Historial de interrupciones de Circleapp

1. 5 de octubre de 2026 a las 9:44 UTCinvestigating

   Actualmente estamos investigando esta cuestión.

2. 5 de octubre de 2026 a las 10:21 UTCresolved

   Este incidente ha sido resuelto. El incidente fue causado por una configuración desaparecida en la aplicación que utilizamos para implementar cambios de código en la aplicación Circle. Después de investigar, aplicamos inmediatamente un parche temporal para restaurar la disponibilidad. Luego identificamos la causa raíz e implementamos una solución permanente. Todos los servicios funcionan normalmente.

3. 5 de octubre de 2026 a las 15:46 UTCpostmortem

   ##### Summary La aplicación del círculo experimentó un incidente entre las 5:44 y las 5:57 AM EST Lo sentimos por la interrupción. #### What happened \(high level\) El incidente fue causado por una configuración desaparecida en la aplicación que utilizamos para desplegar nuevos cambios de código en la aplicación Circle #### Mitigation and immediate fixes Al investigar el problema, repasamos inmediatamente esta aplicación con un cambio temporal que restauró la disponibilidad de aplicaciones. Más tarde hoy identificamos la causa raíz y aplicamos una solución definitiva. ###### Status Todos los servicios funcionan normalmente.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 3 de octubre de 2026 a las 8:13 UTCinvestigating

   Actualmente estamos investigando esta cuestión.

2. 3 de octubre de 2026 a las 8:18 UTCresolved

   Este incidente ha sido resuelto.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 1 de septiembre de 2026 a las 13:59 UTCinvestigating

   Actualmente estamos investigando esta cuestión.

2. 1 de septiembre de 2026 a las 15:43 UTCresolved

   A principios de hoy, experimentamos una breve interrupción del servicio de 9:59-10:50 AM ET durante una actualización de seguridad programada. El servicio ha sido totalmente restaurado, y hemos puesto salvaguardias en marcha para evitar que esto vuelva a suceder. Nos disculpamos por cualquier inconveniente.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 27 de agosto de 2026 a las 22:25 UTCinvestigating

   Actualmente estamos investigando esta cuestión.

2. 27 de agosto de 2026 a las 22:30 UTCresolved

   Este incidente ha sido resuelto.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 20 de agosto de 2026 a las 17:51 UTCinvestigating

   Actualmente estamos investigando esta cuestión.

2. 20 de agosto de 2026 a las 17:54 UTCresolved

   Este incidente ha sido resuelto.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 20 de agosto de 2026 a las 13:04 UTCinvestigating

   Actualmente estamos investigando esta cuestión.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 19 de agosto de 2026 a las 8:52 UTCinvestigating

   Actualmente estamos investigando esta cuestión.

2. 19 de agosto de 2026 a las 9:15 UTCresolved

   Este incidente ha sido resuelto.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 28 de mayo de 2026 a las 16:44 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 28 de mayo de 2026 a las 17:12 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 28 de mayo de 2026 a las 18:46 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 28 de mayo de 2026 a las 20:12 UTCresolved

   The issue has been fully resolved and all systems are operating normally. A detailed post-mortem report will be published here shortly. Thank you for your patience and cooperation.

5. 1 de junio de 2026 a las 15:06 UTCpostmortem

   ## Delays in Asynchronous Actions and Workflows ‌ **Issue Summary** On May 28, 2026, we experienced an incident that caused delays in asynchronous actions and automated workflows. **Timeline \(UTC\)** * **11:29** – The issue began, causing delays in newly scheduled automated workflows. * **15:51** – Our engineering team identified the root cause of the scheduling interruption. * **16:42** – A fix was deployed, restoring normal operations to the background processing framework. * **18:45** – The resulting backlog of delayed tasks was completely cleared and normal service was confirmed. **Root Cause** A routine system update included a software dependency upgrade that unexpectedly conflicted with our background processing framework. This conflict prevented scheduled background jobs from moving into the active processing queue. As a result, automated workflows and other asynchronous actions were delayed, though no underlying data was lost or corrupted during this time. **Resolution** Upon investigating the anomaly in the scheduling queue, our engineering team determined that the recent dependency upgrade was responsible. We immediately reverted the update, which restored the flow of scheduled tasks. To resolve the issue as swiftly as possible, we temporarily scaled up our infrastructure's processing capacity to rapidly clear the backlog of delayed actions. **Preventative Measures** To prevent this type of issue from occurring in the future, we are planning on implementing the following improvements: * **Enhanced Alerting:** We are deploying strict, automated alerts specifically designed to detect anomalies in scheduled task queues, drastically reducing our time to detection. * **Upgraded Telemetry:** We are adding granular, time-series visualizations to our monitoring systems to better track the exact states of background jobs \(scheduled, enqueued, and processed\) in real time. We sincerely apologize for any disruption this may have caused to your operations. The issue was fully mitigated, and all backlogged tasks have been successfully processed.

1. 22 de mayo de 2026 a las 13:26 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 22 de mayo de 2026 a las 19:20 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 20 de mayo de 2026 a las 16:12 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 20 de mayo de 2026 a las 16:15 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 9 de mayo de 2026 a las 3:12 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 9 de mayo de 2026 a las 3:43 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 30 de abril de 2026 a las 18:00 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30 de abril de 2026 a las 19:43 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

3. 30 de abril de 2026 a las 19:43 UTCpostmortem

   Some users experienced an issue where app.circle.so was unavailable. This was caused by the Redis cluster reaching 100% CPU due to a large volume of workflow jobs being re-enqueued. We identified the root cause, scaled down the background deployment pods to relieve the load, and restored service within approximately 3 minutes. We are continuing to investigate and address the underlying issue.

1. 30 de abril de 2026 a las 14:35 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30 de abril de 2026 a las 15:39 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 30 de abril de 2026 a las 11:36 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30 de abril de 2026 a las 12:19 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 30 de abril de 2026 a las 10:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30 de abril de 2026 a las 11:03 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19 de abril de 2026 a las 16:50 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 19 de abril de 2026 a las 18:32 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19 de abril de 2026 a las 1:01 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 19 de abril de 2026 a las 5:23 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 17 de abril de 2026 a las 18:53 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 17 de abril de 2026 a las 19:01 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 15 de abril de 2026 a las 20:01 UTCresolved

   Search functionality was degraded starting at approximately 6:52 PM EDT on April 14. The issue was caused by Elasticsearch cluster degradation. An incident report was filed internally. This issue should have had a status page entry since customers reported broken search. Customers checking [status.circle.so](http://status.circle.so) saw 'All Systems Operational' during this period.

2. 15 de abril de 2026 a las 20:01 UTCpostmortem

   Search functionality was degraded starting at approximately 6:52 PM EDT on April 14. The issue was caused by Elasticsearch cluster degradation. An incident report was filed internally. This issue should have had a status page entry since customers reported broken search. Customers checking [status.circle.so](http://status.circle.so/) saw 'All Systems Operational' during this period.

1. 14 de abril de 2026 a las 4:17 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 14 de abril de 2026 a las 4:36 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

3. 15 de abril de 2026 a las 19:50 UTCpostmortem

   Communities experienced approximately 19 minutes of downtime starting at 12:17 AM EDT. The database crashed due to an out-of-memory error at the infrastructure level, a known AWS RDS bug. Our team raised a second escalation to AWS \(case 177616832700336\), and both cases have been escalated to AWS's highest priority tier. We are actively working with AWS to resolve the underlying infrastructure issue and have additional safeguards in place.