Historial de interrupciones de Knowbe4

1. 4 de septiembre de 2026 a las 10:53 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports of an issue with delivery of Email verification MFA for Workspace. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 4 de septiembre de 2026 a las 14:24 UTCmonitoring

   We have received reports that the issue with delivery of Email verification MFA for Workspace has been mitigated by Microsoft, and we are monitoring the results.

3. 7 de septiembre de 2026 a las 8:25 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 26 de agosto de 2026 a las 16:19 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified an issue where users may experience delays in messages being processed, and our engineering team is looking into a fix.

2. 26 de agosto de 2026 a las 16:46 UTCmonitoring

   Our engineering team has implemented a fix for the issue that causing message processing delays in PhishER, and we are monitoring the results.

3. 26 de agosto de 2026 a las 19:51 UTCresolved

   Our engineering team has implemented a fix for the issue that causing message processing delays in PhishER.

1. 21 de agosto de 2026 a las 8:52 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports that the Gmail Phish Alert Button shows the error "[reportPhishAttempt()] An internal error has occurred. Please try again." when reporting phish. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 21 de agosto de 2026 a las 12:03 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 21 de agosto de 2026 a las 13:08 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 21 de agosto de 2026 a las 14:57 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

5. 26 de agosto de 2026 a las 15:55 UTCpostmortem

   On Friday, August 21, 2026, from approximately 05:20 to 12:55 \(UTC\), some customers experienced intermittent failures when using the Gmail Phish Alert Button add-in to report suspicious emails, receiving the "An internal error has occurred" message instead of a successful report confirmation. The issue affected customers across all regions, with the highest error volumes concentrated in the EU-West and US-East service regions. This issue was caused by a disruption in a caching service on Google's Apps Script platform, which the add-in relies on to store per-user session configuration. The service began intermittently returning empty results on read while still accepting new writes, causing affected report submissions to fail. KnowBe4 engaged Google directly and filed a formal bug report between approximately 12:19 and 12:39 \(UTC\). Error volume declined sharply shortly after as the vendor-side condition cleared, and the Gmail Phish Alert Button returned to normal performance by approximately 12:55 \(UTC\). To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are continuing to work with Google to track the resolution of the underlying caching defect. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 18 de agosto de 2026 a las 14:29 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue causing a Non-Delivery Report (NDR) to be returned when a message is reported via the Phish Alert Button and "Send Us a Copy" is enabled in Account Settings

2. 18 de agosto de 2026 a las 15:26 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 18 de agosto de 2026 a las 20:14 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 5 de agosto de 2026 a las 19:29 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting Google PhishRIP queries, which may cause them to fail.

2. 5 de agosto de 2026 a las 21:24 UTCmonitoring

   Based on our investigation into the recent errors affecting Google PhishRIP queries, it appears these may be related to suspended Gmail accounts. We are continuing to monitor the issue.

3. 6 de agosto de 2026 a las 21:56 UTCresolved

   Upon further investigation we have determined that the errors affecting Google PhishRIP queries were related to individual issues on Google accounts.

1. 4 de agosto de 2026 a las 19:19 UTCidentified

   We have identified an issue preventing account settings from loading in the SAT console.

2. 4 de agosto de 2026 a las 19:51 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 5 de agosto de 2026 a las 12:17 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 28 de julio de 2026 a las 20:00 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos investigando un problema relacionado con los correos electrónicos siendo cuarentena por PhishRIP de manera inesperada

2. 28 de julio de 2026 a las 20:35 UTCmonitoring

   Se ha implementado una solución para este problema y las consultas de PhishRIP ya no están cuarentenando mensajes inesperadamente. Todavía estamos investigando las consultas que pueden haber sido impactadas

3. 29 de julio de 2026 a las 18:58 UTCresolved

   Este incidente ha sido resuelto.

4. 30 de julio de 2026 a las 16:38 UTCpostmortem

   ## **Summary** El 28 de julio de 2026, una actualización del servicio de PhishRIP causó algunas consultas de búsqueda de PhishRIP para coincidir más ampliamente de lo que deberían tener. Los correos electrónicos benignos que no cumplieron los criterios de remitente configurados se cuarentenaron en algunas cuentas de clientes. Las entradas de monitorización automatizadas y asistencia al cliente surgieron rápidamente el problema. Engineering revertió el cambio en unos 25 minutos después de declarar el incidente y detuvo la cuarentena involuntaria. Ingeniería entonces restaurado manualmente los correos electrónicos incorrectamente cuarentena a las bandejas de entrada de los clientes. ### **Causa real** El 28 de julio de 2026, implementamos una actualización de mantenimiento al servicio de consulta detrás de PhishRIP. Esta actualización fue diseñada para mejorar el manejo de direcciones de remitente inválidas permitiendo que el sistema retroceda a buscar solamente la parte de dominio de la dirección. Sin embargo, la lógica de validación existente utilizó una expresión regular que requería un símbolo "@" en el campo del remitente. Cuando una consulta utilizó un dominio desnudo, como [example.com](http://example.com) sin nombre de usuario o símbolo "@", el regex insignia el dominio como inválido. Este conflicto entre la validación existente y la actualización del dominio-búsqueda causó que el sistema desplegue completamente los criterios del remitente. La consulta corrió contra las buzones usando sólo sus parámetros restantes, los correos electrónicos emparejantes y cuarentena bien fuera del remitente previsto. ## **Timeline** Todas las veces están en UTC. Silencio ** Tiempo** Silencioso** Silencio... TEN 19:36 TENIDO Nuestro monitoreo automatizado detectó patrones de ejecución anómalos de consultas y alertó a nuestros ingenieros, quienes inmediatamente comenzaron a investigar. Silencio Silencio 19:51 Silencio La cuestión se incrementó a un incidente de producción de alta intensidad, y se reunió un equipo de respuesta. Silencio Silencio 19:52 Silencio Nuestro equipo de soporte escala los primeros boletos de clientes que reportaron cuarentenas inesperadas, corroborando la alerta de monitoreo. TEN 19:54 TENIDO La causa raíz fue trazada a una reciente implementación de API de consultas, y la ingeniería comenzó a revertir el cambio. Silencio 20:00 Silencio Las comunicaciones por incidentes fueron publicadas en nuestra página de estado, con PhishRIP marcado como Degradado. Silencio Silencio 20:16 Silencio El despliegue fue completamente revertido. TEN 20:35 Las comprobaciones de producción TEN confirmaron que las consultas de materia y dominio coincidían de nuevo sólo con sus objetivos previstos, y que no se cuarenten otros mensajes en error. Nuestra página de estado fue actualizada en consecuencia. Silencio TEN 20:39 TENIDO Ingeniería comenzó a restaurar los correos electrónicos incorrectamente cuarentena. TEN 03:49 \(El próximo día\) Silencio Restorations se completó para todos los conjuntos de consultas del cliente conectados a través de nuestro equipo de soporte. ## **Mitigation and remediation** Revertir el código. Pesamos detener las operaciones activas de PhishRIP a mediados de carrera contra la reversión del código. La interrupción de las tareas de fondo habría perturbado los flujos de trabajo legítimos de seguridad para cada inquilino, por lo que la reversión era la mejor opción. El revertido de código se desplegó y verificó en producción en aproximadamente 40 minutos de escalada. **Rehabilitación por correo electrónico.** Para evitar la liberación de correos electrónicos genuinamente maliciosos de vuelta en entornos de clientes, los restauramos manualmente en lugar de en granel. Ingeniería usó herramientas internas de administración para restaurar correos electrónicos en lotes, y trabajó con Soporte para verificar cada ID de cuenta, ID de consulta y recibir la aprobación del cliente primero. Todas las cuentas reportadas fueron restauradas durante la noche. ## ** Medidas preventivas** * **Cobertura de regresión**: Estamos añadiendo pruebas de unidad e integración para las consultas de remitente de dominio único, no estándar y de proa para capturar estos casos de entrada antes del despliegue. *Query guardrails**: Estamos añadiendo un cheque en el motor de consulta que bloquea las consultas de ejecutar si sus parámetros de filtrado de núcleo se eliminan durante la evaluación. Conclusión Una única regla de validación causó esto: un regex que asumió cada campo del remitente contenía un `@`. Cuando las consultas utilizaron un dominio desnudo, esa suposición dejó caer el filtro del remitente y las consultas coincidieron mucho más correo de lo previsto. La solución fue directa una vez que la encontramos, y el revertido detuvo el daño en unos 25 minutos después de declarar el incidente. Restaurar el correo cuarentena fue un proceso más difícil: no podíamos restaurar correos electrónicos a granel sin arriesgar correos electrónicos genuinamente maliciosos volver a los buzones. Nuestro equipo eligió proceder con cuidado, cuenta de trabajo por cuenta con Support durante toda la noche. Dos medidas preventivas habrían atrapado esto antes: una prueba cubriendo sólo las consultas del remitente de dominios, y una correa que se niega a ejecutar una consulta cuando su filtro del remitente ha sido despojado. Ambos están planeados. Se resuelve la cuestión inmediata y se han restablecido todas las cuentas notificadas. ## **Glosario** *PhishRIP:** Una característica de PhishER que permite a los administradores buscar y cuarentena que coincida con correos electrónicos de phishing en cada buzón de usuario en una organización. * **Regex \(expresión regular\):** Un patrón utilizado en el software para buscar texto y validar la entrada, como comprobar que una dirección de correo electrónico está formateado correctamente. * **Code revertir:** Respaldar una actualización de software para volver a la versión estable anterior.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 17 de julio de 2026 a las 13:18 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos investigando usuarios que no pueden comprar licencias de protección en tienda.knowbe4.com. Actualizaremos esta página cuando tengamos más información.

2. 17 de julio de 2026 a las 18:55 UTCmonitoring

   Hemos implementado una solución y estamos monitoreando los resultados para asegurarnos de que no se produzcan más problemas.

3. 20 de julio de 2026 a las 18:24 UTCinvestigating

   Hemos recibido informes de que los clientes no pueden comprar licencias de protección en store.knowbe4.com. Estamos investigando este problema y actualizaremos esta página cuando tengamos más información.

4. 29 de julio de 2026 a las 18:40 UTCmonitoring

   Hemos implementado una solución para la tienda online y estamos monitoreando los resultados para asegurarnos de que no se produzcan más problemas.

5. 17 de agosto de 2026 a las 21:02 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor the implemented fix for the online store, to ensure that no further issues occur.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 16 de julio de 2026 a las 19:48 UTCinvestigating

   Hemos identificado un problema donde los usuarios pueden recibir una redireccion al iniciar sesión en Defend, y nuestro equipo de ingeniería está buscando una solución.

2. 16 de julio de 2026 a las 20:09 UTCidentified

   Se ha identificado una solución, y estaremos monitoreando los resultados a medida que salga.

3. 16 de julio de 2026 a las 21:20 UTCresolved

   Este incidente ha sido resuelto.

4. 20 de agosto de 2026 a las 21:32 UTCpostmortem

   On Thursday, July 16, 2026, from approximately 19:57 to 21:12 \(UTC\), some customers experienced difficulty logging in to the Defend console, seeing a **Find Out More** screen instead of console access. This issue was caused by a synchronization issue between Salesforce and our internal licensing systems, which incorrectly set some customer license counts to zero. As a result, affected customers were unable to log in. To resolve this issue, our team applied a temporary license override to restore access for affected customers while correcting the underlying licensing records in Salesforce. Once corrected, the systems automatically synchronized the accurate values, and the Defend console access returned to normal performance by approximately 21:12 \(UTC\). To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are implementing improvements to the Salesforce synchronization process to ensure accurate license counts. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 15 de julio de 2026 a las 16:51 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos investigando usuarios que no pueden comprar licencias de protección en tienda.knowbe4.com. Actualizaremos esta página cuando tengamos más información.

2. 15 de julio de 2026 a las 16:54 UTCinvestigating

   Seguimos investigando esta cuestión.

3. 16 de julio de 2026 a las 1:23 UTCmonitoring

   Se ha aplicado una solución y estamos monitoreando los resultados.

4. 16 de julio de 2026 a las 14:04 UTCresolved

   Este incidente ha sido resuelto.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 22 de julio de 2026 a las 21:01 UTCresolved

   Un número de servicio de bandera de alta gama degradado modelo de enrutamiento en colaboración-inferencia, causando que las evaluaciones de PhishML regresen errores predeterminados 0/0/0. El tercero desplegó una solución, y se desplegó una actualización de código para la producción añadiendo el enrutamiento estático. Todos los servicios se han recuperado y están operando normalmente.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 1 de julio de 2026 a las 14:40 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports that users are experiencing issues when logging into the US instance. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 1 de julio de 2026 a las 16:02 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 1 de julio de 2026 a las 18:01 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 8 de julio de 2026 a las 18:52 UTCpostmortem

   ## **Executive Summary** On July 1, 2026, the KnowBe4 Security Awareness Training \(KSAT\) platform experienced a period of degraded performance resulting in intermittent login errors and high latency for users on our United States \(US\) instance. The issue was initiated following a routine platform deployment that introduced an unoptimized database query. This query placed an excessive operational load on our primary database reader cluster, causing database sessions to saturate and subsequent login requests to queue up. Engineering teams promptly identified the degradation, reverted the deployment, and systematically cleared the backlogged database sessions to restore optimal performance. The issue did not affect data integrity or security, and service was fully stabilized. ## **Technical Root Cause** The root cause was determined to be a newly introduced query within a standard application update. Upon deployment, this specific query pattern bypassed optimal indexing strategies, resulting in full table scans and highly extended execution times on the database reader infrastructure. As a high volume of authentication and application requests arrived concurrently, the database reader quickly exhausted its available connection pool due to these long-running, unmitigated database sessions. This resource starvation immediately manifested as severe application latency and intermittent timeouts during the user authentication process. ## **Timeline of Events** The incident began in the mid-morning hours and progressed through identification, remediation, and verification stages over a period of approximately 152 minutes. An internal high-severity incident response group was established immediately following automated monitoring alerts indicating that health checks targeting our application programming interface \(API\) routing layer were failing from regional cloud monitoring nodes. This behavior was confirmed by concurrent engineering analysis of user HTTP Archive files, which demonstrated severe latency spikes specifically isolated to the authentication endpoints. Within three minutes of establishing the response team, cross-referencing recent system changes pointed to a recent application deployment as the primary catalyst. Engineers immediately initiated the rollback process, drafting and approving a revert modification to extract the problematic code from the deployment pipeline. The deployment of the reverted codebase to the US production cluster commenced shortly thereafter. While the deployment processed over the subsequent twenty-five minutes, technical personnel prepared direct database interventions to clear the residual system strain. Once the stable code version was completely active across the fleet, engineers began systematically terminating the lingering, long-running database sessions that had been spawned by the unoptimized query. To ensure a pristine state, the database reader infrastructure was cycled twice. Following these administrative infrastructure restarts, operational telemetry showed the database reader load dropping significantly to a healthy baseline of approximately thirty-six percent. System performance normalized, and administrative logging verified that authentication requests were processing within standard latency thresholds. After monitoring the environment to confirm sustained stability, engineers officially marked the incident as mitigated, later shifting the status to fully resolved following an extended window of zero performance spikes and complete passes on all automated sanity test suites. ## **Mitigation** To alleviate the immediate infrastructure distress and restore user access, the engineering team executed a multi-phased mitigation strategy: * **Codebase Rollback:** The changes introduced in the recent deployment were immediately isolated, reverted, and redeployed to production to prevent any further generation of the unoptimized query. * **Database Session Termination:** Internal engineering tools were utilized to explicitly terminate active, long-running database queries that were blocking the connection pools. * **Infrastructure Cycling:** The database reader instances were restarted twice in succession to flush out stale memory allocations and guarantee that all orphaned database sessions were permanently cleared. ## **Preventative Measures** To prevent a recurrence of this specific issue and mitigate the impact of similar query-based database bottlenecks in the future, KnowBe4 is implementing the following actions: * **Enhanced Query Linting and Analysis:** Integrate automated query execution plan analysis into our continuous integration and continuous deployment pipelines to flag unindexed or high-cost queries before they reach production environments. * **Database Connection Pooling Guardrails:** Adjust database timeouts and implement aggressive circuit-breaker thresholds for user authentication paths to prevent single, long-running query patterns from exhausting the entire connection pool. * **Load Shedding Policies:** Implement strict application-level timeouts on read-heavy database calls to ensure they fail gracefully rather than degrading the overall availability of the core login workflows. ## **Conclusion** We sincerely apologize for the inconvenience and friction this performance degradation caused our customers and partners. KnowBe4 is dedicated to maintaining high availability and reliability across our product suites. By refining our pre-deployment automated query validation and bolstering our database connection resiliency, we are actively working to ensure the continuous, seamless operation of the KSAT platform. ## **Glossary of Technical Terms** * **API \(Application Programming Interface\):** A set of protocols that allows different software applications to communicate with one another. In this context, it routes authentication requests from the user interface to the backend servers. * **Database Reader:** A dedicated database instance or cluster responsible for handling read-only queries \(such as fetching user profiles or validating login configurations\), separating this traffic from write operations to optimize performance. * **HAR \(HTTP Archive\) File:** A JSON-formatted log file that records a web browser's interaction with a website, used by engineers to diagnose performance and network latency issues. * **Latency:** The time delay or duration it takes for a data packet or request to travel from its source to its destination and return a response. * **Sanity Suite:** A collection of automated tests executed against a deployment environment to quickly verify that the core functionality of an application is working correctly.

1. 30 de junio de 2026 a las 16:14 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports that emails sent to Defend are experiencing delays being delivered to inboxes using SMTP. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 30 de junio de 2026 a las 19:46 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

3. 3 de julio de 2026 a las 15:23 UTCpostmortem

   #### Summary On June 30, 2026, customers using the Defend US service experienced delays in email processing. The incident began at approximately 14:00 UTC and was fully resolved by 19:45 UTC. ‌ #### What Happened A scheduled maintenance operation began in the early morning of June 30. As this operation progressed, it placed an unexpectedly high load on our infrastructure, which caused email processing to slow down across our US service. ‌ Our team identified the issue and declared an incident at 16:00 UTC. Steps were taken to reduce the load and restore normal processing speeds, including pausing non-essential background activity and engaging our infrastructure provider for additional support. ‌ By 17:45 UTC, email delivery delays had been fully resolved. Email analysis continued to recover and was back to normal by 19:45 UTC. ‌ #### Customer Impact Email delivery \(SMTP customers\): Emails were delayed in transit by up to 30 minutes between approximately 14:00 UTC and 17:45 UTC. All emails were delivered; no messages were lost. ‌ Email analysis \(Microsoft 365 / Graph API customers\): Email analysis was delayed by an average of 30 minutes before emails were analysed, between approximately 14:00 UTC and 19:45 UTC. Email delivery to end users was not affected. ‌ #### What We Are Doing We have rescheduled the maintenance operation that triggered this incident to run during an overnight, low-traffic window, giving it sufficient time to complete without affecting the live service. ‌ We are also investing in infrastructure improvements to better isolate maintenance operations from customer-facing workloads, so that future maintenance cannot affect email processing in this way.

1. 30 de junio de 2026 a las 14:18 UTCinvestigating

   Hemos identificado un problema donde las evaluaciones de PhishML están causando que se aplique la etiqueta "PML:BYPASSED".

2. 30 de junio de 2026 a las 15:42 UTCmonitoring

   Hemos implementado una solución para PhishER y estamos monitoreando los resultados para asegurarnos de que no se produzcan más problemas. Los mensajes impactados pueden reproducirse a través de todas las reglas y acciones. Tenga en cuenta que esto podría causar que se envíen respuestas duplicadas si se realizó una acción exitosa durante este incidente. Si tiene más preguntas o preocupaciones, póngase en contacto con nuestro equipo de apoyo directamente: https://support.knowbe4.com/hc/en-us/requests/new El siguiente artículo contiene instrucciones sobre cómo reproducir mensajes: https://support.knowbe4.com/hc/en-us/articles/13169303385619-PhishER-Inbox-Guide#h 01HCNEBF8CJQ98GE9PGM7HGDZ0

3. 30 de junio de 2026 a las 19:11 UTCresolved

   Este incidente ha sido resuelto.

4. 22 de julio de 2026 a las 13:20 UTCpostmortem

   El martes 30 de junio de 2026, de aproximadamente 07:40 a 19:15 \(UTC\), los clientes experimentaron resultados incorrectos de PhishER's PhishML puntuación. Los correos electrónicos afectados recibieron una etiqueta PML:BYPASSED en lugar de una clasificación legítima de PhishML, y los puntajes de confianza faltaban de mensajes impactados. Reglas y acciones que dependen de los resultados de PhishML tampoco se activaron. This issue was caused by a code refactor introduced approximately two weeks earlier. Este refactor introdujo una actualización defectuosa que omitió los controladores esenciales necesarios para que PhishML corriera. Sin embargo, el problema permaneció inactivo hasta que otra actualización provocó un nuevo despliegue de modelo PhishML, lo que causó que surgiera el problema de puntuación. Para resolver este problema, nuestro equipo regresó al último despliegue estable y añadió más capacidad para procesar el atraso resultante de las evaluaciones de correo electrónico. PhishER's PhishML scoring devolvió al rendimiento normal por 19:15 \(UTC\). Para evitar este tipo de problema en el futuro, hemos mejorado los controles de salud introduciendo un nuevo punto final para la prueba de humo nuevos modelos antes del despliegue.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 24 de junio de 2026 a las 15:48 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified an issue where users may receive a 500 error upon logging into KCM GRC, and our engineering team is looking into a fix.

2. 24 de junio de 2026 a las 22:06 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified an issue where users may receive a 500 error upon logging into KCM GRC. A fix has been implemented, and we will continue to monitor this issue.

3. 25 de junio de 2026 a las 13:10 UTCresolved

   We have identified an issue where users may receive a 500 error upon logging into KCM GRC. A fix has been implemented, and users should be able to login without error.

4. 4 de agosto de 2026 a las 14:50 UTCpostmortem

   From Tuesday, June 23, 2026, at approximately 10:03 \(UTC\) to Thursday, June 25, 2026, at approximately 11:54 \(UTC\), some US and EU customers experienced intermittent 502 errors when logging in to KCM GRC. This issue was caused by network traffic attempting to connect to invalid multilevel subdomains, which overwhelmed the cache serving KCM GRC and resulted in login errors. Our team initially updated the configuration of our content delivery network, which temporarily resolved the errors, but they returned later that day. After further investigation, we identified the caching issue as the root cause and deployed an infrastructure-level fix to prevent multi-level subdomain traffic from affecting the cache. KCM GRC returned to normal performance by 11:54 \(UTC\) on June 25, 2026. To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are evaluating additional protections to guard against similar traffic that could affect the cache. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 18 de junio de 2026 a las 21:14 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports of the Phishing test reports tab currently being unavailable. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 18 de junio de 2026 a las 21:16 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 18 de junio de 2026 a las 22:42 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 19 de junio de 2026 a las 14:01 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

5. 7 de julio de 2026 a las 19:45 UTCpostmortem

   From Tuesday, June 16, 2026, at approximately 17:34 \(UTC\), to Thursday, June 18, 2026, at approximately 22:41 \(UTC\), some customers experienced intermittent unavailability of the **Phishing Security Test Reports** page in the KnowBe4 console. This issue was caused by a code change that introduced a conflict between two methods for processing phishing campaign data. As a result, phishing campaigns still using legacy phishing categories were unable to load the **Phishing Security Test Reports** page. To resolve this issue, we updated the code to process campaigns correctly under both classification systems, and the **Phishing Security Test Reports** page returned to normal performance by June 18, 2026, at 22:41 \(UTC\). No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 18 de junio de 2026 a las 15:13 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports that the Human Risk Managment widget is showing no results in the KnowBe4 Security Center. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 18 de junio de 2026 a las 15:43 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix for the Human Risk Management widget and we’re monitoring the results to make sure no further issues occur.

3. 18 de junio de 2026 a las 19:12 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 8 de septiembre de 2026 a las 15:44 UTCpostmortem

   From Wednesday, June 17, 2026, at approximately 19:00 \(UTC\), to Thursday, June 18, 2026, at approximately 18:20 \(UTC\), some customers were unable to view results in the KnowBe4 Security Center’s Human Risk Management widget. ‌ This issue was caused by a recent infrastructure migration that left an internal service connection pointing to an outdated endpoint. Though the underlying data processing was unaffected, the Human Risk Management widget could not retrieve data or display results. To resolve this issue, our team updated and reapplied the connection configuration, and the KnowBe4 Security Center returned to normal performance by approximately 18:20 \(UTC\) on June 18, 2026. To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are improving our migration process to ensure that all endpoints are valid after a migration. We are also strengthening known-good rollback procedures in cases where a migration cannot be completed as planned. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 16 de junio de 2026 a las 22:23 UTCinvestigating

   We've identified an issue that has resulted in inconsistent reporting, and our engineering team is looking into a fix.

2. 17 de junio de 2026 a las 12:48 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 17 de junio de 2026 a las 20:19 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 21 de agosto de 2026 a las 18:00 UTCpostmortem

   From Tuesday, June 16, 2026, at approximately 22:23 \(UTC\), to Wednesday, June 17, 2026, at approximately 20:19 \(UTC\), some customers experienced inaccurate user counts in KSAT reporting. Downstream features that rely on this data were also affected, including AIDA Orchestration, Risk Score, and ModStore recommendations. This issue was caused by an incomplete rebuild of the users' data table. A data storage policy removed historical data earlier than intended, so when a full table rebuild ran, some older data was unavailable, causing user counts to drop. To resolve this issue, our team performed a full data migration sync on the users' table and retriggered the dependent data pipelines to update downstream systems. We then tested and confirmed that user counts were returning correct results, and the KSAT console returned to normal performance by June 17, 2026, at 20:19 \(UTC\). To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are correcting the underlying data storage policy to ensure complete historical data is retained for the full rebuild process. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 15 de junio de 2026 a las 16:56 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

2. 20 de agosto de 2026 a las 19:41 UTCpostmortem

   On Monday, June 15, 2026, from approximately 15:30 to 16:34 \(UTC\), some customers experienced processing delays with phishing and training campaigns in the KnowBe4 console. This issue was caused by an update that introduced an incompatible software version. This software prevented our background processing service from completing queued tasks. As a result, training enrollments, notification sending, and SmartGgroup enrollments were delayed. To resolve this issue, our team deployed a fix that reverted the affected dependency and restored normal job processing. Once the fix was deployed, the affected queues cleared, and the KnowBe4 console returned to normal performance by 16:34 \(UTC\). To prevent this issue in the future, we have implemented additional testing layers for similar deployments. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 3 de junio de 2026 a las 15:07 UTCinvestigating

   Hemos recibido informes de 500 errores ocurridos cuando navegamos a perfiles de usuario. Estamos investigando este problema y actualizaremos esta página cuando tengamos más información.

2. 3 de junio de 2026 a las 16:16 UTCmonitoring

   Se ha aplicado una solución y estamos monitoreando los resultados.

3. 3 de junio de 2026 a las 18:14 UTCresolved

   Este incidente ha sido resuelto.

4. 15 de julio de 2026 a las 15:23 UTCpostmortem

   El miércoles 3 de junio de 2026, de aproximadamente 14:49 a 16:09 \(UTC\), los clientes experimentaron errores al acceder a la página **Detalles del usuario** en la consola KSAT. Este problema fue causado por una actualización que introdujo campos desaparecidos, lo que impidió la carga de la página ** Detalles del usuario**. Para resolver este problema, nuestro equipo actualizó la consola de nuevo para restaurar los campos perdidos, y la consola KSAT volvió a su rendimiento normal en aproximadamente 16:09 \(UTC\). Para evitar problemas similares en el futuro, se agregaron pruebas automatizadas adicionales. No se produjeron pérdidas de datos como resultado de esta cuestión.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.