Historial de interrupciones de Atlassian Support

1. 1 de octubre de 2026 a las 7:01 UTCidentified

   Nuestros equipos continúan trabajando en recuperación hasta que el incidente se resuelva completamente. Proporcionaremos más actualizaciones si tenemos avances significativos para compartir. También hay un impacto en los nuevos boletos de soporte creados en términos de componente SLA desaparecido, notificaciones que pueden estar afectando los tiempos de respuesta y la gestión atrasada de algunos tickets.

2. 1 de octubre de 2026 a las 7:51 UTCresolved

   El 01 oct 2026, entre 01:00 UTC y 07:25 UTC, los usuarios pueden haber visto falta de ejecución laboral, incluyendo el procesamiento retrasado de correo electrónico a punta y los horarios que no funcionan como se esperaba. Ahora hemos implementado una solución y los servicios han sido restaurados a la operación normal para los clientes afectados. El impacto para apoyar las entradas con el componente SLA desaparecido y las notificaciones retrasadas también han confirmado la recuperación. Nota: Para los clientes de Bitbucket, si había algún oleoducto programado que no funcionaba durante la ventana del incidente, puede esperar la próxima ejecución programada o desencadenarlo manualmente.

3. 9 de octubre de 2026 a las 18:24 UTCpostmortem

   #### Summary El 1 de octubre de 2026, entre las 01:00 y las 07:25 UTC, el procesamiento de trabajo degradado y la programación de los productos Atlas impactaron, incluyendo Bitbucket Cloud, Confluence, Forge apps, Jira y Jira Service Management en todas las regiones de la nube comercial. Esto causó tareas de fondo retardadas o perdidas, tales como procesamiento de correo electrónico a punto y tuberías programadas; el uso interactivo del producto no fue afectado. El evento fue desencadenado cuando un volumen inesperado de tareas programadas se debía simultáneamente, abrumando nuestra plataforma de programación de trabajo compartida. El monitoreo automatizado detectó el incidente en tres minutos. La recuperación comenzó alrededor de 03:45 UTC como capacidad de ingeniería escalada y la plataforma trabajó a través del atraso, con resolución completa alcanzada en 6 horas y 25 minutos. #### IMPACT La mayoría de las tareas programadas dejaron de funcionar a las 01:00 UTC y se reanudaron a partir de las 03:45 UTC. La mayoría de los trabajos retrasados habían alcanzado alrededor de las 06:00 UTC, y los retrasos restantes habían aclarado antes de las 07:25 UTC. A través de productos afectados: - Recurrir las tareas programadas saltadas o retrasadas debido durante el incidente; las carreras no fueron repetidas automáticamente y las tareas se reanudaron en su próxima hora programada. - La mayoría de las tareas programadas por una sola vez se retrasaron; un pequeño número puede no haber funcionado. - Las reglas de automatización, incluidas las reglas programadas, funcionan normalmente, excepto como se indica a continuación. Bitbucket Cloud Las tuberías programadas debido entre las 01:00 y alrededor de 03:50 UTC no funcionaron. Si un oleoducto programado no funcionó durante el incidente, puede esperar la próxima ejecución programada o activarlo manualmente. Otras operaciones de oleoducto no se vieron afectadas. Confluencia No se enviaron algunos recordatorios del evento calendario entre las 01:00 y las 03:45 UTC. Aplicaciones de forja Los desencadenantes programados se detuvieron a las 01:00 UTC y se reanudaron a partir de las 04:00 UTC; no se reprodujeron las invocaciones perdidas. Objetivos Los recordatorios de correo electrónico del mes para actualizar los objetivos podrían retrasarse. Jira y Jira Service Management Los correos electrónicos entrantes se quedaron en sus buzones y fueron procesados automáticamente después de la recuperación. Las notificaciones programadas, como las suscripciones de filtros, se retrasaron. En algunos proyectos de servicio, las reglas de automatización y notificaciones activadas por los SLA o el tiempo en estado se retrasaron. Los datos del temporizador SLA permanecieron intactos. Atlassian Support Hasta las 07:25 UTC, los problemas con nuestras herramientas de apoyo podrían haber ralentizado algunas de nuestras respuestas. Basándonos en nuestra investigación hasta la fecha, no hemos identificado ninguna pérdida de artículos de trabajo, páginas, repositorios o correos electrónicos entrantes. ## ROOT CAUSE Nuestra plataforma de programación de trabajo compartida funciona a gran escala en condiciones normales. Uno de los consumidores de la plataforma programaba un volumen anormalmente alto de tareas a ejecutar al mismo tiempo el 1 de octubre a la 01:00 UTC. Esta oleada de orden de conciencia superó nuestros límites arquitectónicos y de escalada, creando un proceso atrasado a través de servicios dependientes. Ingeniería aumenta manualmente la capacidad para manejar la carga anormal, permitiendo al servicio procesar el atraso y volver a operaciones normales. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS Sabemos que el trabajo retrasado y perdido afecta su productividad. Estamos priorizando estas acciones para ayudar a reducir la probabilidad y el impacto de incidentes similares: ** Mejorar el aislamiento de la carga de trabajo** Implementar correas de programación justas para que los aumentos de volumen de una sola fuente no mueran de hambre o retrasan tareas en otros productos. - Controles de onda Strengthen:** Añada capacidades operacionales para acelerar rápidamente o detener las cargas de trabajo programadas de fuentes específicas durante los picos de tráfico inesperados. **Mejorar el escalado del sistema y la recuperación:** Mejorar la capacidad de la plataforma y optimizar los procesos de escalado para manejar picos de demanda extrema y recuperarse más rápidamente. Nos disculpamos con clientes cuyos servicios fueron impactados durante este incidente. Gracias. Atlassian

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 23 de septiembre de 2026 a las 12:44 UTCidentified

   Hemos identificado un problema que afecta el acceso a la comunidad Jira Product Discovery y los recursos de apoyo en la Comunidad Atlassiana. Los usuarios afectados pueden encontrar errores o vínculos rotos al intentar acceder al grupo de discusión Jira Product Discovery, artículos, FAQs o documentación relacionada. Nuestros equipos de ingeniería están trabajando activamente en una resolución. Proporcionaremos nuestra próxima actualización en 2 horas, o tan pronto como tengamos una actualización de material.

2. 23 de septiembre de 2026 a las 14:41 UTCidentified

   Hemos implementado una solución de configuración, que ha restaurado el acceso a artículos clave Jira Product Discovery, FAQs, la hoja de ruta pública y el manual de productos. Nuestro equipo de ingeniería sigue trabajando para resolver el acceso al grupo de la comunidad restante y los vínculos de debate. Proporcionaremos otra actualización en 2 horas, o antes si hacemos nuevos progresos.

3. 23 de septiembre de 2026 a las 16:47 UTCidentified

   Nuestros equipos continúan trabajando en una mitigación. Los usuarios afectados pueden experimentar problemas de acceso para grupos comunitarios y enlaces de discusión. Seguiremos compartiendo actualizaciones adicionales aquí a medida que se disponga de más información.

4. 23 de septiembre de 2026 a las 19:07 UTCidentified

   Nuestros equipos han contratado a un proveedor de terceros para mitigar el problema, y proporcionaremos actualizaciones aquí a medida que se disponga de más información.

5. 23 de septiembre de 2026 a las 20:14 UTCresolved

   El 23 de septiembre de 2026, los usuarios afectados pueden haber experimentado alguna perturbación de los servicios en la Comunidad de Atlas. El problema se ha resuelto y el servicio funciona normalmente para todos los clientes afectados.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware that the current issues with accessing Atlassian products are impacting additional products. We have now expanded the impact of the incident to cover the known impacted products at this time. We will provide further update within one hour or sooner as information is available.

2. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:11 UTCidentified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

3. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:24 UTCidentified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

4. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:34 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

5. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:43 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

6. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 6:40 UTCmonitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

7. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 6:48 UTCresolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

8. 19 de mayo de 2026 a las 19:06 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 1:31 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 2:02 UTCresolved

   Upon further investigation, it was identified that Atlassian support was not affected due to this incident and is operating as usual.

3. 20 de mayo de 2026 a las 6:44 UTCpostmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2 de mayo de 2026 a las 1:38 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an incident affecting Jira Software (viewBoard, viewIssue, createIssue). Our team is working to identify the cause and restore service to normal levels. We will provide the next update within 60 minutes.

2. 2 de mayo de 2026 a las 1:38 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting the issue viewing experience in Jira. This is also impacting the accessibility of support tickets. We will share updates here as more information becomes available.

3. 2 de mayo de 2026 a las 2:00 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting the Work Item viewing experience in Jira. This is also impacting the accessibility of support tickets. We will share updates here as more information becomes available.

4. 2 de mayo de 2026 a las 2:47 UTCresolved

   The Jira Work Item View experience has been restored to normal service. Our teams are continuing to investigate the root cause affecting this issue. We will provide more details once we identify the root cause

5. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 19:44 UTCpostmortem

   ### SUMMARY ### Between May 1, 2026 at 23:34 UTC and May 2, 2026 at 02:53 UTC Atlassian customers using Jira and Jira Service Management (JSM) across all Cloud tenants received an error page when attempting to open a work item due to a schema incompatibility, and editing work item fields was degraded for both products. Navigating to and interacting with boards were degraded for Jira specifically. On Jira mobile, users were unable to view work items and work item search was degraded. This was caused by a deployment of a schema configuration change that had only been validated against some production environments. The issue also affected Atlassian's customer support operations and temporarily impacted Atlassian’s ability to respond to incoming support requests. Customers were able to raise tickets as usual. Atlassian’s automated monitoring systems detected the issue on May 1, 2026 at 23:41 UTC, and engineering teams promptly began investigating. The issue was reported on Statuspage on May 2, 2026 at 00:55 UTC. The issue was resolved after 3 hours and 19 minutes on May 2, 2026 at 02:53 UTC when the previous version of the schema configuration was successfully redeployed to all regions. ### IMPACT ### - **Duration**: 3 hours 19 minutes (May 1, 2026 at 23:34 UTC – May 2, 2026 at 02:53 UTC) - **Affected regions**: All regions. - **Affected products**: Jira, JSM, Jira Mobile - **Customer experience**: - Users were unable to view work items using the work item view; consequently updating and creating work items from the work item view was affected. - Editing work items was degraded. - Boards did not show under Spaces in the Jira navigation. - Certain board interactions were affected. - Other areas of Jira not dependent on the broken schema configuration continued to operate normally. ### ### ROOT CAUSE ### The root cause was a deployment sequencing issue. A schema configuration change was deployed to the API gateway layer before the corresponding application-level change had been deployed across all production environments. This created a mismatch between the schema expected by the gateway and the schema served by the application servers. ### ### MITIGATIONS ### The engineering team identified the problematic schema change and initiated a rollback of the deployment. A deployment blocker was put in place to prevent further changes while the rollback was executed. The previous version of the schema configuration was redeployed, and service was restored across all regions. ### ### REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN & NEXT STEPS ### We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: - We are adding automated pre-deployment checks to verify that schema configurations are compatible across all production environments before changes are deployed. - We will streamline our incident communication processes, incident response training and tooling to reduce the time between incident detection and customer notification. - We are working to improve resilience of critical customer-facing support services to ensure SLA continuity during outages. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 13 de abril de 2026 a las 7:29 UTCmonitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 13 de abril de 2026 a las 8:33 UTCmonitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 13 de abril de 2026 a las 10:17 UTCresolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 21 de abril de 2026 a las 2:35 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2 de abril de 2026 a las 1:49 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is investigating an issue relating to 503 errors being displayed when attempting to load confluence.atlassian.com. We are investigating this issue with urgency and will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 2 de abril de 2026 a las 2:23 UTCmonitoring

   We are now seeing recovery across confluence.atlassian.com and ja.confluence.atlassian.com sites. We are continuing to monitor the recovery and will update when we are satisfied that this incident is fully resolved.

3. 2 de abril de 2026 a las 2:39 UTCresolved

   Our team has been able to successfully recover all services from confluence.atlassian.com and ja.confluence.atlassian.com and these sites are now performing as expected. This incident is now resolved. We apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.

1. 17 de diciembre de 2025 a las 13:48 UTCinvestigating

   Support ticket creation is slow or partially impacted for some of our customers. Support chats are being initiated but not visible to Atlassian support teams. Our team is aware and investigating the same. We will update you in next 60 mins or sooner.

2. 17 de diciembre de 2025 a las 14:15 UTCmonitoring

   This issue resulted from a permission problem. The Atlassian team quickly identified and has fixed it. All support tickets raised during this period are being created. Our support team will process the tickets in the order they were received. For expired chat support sessions, support tickets will be created and our support team will proactively reach out. We continue to monitor the status.

3. 17 de diciembre de 2025 a las 14:43 UTCresolved

   Team has reconfirmed everything is working as expected. This issue is resolved.

1. 5 de diciembre de 2025 a las 8:08 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware that access to created Ecohelp support tickets is not available for some of our customers. Our team is investigating this issue. Repeat creation of tickets is not required as the created tickets are visible to the Atlassian teams. We will provide next update in 60 minutes.

2. 5 de diciembre de 2025 a las 9:56 UTCinvestigating

   Customers encounter a permission error when accessing tickets: No Access - You do not have permission to view this request. Ticket creation works and created tickets are visible to the Atlassian teams. The Atlassian team continues investigating. The root cause remains unclear. We will provide next update in 60 minutes.

3. 5 de diciembre de 2025 a las 11:06 UTCinvestigating

   Customers continue to encounter a permission error when accessing tickets: No Access - You do not have permission to view this request. Ticket creation works and created tickets are visible to the Atlassian teams. The Atlassian team is engaged and continues investigation. However, the root cause remains unclear. We will provide next update in 3 hours or sooner.

4. 5 de diciembre de 2025 a las 12:09 UTCresolved

   The feature flag causing the issue has been reverted, fixing the problem. With that this incident is resolved.

1. 6 de noviembre de 2025 a las 19:36 UTCinvestigating

   Marketplace Community is experiencing slow load times and degraded performance on the Forums. We are actively investigating and hope to have a resolution as soon as possible.

2. 6 de noviembre de 2025 a las 19:50 UTCinvestigating

   Atlassian Community is experiencing slow load times and degraded performance on the Forums. We are actively investigating and hope to have a resolution as soon as possible.

3. 7 de noviembre de 2025 a las 14:10 UTCmonitoring

   The incident has been fixed and continue to stay under monitoring.

4. 10 de noviembre de 2025 a las 4:17 UTCresolved

   The issue has been resolved and there is no performance related slowness on Atlassian Community Forums now.

1. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 7:56 UTCinvestigating

   We have noticed that Atlassian Cloud services are impacted and our teams are actively investigating the same. We shall keep you informed of the progress every hour.

2. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 8:24 UTCinvestigating

   Atlassian Cloud services are impacted and we are aware that our customers might not be able to create support tickets. Our teams are actively investigating the same. We shall keep you informed of the progress every hour.

3. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 9:24 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing an outage due to some issue at the end of our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to get this resolved or mitigated as quickly as possible. ETA of the same is not know at the moment. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

4. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 9:58 UTCidentified

   We understand that our public cloud provider has identified the cause of the issue. We are starting to see some recovery and is working towards mitigation. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

5. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 11:07 UTCidentified

   We continue to work with our public cloud provider towards mitigating the issue at the earliest. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

6. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 12:06 UTCidentified

   Atlassian team is actively engaged and continues to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue at the earliest. We are starting to see partial operations succeed. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

7. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 13:58 UTCidentified

   Our public cloud provider is working to mitigate this issue quickly. We are seeing some early positive indicators and are continuing to monitor. We appreciate your patience and will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner.

8. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 14:02 UTCidentified

   We understand your pain and mitigating or fixing this issue is of utmost importance. Our public cloud provider is actively working to mitigate this issue on priority. We have been seeing partial operational success. We appreciate your patience and will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner.

9. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 16:36 UTCidentified

   Update - Thank you for your continued patience. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority. Our public cloud provider is still actively working to mitigate this issue with urgency and while we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will be providing hourly updates on this issue.

10. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 17:27 UTCidentified

    Update - We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority. Our public cloud provider is actively working to mitigate this issue with urgency. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner as new information becomes available.

11. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 17:43 UTCidentified

    We are currently aware of an ongoing incident impacting Atlassian Cloud services due to an outage with our public cloud provider, AWS. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority and we are closely monitoring the health of AWS services. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner as new information becomes available.

12. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 18:38 UTCmonitoring

    There have been no changes since our last update. We will provide our next updated by 9:00PM UTC or sooner as new information becomes available. We are currently aware of an ongoing incident impacting Atlassian Cloud services due to an outage with our public cloud provider, AWS. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority and we are closely monitoring the health of AWS services. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation.

13. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 21:26 UTCmonitoring

    Monitoring - We've started seeing continued product experience improvement. While we still have a backlog of event processing, we are seeing improvements in systems operational capabilities across all products. We estimate a significant improvement with the next few hours and will continue to monitor the health of AWS services and the effects on Atlassian customers. We appreciate your continued patience and remain committed to full resolution as we work through this situation. We will post our next update in two hours.

14. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 22:58 UTCmonitoring

    Our teams are continuing to monitor the recovery of systems across Atlassian products. This update is to inform that the Atlassian Support portal is fully operational at this time for customers that wish to contact support.

15. 21 de octubre de 2025 a las 0:03 UTCmonitoring

    Our team is now seeing recovery across all impacted Atlassian products. We are continuing to monitor for individual products that may still be processing backlogged items now that services are restored. The Atlassian Support portal is currently still displaying a message directing customers to our temporary support channel. Please note that our support portal is currently fully functional for those attempting to raise requests. We are continuing to look into this alert to remove this message. We will provide further update on our recovery status in one hour.

16. 21 de octubre de 2025 a las 1:07 UTCmonitoring

    We continue to see recovery progressing across all impacted products as backlogged items continue to be processed. The Atlassian Support portal is currently displaying a message directing customers to our temporary support channel. Please note that our support portal is currently fully functional for those attempting to raise requests. We are continuing to look into this alert to remove this message. We will provide further update on our recovery status in two hours.

17. 21 de octubre de 2025 a las 3:24 UTCmonitoring

    The issue relating to the Atlassian Support portal displaying a message to customers to use our temporary support channel has now been resolved. The Atlassian Support portal is fully functional for any ongoing support issues. With regards to other Atlassian products, we continue to see recovery continuing across all impacted products and our teams are continuing to monitor as the recovery continues. We will provide further update on our recovery status within two hours.

18. 21 de octubre de 2025 a las 5:24 UTCresolved

    Our team is now able to see full recovery across the vast majority of Atlassian products. We are aware of some ongoing issues with specific components such as migrations and JSM virtual service agents, and our team is continuing to investigate with urgency. We apologise for the inconvenience that this incident has caused and we will provide further information when the Post Incident Investigation has been completed.

19. 24 de octubre de 2025 a las 17:47 UTCpostmortem

    ### Postmortem publish date: Nov 19th, 2025 ### Summary All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. Customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 04:05. The service disruptions were triggered due to an [AWS DynamoDB outage](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=1%3A50%20PM.-,DynamoDB,-Between%2011%3A48) and further affected by subsequent failures in [AWS EC2](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) and [AWS Network Load Balancer](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) within the us-east-1 region. The incident started at Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and was detected within six minutes by our automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore all core services by Oct 21, 2025 04:05. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues was completed on Oct 22, 2025. We recognize the critical role our products play in your daily operations, and we offer our sincere apologies for any impact this incident had on your teams. We are taking immediate steps to enhance the reliability and performance of our services, so that you continue to receive the standard of service you have come to trust. ### IMPACT Before examining product-level impacts, it's helpful to understand Atlassian's service topology and internal dependencies. Products such as Jira and Confluence are deployed across multiple AWS regions. The data for each tenant is stored and processed exclusively within its designated host region. This design is intentional and represents the desired operational state, as it limits the impact of any regional outage strictly to tenants in-region, in this case us-east-1. While in-scope application data is pinned to the region selected by the customer, there are times when systems need to call other internal services that may be based in a different region. If a problem occurs in the main region where these services operate, systems are designed to automatically fail over to a backup region, usually within three minutes. However, if unexpected issues arise during this failover, it can take longer to restore services. In rare cases, this could affect customers in more than one region. It’s important to note that all in-scope application data for supported products is pinned according to a customer’s chosen region. **Jira** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 20:00, customers with tenants hosted in the us-east-1 region experienced increased error rates when accessing core entities such as Issues, Boards, and Backlogs. This disruption was caused by AWS's inability to allocate AWS EC2 instances and elevated errors in AWS Network Load Balancer \(NLB\). During this window, users may also have observed intermittent timeouts, slow page loads, and failures when performing operations like creating or updating issues, loading board views, and executing workflow transitions. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced elevated failure rates when attempting to load Jira pages. This disruption was caused by the regional frontend service entering an unhealthy state during this specific time interval. Normally, the frontend service connects to the primary AWS DynamoDB instance located in the us-east-1 to retrieve the most recent configuration data necessary for proper operation. Additionally, the service is designed with a fallback mechanism that references static configuration data in the event that the primary database becomes inaccessible. Unfortunately, a latent bug existed in the local fallback path. When the frontend service nodes restarted, they were unable to load critical operational configuration data from primary or fallback sources, leading to the observed failures experienced by customers. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 06:30, customers experienced significant delays and missing Jira in-app notifications across all regions. The notification ingestion service, which is hosted exclusively in us-east-1, exhibited an increased failure rate when processing notification messages due to AWS EC2 and NLB issues. This issue resulted in notifications being delayed - and in some cases, not delivered at all - to users worldwide. **Jira Service Management \(JSM\)** JSM was impacted similarly to Jira above, with the same timeframes and for the same reasons. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced significantly elevated failure rates when attempting to load JSM pages. This affected all JSM experiences including the Help Centre, Portal, Queues, Work Items, Operations, and Alerts. **Confluence** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 02:45, customers using Confluence in the us-east-1 region experienced elevated failure rates when performing common operations such as editing pages or adding comments. The primary cause of this service degradation was the system's inability to auto-scale due to AWS EC2 issues to manage peak traffic load effectively. Though the AWS outage ended at Oct 20, 21:09, a subset of customers continued to experience failures as some Confluence web server nodes across multiple clusters remained in an unhealthy state. This was ultimately mitigated by recycling the affected nodes. To protect our systems while AWS recovered, we made a deliberate decision to enable node termination protection. This action successfully preserved our server capacity but, as a trade-off, it extended the time required for a full recovery once AWS services were restored. **Automation** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 23:59, automation customers whose rules are processed in us-east-1 experienced delays of up to 23 hours in rule execution. During this window, some events triggering rule executions were processed out of order because they arrived later during backlog processing. This caused potential inconsistencies in workflow executions, as rules were run in the order events were received, not when the action causing the event occurred. Additionally, some rule actions failed because they depend on first-party and third-party systems, which were also affected by the AWS outage. Customers can see most of these failures in their audit logs; however, a few updates were not logged due to the nature of the outage. By Oct 21, 2025 5:30, the backlog of rule runs in us-east-1 was cleared. Although most of these delayed rules were successfully handled, there were some additional replays of events to ensure completeness. Our investigation confirmed that a few events may never have triggered their associated rules due to the outage. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 11:20, all non-us-east-1 regional automation services experienced delays of up to 4 hours in rule execution. This was caused by an upstream service that was unable to deliver events as expected. The delivery service encountered a failure due to a cross-region dependency call to a service hosted in the us-east-1 region. Because of this dependency issue, the delivery service was unable to successfully deliver events throughout this time frame, resulting in customer-defined rules not being executed in a timely manner. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:33, Bitbucket experienced intermittent unavailability across core services. During this period, users faced increased error rates and latency when signing in, navigating repositories, and performing essential actions such as creating, updating, or approving pull requests. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage that impacted downstream services. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 22:46, numerous Bitbucket Pipeline steps failed to start, stalled mid-execution, or experienced significant queueing delays. Impact varied, with partial recoveries followed by degradation as downstream components re-synchronized. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage, compounded by instability in AWS EC2 instance availability and AWS Network Load Balancers. Furthermore, Bitbucket Pipelines continued to experience a low but persistent rate of step timeouts and scheduling errors due to AWS bare-metal capacity shortages in select availability zones. Atlassian coordinated with AWS to provision additional bare-metal hosts and addressed a significant backlog of pending pods, successfully restoring services by 01:30 on Oct 21, 2025. **Trello** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 15:25, users of Trello experienced widespread service degradation and intermittent failures due to upstream AWS issues affecting multiple components, including AWS DynamoDB and subsequent AWS EC2 capacity constraints. During this period, customers reported elevated error rates when loading boards, opening cards, adding comments or attachments. **Login** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, a small subset of users experienced failures when attempting to initiate new login sessions using SAML tokens. This resulted in an inability for those users to access Atlassian products during that time period. However, users who already had valid active sessions were not affected by this issue and continued to have uninterrupted access. The issue impacted all regions globally because regional identity services relied on a write replica located in the us-east-1 region to synchronize profile data. When the primary region became unavailable, the failover to a secondary database in another region failed, which delayed recovery. This failover defect has since been addressed. **Statuspage** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, Statuspage customers who were not already logged in to the management portal were unable to log in to create or update incident statuses. This impact was restricted only to users who were not already logged in at the time. The root cause was the same as described in the Login section above, and it was resolved by the same remediation steps. ### REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN & NEXT STEPS We have completed the following critical actions designed to help prevent cross-region impact from similar issues: * Resolved the code defect in the fallback option to ensure that Jira Frontend Services in other regions remain unaffected during a region-wide outage. * Fixed the issue that prevented timely failover of the identity service which impacted new login sessions. * Resolved the code defect so that delivery services in unaffected regions remain operational during region-wide outages. Additionally, we are prioritizing the following improvement actions: * Implement mitigation strategies to strengthen resilience against region-wide outages in the notification ingestion service. Although disruptions to our cloud services are sometimes unavoidable during outages of the underlying cloud provider, we continuously evaluate and improve test coverage to strengthen resilience of our cloud services against these issues. We recognize the critical importance of our products to your daily operations and overall productivity, and we extend our sincere apologies for any disruptions this incident may have caused your teams. If you were impacted and require additional details for internal post-incident reviews, please reach out to your Atlassian support representative with affected timeframes and tenant identifiers so we can correlate logs and provide guidance. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 8 de octubre de 2025 a las 22:20 UTCidentified

   We have identified an issue starting at 17:00 UTC on Monday, October 6th, 2025 affecting all Loom users who record videos with the Chrome Extension, causing unexpected delays when saving videos. If the browser is closed before the video is playable, the recording may be lost. To address this, we have developed an updated version of the extension, which is currently under review by Google. We anticipate the fix to be published by 20:00 UTC on October 15th, 2025, or sooner. In the meantime, users will see an in-browser message if their video has not yet been saved, advising them not to close the browser session. We will provide an update again when the fix is available.

2. 9 de octubre de 2025 a las 20:00 UTCresolved

   We have resolved the incident. A new version of the Loom chrome extension has been approved and published to the Chrome Extension store. Update to the latest version(v5.5.142) of the extension.

1. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 1:10 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating cases of degraded performance for attachments in the Customer Support portal. We will provide more details within the next hour.

2. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 1:37 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified the root cause of the performance degraded service and have mitigated the problem. We are now monitoring closely.

3. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 4:32 UTCinvestigating

   On further monitoring, we see the issue resurfacing so our team is actively investigating with urgency and we will provide an update as soon as possible. We apologise for any inconvenience caused by this issue.

4. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 4:49 UTCmonitoring

   We identified that there was a temporary regression in our backend service health and we have mitigated the problem. We will continue to monitor the issue.

5. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 6:08 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate the regression issue and we will provide more details once we identify the root cause.

6. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 7:04 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to see issues with customers uploading new attachments and viewing existing attachments. We have identified the root cause and work is underway to resolve the issue.

7. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 8:21 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating the issue of being unable to view Support tickets and uploading attachments in Atlassian support portal. We will provide more details within the next hour.

8. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 9:02 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate issues with our Customer Support portal. Please note that support ticket creation is still working as expected. You can continue to interact with us by replying to the email you received when your support ticket was created.

9. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 10:01 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is actively engaged and continuing to investigate issues with our Customer Support portal. Please note that support ticket creation is still working as expected. You can continue to interact with us by replying to the email you received when your support ticket was created.

10. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 11:01 UTCinvestigating

    Atlassian team continues to investigate the issue with utmost importance. Please note that support ticket creation is still working as expected. You can continue to interact with us by replying to the email you received when your support ticket was created.

11. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 12:01 UTCinvestigating

    Our team continues to investigate the issue on priority. Please note that support ticket creation is still working as expected. You can continue to interact with us by replying to the email you received when your support ticket was created.

12. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 13:02 UTCidentified

    We have identified the cause of the issue and expect recovery shortly.

13. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 13:13 UTCmonitoring

    We have identified the root cause of partially impacting Atlassian support portal that led to the issue of visibility of the Support tickets and customers being unable to upload attachments. We have mitigated the problem and continue to monitoring the services closely. There will be no further updates here until the status is changed to 'Resolved' unless the issue recurs.

14. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 14:02 UTCinvestigating

    We are again seeing issues with uploading new attachments and viewing existing attachments. We will provide more details within the 2 hours.

15. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 15:01 UTCinvestigating

    Atlassian team is investigating the issues with viewing existing attachments and uploading attachments. We will provide more details within the next hour.

16. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 16:15 UTCinvestigating

    We continue to investigate to identify root cause of the issue. We have made changes to contain the issue to listing attachments for tickets. As a result of some mitigation changes, rest of the support portal is working as expected. New attachments are getting uploaded and a comment is added in the support ticket indicating successful upload of the attachment. From the comment, customers can view the attachment (if required). Customers don't need to upload the attachment again. Currently, the table/list of attachments to the support ticket is not visible to our customers and we continue to work to restore this functionality. We will provide more details within the next hour.

17. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 17:54 UTCinvestigating

    No change since our last update. We are continuing to work to restore full attachment functionality. Customers can upload attachments, but may receive an error message when doing so, and will not be able to view the attachment list at this time. However, soon after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket that the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take additional upload steps, and our Support team will be able to access the attachment. The rest of the support portal is working as expected. Thank you for your patience. We will provide an update by 19:00 UTC, if not sooner.

18. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 18:58 UTCinvestigating

    No change since our last update. We are continuing to work to restore full attachment functionality. Customers can upload attachments, but may receive an error message when doing so, and will not be able to view the attachment list at this time. However, soon after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket that the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take additional upload steps, and our Support team will be able to access the attachment. The rest of the support portal is working as expected. Thank you for your patience. We will provide an update by 22:00 UTC, if not sooner.

19. 6 de octubre de 2025 a las 22:00 UTCinvestigating

    No change since our last update. We are continuing to work to restore full attachment functionality. Customers can upload attachments, but may receive an error message when doing so, and will not be able to view the attachment list at this time. However, soon after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket that the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take additional upload steps, and our Support team will be able to access the attachment. The rest of the support portal is working as expected. Thank you for your patience. We will provide an update by October 7th 04:00 UTC, if not sooner.

20. 7 de octubre de 2025 a las 4:01 UTCinvestigating

    No change since our previous update. Our team is continuing to work to restore full attachment functionality. Customers can upload attachments, but may receive an error message when doing so, and will not be able to view the attachment list at this time. Soon after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket that the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take additional upload steps, and our Support team will be able to access the attachment. The rest of the support portal is working as expected. Thank you for your patience. We will provide further update by October 7th 08:00 UTC, if not sooner.

21. 7 de octubre de 2025 a las 8:28 UTCinvestigating

    We don't have any new update to share at this point. However, please be rest assured that out team is continuing to work to restore full attachment functionality. Customers can upload attachments, but may receive an error message when doing so, and will not be able to view the attachment list at this time. Soon after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket that the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take additional upload steps, and our Support team will be able to access the attachment. The rest of the support portal is working as expected. Thank you for your patience. We will provide further update by October 7th 12:00 UTC, if not sooner.

22. 7 de octubre de 2025 a las 11:59 UTCinvestigating

    Atlassian teams have identified some likely root causes and are testing and simulating to confirm them. Once the root cause is confirmed, our teams will carefully conduct thorough checks before making any changes. Meanwhile, customers can upload attachments but may see an error message and cannot view the attachment list. Shortly after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket confirming the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take extra steps; our Support team can access the attachments. The rest of the support portal is working normally. We appreciate your patience. We will provide further update by October 7th 18:00 UTC, if not sooner.

23. 7 de octubre de 2025 a las 18:04 UTCidentified

    Our teams are continuing to make progress and are in the final stages of validating potential fixes to address this issue. Meanwhile, customers can upload attachments but may see an error message and cannot view the attachment list. Shortly after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket confirming the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take extra steps; our Support team can access the attachments. The rest of the support portal is working normally. We appreciate your patience and will provide a further update by October 7th, 21:00 UTC, if not sooner.

24. 7 de octubre de 2025 a las 21:02 UTCidentified

    Our teams are continuing to make progress and are actively working on finalizing the deployment plan for fixes to address this issue. Meanwhile, customers can upload attachments but may see an error message and cannot view the attachment list. Shortly after uploading, they will see a comment on their ticket confirming the attachment was added. Customers do not need to take extra steps; our Support team can access the attachments. The rest of the support portal is working normally. We appreciate your patience and will provide a further update by October 8th, 01:00 UTC, if not sooner.

25. 8 de octubre de 2025 a las 2:18 UTCresolved

    We are closing this incident on Statuspage as the Atlassian Support portal functionality has been restored. We are aware that the ticket attachments panel remains unavailable and that some customers may be receiving a 'Something went wrong!' error message despite successfully uploading ticket attachments. We are working to resolve these UX issues. Atlassian Support is available for customers needing further assistance.

1. 17 de junio de 2025 a las 8:10 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating the issue

2. 17 de junio de 2025 a las 8:12 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 17 de junio de 2025 a las 8:32 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 15 de agosto de 2024 a las 20:27 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating cases of degraded performance for support.atlassian.com ticket system. This may cause delays in receiving responses from Support tickets. We will provide more details as they are available.

2. 15 de agosto de 2024 a las 21:13 UTCresolved

   Between 18:55 UTC to 21:00 UTC, we experienced degraded performance for the support.atlassian.com ticket system. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.

1. 13 de agosto de 2024 a las 15:46 UTCinvestigating

   Currently, chat support for all products is offline. The team is actively investigating the incident and working on a fix.

2. 14 de agosto de 2024 a las 9:45 UTCresolved

   The issue with chat has been resolved and is functional again.

1. 3 de julio de 2024 a las 20:50 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue with that is impacting Atlassian, Atlassian Partners, Atlassian Support, Confluence, Jira Work Management, Jira Service Management, Jira, Opsgenie, Atlassian Developer, Atlassian (deprecated), Trello, Atlassian Bitbucket, Guard, Jira Align, Jira Product Discovery, Atlas, Atlassian Analytics, and Rovo Cloud customers. We will provide more details within the next hour.

2. 3 de julio de 2024 a las 21:45 UTCmonitoring

   We have mitigated the problem and continue looking into the root cause. The outage was between 8:08pm 03/07 UTC - 08:31pm 03/07 UTC We are now monitoring closely.

3. 3 de julio de 2024 a las 22:02 UTCresolved

   We mistakenly believed there was impact to these services. The service is operating normally.

1. 3 de junio de 2024 a las 23:10 UTCidentified

   We are investigating an issue with error responses for some Cloud customers across multiple products. We have identified the root cause and expect recovery shortly.

2. 4 de junio de 2024 a las 0:34 UTCresolved

   Between 22:18 UTC to 22:56 UTC, we experienced errors for multiple Cloud products. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.

3. 11 de junio de 2024 a las 0:59 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On June 3rd, between 09:43pm and 10:58 pm UTC, Atlassian customers using multiple product\(s\) were unable to access their services. The event was triggered by a change to the infrastructure API Gateway, which is responsible for routing the traffic to the correct application backends. The incident was detected by the automated monitoring system within five minutes and mitigated by correcting a faulty release feature flag, which put Atlassian systems into a known good state. The first communications were published on the Statuspage at 11:11pm UTC. The total time to resolution was about 75 minutes. ### **IMPACT** The overall impact was between 09:43pm and 10:17pm UTC, with the system initially in a degraded state, followed by a total outage between 10:17pm and 10:58pm UTC. _The Incident caused service disruption to customers in all regions and affected the following products:_ * Jira Software * Jira Service Management * Jira Work Management * Jira Product Discovery * Jira Align * Confluence * Trello * Bitbucket * Opsgenie * Compass ### **ROOT CAUSE** A policy used in the infrastructure API gateway was being updated in production via a feature flag. The combination of an erroneous value entered in a feature flag, and a bug in the code resulted in the API Gateway not processing any traffic. This created a total outage, where all users started receiving 5XX errors for most Atlassian products. Once the problem was identified and the feature flag updated to the correct values, all services started seeing recovery immediately. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have several testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn’t identified because the change did not go through our regular release process and instead was incorrectly applied through a feature flag. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to avoid repeating this type of incident: * Prevent high-risk feature flags from being used in production * Improve the policy changes testing * Enforcing longer soak time for policy changes * Any feature flags should go through progressive rollouts to minimize broad impact * Review the infrastructure feature flags to ensure they all have appropriate defaults * Improve our processes and internal tooling to provide faster communications to our customers We apologize to customers whose services were affected by this incident and are taking immediate steps to address the above gaps. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 18 de abril de 2024 a las 19:42 UTCresolved

   support.atlassian.com/requests intermittent page load issues

1. 5 de abril de 2024 a las 23:20 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating issues with customers' ability to submit support tickets. We will provide updates here as we have them. If you have an urgent technical issue, you can reach out to us using the following email addresses: https://confluence.atlassian.com/support/contact-support-temporary-channel-950800787.html

2. 6 de abril de 2024 a las 0:28 UTCresolved

   Between 9:22 PM UTC to 00:35 AM UTC, we experienced an issue for http://support.atlassian.com. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally.

3. 19 de abril de 2024 a las 21:49 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary Between April 05 at 21:22 and April 6, 2024, at 00:21 UTC, some Atlassian customers were unable to submit support tickets via the Atlassian Support portal. The event was triggered by a failure release of a route configuration for a support form backend service. The changes included a redirection of an API route in a resource file. The incident was detected within one minute by a customer and mitigated by rolling back the configuration change which put Atlassian Support form system into a known good state. The total time to resolution was about three hours and 21 minutes. ### **IMPACT** The overall impact was between April 05 at 21:22 and April 6, 2024, at 00:21 UTC on the Atlassian support portal. The Incident caused service disruption to some customers where they attempted to submit a support case through the online portal. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The issue was caused by a change to a support form backend service resource file.  As a result, the support site could not make online support ticket requests, and the users received support form connectivity errors when attempting to submit the form as well as a banner notification alerting to the system issue.  ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn’t identified because the change was related to a very specific service descriptor file change that was not covered by our automated continuous deployment suites and tests. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to avoid repeating this type of incident: * Create additional route configuration automated testing and monitoring * Consider adding deployment / region specific configuration controls to APIs * Create additional endpoint PDV \(post-deployment verification\) monitors for system health * Updates to hot fix deployment pipeline processes to support incident remediation We apologize to customers who were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the Atlassian Support portal availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support