend that customers with workloads running in the Middle East take action now to migrate those workloads to alternate AWS Regions. Customers should enact their disaster recovery plans, recover from remote backups stored in other Regions, and update their applications to direct traffic away from the affected Regions. For customers requiring guidance on alternate regions, we recommend considering AWS Regions in the United States, Europe, or Asia Pacific, as appropriate for your latency and data residency requirements.

23. 30 de abril de 2026 a las 7:25 UTCinvestigating

    We are providing an update on the ongoing service disruption. The Middle East (UAE) Region (ME-CENTRAL-1) has suffered damage as a result of the conflict in the Middle East and is currently unable to reliably support customer applications. While some workloads continue to function normally, we strongly recommend customers migrate all accessible resources to other Regions and restore inaccessible resources from remote backups as soon as possible. Relevant billing operations are currently suspended while we restore normal operations in this AWS Region. This process is expected to take several months.

1. 25 de febrero de 2026 a las 18:14 UTCresolved

   We are experiencing intermittent missing or delayed EC2 instance and status check metrics in the US-EAST-1 Region. Alarms on delayed or missing metrics may transition into an INSUFFICIENT_DATA state. We are taking multiple parallel paths to mitigate this issue. While underlying resources are not affected by this issue, customers with automated actions based off of delayed or missing metric data may see their automations start. EC2 APIs are not impacted and therefore EC2 AutoScaling will not be affected by this issue.

2. 25 de febrero de 2026 a las 19:28 UTCresolved

   We can confirm issues with intermittent missing and/or delayed EC2 instance metrics and status checks in the US-EAST-1 Region. While existing instances are unaffected by this issue and operating normally, metrics and status checks may be delayed or reporting INSUFFICIENT_DATA. We have identified the issue to be in an underlying subsystem responsible for publishing EC2 metric data to CloudWatch. Engineers were automatically engaged, and continue to investigate multiple paths to mitigate the issue in parallel. We recommend customers treat the INSUFFICIENT_DATA state as missing data instead of an alarm breach, especially when configuring the alarm to stop, terminate, reboot, or recover an instance. More information is available <a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/UsingAlarmActions.html">here</a>. While we do not have a firm ETA for resolution, we will provide another update by 12:30 PM, or sooner if we have additional information to share.

3. 25 de febrero de 2026 a las 20:10 UTCresolved

   We are seeing early signs of recovery and continue to work toward full resolution. We will continue to provide updates.

4. 25 de febrero de 2026 a las 20:33 UTCresolved

   We can confirm significant signs of recovery, and continuing to monitor to ensure stability. At this time, missing/delayed metrics and instance status checks are recovered. We are actively working to backfill delayed data.

5. 25 de febrero de 2026 a las 20:51 UTCresolved

   Between 7:00 AM and 12:05 PM PST, we experienced errors while publishing EC2 instance metrics and status checks in the US-EAST-1 Region. This issue resulted in metrics and status checks to be delayed or report INSUFFICIENT_DATA. EC2 APIs and instances were unaffected by this issue and continue to operate normally. We were automatically engaged at 7:05 AM and began identifying multiple parallel paths to mitigate the issue. By 7:20 AM, we identified that the issue was related to an underlying subsystem responsible for publishing EC2 metric data to CloudWatch. By 12:03 PM, we completed our mitigation efforts and observed full recovery at 12:05 PM. New metrics are being published as expected. Delayed metrics are in the process of backfilling and may take a few hours to fully complete. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.