Historial de interrupciones de Confluence

1. 1 de octubre de 2026 a las 2:55 UTCinvestigating

   El procesamiento de empleo y la programación de empleo se degrada, lo que está afectando el trabajo programado y asincrónico en varios productos, incluyendo Jira, Confluence y Bitbucket Cloud. Los usuarios afectados pueden ver la ejecución de trabajo retrasada o desaparecida, incluyendo el procesamiento retrasado de correo electrónico a truco y los horarios que no funcionan como se espera.

2. 1 de octubre de 2026 a las 3:47 UTCidentified

   Nuestros equipos han identificado la causa raíz de este incidente y ahora están trabajando activamente para mitigar el problema. Proporcionaremos actualizaciones adicionales dentro de una hora o antes si tenemos algún progreso significativo para compartir.

3. 1 de octubre de 2026 a las 4:03 UTCidentified

   Nuestros equipos han adoptado medidas correctivas para mitigar la cuestión y están observando algunas mejoras. Seguimos vigilando la situación y tomaremos las medidas necesarias hasta que el incidente se recupere completamente.

4. 1 de octubre de 2026 a las 5:00 UTCidentified

   Nuestros equipos continúan trabajando en recuperación hasta que el incidente se resuelva completamente. Proporcionaremos más actualizaciones si tenemos avances significativos para compartir. Junto con el impacto en el trabajo programado y asincrónico en varios productos, también identificamos el componente SLA en Jira Service Management no aparece como se espera.

5. 1 de octubre de 2026 a las 7:01 UTCidentified

   Nuestros equipos continúan trabajando en recuperación hasta que el incidente se resuelva completamente. Proporcionaremos más actualizaciones si tenemos avances significativos para compartir. También hay un impacto en los nuevos boletos de soporte creados en términos de componente SLA desaparecido, notificaciones que pueden estar afectando los tiempos de respuesta y la gestión atrasada de algunos tickets.

6. 1 de octubre de 2026 a las 7:51 UTCresolved

   El 01 oct 2026, entre 01:00 UTC y 07:25 UTC, los usuarios pueden haber visto falta de ejecución laboral, incluyendo el procesamiento retrasado de correo electrónico a punta y los horarios que no funcionan como se esperaba. Ahora hemos implementado una solución y los servicios han sido restaurados a la operación normal para los clientes afectados. El impacto para apoyar las entradas con el componente SLA desaparecido y las notificaciones retrasadas también han confirmado la recuperación. Nota: Para los clientes de Bitbucket, si había algún oleoducto programado que no funcionaba durante la ventana del incidente, puede esperar la próxima ejecución programada o desencadenarlo manualmente.

7. 9 de octubre de 2026 a las 18:24 UTCpostmortem

   #### Summary El 1 de octubre de 2026, entre las 01:00 y las 07:25 UTC, el procesamiento de trabajo degradado y la programación de los productos Atlas impactaron, incluyendo Bitbucket Cloud, Confluence, Forge apps, Jira y Jira Service Management en todas las regiones de la nube comercial. Esto causó tareas de fondo retardadas o perdidas, tales como procesamiento de correo electrónico a punto y tuberías programadas; el uso interactivo del producto no fue afectado. El evento fue desencadenado cuando un volumen inesperado de tareas programadas se debía simultáneamente, abrumando nuestra plataforma de programación de trabajo compartida. El monitoreo automatizado detectó el incidente en tres minutos. La recuperación comenzó alrededor de 03:45 UTC como capacidad de ingeniería escalada y la plataforma trabajó a través del atraso, con resolución completa alcanzada en 6 horas y 25 minutos. #### IMPACT La mayoría de las tareas programadas dejaron de funcionar a las 01:00 UTC y se reanudaron a partir de las 03:45 UTC. La mayoría de los trabajos retrasados habían alcanzado alrededor de las 06:00 UTC, y los retrasos restantes habían aclarado antes de las 07:25 UTC. A través de productos afectados: - Recurrir las tareas programadas saltadas o retrasadas debido durante el incidente; las carreras no fueron repetidas automáticamente y las tareas se reanudaron en su próxima hora programada. - La mayoría de las tareas programadas por una sola vez se retrasaron; un pequeño número puede no haber funcionado. - Las reglas de automatización, incluidas las reglas programadas, funcionan normalmente, excepto como se indica a continuación. Bitbucket Cloud Las tuberías programadas debido entre las 01:00 y alrededor de 03:50 UTC no funcionaron. Si un oleoducto programado no funcionó durante el incidente, puede esperar la próxima ejecución programada o activarlo manualmente. Otras operaciones de oleoducto no se vieron afectadas. Confluencia No se enviaron algunos recordatorios del evento calendario entre las 01:00 y las 03:45 UTC. Aplicaciones de forja Los desencadenantes programados se detuvieron a las 01:00 UTC y se reanudaron a partir de las 04:00 UTC; no se reprodujeron las invocaciones perdidas. Objetivos Los recordatorios de correo electrónico del mes para actualizar los objetivos podrían retrasarse. Jira y Jira Service Management Los correos electrónicos entrantes se quedaron en sus buzones y fueron procesados automáticamente después de la recuperación. Las notificaciones programadas, como las suscripciones de filtros, se retrasaron. En algunos proyectos de servicio, las reglas de automatización y notificaciones activadas por los SLA o el tiempo en estado se retrasaron. Los datos del temporizador SLA permanecieron intactos. Atlassian Support Hasta las 07:25 UTC, los problemas con nuestras herramientas de apoyo podrían haber ralentizado algunas de nuestras respuestas. Basándonos en nuestra investigación hasta la fecha, no hemos identificado ninguna pérdida de artículos de trabajo, páginas, repositorios o correos electrónicos entrantes. ## ROOT CAUSE Nuestra plataforma de programación de trabajo compartida funciona a gran escala en condiciones normales. Uno de los consumidores de la plataforma programaba un volumen anormalmente alto de tareas a ejecutar al mismo tiempo el 1 de octubre a la 01:00 UTC. Esta oleada de orden de conciencia superó nuestros límites arquitectónicos y de escalada, creando un proceso atrasado a través de servicios dependientes. Ingeniería aumenta manualmente la capacidad para manejar la carga anormal, permitiendo al servicio procesar el atraso y volver a operaciones normales. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS Sabemos que el trabajo retrasado y perdido afecta su productividad. Estamos priorizando estas acciones para ayudar a reducir la probabilidad y el impacto de incidentes similares: ** Mejorar el aislamiento de la carga de trabajo** Implementar correas de programación justas para que los aumentos de volumen de una sola fuente no mueran de hambre o retrasan tareas en otros productos. - Controles de onda Strengthen:** Añada capacidades operacionales para acelerar rápidamente o detener las cargas de trabajo programadas de fuentes específicas durante los picos de tráfico inesperados. **Mejorar el escalado del sistema y la recuperación:** Mejorar la capacidad de la plataforma y optimizar los procesos de escalado para manejar picos de demanda extrema y recuperarse más rápidamente. Nos disculpamos con clientes cuyos servicios fueron impactados durante este incidente. Gracias. Atlassian

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 27 de agosto de 2026 a las 4:22 UTCinvestigating

   Nuestros equipos han identificado esta cuestión también está impactando a Jira Service Management. Actualizaremos lo antes posible.

2. 27 de agosto de 2026 a las 4:25 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos investigando un problema con el acceso a productos que impactan a los clientes de Confluencia, Jira Cloud y Jira Serivce Management. Nuestro equipo está investigando urgentemente esta cuestión y proporcionaremos más detalles dentro de una hora o antes si hay información disponible.

3. 27 de agosto de 2026 a las 4:33 UTCidentified

   Nuestros equipos han identificado una posible solución para los problemas que afectan a Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management y Confluence. Esto se está poniendo en marcha para las regiones afectadas y actualizaremos dentro de una hora, o antes si hay más información disponible.

4. 27 de agosto de 2026 a las 4:51 UTCmonitoring

   Las cuestiones relacionadas con la carga de Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management y Confluence están ahora en recuperación. Seguiremos monitoreando de cerca para confirmar la estabilidad y proporcionar una actualización dentro de una hora, o antes cuando se disponga de más información.

5. 27 de agosto de 2026 a las 5:16 UTCresolved

   El 27 de agosto de 2026 UTC, productos Atlas, incluyendo Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management y Confluence, experimentaron una perturbación, y los servicios no estaban disponibles para los usuarios afectados. El problema se ha resuelto y el servicio funciona normalmente para todos los clientes afectados. En esta página se pondrá a disposición una postal pública para este incidente cuando se haya completado la investigación completa del incidente.

6. 7 de septiembre de 2026 a las 2:53 UTCpostmortem

   ** RESUMEN** El 27 de agosto de 2026, entre 03:51 y 04:35 UTC, los clientes Atlassianos de las regiones de Europa Occidental y el sureste APAC no pudieron llegar a los productos de Atlassian Cloud, incluyendo Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search y Talent. El evento fue desencadenado por un cambio de código defectuoso a la capa de enrutamiento de una de nuestras flotas proxy. Esto dio lugar a errores de HTTP 404 en todo el tráfico de clientes a través de estas flotas proxy en las regiones de Europa Occidental y el Sureste APAC. El incidente fue detectado dentro de 1 minuto por nuestros sistemas de monitoreo automatizados, y mitigado por volver a la versión anterior de configuración, que puso la flota proxy en un estado conocido. Tras la recuperación de la flota proxy, algunos clientes de Jira y Confluence (independientemente de su ubicación) recibieron errores HTTP 503 entre 04:33 y 04:53 UTC como flotas de servidores ajustadas a la afluencia de tráfico. **IMPACT** El impacto general se dividió en dos períodos discretos: - En primer lugar, el 27 de agosto de 2026, entre 03:51 y 04:35 UTC en Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search y Talent. El incidente causó la interrupción del servicio al tráfico de clientes proveniente de las regiones de Europa Occidental y el Sureste APAC, con errores HTTP 404 devueltos. No hubo impacto en el tráfico de API de clientes, independientemente de la ubicación de origen. - Segundo, el 27 de agosto de 2026, entre 04:33 y 04:53 UTC, algunos clientes de Jira y Confluence independientemente de la ubicación recibieron errores HTTP 503 después de los errores HTTP 404 fueron resueltos: ~32% de solicitudes en ap-southeast-2, ~4% de solicitudes en eu-west-1, ~2.5% de solicitudes en nosotros-oeste-2 y ap-southeast-1, y todas las solicitudes restantes regiones globales. ♪ROOT CAUSE ♪ El evento fue desencadenado por un cambio de código a una de nuestras flotas proxy. Sin embargo, hubo un defecto en el código implementado que no fue detectado por pruebas manuales y automatizadas. Esto llevó a una malconfiguración de una funcionalidad de búsqueda de arrendatarios en el nivel proxy, lo que llevó a que el tráfico no tuviera una ruta de red válida, lo que dio lugar a errores HTTP 404 que se estaban sirviendo a todo el tráfico de clientes a través de estas flotas proxy en Europa Occidental y el Sureste APAC regiones. Después de recuperar el impacto del tier proxy, un segundo período de impacto fue causado a algunos clientes de Jira y Confluence. Debido a la reducción del tráfico servido a Jira y Confluencia por la flota proxy, los niveles de servicio Jira y Confluence se habían escalado automáticamente en el número de servidores que prestan servicio al tráfico de clientes. Una vez que se restableció la funcionalidad de la flota proxy, el aumento del tráfico desbordó el nivel de servicio de Jira, que devolvió una tasa elevada de HTTP 503s hasta que se escala automáticamente de nuevo. MEDIDAS REMEDIALES PLAN DE PLANES NEXOS** Sabemos que las salidas impactan su productividad. Si bien tenemos una serie de pruebas y procesos preventivos en su lugar, este problema específico no se identificó porque el cambio estaba relacionado con un tipo de caso de borde muy específico que no fue recogido por nuestras suites de despliegue continuo automatizadas y scripts de prueba manuales. Estamos priorizando las siguientes acciones de mejora para evitar repetir este tipo de incidente: **Añadiendo nuevas salvaguardias para el despliegue** El oleoducto de despliegue para la configuración del nivel proxy impactado estaba utilizando un sistema legado y no tenía las características de despliegue regional lenta apropiadas configuradas correctamente. Ya hemos añadido las salvaguardias correctas, y estamos moviendo esto a nuestro canal de implementación estándar de la empresa que incluye todos nuestros controles de seguridad habilitados por defecto. También estamos auditando todos los servicios de redes para validar que están todos en el nuevo servicio estándar de implementación de tuberías. * Mejorar las políticas de escala de la flota de servicios* La configuración de escalada automática para nuestras flotas de servicio Jira y Confluence fue configurada para escalar demasiado agresivamente. Estamos revisando y actualizando a fondo todas las complejas políticas de escalada automática Jira y Confluence para asegurar que esto no ocurra de nuevo. Nos disculpamos con clientes cuyos servicios fueron impactados durante este incidente; estamos tomando medidas inmediatas para mejorar el rendimiento y la disponibilidad de la plataforma. Gracias. Asistencia al cliente de Atlas

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 25 de agosto de 2026 a las 8:42 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos investigando activamente los informes sobre la degradación del desempeño, lo que ha dado lugar a un aumento de latencia para las notificaciones de correo electrónico, móvil y de retraso para Jira, JSM y Confluence. Nuestros equipos están investigando el tema y se compartirá más información dentro de las próximas 1 hora.

2. 25 de agosto de 2026 a las 9:44 UTCinvestigating

   Nuestros equipos han identificado las regiones afectadas y están trabajando activamente para mitigar la cuestión. Proporcionaremos actualizaciones adicionales dentro de una hora, o antes si tenemos avances significativos para compartir.

3. 25 de agosto de 2026 a las 10:49 UTCinvestigating

   Nuestros equipos han adoptado pocas medidas correctivas para mitigar la cuestión en una de las regiones afectadas y están observando algunas mejoras. Seguimos vigilando la situación y tomaremos las medidas necesarias hasta que el incidente se recupere completamente. Proporcionaremos más actualizaciones dentro de las próximas dos horas, o antes si tenemos avances significativos para compartir.

4. 25 de agosto de 2026 a las 13:01 UTCmonitoring

   Nuestros equipos siguen atenuando la cuestión y están observando algunas mejoras. Seguimos vigilando la situación y tomaremos las medidas necesarias hasta que el incidente se recupere completamente. Proporcionaremos más actualizaciones dentro de las próximas dos horas, o antes si tenemos avances significativos para compartir.

5. 25 de agosto de 2026 a las 14:33 UTCresolved

   El 25 de agosto de 2026, algunos usuarios pueden haber experimentado un aumento de latencia en las notificaciones de correo electrónico, móviles y holgados. El problema se ha resuelto y el servicio funciona normalmente para todos los clientes.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 24 de agosto de 2026 a las 19:22 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos investigando activamente los informes sobre la degradación del desempeño que dieron lugar a un aumento de latencia para las notificaciones de correo electrónico, móvil y Slack para JIRA, JSM y Confluence. Compartiremos actualizaciones aquí ya que hay más información disponible.

2. 24 de agosto de 2026 a las 20:25 UTCinvestigating

   Nuestros equipos han identificado tres regiones afectadas, y continúan investigando el aumento de latencia que afecta a las notificaciones de correo electrónico, móvil y Slack para JIRA, JSM y Confluence.

3. 24 de agosto de 2026 a las 21:30 UTCidentified

   Hemos identificado la causa probable de la cuestión, y nuestros equipos están trabajando diligentemente en una mitigación. Los usuarios afectados pueden experimentar mayor latencia en las notificaciones de correo electrónico, móvil y Slack para JIRA, JSM y Confluencia. Seguiremos compartiendo actualizaciones adicionales aquí ya que hay más información disponible.

4. 24 de agosto de 2026 a las 23:15 UTCresolved

   El 24 de agosto de 2026, algunos usuarios de JIRA, JSM y Confluence pueden haber experimentado la degradación del rendimiento dando lugar a una mayor latencia en las notificaciones de correo electrónico, móvil y Slack. La cuestión se ha resuelto para las notificaciones recién creadas, y el servicio funciona normalmente. Puede haber notificaciones antiguas que se están procesando, y esperamos que se completen en las próximas horas.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 21 de agosto de 2026 a las 7:16 UTCidentified

   Hemos identificado la causa raíz de un problema que afecta a los macros de Marketplace App en Confluence. Los usuarios pueden experimentar macros sin renderizar correctamente ni mostrar errores. Nuestro equipo de ingeniería ha identificado la causa raíz y la remediación está en marcha. Proporcionaremos más actualizaciones en los próximos 60 minutos.

2. 21 de agosto de 2026 a las 8:15 UTCidentified

   Se ha identificado una solución y actualmente se está desplegando. Los usuarios deben comenzar a ver la aplicación de MarketPlace impactada - Conectar macros para comenzar a renderizar correctamente, una vez que la solución se haya propagado completamente. Proporcionaremos más actualizaciones dentro de las próximas 2 horas.

3. 21 de agosto de 2026 a las 10:10 UTCresolved

   El 21 de agosto de 2026, entre 04:26 UTC y 09:33 UTC, algunos usuarios pueden haber experimentado problemas con macros que no renderizan correctamente en Confluencia. El problema ya se ha resuelto y el servicio funciona normalmente para todos los clientes.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 12 de agosto de 2026 a las 20:11 UTCidentified

   Some Confluence Cloud users visiting public links saw a Something went wrong error page. The issue affected anonymous access paths for public links, and some related Confluence areas could also show the same error message.

2. 12 de agosto de 2026 a las 22:13 UTCresolved

   On August 12, 2026 some Confluence users utilizing anonymous access via public links, may have experienced a 'Something went wrong' error message. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 6 de julio de 2026 a las 9:23 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos investigando problemas que afectan a sus servicios. Estamos trabajando activamente para identificar la causa y resolver el problema. Proporcionaremos actualizaciones adicionales dentro de una hora.

2. 6 de julio de 2026 a las 10:04 UTCmonitoring

   Hemos aplicado con éxito la solución y estamos viendo recuperación. Las capacidades de automatización están siendo restauradas y deben funcionar normalmente hacia adelante. Las solicitudes de procesamiento de datos presentadas durante el período de salida no se completaron debido a la falta de disponibilidad de servicios. Seguimos vigilando la situación y esperamos una recuperación completa en la próxima hora. Proporcionaremos actualizaciones adicionales en la próxima hora o antes.

3. 6 de julio de 2026 a las 11:46 UTCinvestigating

   Todavía estamos viendo algunos problemas con la búsqueda de usuarios, el usuario-picker y activos en todo con la UE-Región. Seguimos investigando la situación y proporcionaremos actualizaciones adicionales en la próxima hora o antes.

4. 6 de julio de 2026 a las 12:25 UTCmonitoring

   Hemos aplicado la solución para mitigar el problema y estamos viendo la recuperación. Seguimos vigilando la situación y debemos recuperarnos completamente pronto. Deberíamos poder proporcionar más actualizaciones en la próxima hora o temprano.

5. 6 de julio de 2026 a las 13:04 UTCresolved

   El 6 de julio de 2026, entre 06:51 UTC a 09:39 UTC algunos usuarios pueden haber experimentado problemas relacionados Automatización, y entre 08:10 UTC a 11:50 UTC algunos usuarios pueden haber experimentado problemas relacionados con la búsqueda de usuarios, el usuario-picker y activos en la UE-Región. Los problemas ya se han resuelto y los servicios funcionan normalmente para todos los clientes.

6. 17 de julio de 2026 a las 16:59 UTCpostmortem

   ## Summary El 6 de julio de 2026, entre las 06:51 y 20:17 UTC, los clientes Atlassianos que utilizan productos en la nube en las regiones europeas (UE) experimentaron interrupciones de servicios que afectan la ejecución de reglas de automatización, búsqueda de usuarios, buscador de usuarios y flujos de trabajo relacionados. El incidente comenzó cuando un servicio central de identidad experimentó la saturación de bases de datos en las regiones de la UE, aumentando las tasas de latencia y error. Mientras los equipos de respuesta trabajaban para restaurar la capacidad, se aplicó una mitigación de emergencia que impedía que las normas de automatización tuvieran acceso al punto final de identidad. Paralelamente, la elevada latencia de identidad contribuyó a un fallo en cascada en un servicio de búsqueda de usuarios de aguas abajo, búsqueda de usuarios degradantes y experiencias de usuario en varios productos. El servicio se restableció progresivamente después de que se añadiera la capacidad adicional de lectura de la base de datos, se eliminó el bloque de emergencia y se aumentó manualmente el servicio de búsqueda de usuarios. ## Impacto El incidente afectó a clientes de varios productos Atlassianos en las regiones de la UE el 6 de julio de 2026 entre las 06:51 y 20:17 UTC. - **Degradación del servicio de Identidad del Fuego**: se observaron tasas elevadas de acceso intermitente denegadas en los productos de las regiones de la UE. - ** Fallos de ejecución de reglas de automatización:** reglas de automatización usando el usuario predeterminado (Automation for Jira) en Jira, Jira Service Management y Jira Product Discovery en las regiones de la UE fallaron con un error de permisos. - **User search and user picker failures:** user search success rates dropped significantly in EU regions, with user picker capacity largely unavailable across products. ## Root Cause El incidente se originó de un cambio de configuración reciente que redujo la vida de caché para un servicio de identidad central. A medida que el tráfico del día de trabajo de la UE aumentó el 6 de julio de 2026, una mayor parte de las solicitudes comenzaron a llegar directamente a la base de datos de respaldo en lugar de ser atendidos por cache. Las bases de datos de la UE no tenían suficiente capacidad regional para absorber el aumento de la carga, y la CPU de bases de datos alcanzó la saturación, causando elevados accesos intermitentes denegados. Como parte de la mitigación, se aplicó un bloque de emergencia para reducir la carga en la base de datos saturada de servicios de identidad y priorizar la restauración del servicio básico de identidad. Esto impidió inadvertidamente que las reglas de automatización pasaran sus cheques de permiso de ejecución previa, lo que les hizo fracasar. La duración ampliada se debió principalmente a una ola secundaria de fallas de las reglas de automatización causadas por el límite de procesamiento que se agudiza. Paralelamente, la degradación sostenida causó un aumento de latencia e insuficiencias intermitentes entre los productos que dependen de estos controles, y contribuyó a un fallo en cascada en un servicio de búsqueda de usuarios de aguas abajo. Como resultado, las experiencias de búsqueda de usuarios y de captador de usuarios se hicieron en gran medida indisponibles en las regiones de la UE hasta que se recuperó el servicio de permisos y el servicio de búsqueda de usuarios fue ampliado para restaurar la capacidad. ## Remedial Actions Plan " Next Steps Sabemos que las salidas impactan la productividad de los clientes. Atlassian está priorizando las siguientes acciones para ayudar a prevenir incidentes similares en el futuro: **Mejora las salvaguardias para la mitigación de emergencias de alto impacto** Harden operational tooling so mitigation steps that could disable customer-facing workflows require additional review. **Strengthen infraestructura de identidad capacidad y cambio de seguridad:** Examinar el tamaño de la base de datos regional y el encabezamiento de la capacidad para reducir el riesgo de saturación durante los períodos de tráfico máximo, y refinar el proceso de evaluación de los cambios de configuración para que se evalúe el impacto de la carga aguas abajo antes de la puesta en marcha de la producción. - **Strengthen resiliencia contra fallos en cascada de la degradación de aguas arriba:** Gestión de la retropresión auditiva, configuración de interruptores y comportamiento de autoescalamiento en los servicios, para que la degradación de corriente no cause un impacto de producto más amplio en la búsqueda de usuarios, el buscador de usuarios y experiencias relacionadas. - **Harden replay mechanisms for Automation rule failures:** Aumentar la resiliencia de las normas de automatización para reducir el impacto asociado a incidentes que ocurren en dependencias. Reconocemos que los flujos de trabajo fiables críticos son para nuestros clientes, y nos disculpamos a los clientes que fueron afectados por este incidente. Gracias. Asistencia al cliente de Atlas

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 16 de junio de 2026 a las 13:46 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is investigating degraded performance affecting your service. We are actively working to identify the cause and resolve the issue. We will provide further updates within one hour.

2. 16 de junio de 2026 a las 14:28 UTCidentified

   We have identified the source of degraded performance affecting some Confluence Cloud users. A subset of users may experience errors or slowness when viewing or editing pages. Our team has initiated a remediation and is actively monitoring recovery. We will provide another update within one hour or once the issue is fully resolved.

3. 16 de junio de 2026 a las 14:53 UTCmonitoring

   We have been able to apply the fix to mitigate the issue and we are seeing recovery. We continue to monitor the situation and should be fully recovered soon. We should be able to provide more updates in the next one hour or earlier.

4. 16 de junio de 2026 a las 15:56 UTCresolved

   On June 16, 2026, Confluence Cloud users for some customers may have experienced performance degradation of view and edit page experiences. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23 de junio de 2026 a las 18:25 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary ### On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT ### The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ### ROOT CAUSE ### 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ### We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. We have already deployed the following fix: - Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: - Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. - Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12 de junio de 2026 a las 7:39 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing experiencing degraded performance in Confluence Cloud affecting view page and edit page functionality. Our teams are actively investigating and will be sharing more updates in next 1 hour or sooner.

2. 12 de junio de 2026 a las 8:45 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing degraded performance with view content, create and edit functionality on Confluence Cloud primarily in the EU region. Our teams are actively working to identify the root cause of the issue. We will share additional updates in next 2 hours or sooner as more information is available.

3. 12 de junio de 2026 a las 10:29 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause of this issue and implemented a fix. We are beginning to observe signs of recovery, with some affected users regaining access to view, create, and edit content on Confluence Cloud. We will provide a further update within one hour, or sooner if we confirm full recovery for all affected customers.

4. 12 de junio de 2026 a las 11:15 UTCresolved

   On June 12th 2026, between 07:04 to 11:06 UTC, some Confluence users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23 de junio de 2026 a las 18:28 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ‌ ### ROOT CAUSE ‌ 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ‌ ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ‌ We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. ‌ We have already deployed the following fix: * Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: * Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. * Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ ‌ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 10 de junio de 2026 a las 6:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating reports of extended delays being experienced across tasks such as processing of Incoming Emails, Notifications relating to changes or creation of Work Items, in addition to delays in processing Scheduled Triggers from Marketplace apps. Our team is looking into this with urgency and we will provide further update within one hour as our investigation continues.

2. 10 de junio de 2026 a las 6:14 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause for this issue and has now deployed a fix that is rolling out across impacted products. At this time we are monitoring for the recovery of these events across Jira Service Management, Jira Cloud and Ecosystem app Scheduled Triggers. We will provide further update within one hour or when we have seen a full recovery of all task processing across these products.

3. 10 de junio de 2026 a las 6:14 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has now determined that performance has returned to expected levels for those impacted by this incident. Additional products that are now known to have been impacted by this incident are Confluence, Customer Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery. These products would have seen similar impact where email notifications or processing of events may have been delayed while this incident was underway. We are now monitoring for the full recovery of performance across all products and will update when we are confident this issue is fully resolved, or within one hour, whichever is sooner.

4. 10 de junio de 2026 a las 6:31 UTCresolved

   We are now confident that any of the tasks that were impacted by this incident and were delayed should now be operating as expected. We apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.

1. 27 de mayo de 2026 a las 6:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where customers attempting to view Calendars receive an error message on Confluence Cloud pages. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 27 de mayo de 2026 a las 7:06 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause and are in process of deploying a fix. We will share further updates in next 1 hours, or sooner if we have any meaningful developments to report.

3. 27 de mayo de 2026 a las 7:48 UTCresolved

   Between 00:50 UTC and 07:30 UTC on 27 May 2026, some users were facing errors when attempting to view Calendars in Confluence. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and this incident has been fully restored.

1. 26 de mayo de 2026 a las 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where some custom extensions may fail to load when editing Confluence Cloud pages. Affected users may see 'Error loading the extension!' messages or notice that certain macros are missing from the editor's extension selection menu. Viewing published pages is not affected. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 26 de mayo de 2026 a las 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating an issue affecting the editing macros in Confluence Cloud editor. Our team is working to identify the root cause. We will provide an update within approximately one hour.

3. 26 de mayo de 2026 a las 13:55 UTCresolved

   Between 08:30 UTC and 13:51 UTC on 26 May 2026, some users were unable to load or edit certain macros in the Confluence Cloud page editor. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and macro functionality has been fully restored.

1. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 4:54 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue with multiple Atlassian products that is impacting a large number of Confluence and Jira Cloud customers. We are continuing to investigate and will add further details about additional impact as our investigation continues. We will provide more details within the next hour or sooner if further information becomes available

2. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware that the current issues with accessing Atlassian products are impacting additional products. We have now expanded the impact of the incident to cover the known impacted products at this time. We will provide further update within one hour or sooner as information is available.

3. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:11 UTCidentified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

4. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:24 UTCidentified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

5. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:34 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

6. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:43 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

7. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 6:40 UTCmonitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

8. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 6:41 UTCmonitoring

   We are approaching full system recovery at this time, and are performing final confirmations that services are restored.

9. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 6:48 UTCresolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

10. 19 de mayo de 2026 a las 19:04 UTCpostmortem

    ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 1:31 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 4:10 UTCidentified

   We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

3. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 4:10 UTCidentified

   Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

4. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 4:10 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

5. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:53 UTCmonitoring

   The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

6. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 8:03 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

7. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 11:12 UTCmonitoring

   Our services are now fully operational. We continue to replay any events that were missed during the incident, and are making good progress. We will provide a further update once replays are complete. If you experience any ongoing issues, please contact our support team. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

8. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 19:45 UTCresolved

   On May 8, 2026, some customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

9. 20 de mayo de 2026 a las 6:55 UTCpostmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support.

1. 14 de abril de 2026 a las 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a partial service disruption affecting Rovo, specifically for customers using automation rules that invoke Rovo agents. Some customers may find that these automations are not completing as expected. We'll share updates here as more information becomes available.

2. 14 de abril de 2026 a las 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified that this incident also affects automation rules in Confluence that use Rovo agents. We are investigating and will provide updates as we learn more.

3. 14 de abril de 2026 a las 14:11 UTCidentified

   We have identified the issue, and our teams are working to resolve it and restore normal operations as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as they become available.

4. 14 de abril de 2026 a las 15:46 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

5. 14 de abril de 2026 a las 16:11 UTCresolved

   On April 14, 2026, affected users may have experienced some service disruption with automation rules that use Rovo agents. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 13 de abril de 2026 a las 7:29 UTCmonitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 13 de abril de 2026 a las 8:33 UTCmonitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 13 de abril de 2026 a las 10:17 UTCresolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 21 de abril de 2026 a las 2:33 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 8 de abril de 2026 a las 6:01 UTCinvestigating

   The impact of this incident is now understood to also be impacting search in Jira and Confluence, as well as additional downstream impacts to Rovo Chat, User Management, Administration and Guard. Our team is continuing to investigate with urgency and we will provide further update within 1 hour.

2. 8 de abril de 2026 a las 6:25 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is aware that users are currently experiencing errors while attempting to search in Confluence and Jira. Our team is investigating with urgency and will be providing an update within 1 hour.

3. 8 de abril de 2026 a las 7:40 UTCidentified

   Confluence and Jira search reliability is improving, and we expect full recovery shortly; we will continue to closely monitor the services to ensure they remain stable.

4. 8 de abril de 2026 a las 8:33 UTCidentified

   We have restored core search functionality and services are operating again, but some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour while new data continues to be indexed. We are actively working to complete reindexing and will update this page as performance fully recovers.

5. 8 de abril de 2026 a las 9:03 UTCidentified

   We are also aware of impact as a result of these search failures to Customer Service Management, Asset Reports, Jira Service Management and dashboards within Focus. Our team have identified the potential root cause of the issue and our teams are working with urgency on a resolution. We will provide further update within 1 hour.

6. 8 de abril de 2026 a las 9:03 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally. Some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour, while new data continues to be indexed. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

7. 8 de abril de 2026 a las 11:43 UTCresolved

   The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

8. 17 de abril de 2026 a las 16:24 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. A configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high‑density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers. The root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC. ### **IMPACT** During the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period. Impacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context. **Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions. **Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue. **Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC. **Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC. **Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC. ### **ROOT CAUSE** Atlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. An infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \(CPU & Memory\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products. The change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst‑affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: * **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types** Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly. * **Strengthen automated pre‑deploy validation for resource changes** Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads. * **Improve post‑deploy verification and alerting** Enhance monitoring and post‑deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod‑IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out. * **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits** Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts. * **Enhance recovery automation** Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12 de marzo de 2026 a las 13:38 UTCinvestigating

   Confluence Cloud users may experience errors when accessing certain Marketplace macros. Affected customers are seeing the message Error rendering macro 'static-macro': Page loading failed. Our team is actively investigating this issue. We will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner.

2. 12 de marzo de 2026 a las 13:38 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the cause of this issue, and a fix is currently being deployed. We are monitoring the deployment, and we will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner if needed.

3. 13 de marzo de 2026 a las 0:26 UTCresolved

   On March 12, 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 10 de marzo de 2026 a las 0:15 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of customers experiencing delays with their automations within Jira, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Jira Product Discovery and Confluence. Our team is investigating with urgency and we will provide an update within one hour.

2. 10 de marzo de 2026 a las 0:15 UTCidentified

   Our team has now identified the cause of this issue relating to delayed automation events and has put a hotfix in place to help restore automation performance. We will continue to monitor performance as the backlog of issues is now being processed.

3. 10 de marzo de 2026 a las 0:51 UTCmonitoring

   The performance degradation of automations has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. 10 de marzo de 2026 a las 0:59 UTCresolved

   On 9 March UTC, Automation users in the APAC region may have experienced performance degradation within Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Confluence. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 20 de febrero de 2026 a las 4:14 UTCidentified

   Customers using Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours as we continue our investigation.

2. 20 de febrero de 2026 a las 12:26 UTCidentified

   We understand that customers using Customer Service Management, Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours or sooner based on significant progress.

3. 20 de febrero de 2026 a las 12:26 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved and all services are functional.