Historial de interrupciones de Okta

1. 15 de septiembre de 2026 a las 16:22 UTCupdate

   Los equipos de Okta Engineering están trabajando activamente en una solución y coordinando con el proveedor de servicios para restaurar la funcionalidad de baldosas directas. Proporcionaremos una actualización en 30 minutos, o antes, ya que se dispone de información adicional.

2. 15 de septiembre de 2026 a las 16:54 UTCupdate

   Continuamos trabajando directamente con nuestro proveedor de servicios de terceros para solucionar problemas y resolver los errores intermitentes HTTP 401 que afectan a las aplicaciones Office 365. Proporcionaremos otra actualización tan pronto como se disponga de nuevos detalles.

3. 15 de septiembre de 2026 a las 18:30 UTCupdate

   La solución de problemas activa con nuestro proveedor sigue siendo una escalada de alta prioridad en ambos equipos de ingeniería. Si bien la determinación de la causa raíz sigue en curso, entendemos el impacto operacional y estamos totalmente centrados en lograr que esto se resuelva. Nuestra próxima actualización será publicada tan pronto como estén disponibles nuevos detalles.

4. 15 de septiembre de 2026 a las 23:02 UTCupdate

   Nuestro proveedor de terceros ha identificado la causa raíz que está afectando intermitentemente los servicios de Microsoft 365 y actualmente está implementando una solución. El despliegue está en marcha a partir del 15 de septiembre de 2026, aunque se espera que la propagación completa en todas las cuentas de usuario tome aproximadamente 48 horas para resolver plenamente la cuestión. Estamos monitoreando activamente el progreso de la implantación y proporcionaremos nuevas actualizaciones a medida que se disponga de nuevos detalles. La información adicional de la causa raíz estará disponible una vez que el proveedor haya completado completamente la salida de la solución fija y validada resolución completa.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 11 de septiembre de 2026 a las 12:50 UTCresolved

   Engineering ha identificado la cuestión y ha adoptado medidas de rehabilitación para mitigar la cuestión. Se ha restaurado la conectividad a los dominios personalizados y el servicio ha vuelto a la normalidad. Okta seguirá monitoreando.

2. 11 de septiembre de 2026 a las 13:10 UTCresolved

   Okta ha remediado los problemas de conectividad OK9. Los errores de conectividad persistieron de 5:00 AM PDT a 5:36 AM PDT. Seguiremos monitoreando y produciendo un RCA en 5 días hábiles.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 3 de septiembre de 2026 a las 10:42 UTCresolved

   El equipo de ingeniería continúa investigando el error 500 del OP1. Durante este tiempo, los usuarios pueden estar experimentando problemas intermitentes dentro de nuestro sistema. Proporcionaremos otra actualización dentro de los próximos 30 minutos, o antes si se dispone de información adicional.

2. 3 de septiembre de 2026 a las 11:02 UTCresolved

   El equipo de ingeniería continúa investigando el error 500 del OP1. Durante este tiempo, los usuarios pueden estar experimentando problemas intermitentes dentro de nuestro sistema. Proporcionaremos otra actualización dentro de los próximos 30 minutos, o antes si se dispone de información adicional.

3. 3 de septiembre de 2026 a las 11:34 UTCresolved

   El equipo de ingeniería continúa investigando el error 500 del OP1. Durante este tiempo, los usuarios pueden estar experimentando problemas intermitentes dentro de nuestro sistema. Proporcionaremos otra actualización dentro de los próximos 30 minutos, o antes si se dispone de información adicional.

4. 3 de septiembre de 2026 a las 12:00 UTCresolved

   El equipo de ingeniería continúa investigando el error 500 del OP1. Durante este tiempo, los usuarios pueden estar experimentando problemas intermitentes dentro de nuestro sistema. Proporcionaremos otra actualización dentro de los próximos 30 minutos, o antes si se dispone de información adicional.

5. 3 de septiembre de 2026 a las 12:30 UTCresolved

   El equipo de ingeniería continúa investigando el error 500 del OP1. Durante este tiempo, los usuarios pueden estar experimentando problemas intermitentes dentro de nuestro sistema. Proporcionaremos otra actualización dentro de los próximos 30 minutos, o antes si se dispone de información adicional.

6. 3 de septiembre de 2026 a las 13:03 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering fue capaz de tomar las medidas necesarias para mitigar el problema y actualmente está monitoreando la estabilidad. La causa de la cuestión y los detalles sobre las medidas adoptadas se publicarán en la página Trust.

7. 3 de septiembre de 2026 a las 14:09 UTCresolved

   Tras la vigilancia durante un período prolongado, confirmamos que la cuestión no ha vuelto a ocurrir. Un análisis de causa raíz (RCA) se publicará aquí dentro de cinco días hábiles. Sinceramente nos disculpamos por el impacto que esto tuvo en usted y sus usuarios.

8. 11 de septiembre de 2026 a las 17:26 UTCresolved

   Sinceramente nos disculpamos por cualquier impacto que este incidente le haya causado, su negocio, y sus clientes. En Okta, la confianza y la transparencia son nuestras principales prioridades. A continuación se describen los hechos relativos a este incidente. Nos comprometemos a implementar mejoras en el servicio para evitar futuros incidentes de este incidente. Detección e impacto: El 2 de septiembre de 2026 a las 11:43 PM PDT, monitorización interna de Okta e informes de clientes alertaron a nuestro equipo de problemas para que los usuarios accedieran a Okta Preview Cell OP1 en Norteamérica. Durante este período, algunos clientes del OP1 pueden haber experimentado HTTP 500 Error de servidor interno o códigos de respuesta no disponibles para varios puntos finales, incluyendo aquellos relacionados con la autenticación y SSO. Root Cause Summary: Una versión introdujo un desajuste de la estructura de datos de caché temporal entre versiones de software. Estos datos de caché se utilizan como parte de la evaluación de solicitudes y se espera que sean compatibles con el futuro y el revés. Como resultado, estas evaluaciones fallidas de objetos cache resultaron en errores a través de la autenticación básica y los puntos finales de API. Pasos de Remediación: Los equipos de respuesta a incidentes de Okta Engineering tomaron una serie de acciones correctivas, incluyendo la puesta en marcha de cambios de servicio y aislamiento y compensación de valores de datos incompatibles de la tienda de caché. Medidas preventivas: A fin de evitar que vuelvan a ocurrir incidentes similares, Okta ha implementado actualmente lo siguiente: Estructura de datos resuelta para una mejora de la implementación segura Implementación de normas de cumplimiento de la coherencia de los datos de detección de deriva implementadas y nuevas pruebas automatizadas relacionadas con el cumplimiento de la compatibilidad entre implementaciones de servicios Adicionalmente, estamos revisando y mejorando nuestros procesos y procedimientos de prueba interna para evitar que esta cuestión vuelva a ocurrir en el futuro.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 14 de agosto de 2026 a las 15:23 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering está investigando y ha determinado que el incidente está afectando actualmente la entrega de correo electrónico a un subconjunto de clientes. Durante este tiempo, los clientes pueden experimentar aplazamientos de envío de correo electrónico. Proporcionaremos una actualización en 30 minutos, o antes si hay información adicional disponible.

2. 14 de agosto de 2026 a las 15:39 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering has determined that certain third-party providers were failing to receive emails from Okta. Our monitoring shows delivery rates are recovering to normal conditions and will continue to monitor until full resolution. Our next update will be in 30 minutes or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. 14 de agosto de 2026 a las 16:50 UTCresolved

   Our monitoring indicates that email deferrals to the impacted third-party email service have returned to the expected baseline. Additional information will be available within 5 Business days.

4. 21 de agosto de 2026 a las 16:04 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Okta detected an increase in customer support tickets regarding email delivery issues. Customers using custom email domains routed through Proofpoint experienced email delivery deferrals. During this period, affected end users were unable to receive system-generated emails, including One-Time Passwords (OTPs), account activation emails, password reset emails, factor enrollment emails, and other automated notifications. Root Cause Summary: Third-party provider Proofpoint experienced a service disruption, causing issues with email deliverability. When Okta services attempted to send emails to recipient domains whose MX records pointed to Proofpoint's infrastructure, the delivery attempts failed due to connection errors, resulting in deferred delivery. Okta's email sending infrastructure operated normally throughout the event. Remediation Steps: Okta Engineering monitored service telemetry and confirmed that email delivery returned to normal pre-incident baselines once Proofpoint restored stability to its infrastructure. Preventive Actions: Okta is defining automated alerting thresholds for email-bound and deferral rates to decrease detection time and updating runbooks to allow faster diagnosis of downstream provider disruptions. Timing: Incident start: August 14, 2026, at 5:00 AM PDT Incident resolved: August 14, 2026, at 10:04 AM PDT. Duration (# of minutes): 304 minutes Based on details provided by https://www.proofpoint.com/us/support-services

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 24 de julio de 2026 a las 13:55 UTCresolved

   Después de un período de estabilidad y vigilancia, ahora podemos confirmar que la cuestión del servicio se ha resuelto plenamente. La información adicional de la causa raíz estará disponible dentro de cinco días hábiles.

2. 1 de agosto de 2026 a las 3:28 UTCresolved

   Sinceramente nos disculpamos por cualquier impacto que este incidente le haya causado, su negocio, y sus clientes. En Okta, la confianza y la transparencia son nuestras principales prioridades. A continuación se describen los hechos relativos a este incidente. Nos comprometemos a implementar mejoras en nuestros servicios para prevenir futuros acontecimientos. Detección e impacto El 24 de julio de 2026, aproximadamente a las 3:55 AM PDT, Okta observó la degradación del servicio para OK7, OK12, OK14 y OP3. El incidente impactó específicamente a clientes utilizando la autenticación delegada AD/LDAP y clientes OAuth token-endpoint situados dentro de la región AWS us-west-2. A lo largo del evento, los usuarios encontraron errores accediendo a recursos, fallas de autenticación, tiempo de conexión de agentes, latencia y solicitudes OAuth token. Root Cause Summary La causa raíz se originó de errores dentro de un proveedor de servicios en la nube para la región afectada. Pasos de rehabilitación El proveedor de servicios de nube recuperó la conectividad, y el servicio Okta se estabilizó alrededor de 4:10 AM PDT, y nuestros equipos confirmaron un retorno completo a operaciones de base a 4:19 AM PDT. Preventative Actions Okta está examinando y ejecutando activamente varias iniciativas para prevenir futuros acontecimientos. Estas medidas incluyen: auditoría y mejora de nuestros procesos de respuesta a incidentes en el caso de cuestiones extendidas dentro de una región, y refinación de nuestra vigilancia y alerta sobre la base de este incidente. Duración total Duración total (Minutes): 15 minutos Hora de inicio: 3:55 AM PDT Tiempo de fin: 4:10 AM PDT Duración (# de minutos): 15

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 22 de julio de 2026 a las 15:14 UTCresolved

   Por favor, tenga en cuenta que nuestro mantenimiento programado está actualmente en curso, y los equipos de Okta Engineering están activamente comprometidos. Durante esta ventana extendida, los clientes pueden experimentar errores al iniciar sesión en Okta Workflows. Apreciamos su paciencia mientras nuestros equipos trabajan para completar esta operación lo más rápido y seguro posible. nbsp; Para entender cómo esto podría afectar a su organización y ver las soluciones de trabajo recomendadas, revise nuestro artículo de apoyo detallado: 3)nbsp;https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/okta-workflows-cell-migration-expected-behaviors-and-workarounds?language=en US . Proporcionaremos actualizaciones adicionales en 30 minutos, o antes, ya que se dispone de más información.

2. 22 de julio de 2026 a las 15:49 UTCresolved

   La actividad de mantenimiento sigue en curso, ya que aseguramos que la migración se complete de forma segura y satisfactoria.   Seguiremos compartiendo actualizaciones en 30 minutos o antes, ya que están disponibles. Entretanto, consulte el artículo de apoyo que figura a continuación para obtener las últimas orientaciones sobre las soluciones de trabajo y los comportamientos esperados: https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/okta-workflows-cell-migration-expected-behaviors-and-workarounds?language=en US

3. 22 de julio de 2026 a las 16:19 UTCresolved

   Actualmente observamos el desempeño estable del sistema tras las actividades de migración. Nuestros equipos de ingeniería siguen participando activamente en la vigilancia de todos los servicios. Los flujos de trabajo básicos se están recuperando, y los clientes deben ver mejoras continuas. Proporcionaremos nuestra próxima actualización en 30 minutos, o antes si se dispone de nueva información.

4. 22 de julio de 2026 a las 16:59 UTCresolved

   Después de un período de estabilidad y vigilancia, ahora podemos confirmar que la cuestión del servicio se ha resuelto plenamente. La información adicional de la causa raíz estará disponible dentro de cinco días hábiles.

5. 29 de julio de 2026 a las 23:34 UTCresolved

   Sinceramente nos disculpamos por cualquier impacto que este incidente le haya causado, su negocio, y sus clientes. En Okta, la confianza y la transparencia son nuestras principales prioridades. A continuación se describen los hechos relativos a este incidente. Nos comprometemos a implementar mejoras en nuestros servicios para prevenir futuros acontecimientos. Reconocemos que este mantenimiento va más allá de su ventana comunicada originalmente y que nuestras actualizaciones de estado durante esa extensión no mantuvieron informados oportunamente a los clientes. Nos disculpamos por esto; mejorarlo es parte de nuestras acciones preventivas a continuación. Detección e impacto El 22 de julio de 2026, a las 5:15 AM PDT, Okta Workflows en nuestra región de América del Norte (FL1 cell) comenzó a experimentar problemas que afectaron a los usuarios de Workflows en las células 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 y 11. Durante este tiempo, algunas ejecuciones de flujo de trabajo fallaron o terminaron prematuramente, y los usuarios encontraron errores cargando la consola de flujos de trabajo. Además, algunas conexiones de aplicaciones dejaron de funcionar, exigiendo a los usuarios volver a autenticar manualmente para restaurar la funcionalidad. Root Cause Summary La cuestión se produjo durante una actualización del sistema prevista. Un defecto en el software de un proveedor de terceros causó que la actualización funcionara significativamente más de lo esperado. Mientras emigraba a un nuevo sistema de datastore, una falla de comunicación entre los componentes del sistema impidió que el servicio regresara a su estado normal dentro de la ventana esperada. Durante este período, la Consola de flujos de trabajo no se degradaba con gracia cuando la tienda de datos subyacente no estaba disponible; en cambio, superó errores directamente a los usuarios. Además, las conexiones de aplicaciones cuyas credenciales no pudieron ser refrescadas durante la interrupción se dejaron en un estado fallido y no se refrescaron automáticamente, por lo que algunos errores continuaron después de la actualización completada, hasta que la conexión afectada fue reautorizada. Pasos de rehabilitación El proveedor de terceros confirmó que el grupo se estabilizó a las 8:34 AM PDT. Tras la estabilización, Okta Engineering recuperó los servicios afectados para limpiar los caches de configuración de establos. Los clientes que experimentaron errores de actualización de OAuth token durante este período fueron obligados a reautorizar manualmente cualquier conexión de aplicación. La funcionalidad completa fue restaurada por 9:33 AM PDT. Si sigues afectado: reautorizar manualmente las credenciales de conexión afectadas en la consola de flujos de trabajo (véase KB: Okta Workflows: Cell Migration Expected Behaviors and Workarounds). Las ejecuciones de flujo de trabajo que falló durante la ventana se pueden re-correr utilizando su proceso normal; contacte con Okta Support si desea ayudar a identificar las ejecuciones afectadas. Medidas preventivas Para evitar que ocurran incidentes similares, Okta ha tomado las siguientes medidas. Hemos aplicado una retención en toda la flota de todas las migraciones adicionales de motores de datastore hasta que nuestro proveedor de terceros implemente una solución para el defecto confirmado y confirma que es seguro proceder. También estamos actualizando la Consola de flujos de trabajo para fallar rápido y recuperar automáticamente cuando la infraestructura es temporalmente indisponible, asegurando que los usuarios vean un estado de reconexión en lugar de errores de sistema bruto. Paralelamente, estamos agregando monitoreo y alerta automatizada directa para fallos de convergencia en racimo para asegurar una detección más rápida durante las ventanas de mantenimiento. Por último, estamos mejorando cómo nos comunicamos durante el mantenimiento que dura mucho, incluyendo una página de estado más oportuna y actualizaciones de progreso/compleción. Para preguntas sobre la fiabilidad de los flujos de trabajo o la hoja de ruta, su equipo de cuenta de Okta puede ayudar. Duración Total Duración Total (Minutes): 258 minutos (4 horas y 18 minutos) Hora de inicio: 5:15 AM PDT Tiempo de final: 9:33 AM PDT Duración (# de minutos): 258 minutos

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 13 de julio de 2026 a las 21:23 UTCresolved

   Nuestro equipo de ingeniería ha aplicado una posible solución al entorno de vista previa impactado y está monitoreando activamente el sistema de recuperación. Proporcionaremos otra actualización dentro de 30 minutos, o antes si se dispone de nueva información. Sinceramente nos disculpamos por cualquier inconveniente.

2. 13 de julio de 2026 a las 21:39 UTCresolved

   Nuestro equipo de Ingeniería ha aplicado una solución, y estamos observando la restauración del servicio a nuestro entorno de vista previa OP2. Estamos monitoreando de cerca el sistema y proporcionaremos otra actualización dentro de 30 minutos.

3. 13 de julio de 2026 a las 21:53 UTCresolved

   Hemos confirmado que el entorno de previsualización OP2 se ha estabilizado completamente, y el problema anterior está completamente resuelto. La información adicional de la causa raíz estará disponible dentro de cinco días hábiles.

4. 21 de julio de 2026 a las 1:57 UTCresolved

   Sinceramente nos disculpamos por cualquier impacto que este incidente le haya causado, su negocio, y sus clientes. En Okta, la confianza y la transparencia son nuestras principales prioridades. A continuación se describen los hechos relativos a este incidente. Nos comprometemos a implementar mejoras en el servicio para evitar futuros incidentes de este incidente. Detección e impacto: El 13 de julio de 2026 a las 1:01 PM PT, el monitoreo interno de Okta alertó a nuestro equipo de errores elevados en el entorno EMEA Preview Cell. Durante este período, todos los clientes del entorno EMEA Preview Cell fueron afectados, experimentando fallas de autenticación y lentitud de servicio. Los administradores y usuarios finales pueden haber encontrado mensajes de "Internal Server Error" y otros errores al intentar iniciar o acceder a los servicios de Okta. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered during a scheduled service upgrade. Una malconfiguración causó que el grupo EMEA Preview Cell reciba inadvertidamente una versión incorrecta de un componente de enrutamiento de infraestructura crítica. Esta actualización rompió el enrutamiento interno de redes, lo que impidió la comunicación entre componentes de infraestructura de otro modo saludable. Debido a que las solicitudes no podían llegar a la aplicación principal, se produjeron errores de servicio generalizados y fallas de autenticación. Pasos de Remediación: El equipo de ingeniería de Okta identificó el problema e inmediatamente comenzó a desplegar la versión anterior y estable de la configuración de enrutamiento. Tras la devolución, los ingenieros reanudaron sistemáticamente los servicios afectados (incluyendo las pasarelas y los proxies) para restaurar la conectividad interna. Estas acciones abordaron con éxito la cuestión, y el impacto del cliente fue mitigado completamente por 2:20 PM PT. Medidas preventivas: Estamos refinando nuestros procesos operacionales para mejorar la estabilidad de los servicios. Esto incluye el trabajo continuo para mejorar las capacidades de detección y monitoreo de automóviles, ayudándonos a identificar y abordar los problemas potenciales de manera más eficaz. Duración total (Minutes): 79 minutos (1 hora 19 minutos) Hora de inicio: 1:01 PM PT Tiempo de fin: 2:20 PM PT

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 7 de julio de 2026 a las 20:50 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering tiene un problema identificado que afecta a Okta Workflows y actualmente está tomando medidas para remediar. Los clientes pueden ver 500 errores o timeouts en la consola de Okta Workflows, puntos finales de API e inbound webhooks. Proporcionaremos otra actualización dentro de los próximos 30 minutos, o antes si se dispone de información adicional.

2. 7 de julio de 2026 a las 21:03 UTCresolved

   Se ha resuelto el problema con Okta Workflows. Todos los flujos de trabajo se están procesando normalmente. Un análisis de causa raíz (RCA) se publicará aquí dentro de cinco días hábiles. Nos disculpamos por cualquier inconveniente que esto pueda haber causado.

3. 15 de julio de 2026 a las 15:22 UTCresolved

   Sinceramente nos disculpamos por cualquier impacto que este incidente pueda haber causado a usted, su negocio, o sus clientes. En Okta, la confianza y la transparencia son nuestras principales prioridades. A continuación se describen los hechos relativos a este incidente. Nos comprometemos a implementar mejoras en el servicio para evitar futuros incidentes de este incidente. Detección e impacto: El 7 de julio de 2026, a las 1:01 PM PDT, monitorización interna de Okta e informes de clientes alertaron a nuestro equipo a problemas con los usuarios que accedían a los flujos de trabajo en la célula Okta OK14 en Norteamérica. Durante este período, los clientes de FL14 pueden haber experimentado errores HTTP 500, 503, o 504 Gateway Timeout cuando navegan a flujos de trabajo desde el portal de administración o intentan iniciar sesión en la Consola Workflows vía SSO. Las sesiones existentes pueden haberse equivocado intermitentemente. Los flujos de trabajo programados y en demanda, ganchos en línea y juegos web pueden haber experimentado errores y timeouts. Además, las ejecuciones en vuelo experimentaron timeouts. Root Cause Summary: Este incidente ocurrió durante el despliegue previsto de la liberación 2027.07.0 a la célula FL14. En el curso del proceso de despliegue, una cápsula de servicio responsable de ejecutar actualizaciones de esquema fue terminada prematuramente. Esta terminación temprana condujo a conexiones de base de datos inesperadas y de larga duración, lo que en última instancia causó el agotamiento de la conexión en la base de datos principal de la célula. Pasos de Remediación: Al recibir alertas e informes de clientes, el equipo comenzó el diagnóstico a las 12:44 PM PDT. A las 1:30 PM PDT, aislaron y quitaron la cápsula de servicio realizando actualizaciones de esquema. Esto permitió que las conexiones de la base de datos fueran claras, restaurando el servicio completo por 1:45 PM PDT. Medidas preventivas: Para prevenir futuros acontecimientos, Okta está comprometida a fortalecer nuestra estabilidad de infraestructura y mejorar nuestras capacidades de monitoreo. Actualmente estamos implementando mejoras estratégicas en nuestros procesos de implementación y sistemas de alerta para asegurar una detección más rápida, respuesta y mayor resiliencia en nuestros servicios. Duración total: 67 minutos

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 26 de junio de 2026 a las 15:22 UTCresolved

   Our Engineering team has identified the issue, and we will continue monitoring the issue. We will provide another update within the next 15 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

2. 29 de junio de 2026 a las 23:50 UTCresolved

3. 30 de junio de 2026 a las 15:01 UTCresolved

   The Root Cause Analysis (RCA) details previously posted in this update were published in error and belonged to a separate incident that occurred on June 22nd (I-10858). We sincerely apologize for any confusion this may have caused. Our formal RCA process for this OK11 custom domains incident (I-10874) is still actively underway. We remain committed to transparency and will provide an accurate, dedicated RCA for this disruption within 5 business days (expected late July 6, 2026). Thank you for your patience.

4. 6 de julio de 2026 a las 22:01 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 26th at 7:43 AM (PT), Okta was alerted to customer reports of connection issues and authentication failures when accessing custom domains. The incident was isolated to OK11 and normal connectivity was restored at 7:53 AM (PT). Root Cause Summary: Okta Engineering identified that the root cause of the issue originated during a custom domain traffic migration in OK11 on June 25th at 10:47 AM (PT), the new routing infrastructure became resource-constrained under increased traffic volume the next day. This resulted in TCP connection resets and errors sent to clients attempting to access custom domains. Remediation Steps: Once the source of the issue was identified, Okta engineering immediately mitigated the issue by reverting custom domain traffic back to the previous infrastructure, restoring normal connectivity within minutes. Preventative Actions: To prevent future incidents, the routing infrastructure was scaled to prevent recurrence. Okta will work to implement enhanced monitoring and alerting, as well as updated auto-scaling policies to ensure routing infrastructure maintains adequate capacity during traffic fluctuations and future infrastructure improvements. Duration (# of minutes): Total Duration (Minutes): 53 minutes Actual Time: 7:00 AM - 7:53 AM PT

1. 22 de junio de 2026 a las 22:02 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team has taken steps to mitigate the issue. We have observed that the errors have been reduced and is continuing to subside. We are monitoring the situation closely and will provide further updates in 15-30 minutes as we move toward full mitigation.

2. 22 de junio de 2026 a las 22:33 UTCresolved

   Internal monitoring confirmed that the EU1 environment has fully recovered and is operating normally. A full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be made available within 5 business days. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.

3. 30 de junio de 2026 a las 14:43 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 22nd, 2026, at 2:08 PM PDT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team to errors in the EU environment. During this period, administrators and end users may have experienced intermittent 500 Internal Server Error and 429 Rate Limit responses when attempting to access Okta services. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by an unexpected scaling down of the application cluster during scheduled maintenance of the environment. This change accidentally overwrote the custom capacity settings for several of our applications. This caused the system to automatically revert to its lowest default capacity, drastically reducing the amount of user traffic it could handle simultaneously. As a result, the remaining servers were immediately overwhelmed by the normal volume of user requests, leading to system slowdowns, errors, and "too many requests" blockages for our customers in the impacted cell. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering team identified the root cause issue at 2:44 PM PDT. The team mitigated the issue by scaling up resource capacity, completely stabilizing service health back to normal levels by 2:48 PM PDT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: - Strengthen guardrails by improving our validation tools and multi-environment review processes to automatically detect and flag unexpected server capacity changes before they're applied. - Accelerate system monitoring by implementing enhanced monitoring thresholds to instantly detect and report infrastructure capacity drops before they can impact end users. - Optimize failover protocols by auditing critical alert paths for maximum reliability while establishing a clear, structured communication plan for when automated backup systems are triggered. These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again. Duration (# of minutes):40 minutes

1. 2 de junio de 2026 a las 11:21 UTCresolved

   Engineering is still investigating the issue, recent actions that were taken show errors subsiding.

2. 2 de junio de 2026 a las 11:40 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team has observed that the errors have been reduced. We are monitoring the situation closely and will provide further updates as we move toward full mitigation.

3. 2 de junio de 2026 a las 12:07 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering has confirmed that the issue has been resolved. An RCA will be provided in five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

4. 10 de junio de 2026 a las 2:19 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 2nd, 2026, at 2:36 AM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team to elevated errors in the OK9 environment. During this period, administrators and end users may have experienced intermittent 500 Internal Server errors when trying to access Okta services. Additionally, Admins may have encountered error messages when fetching certain records. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by a misconfiguration introduced during a scheduled maintenance of the environment. This maintenance introduced an error that caused connectivity issues within specific infrastructure components. Only a small percentage of the infrastructure was affected during this period. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering team identified and isolated impacted infrastructure at 4:01AM PT. These actions successfully addressed the issue, and normal operations were restored by 4:17 AM PT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: Incident response processes, procedures, and investigation tools to more rapidly diagnose similar issues in the future. Risk evaluation processes to include expanding error types and adding additional appropriate corresponding alerts and monitoring associated with vulnerability updates. These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again and, in cases like these, allow Okta to respond faster when possible. Duration (# of minutes): 100

1. 1 de mayo de 2026 a las 0:28 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team has successfully resolved the service instability that was causing system timeouts. Okta engineering has confirmed that errors have subsided, and we have transitioned into a monitoring phase to ensure continued stability. We sincerely appreciate your patience while our team worked to identify and resolve the issue.

2. 1 de mayo de 2026 a las 1:01 UTCresolved

   Internal monitoring confirmed that the OP1 environment has fully recovered and is operating normally. A full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be made available within 5 days. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.

3. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 2:51 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On April 30th, 2026, at 10:57 AM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team of login issues for users accessing Okta Preview Cell 1. During this period, customers may have received 500 errors for query timeouts and were unable to log in. Root Cause Summary: The incident stemmed from a database query change. The updated query intermittently exceeded its timeout limit across several login endpoints. Consequently, users experienced 500 errors and were unable to log in. Remediation Steps: Upon receiving the alerts, Okta Engineering immediately launched an investigation. By 1:02 PM PT, the team took initial mitigation steps to resolve the issue, however these steps did not resolve the issue. The incident response team continued to triage and diagnose the issue and identified the root cause related to the updated database query change at 4:50 PM PT. The team reverted the new query behavior at 5:00 PM PT in Preview Cell 1, and full service functionality was restored by 5:05 PM PT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: -Reviewing incident response processes and investigation tools to more rapidly diagnose similar issues in the future -Risk evaluation processes associated with query updates -Alerts and monitors associated with the database proxy These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again and, in cases like these, allow Okta to respond faster when possible. Duration (# of minutes): 375

1. 29 de abril de 2026 a las 22:42 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Customers using the third-party service Kolide began reporting that attempts to sign in to their orgs redirected to an unrelated tenant and received an HTTP 400 error with the message “Login Failed - 400: Bad Request Error Code: GENERAL_NONSUCCESS” Root Cause Summary: Kolide has confirmed for Okta that an incident occurred with their Device Trust SAML authentication system, resulting in some users being redirected to an incorrect service provider after completing authentication. This resulted in users receiving a 400 error. Kolide reported that users were unable to access their intended application, any unauthorized applications, or any unauthorized environments. Remediation Steps: Okta Support advised customers that they could temporarily disable their Kolide integrations to allow their users to successfully access their services. Timing: Kolide reports: Incident start: April 22, 2026, at 8:24 AM PDT Incident resolved: April 22, 2026, at 8:30 AM PDT Duration (# of minutes): 6 Minutes

1. 13 de abril de 2026 a las 20:33 UTCresolved

   Okta has identified the issue impacting Access Request job processing and Engineering Teams are working to restore the service. We are rolling out the fix for this issue in 30 minutes and will provide another update once the fix is rolled out.

2. 13 de abril de 2026 a las 20:59 UTCresolved

   Okta has identified the root cause of the issue affecting Access Request job processing as of 1:00 PM PT. A resolution was implemented at 1:45 PM PT, and the service is now fully operational for new submissions. The engineering team is currently working to restore and process any requests submitted during the disruption period. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. 13 de abril de 2026 a las 21:29 UTCresolved

   While new Access Request job processing has been restored, Okta is also working to resolve the issue affecting in-flight Access Request job requests processed during the disruption period.  The fix for this issue is expected to be implemented around 5:00pm PT.  Okta will provide another update at 5:00pm PT or sooner if one becomes available.

4. 14 de abril de 2026 a las 0:25 UTCresolved

   The issue with in-flight Access Request job requests processed during the disruption period has also been resolved. All Access Request jobs are now processing normally. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

5. 21 de abril de 2026 a las 23:16 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this kind. Detection and Impact: On April 13, 2026, at 11:51 AM PST, an incident was reported where Okta Identity Governance (OIG) access requests stalled in the "In Progress" state indefinitely across all environments. The system accepted initial submissions and first-level approvals, but failed to trigger subsequent automated tasks like assigning users to apps/groups or running delegated workflows. . Root Cause Summary: During a recent update deployment, new tasks inadvertently moved to a 'LOCKED' status without implementing the necessary logic to transition them back to 'OPEN.' This caused the tasks to become permanently hidden, preventing the automated execution of the action associated with them. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering teams promptly responded, initiating immediate detection and diagnosis. Corrective measures, including a code fix deployed to all cells, were implemented to prevent any new access requests from becoming stuck. A remediation migration successfully transitioned most affected requests to a fixed state. Normal functionality was fully restored by April 13, 2026, at 5:18 PM PST, following the completion of a final migration to unblock remaining requests.On April 14, 2026, Okta took further steps to resolve in-flight requests that were stuck, moving them to a final, terminal state. Preventative Actions: Okta is taking several steps to prevent this issue from recurring. These include enhanced testing, deployment of safeguards, and improvements to our monitoring and alerting systems. Duration (# of minutes): 434

1. 24 de marzo de 2026 a las 23:32 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Okta internal monitoring alerted our engineering team to disruptions to the Okta status page and the commercial support portal. Okta Engineering identified a service disruption with our third-party provider and confirmed the impact. During the disruption, customer admins were unable to access the Okta Support Center (support.okta.com) to log support cases or view the primary status page (status.okta.com). Root Cause Summary: Okta's third-party provider, responsible for hosting the Okta Support Center and status page, experienced a service disruption. The third-party provider identified a version mismatch between their application and database layers as the technical trigger. This mismatch resulted in internal server errors and login failures, rendering the Okta Support Center and status page inaccessible for a portion of their disruption. Remediation Steps: Okta teams posted an admin banner within the Okta Admin Console to provide visibility into the disruption and offer a phone number for customers who needed to log support cases manually while the Okta Support Center was unavailable. Services were fully restored after the third-party provider successfully deployed a fix-forward release to the impacted infrastructure, which restored login access. Preventive Actions: As part of Okta's commitment to operational resilience, we have optimized our vendor engagement matrix to accelerate incident mitigation and downstream coordination. We are also conducting an expanded audit of external dependencies to formalize alternative response procedures within our disaster recovery plans. Simultaneously, Engineering has enhanced real-time monitoring and alerting for service endpoints, enabling faster detection and resolution. Timing: Incident start: March 16, 2026, at 08:58 PM PDT Incident resolved: March 16, 2026, at 11:34 PM PDT Duration (# of minutes): 156 minutes

1. 13 de marzo de 2026 a las 18:48 UTCresolved

   At around 11:20AM PT, Okta Engineering has confirmed that the issue has been resolved in both cells, EU1 and OK1. An RCA will be provided in five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

2. 20 de marzo de 2026 a las 20:35 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this kind. Detection and Impact On March 13, 2026, at 10:49 AM PT, Okta detected a service degradation that prevented some customers on the OK1 and EU1 cells from performing directory operations, viewing or searching for users, groups, and devices in the Okta Admin Console. Customers may have experienced "Invalid search query" messages or 5xx errors. This issue also affected several API endpoints related to users, groups, and devices, which may have impacted customer integrations relying on this functionality. End-user authentication was not impacted. Root Cause Summary The root cause of this incident was a planned configuration change that exposed a bug in the underlying service, resulting in system errors and disrupting both directory-based APIs. Remediation Steps Upon detection, Okta's engineering teams initiated incident response procedures. Once the problematic configuration change was identified as the source of the errors, it was immediately reverted. After the reversion was applied and verified, full functionality was restored to all impacted customers. Preventative Actions Okta is taking steps to prevent future occurrences of this kind, including enhancing our testing processes, hardening and improving our configuration rollout strategy, and upgrading our monitoring and alerting systems for enhanced detection. Start Time: 03/13/2026 10:17 AM PT End Time: 03/13/2026 11:21 AM PT Duration (# of minutes): 64

1. 4 de febrero de 2026 a las 12:37 UTCresolved

   Okta has implemented a fix for the LDAP issue affecting the OK9 environment. We are observing signs of service recovery and confirmed improvements from customers. We will continue to monitor the situation closely to ensure full resolution. We are monitoring the situation closely and will provide further updates within the next 30 minutes.

2. 4 de febrero de 2026 a las 12:50 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved. Internal monitoring and customer reports confirm that the LDAPi system in OK9 has fully recovered and is operating normally. We will continue to closely monitor the service to ensure stability. A full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be made available within 5 days. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.

3. 11 de febrero de 2026 a las 18:45 UTCresolved

   On February 4th, 2026, at 3:33 AM PT, Okta received customer reports of authentication failures within the OK9 (EMEA) cell. Customers attempting to access LDAP interface services encountered certificate validation errors related to hostname mismatches, preventing successful authentication. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by a misconfiguration introduced during a scheduled update of our LDAP interface to a new configuration source on February 4th 2:24 AM PT. This update inadvertently applied an incorrect SSL certificate profile to the LDAP interface within the OK9 environment. This misconfiguration caused certificate validity errors, resulting in connection issues when attempting to use LDAP services. Remediation Steps: Once the source of the issue was identified, Okta engineering team rolled back changes at 4:07 AM PT. These actions successfully addressed the issue and restored normal operations by 4:26 AM PT. Preventative Actions: To prevent future incidents, Okta has updated synthetic tests and enhanced monitoring. Teams also plan to add new tooling to improve changes to the LDAP service certificates. In addition, we are reviewing our internal processes and procedures, refining our automated rollback processes to further reduce the customer impact time for similar issues in the future. Duration (# of minutes): Total Duration (Minutes): 122 minutes Actual Time: 02:24 AM PT - 04:26 AM PT

1. 28 de enero de 2026 a las 19:24 UTCresolved

   We are seeing significant and steady system stability as our third-party provider recovery continues in the EU-West-1 region. We will continue monitoring the service to ensure a full recovery. We will provide another update in 60 minutes or as soon as more information becomes available.

2. 28 de enero de 2026 a las 19:36 UTCresolved

   The third-party provider has confirmed that the issue has been resolved. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within five business days.

3. 5 de febrero de 2026 a las 1:26 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On January 29th, 2026, at 8:28 AM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team of intermittent connectivity issues accessing Okta Cell 9 (EMEA). During this period, customers may have experienced intermittent errors establishing network connections and latency when trying to access Okta services. Clients configured to retry failed connections likely saw successful connectivity on secondary attempts. Root Cause Summary: The incident stemmed from a failure of a component that manages configuration changes to the networking infrastructure with our Cloud Service Provider (CSP) in the region hosting Okta Cell 9. Remediation Steps: Immediately upon receiving the alerts, Okta Engineering began investigating several isolated spikes but determined that cell health was stable. At 9:35 AM PT, Okta Engineering received more alerts and immediately initiated incident response procedures. At 9:51 AM PT, Okta Engineering began working with the CSP to diagnose the issue. At 10:13 AM PT, the latency began to stabilize. At 11:22 AM PT, the issue was resolved. Preventative Actions: To prevent similar incidents from recurring, Okta Engineering is improving our monitoring, working with our CSP to enhance their monitoring, and reviewing incident response processes associated with this event. Duration (# of minutes): 186

4. 11 de febrero de 2026 a las 18:40 UTCresolved

1. 22 de enero de 2026 a las 21:46 UTCresolved

   We are continuing to monitor the third-party email service provider's progress toward a resolution. At this time, we have not received an estimated time for recovery (ETR). If you are attempting to sign in and have configured alternative MFA factors (such as Okta Verify, SMS, or Security Keys/Biometrics), we recommend using those options to avoid delays associated with email delivery. Our engineering teams remain on standby to verify service restoration the moment it begins. We will continue to provide updates as soon as the impacted provider shares new information.

2. 22 de enero de 2026 a las 23:24 UTCresolved

   We're continuing to track the ongoing service disruption with the third-party email provider. We appreciate your patience while we await the provider's resolution of the root cause. We'll post our next update in 90 minutes or as soon as we have a significant change in status.

3. 23 de enero de 2026 a las 0:46 UTCresolved

   The third-party email provider has identified the root cause as a service infrastructure issue within the North America region. They are currently implementing load-balancing configurations to stabilize the environment. While recovery is underway, users may continue to experience intermittent delays or failures in receiving emails. We are monitoring the provider's progress and will provide another update as they move toward full resolution.

4. 23 de enero de 2026 a las 3:55 UTCresolved

   The third-party provider continues to see improvements across their impacted North American infrastructure. While our internal systems remain healthy, our team is on standby to validate the restoration of all external dependencies. We will provide a final update once the provider confirms that their services have fully returned to normal operations.

5. 23 de enero de 2026 a las 6:46 UTCresolved

   The third-party provider has confirmed that a fix has been successfully deployed. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within ten business days. We sincerely apologize for the impact this had on you and your users.

6. 30 de enero de 2026 a las 22:34 UTCresolved

   Following is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service Timing: Incident start: January 22, 2026, at 10:55 AM PST Incident resolved: January 22, 202,6 at 7:50 PM PST Detection: The issue was initially identified through customer reports that they were not receiving expected email notifications. Okta Engineering confirmed the service disruption after internal monitoring indicated a high volume of deferred email delivery attempts to specific third-party domains. Impact: Customers across all Okta cells with email addresses hosted by Microsoft Exchange Online may have experienced intermittent delays or failures in receiving automated email notifications, such as Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) codes and enrollment links. Okta services remained healthy and attempted to resend deferred messages. Root Cause: Microsoft reports that it experienced a service issue within its North American data centers during a planned maintenance activity. As a result, emails sent from Okta to the affected provider resulted in “soft bounce” errors, indicating that the provider's servers were temporarily unable to accept the messages. Remediation Steps: To mitigate the impact on users attempting to sign in, Okta recommended using alternative MFA factors, such as Okta Verify, security keys, or SMS, to bypass delays associated with email delivery. Okta Engineering continuously monitored the third-party provider's recovery efforts and validated that mail delivery returned to baseline levels once the provider stabilized their environment.

1. 20 de enero de 2026 a las 16:04 UTCresolved

   We've identified that the service interruption is due to an issue with a third-party provider. We are actively working with the provider to ensure a swift resolution and are closely monitoring progress. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

2. 20 de enero de 2026 a las 16:35 UTCresolved

   We are continuing to monitor progress with our third-party provider. The provider is currently implementing mitigation steps, and we are seeing signs of recovery. Several customers have already confirmed that service has been restored on their end. We are working to ensure this resolution is consistent across all accounts. We will provide the next updates within 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. 20 de enero de 2026 a las 17:10 UTCresolved

   Our third-party provider is continuing their recovery efforts. While we are no longer seeing active errors, we remain in a period of close monitoring as they work toward a final resolution. We recognize that some users may still experience residual effects; our Support teams are working with them to resolve these errors. Our next update will be in 60 minutes or sooner if additional information becomes available.

4. 20 de enero de 2026 a las 17:21 UTCresolved

   Our third-party provider has confirmed that a fix has been successfully deployed. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within ten business days. We sincerely apologize for the impact this had on you and your users.

5. 26 de enero de 2026 a las 18:31 UTCresolved

   Following is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. Timing: Incident start: January 19, 2026, at 10:10 AM PST Incident resolved: January 20, 2026, at 11:49 AM PST Detection: Okta teams were notified via customer cases and an increase in Google Workspace import errors. Impact: Any customers performing Google Workspace imports during the incident window may have encountered an error stating “UserImportJob: Failed to download users. Json field=primaryEmail does not exist for object=[...]” Root Cause: Google Workspaces, a third-party provider, confirmed that a faulty code change introduced caused certain fields, such as primary email addresses, to be missing in API call results. As a result, Okta imports from Google Workspace could not complete, leading to import failures. Google provides additional details for this disruption: https://www.google.com/appsstatus/dashboard/incidents/9q5n4sfDnxYzHj8FxEua Remediation Steps: Okta teams soon identified that a provider-side disruption was the cause of the incident and opened a formal support case to track the resolution. The third-party provider resolved the incident by rolling back a faulty code change and restoring the missing metadata. Recovery occurred in stages, with some customers successfully remediated before others. Okta teams monitored the recovery in real-time and confirmed successful import signals across multiple impacted customers before standing down.