58 incidentes de Cloudamqp registrados desde diciembre de 2024, con actualizaciones oficiales, componentes afectados, duración y detalles de resolución.
We're investigating connectivity issues affecting some servers in Azure West Europe. We'll post an update as soon as we know more.
Connectivity to servers in southeast Asia has been restored.
Estamos investigando problemas de conectividad que afectan a algunos servidores en Google europe-west2. Publicaremos una actualización tan pronto como sepamos más.
Seguimos investigando esta cuestión.
El incidente se limita a servidores en europe-west2-b
GCE sigue reportando problemas, pero estamos viendo que algunas llamadas de API tienen éxito.
GCE ha confirmado que una salida de energía en europe-west2-b causó la perturbación. La cuestión de la energía se ha visto mitigada, y la recuperación total de las cargas de trabajo afectadas está prevista para las 13:00 horas de la UTC hoy. Seguimos monitoreando la recuperación.
Continuamos monitoreando cualquier otro problema.
Este incidente ha sido resuelto.
Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.
Estamos investigando problemas de conectividad que afectan a algunos servidores de Azure West Europe. Publicaremos una actualización tan pronto como sepamos más.
Azure es consciente de esta cuestión y está investigando activamente. Publicaremos otra actualización tan pronto como sepamos más.
Azure ha identificado esta cuestión. Han reducido la cuestión a la accesibilidad del almacenamiento que afecta a la región. Sus equipos están llevando a cabo activamente acciones de recuperación en la infraestructura afectada y siguen investigando la causa subyacente. Estamos monitoreando el progreso de la recuperación y trabajando para restaurar los recursos afectados.
Hemos podido establecer una comunicación con casos en Azure West Europe. La mayoría de los casos están en marcha. Azure todavía tiene algunos VM para resolver.
Todas las instancias de CloudAMQP están en marcha en Azure West Europe.
**Summary** CloudAMQP perdió conectividad con un subconjunto de grupos en la zona de disponibilidad de Azure West Europe el 9 de octubre. Los grupos de nodos individuales en AZ2 fueron los más afectados por el incidente. # Impact** Los clientes no pudieron acceder a datos o nodos de mange afectados durante el incidente. Timeline of events from Azure. * 12:25 UTC el 09 de octubre de 2026 – Identificamos este tema a través de nuestras alertas de monitoreo de servicios internos. * 12:29 UTC el 09 octubre 2026 – El impacto del cliente comenzó, con fallos de disco VM detectados en la unidad de almacenamiento de la escala de Europa Occidental afectada. * 2:30 UTC el 09 de octubre de 2026 – La investigación identificó pérdida de latidos cardíacos a través de múltiples nodos de almacenamiento y dominios de falla, lo que dio lugar a la unidad de la escala de almacenamiento para ir en modo de socorro. * 15:32 UTC el 09 octubre 2026 - Tomamos la unidad de la escala de almacenamiento fuera del modo de socorro, aislando los discos en los servidores de almacenamiento impactados para permitir la recuperación de los discos restantes. En esta etapa, la mayoría de los clientes afectados comenzaron a ver la recuperación. * 21:00 UTC el 09 octubre 2026 - Los ingenieros de Datacenter y Almacenamiento continuaron ejecutando el plan de recuperación en múltiples nodos de almacenamiento. * 23:27 UTC el 09 octubre 2026 – Los esfuerzos para recuperar los nodos de almacenamiento afectados fueron exitosos, y continuaron trabajando para recuperar los discos virtuales. Las medidas de recuperación posteriores incluyeron la recuperación a nivel de nodos y el restablecimiento de los recursos de almacenamiento afectados. * 03:00 UTC el 10 de octubre de 2026 – La funcionalidad del servicio recuperada, y el impacto del cliente fue mitigado. *Causa de raíz* Azure experimentó un problema de plataforma resultó en un impacto en los discos de almacenamiento de Azure Virtual Machines en la región de Europa Occidental AZ 2. Los clientes afectados pueden haber experimentado fallos de conectividad, reinicios inesperados o máquinas virtuales entrando en un estado fallido en la región. **Resolución** El acceso a la máquina fue restaurado por Azure en unas 3 horas. CloudAMQP fue capaz de restaurar la comunicación con los nodos impactados. Seguimos monitoreando las actualizaciones de Azure para asegurar que los nodos ya no fueran impactados.
Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.
Estamos viendo conectividad de red degradada entre algunas redes no Azure UAE North (azure-arm::uaenorth), causada por un problema de enrutamiento en un proveedor de tránsito de corriente avanzada. Todos los servidores de la región están levantados y procesando mensajes, y el monitoreo, métricas y registros funcionan como normales. Los clientes cuyos clientes se conectan con redes afectadas por este problema de enrutamiento también pueden ver los timeouts de conexión. Hemos reportado el problema al proveedor y estamos encaminando nuestro propio tráfico de gestión alrededor de él.
Routing vuelve a la normalidad.
Este incidente ha sido resuelto.
Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.
Actualmente estamos investigando esta cuestión.
Se ha determinado la cuestión y se está aplicando una solución.
Se ha aplicado una solución y estamos monitoreando los resultados.
Este incidente ha sido resuelto.
Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.
DigitalOcean está experimentando problemas con su panel de API y control y puede encontrarse con errores y mayor latencia mientras persiste el problema
Este incidente ha sido resuelto.
Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.
Hemos recibido varias alertas notificándonos acerca de un par de servidores desplegados en Azure West US que no son accesibles. Aparentemente esto parece estar relacionado específicamente con esta región impactando el 25% de los servidores.
Microsoft Azure confirmó que estaban teniendo problemas de red en la región de Estados Unidos Occidental. Por ahora, la mayoría de los servidores están operativos. Seguiremos monitoreando las siguientes horas.
Este incidente ha sido resuelto.
Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.
We are currently investigating this issue.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
**Summary** Between June 25 and June 26, our monitoring system incorrectly reported some dedicated servers as unreachable and sent "server down" notifications for servers that were in fact operating normally. This was a monitoring-side issue only — no customer servers or services were actually down, and no data or message delivery was affected. **Impact** Affected customers received one or more alerts indicating their dedicated server was down. These alerts were false positives. The servers themselves remained healthy and fully available throughout the incident. **Root cause** Before connecting to a server, our monitoring system performs a network authorization step. A defect in how one component handled a transient network hiccup could leave a monitoring process unable to complete that step, after which it failed to connect to the servers it was responsible for checking. The servers themselves stayed healthy and available throughout — the monitoring process had simply lost its ability to reach them, and reported them as down. **Resolution** We identified the affected monitoring processes, confirmed the root cause in production, and deployed a fix that makes this authorization step resilient to such transient failures and able to recover automatically. After deploying, we monitored the system to confirm that notifications returned to normal. We apologize for the confusion these false notifications may have caused.
Between 17:30 and 20:00 UTC on 2026-05-30, our server monitoring system generated a large number of false "server_unreachable" alerts. Clusters were operational and healthy throughout this period — no customer data or message delivery was affected. The alerts were caused by a rolling restart of our monitoring service, during which individual monitoring workers went offline mid-cycle and lost state. This caused the workers to report connection timeouts for servers they could no longer reach — even though those servers were fully healthy. We apologize for any concern this may have caused.
This incident has been resolved.
We are investigating connectivity issues affecting some CloudAMQP instances in Azure West Europe. Affected instances may see connection failures or unexpected restarts. The root cause is an ongoing Microsoft Azure platform incident in the West Europe region (started 14:31 UTC, 23 May 2026). Microsoft is investigating.
Resolved — Microsoft has confirmed that the Azure West Europe Virtual Machines incident is resolved. The impact window was 14:09–14:13 UTC on 23 May 2026, during which a limited number of customers may have experienced connection failures or unexpected Virtual Machine restarts. The Azure environment self-healed and the service has been confirmed restored. Affected CloudAMQP instances should now be operating normally.
Since around 8pm UTC last night, some metrics are not being forwarded to legacy integration. Prometheus integrations not affected. We are investingating.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
# Legacy host metrics integrations degraded Incident window: 2026-05-21 18:37 UTC – 2026-05-22 04:05 UTC \(9h 28m\) Affected service: Legacy metric integrations \(CloudWatch, Datadog, Librato, New Relic, Splunk, Stackdriver\). Host metrics affected, not broker metrics, nor was internal monitoring or console graphs. ## Summary For ~9.5 hours, the service that collects host-level metrics \(CPU, memory, disk, network\) for legacy third-party integrations entered a crash loop and stopped shipping data. ## Root Cause An internal credential-signing service was migrated to a new container runtime the afternoon before. Due to a bug with environment variables the collector could not renew it's credentials. The collector's existing credential remained valid for several hours, so the failure only surfaced when it tried to renew. ## Resolution On-call staff detected the failure early morning, developers helped restore the service and collector recovered at 04:05 UTC. ## Prevention * All services, both signing and collector report failed authentication attempts earlier and with higher severity * Metrics pipeline alarm thresholds was tightened so a similar drop in data triggers alarms faster.
We are currently experiencing issues with our backend services handling account and server creation. This does not affect any running customer servers but might delay provisioning new servers.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently experiencing issues with our backend services handling account and server creation. This does not affect any running customer servers but might delay provisioning new servers.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
Still seeing slow requests, doing another investigation.
Looks like we're back at full performance now.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently investigating this issue.
Servers in Azure West Europe can experience connection issues due to underlying issues at provider. Latest update from Azure "Current Status: We continue to investigate an availability issue caused by a subset of unhealthy backend storage infrastructure supporting Azure Virtual Machines and Azure Direct Drive in West Europe."
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently experiencing issues with our backend services handling account and server creation. This does not affect any running customer servers but might delay provisioning new servers.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
We had an abnormal increase in traffic causing timeouts and slow responses for customer.cloudamqp.com, we increased capacity and are back to normal. This did not affect any running clusters, just provisioning and configuration updates.
We are getting indications of instances being down in Azure region westus. We are investigating the issue.
This incident has been resolved.
Servers in Azure West US 3 can experience connection issues due to underlying issues at provider. We monitor and will update when we know more.
This incident has been resolved.
There appears to be an issue regarding sending metrics to all Legacy metrics integrations. Alarms based on broker metrics also got affected. We are currently investigating the issue Prometheus based metrics (Datadog v3 etc) not affected.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
Broker metrics and metrics integrations degradation Window: 2026-04-23 03:25 – 05:35 UTC \(2h 10m\) ## Impact Broker metrics \(connections, channels, queues, consumers, message rates, node and netsplit state\) were degraded, progressively dropping until recovery at 05:35 UTC. Downstream effects: * Queue, Consumer, Connection, Channel, Connection flow, and Netsplit alarms: threshold breaches during the window may not have triggered, or triggered late. Alarms already tripped before 03:25 UTC kept their state. * Metrics Integrations \(Datadog, CloudWatch, New Relic, Splunk, Dynatrace, etc.\): delivery of broker metrics was reduced for the duration of the window. Alarms configured on the receiving side may likewise have missed or lagged. Not affected: server metrics \(CPU, memory, disk\) and their corresponding alarms, Notice alarms, broker availability, and the metric graphs shown in the CloudAMQP console \(these use a separate data path and continued to update normally\). ## Timeline \(UTC\) * 03:25 — broker-metrics collection begins degrading * 03:35 — ~30% of broker-metric samples missing * 03:50 — ~50% plateau * 05:25 — collector workers cycled and re-initialised * 05:35 — full throughput restored ## Root cause Broker metrics are polled from each cluster's management HTTP API by a pool of collector workers and published to an internal message bus that both the Alarms service and Metrics Integrations consume from. At 03:25 UTC this service became unresponsive without raising an error. Affected workers silently stopped polling while remaining alive to the platform, so automatic restart did not trigger. On-call staff began investigating around 05:00 UTC; force-restarting the service restored metric flow. The exact trigger has not been identified. Our focus is on ensuring the condition is detected and handled promptly if it recurs. ## What we are changing * Added metrics and alarms specific to this service, with high-urgency paging for on-call. * Reliability improvements in the service itself to detect and restart stalled work. ## What you can do CloudAMQP offers a new generation of metrics integrations based on Prometheus, with a re-engineered pipeline that does not rely on these centralised services — each server forwards data directly to your endpoint. These have been running in production for some time and have proved very reliable. * [https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/prometheus-metrics-integrations.html](https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/prometheus-metrics-integrations.html) * [https://www.cloudamqp.com/docs/monitoring\_metrics\_datadog\_v3.html](https://www.cloudamqp.com/docs/monitoring_metrics_datadog_v3.html) * Background: [https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/decentralized-observability-with-open-telemetry-part-1.html](https://www.cloudamqp.com/blog/decentralized-observability-with-open-telemetry-part-1.html)
One of our backend components suffered a small outage due to an unexpected full services restart. Connectivity with the servers were broken and service triggered alarms for many clusters. We apologize for the inconvenience. All clusters were operational and healthy within the incident/alarms timespan.
Customers are experiencing Management UI being unavailable with 502 Bad Gateway. Timeline: - 14:16 UTC -> The issue was identified - 14:30 UTC -> Recent code changes were reverted. No relationship with incident noted.
The Management UI and brokers are serving traffic normally. You can still use the Management UI by using the Broker URL and properly typing User and Password. The impact is related to our backend service logs into Management UI via CloudAMQP SSO.
We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.
The Management UI SSO shortcut is back to service. Impacted Clusters: All customers with clusters created more than 6 months ago Cause: Some code changes unexpectedly changed the communication schema between our backend services and the SSO component on the clusters. The proxy configuration conflicted with those changes causing the 502 Bad Gateway error to show up. Impact: Only the SSO via CloudAMQP Console was impacted given it required communication with our backend components. The AMQP Clusters were healthy and servicing traffic via both AMQP and HTTP on Management UI and API. Logging into the Management UI via Credentials and all Authentications Backends was functioning normally.
