Historial de interrupciones de Spreedly

1. 2 de septiembre de 2026 a las 15:11 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly ha detectado un problema que podría resultar en un rendimiento degradado en APIs transaccionales. Si bien estamos proporcionando una notificación temprana en un esfuerzo por alertarlo lo antes posible, seguimos investigando el alcance e impacto real y proporcionaremos una actualización tan pronto como se disponga de más detalles. Gracias por su paciencia.

2. 2 de septiembre de 2026 a las 15:57 UTCmonitoring

   Estamos trabajando para resolver un retraso de rendimiento que afecta a algunos procesos de pago (comprar, capturar y crear métodos de pago específicamente) relacionados con el mantenimiento reciente de bases de datos. Una solución está en marcha, y nuestro equipo está monitoreando activamente el sistema. Por favor, compruebe aquí para actualizaciones en tiempo real.

3. 2 de septiembre de 2026 a las 21:32 UTCresolved

   Este incidente ha sido resuelto.

4. 9 de septiembre de 2026 a las 21:50 UTCpostmortem

   ## Septiembre 9, 2026 — Tasas de error elevadas que afectan el procesamiento de transacciones ## High Level Summary El 2 de septiembre de 2026, entre 14:35 y 15:19 UTC, Spreedly experimentó un período de tasas de error elevadas que afectaban a un subconjunto de solicitudes de transacción en todos los puntos finales. La cuestión duró aproximadamente 44 minutos y fue causada por un problema de infraestructura con nuestra plataforma de base de datos. Nuestro equipo identificó y resolvió el tema el mismo día. ### What Happened Durante una actualización de esquemas de rutina, un defecto en nuestra plataforma de base de datos subyacente causó que uno de nuestros nodos de bases de datos no estuviera disponible. Esto redujo temporalmente la redundancia para una parte de nuestros datos de transacción, lo que llevó algunas solicitudes a un tiempo o recibir una respuesta de error del sistema \(HTTP 500\) en lugar de procesar normalmente. Nuestro equipo trabajó directamente con nuestro proveedor de bases de datos para identificar la causa raíz y confirmar la recuperación completa de la infraestructura afectada. ## Next Steps Hemos identificado la causa subyacente como un problema conocido en el software de nuestro proveedor de bases de datos. Se prevé que se aplique una solución suministrada por proveedores durante el mantenimiento normal programado. Paralelamente, estamos agregando monitoreo adicional para detectar esta clase de problema antes, y ajustando nuestros procedimientos internos en torno al trabajo de mantenimiento de bases de datos para reducir aún más el riesgo de un incidente similar que va adelante. - El Equipo Spreedly

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 14 de agosto de 2026 a las 16:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an increase in 5xx errors on the Core Transactional API. Some transactions may be failing or returning unexpected error responses during this time. We will provide an update as soon as we have more information.

2. 14 de agosto de 2026 a las 16:34 UTCresolved

   A fix has been implemented and error rates have returned to normal. Some transactions may have failed or returned errors during the affected window. We're continuing to monitor and will follow up with a more detailed post-incident summary.

3. 3 de septiembre de 2026 a las 20:55 UTCpostmortem

   ### Service Disruption on Transaction Endpoints ### ‌High Level Summary On August 14, 2026, Spreedly experienced a brief service disruption affecting some transaction-related API endpoints for approximately 20 minutes \(4:06 PM – 4:26 PM ET\). During this window, some requests to endpoints involving transaction lookups, captures, voids, credits, and payment method operations may have received error responses. The issue was identified and resolved quickly by our engineering team. ### What Happened A routine database schema update caused a subset of existing database connections to reference outdated schema information, resulting in intermittent errors on affected requests. Once identified, our team refreshed the affected database connections, which fully resolved the issue. ### Next Steps We are reviewing our schema migration process to add additional safeguards that will prevent this class of issue from recurring, and are improving automated testing coverage for this scenario. We have added auto-retry and recovery mechanisms so that if a connection does reference an outdated schema it will not affect transactions going forward.

1. 27 de julio de 2026 a las 13:50 UTCinvestigating

   Actualmente estamos investigando esta cuestión.

2. 27 de julio de 2026 a las 14:00 UTCidentified

   Se ha determinado la cuestión y se está aplicando una solución.

3. 27 de julio de 2026 a las 15:00 UTCmonitoring

   Detectó premeditadamente una cuestión que podría haber afectado el desempeño de las transacciones básicas. Si bien la cuestión parece resolverse, nuestro equipo está vigilando activamente los sistemas para garantizar la estabilidad continua. Proporcionaremos una actualización final una vez que nuestra investigación sobre el alcance completo y el impacto esté completa. Por favor, siga nuestro StatusPage para la última actualización.

4. 27 de julio de 2026 a las 21:41 UTCresolved

   Tras vigilar y confirmar de cerca que todos los sistemas están estabilizados y funcionan según lo previsto, se considera resuelto este incidente. No se espera más impacto del cliente. Estamos completando nuestra investigación sobre las causas del incidente y cualquier impacto residual. Nos disculpamos por cualquier inconveniente o perturbación.

5. 3 de septiembre de 2026 a las 20:57 UTCpostmortem

   ## High Level Summary El 27 de julio de 2026, Spreedly experimentó errores intermitentes en un subconjunto de solicitudes de transacción, incluyendo compras, autorizaciones y webhooks. ### What Happened Una migración de bases de datos actualizó el esquema de un servicio interno que administra los métodos de pago almacenados. Esto causó errores en las conexiones existentes haciendo referencia a un caché de establo. Volvimos el cambio y envolvimos esas conexiones, resolviendo completamente la cuestión. ## Next Steps Estamos revisando nuestro proceso de migración de esquemas para agregar salvaguardias adicionales que impedirán que esta clase de problema vuelva a repetirse, y están mejorando la cobertura de pruebas automatizadas para este escenario. Hemos añadido mecanismos de auto-retry y recuperación para que si una conexión hace referencia a un esquema anticuado no afecte a las transacciones que avanzan.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 11 de julio de 2026 a las 14:33 UTCinvestigating

   Estamos investigando tasas de error elevadas que afectan ciertas solicitudes de API. Algunos puntos finales de lista y recuperación pueden devolver 500 respuestas intermitentes mientras trabajamos para identificar la causa raíz.

2. 11 de julio de 2026 a las 15:38 UTCresolved

   Identificamos y resolvimos la cuestión causando 500 respuestas intermitentes en ciertas listas y puntos finales de recuperación. Se ha desplegado una actualización de configuración para evitar que las solicitudes se rescindan prematuramente y seguimos vigilando el servicio.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 8 de julio de 2026 a las 15:22 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly ha detectado un problema que podría resultar en un rendimiento degradado en las transacciones de crédito de Cybersource. Si bien estamos proporcionando esta notificación temprana en un esfuerzo por alertarlo lo antes posible, todavía estamos investigando el alcance e impacto real. Proporcionaremos una actualización tan pronto como estén disponibles más detalles.

2. 8 de julio de 2026 a las 16:08 UTCidentified

   Hemos identificado un error de resolución DNS interno transitorio que ocurrió entre las 15:00 y las 15:05 UTC causando errores selectos de 500 a través de servicios Spreedly. Seguimos investigando todo el impacto y proporcionaremos información adicional cuando esté disponible.

3. 8 de julio de 2026 a las 16:54 UTCresolved

   Tras vigilar y confirmar de cerca que todos los sistemas están estabilizados y funcionan según lo previsto, se considera resuelto este incidente. No se espera más impacto del cliente. Estamos completando nuestra investigación sobre las causas del incidente y cualquier impacto residual. Nos disculpamos por cualquier inconveniente o perturbación.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 17 de junio de 2026 a las 14:55 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly ha detectado un problema que podría resultar en un rendimiento degradado con transacciones asincrónicas. Si bien estamos proporcionando una notificación temprana en un esfuerzo por alertarlo lo antes posible, seguimos investigando el alcance e impacto real y proporcionaremos una actualización tan pronto como se disponga de más detalles. Gracias por su paciencia.

2. 17 de junio de 2026 a las 15:00 UTCmonitoring

   Hemos implementado una solución y estabilizado las transacciones asincrónicas. Nuestro equipo está monitoreando la situación de cerca para asegurar que no haya impactos adicionales. Por favor, siga nuestro StatusPage para la última actualización.

3. 17 de junio de 2026 a las 16:03 UTCmonitoring

   Estamos monitoreando de cerca cualquier otra cuestión o impactos adicionales. Por favor siga nuestro StatusPage para las últimas actualizaciones.

4. 17 de junio de 2026 a las 21:42 UTCresolved

   Después de un período de monitoreo, hemos confirmado que la cuestión se ha resuelto y los sistemas funcionan normalmente. Si sigues experimentando algún problema, por favor contacta con Support.

5. 24 de junio de 2026 a las 20:10 UTCpostmortem

   24 de junio de 2026 — Disrupción de Procesamiento de Transacción Asincrónica ** Resumen de alto nivel** El 17 de junio de 2026 de aproximadamente 10:02 AM a 10:41 AM UTC, Spreedly experimentó una perturbación que afectaba a las transacciones de gateway asincrónicas y los flujos de autenticación 3DS. Durante la ventana de 39 minutos, aproximadamente 1.634 transacciones quedaron en un estado pendiente sin un resultado confirmado, lo que representa menos del 1% del volumen total de transacción durante ese período. Lo que sucedió Un despliegue de código introdujo una cuestión de compatibilidad entre las instancias de aplicación recién desplegadas y previamente ejecutadas. Durante un proceso de devolución, algunas solicitudes fueron enrutadas a través de versiones de código mixto, causando fallos al procesar actualizaciones de estado de transacción asincrónicas. Los tipos de transacción afectados incluyen transacciones de puerta asincrónicas \(página de entrada específica 3DS, y otras verificaciones, autorizaciones y compras asincrónicas\) y autenticación global 3DS. Las transacciones que entraron en el flujo afectado durante esta ventana pueden reflejar un resultado indeterminado, el estado de transacción en su puerta de entrada puede diferir de lo que informa Spreedly. **Siguientes pasos** Recomendamos revisar las transacciones de la ventana UTC 10:02-10:41 AM el 17 de junio que permanecen en un estado pendiente: Las comprobaciones pueden ser retratadas con seguridad. Las autorizaciones deben ser anuladas en la puerta de entrada antes de reintentar. Las compras conllevan un riesgo de duplicación, recomendamos el reembolso antes de reintentar. Por favor, contacte con Spreedly support si necesita ayuda para identificar las transacciones afectadas o determinar el camino de remediación adecuado. Trabajamos activamente para prevenir esta clase de problemas mediante la mejora de las salvaguardias de despliegue y la detección automatizada de retrocesos. - El Equipo Spreedly

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 18:00 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring results.

2. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 18:05 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19 de marzo de 2026 a las 15:13 UTCidentified

   We are currently investigating performance of the Dodgeball service.

2. 19 de marzo de 2026 a las 15:30 UTCidentified

   We are working to resolve an issue with delayed processing of requests to the Dodgeball services.

3. 19 de marzo de 2026 a las 15:55 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the Dodgeball component that was experiencing a partial outage. We are continuing to monitor

4. 19 de marzo de 2026 a las 16:07 UTCmonitoring

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

5. 19 de marzo de 2026 a las 16:09 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 16 de marzo de 2026 a las 17:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating elevated errors on API endpoints

2. 16 de marzo de 2026 a las 17:51 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring to ensure services are operating correctly

3. 16 de marzo de 2026 a las 18:07 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

4. 19 de marzo de 2026 a las 19:07 UTCpostmortem

   ### Mar 18th 2026 — _Decryption Errors on API endpoints_ ### Summary Between 5:40 PM and 5:43 PM UTC on March 16, 2026, we experienced a brief issue during a key rotation that caused a small subset of API requests to fail due to decryption errors. These errors occurred within our system before any external processing took place. The issue was quickly identified, and traffic was immediately redirected to a stable environment, restoring normal service. ### What Happened At 5:36 PM UTC, we routed traffic to a newly deployed cluster of our encryption service running with the latest security keys. Shortly after, we observed decryption errors affecting a small subset of records, which resulted in some requests returning 500 error responses. We promptly redirected traffic back to the existing cluster, restoring normal operation. Further investigation determined that these records were still associated with a key in the process of rotation, and we updated them as a follow-up action to prevent the issue from recurring. ### Next Steps We have enhanced our process to ensure that a key’s usage is fully verified before it is removed from the encryption service. -The Spreedly Team

1. 26 de febrero de 2026 a las 16:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting customers using Dodgeball. The production database backing Dodgeball has reached critically low available storage, which is expected to result in elevated error rates. Customers may begin experiencing errors within the next 10 minutes as the system’s ability to process requests degrades. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working to restore normal capacity as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

2. 26 de febrero de 2026 a las 16:59 UTCmonitoring

   The engineering team has successfully resolved the storage issue affecting the Dodgeball production PostgreSQL instance. Capacity has been restored and the system is now operating normally. At this time, we are not observing any elevated error rates for customers using Dodgeball. We will continue to monitor the system closely to ensure stability. Further updates will be provided if necessary.

3. 26 de febrero de 2026 a las 18:44 UTCresolved

   The storage issue affecting the Dodgeball production instance has been fully resolved. Capacity has been restored and systems are operating normally. We are no longer observing elevated error rates for customers using Dodgeball. Thank you for your patience while we worked to resolve this issue.

1. 25 de febrero de 2026 a las 19:18 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating performance of the Dodgeball service.

2. 25 de febrero de 2026 a las 19:48 UTCidentified

   We are working to resolve an issue with processing of Checkpoints that is causing latency and errors for requests to the Dodgeball services.

3. 25 de febrero de 2026 a las 20:35 UTCmonitoring

   Service has resumed and we are monitoring for further impact. We apologize for any inconvenience this has caused

4. 25 de febrero de 2026 a las 21:52 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

1. 5 de febrero de 2026 a las 15:56 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue where credit transactions referencing Capture transactions are failing in production. Some customers may see errors when attempting to issue credits against Capture transactions. Capture transactions themselves are processing successfully. Our engineering team is actively investigating this behavior to determine the cause and confirm whether this is a regression or an unintended change. We will provide updates as soon as more information is available.

2. 5 de febrero de 2026 a las 16:25 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve deployed a revert to address the issue where credit transactions referencing Capture transactions were failing. We’re actively monitoring to ensure credit requests referencing Captures are processing as expected. At this time, we’re not seeing further errors related to this behavior.

3. 5 de febrero de 2026 a las 17:01 UTCresolved

   After monitoring the system post-deploy, we’re no longer seeing errors related to credits referencing Capture transactions, and processing has returned to normal. Thank you for your patience.

4. 10 de febrero de 2026 a las 17:22 UTCpostmortem

   ### February 10, 2026 — Credits Referencing Capture Transactions Failing ### ‌High Level Summary Between approximately 1:56 PM UTC and 4:15 PM UTC on February 5, 2026, credit transactions where the reference transaction was a capture failed with the error "The specified `reference_token` corresponds to a transaction which cannot be used as a reference." ### What Happened At approximately 1:56 PM UTC on February 5, 2026, Spreedly rolled out a change to support credits on the CyberSource Rest gateway. This included a change in the way we validated reference transaction types used in credits. Specifically, there was an unintended side-effect which caused captures to no longer be treated as a valid reference type for credits on gateways other than CyberSource Rest. Once this was discovered, the code was reverted at 4:01PM UTC. By 4:15 PM UTC, credit requests against captures were fully functional. ### Next Steps * Any credit attempts that failed with this error are safe to retry * We are making improvements to our code review processes and regression test suite to ensure we catch similar errors before they make it into production * We have identified a gap in our observability surrounding validation errors that we will be prioritizing ‌ -The Spreedly Team

1. 4 de febrero de 2026 a las 18:15 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue that is affecting multiple customers using Payflow Pro where some transactions fail with the error: “Invalid Request. Malicious string found in XML document”. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 4 de febrero de 2026 a las 19:52 UTCmonitoring

   We are no longer seeing errors at this time, and the issue appears to have subsided. We are working with Payflow Pro to identify the root cause. Our team continues to monitor the situation closely to ensure stability. Please continue to follow our StatusPage for the latest updates.

3. 4 de febrero de 2026 a las 19:56 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 27 de enero de 2026 a las 19:59 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue related to a dodgeball component experiencing a partial outage. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 27 de enero de 2026 a las 20:12 UTCresolved

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the Dodgeball component that was experiencing a partial outage. After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

1. 27 de enero de 2026 a las 19:08 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue potentially resulting in a high number of pending 3DS2 Global transactions. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 27 de enero de 2026 a las 19:25 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the 3DS2 Global transactions. Our team is monitoring the situation closely to ensure there are no additional impacts. Please continue to follow our StatusPage for the latest update.

3. 27 de enero de 2026 a las 19:29 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

4. 3 de febrero de 2026 a las 15:38 UTCpostmortem

   ### February 3rd, 2026 — 3DS2 Global Transactions Pending ‌ Between 5:40 pm UTC and 7:24 PM UTC on January 27, 2026 the latest version of the Spreedly iFrame \(`iframe-v1`\) was configured to use version 1.180 which contained a bug related to the handling of device fingerprinting for `Sca::Authentications` in an end user's browser. As a result there was an elevated number of `Sca::Authentications` stuck in a pending flow with a `required_action` of `device_fingerprint`. These transactions were held in a pending state and never completed. Our team identified the issue and updated the version of iFrame \(`iframe-v1`\) to utilize `1.179`. ### What Happened At 5:40 pm UTC on January 27th, 2026 a new version of iFrame was released \(1.180\) and updated the version to be used in the `iframe-v1.min.js` asset to point to `1.180`. This change was meant to improve the error handling for the loading of 3rd party critical SDKs however it caused the SDK to enter a permanently error-ed state when attempting to perform device fingerprinting due to a race condition with loading the SDKs. At 7:20 pm UTC on January 27th, 2026 the change was rolled back and by 7:24 pm UTC, 2026 the `iframe-v1.min.js` asset globally was pointing to version `1.179`. ### Next Steps We have identified a gap in our observability and alerting within the iFrame service related to the managing of 3DS lifecycle flows that we will be prioritizing. -The Spreedly Team

1. 9 de enero de 2026 a las 18:46 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 9 de enero de 2026 a las 18:52 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 9 de enero de 2026 a las 19:07 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been deployed and we are seeing systems recover. We will continue to monitor to ensure stability and will provide further updates as needed.

4. 9 de enero de 2026 a las 19:10 UTCresolved

   After a period of monitoring, we have confirmed that the issue has been resolved and systems are operating normally. If you continue to experience any issues, please reach out to Support.

1. 29 de diciembre de 2025 a las 16:50 UTCresolved

   Between 7:00 PM EST on Saturday, December 27th, and 1:00 AM EST on Sunday, December 28th, we identified a period of higher-than-normal latency caused by a pre-planned customer event that resulted in a significant traffic spike. Although we did not observe any service failures or timeouts, our systems experienced degraded service due to the increased latency. Systems recovered quickly once peak traffic subsided and are now operating normally. We expect performance to remain stable moving forward.

1. 16 de diciembre de 2025 a las 21:56 UTCresolved

   Between 3:59 and 4:03 EST, customers may have experienced degraded performance when processing transactions that required 3D Secure (3DS) authentication via our Global 3DS service. Performance has since returned to normal, and no further impact has been observed. If you have any questions about potential impact to your transactions during this time window, please reach out to Spreedly Support for assistance.

2. 18 de diciembre de 2025 a las 21:26 UTCpostmortem

   # _December 18, 2025 — Delayed Processing of Some 3DS Global Transactions_ ‌ _A targeted update intended for Gateway-Specific 3DS processing impacted a subset of 3DS Global transactions. This caused a small number of transactions to remain in a "Pending" state rather than progressing to completion._ ### What Happened Between 08:59 PM and 09:03 PM UTC on December 16, 2025, a deployment intended to update Gateway-Specific 3DS logic inadvertently affected the processing of 3DS Global transactions. As a result, 52 transactions failed to reach a final state and remained "pending." During this 4-minute window, customers attempting a 3DS-authenticated operation would have encountered an interruption, preventing their transactions from completing. Our team identified the impact immediately and rolled back the change to restore normal service. ### Next Steps _We have successfully identified and corrected the underlying logic error within the change. We are also enhancing our automated deployment tests to better catch cross-module dependencies of this nature. We sincerely apologize for any disruption this caused to your operations._ ‌ — The Spreedly Team

1. 9 de diciembre de 2025 a las 15:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where roughly 30–40% of transactions are not appearing in Spreedly reporting since 12/03. Primary datastores and secondary services show no data loss, indicating the issue lies within the reporting ingestion process. Please reach out to Spreedly Support if you need assistance.

2. 10 de diciembre de 2025 a las 6:53 UTCinvestigating

   Our team continues to investigate the root cause of the missing transaction data appearing in Spreedly reporting. All primary datastores and transactional processing are functioning normally, and there is no indication of data loss at the source. The issue appears to be isolated to the reporting ingestion process.

3. 10 de diciembre de 2025 a las 14:42 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified and fixed the issue that was causing some transaction data to be missing from Spreedly reporting. Our team is now working on backfilling the missing reporting data to ensure completeness and accuracy. All primary processing systems continue to operate normally, and there is no impact to transaction processing.

4. 10 de diciembre de 2025 a las 20:04 UTCresolved

   Our team has completed the backfill process, and all missing transaction data has now been fully restored in Spreedly reporting. Transaction reporting is up to date and functioning as expected. All primary processing systems continued to operate normally throughout this incident, and no transaction processing impact occurred.

5. 2 de enero de 2026 a las 21:44 UTCpostmortem

   ### _Postmortem: January 2, 2026_ — _Transaction Reporting Degraded_ ### ‌High Level Summary Select data related to transactions did not make it into our downstream systems, causing inaccurate reports in [app.spreedly.com](http://app.spreedly.com) ### What Happened After completing system updates on December 3, 2025, approximately 30-40% of data related to transactions did not make it into our reporting tools due to a latent bug in one of our supporting applications. This caused inaccurate reports in [app.spreedly.com](http://app.spreedly.com). This did not impact any primary system functionality and no data was lost. ### Next Steps * Our team has since identified and fixed the affected application. The missing data was backfilled and subsequent data continues to flow normally * We are adding additional monitoring in order to more quickly flag discrepancies * We are continuing to make updates to simplify our data pipeline that will prevent similar issues in the future -The Spreedly Team

1. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 15:41 UTCidentified

   The major AWS outage on October 20, 2025, has been largely resolved for most affected services, though some residual issues may persist. Spreedly’s core platform remains stable and fully available. However, due to downstream impact from the AWS outage, some of Spreedly’s indexing endpoints and callback processing are experiencing delays. This is related to dependencies on third-party systems that were affected by the outage and are still undergoing recovery. As a result, you may continue to see intermittent latency or delayed responses for API requests involving these systems. We are actively monitoring the situation as AWS and its downstream services continue recovery efforts. For ongoing updates, please refer to the AWS status page here

2. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 20:22 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected.

3. 23 de octubre de 2025 a las 18:27 UTCpostmortem

   ### Postmortem: October 24, 2025 — _AWS outage_ Monday's AWS outage had downstream impact on some 3rd-party systems utilized by Spreedly's platform. Namely, our indexing endpoints and callbacks lagged behind due to the outage and recovery steps. ### What Happened Spreedly's 3DS global service and legacy smart routing product both faced a period of failures due to 3rd-party systems relying on AWS. ### Next Steps Spreedly will improve its response to our alerts platform, and are actively working on multi-region support slated for 2026, which should mitigate the impact of similar events going forward. -The Spreedly Team