Historial de interrupciones de Trello

1. 17 de mayo de 2026 a las 14:11 UTCinvestigating

   Los usuarios pueden estar experimentando desaceleraciones a través de varias funciones de Trello incluyendo la creación o eliminación de comentarios, tarjetas de edición, o la creación de nuevos adjuntos. El equipo está trabajando activamente para solucionar el problema y proporcionará más actualizaciones dentro de la hora.

2. 17 de mayo de 2026 a las 15:13 UTCidentified

   El equipo ha identificado la causa raíz y es difícil trabajar para resolver esta cuestión. Los usuarios verán problemas para crear/actualizar/deletar comentarios y cargar la vista de actividad para las tarjetas en este momento. El resto de las características de Trello deben estar funcionando como normal. Proporcionaremos más actualizaciones dentro de 2h.

3. 17 de mayo de 2026 a las 16:25 UTCidentified

   El trabajo del equipo de ingeniería de Trello sigue restableciendo funcionalidad a comentarios y puntos de vista de la actividad. La siguiente actualización será publicada dentro de 4h o en un cambio significativo. Gracias por su paciencia.

4. 17 de mayo de 2026 a las 21:03 UTCidentified

   El trabajo del equipo de ingeniería de Trello sigue restableciendo funcionalidad a comentarios y puntos de vista de la actividad. La recuperación de los sistemas afectados está tomando más tiempo de lo previsto. La siguiente actualización será publicada dentro de 4h o en un cambio significativo. Gracias por su paciencia.

5. 18 de mayo de 2026 a las 0:53 UTCidentified

   Trello está experimentando desaceleraciones y fracasos que afectan las operaciones de comentarios, incluyendo la creación y eliminación de comentarios. Los usuarios también pueden experimentar retrasos al cargar las vistas de la actividad en las tarjetas, ver los archivos adjuntos, usar Power-Ups o exportar tablas. Algunos usuarios están encontrando errores al ver tarjetas específicas. El equipo está trabajando duro para restaurar la funcionalidad completa y proporcionará otra actualización dentro de 3h.

6. 18 de mayo de 2026 a las 3:51 UTCidentified

   Trello está experimentando desaceleraciones y fracasos que afectan las operaciones de comentarios, incluyendo la creación y eliminación de comentarios. Los usuarios también pueden experimentar retrasos al cargar las vistas de la actividad en las tarjetas, ver los archivos adjuntos, usar Power-Ups, exportar tablas y 'Updates' en la página principal. Nuestro equipo está trabajando activamente en la resolución y probablemente tomará hasta 7 horas para restaurar los servicios de nuevo a la plena funcionalidad. Proporcionaremos más información en este momento, o antes si tenemos información adicional que compartir antes de esta resolución.

7. 18 de mayo de 2026 a las 10:14 UTCidentified

   Trello continúa experimentando desaceleraciones y fracasos que están afectando las operaciones de comentarios, incluyendo la creación y eliminación de comentarios. Nuestros equipos continúan trabajando en la resolución de la cuestión, mientras que está tomando más tiempo de lo esperado. Proporcionaremos más actualizaciones dentro de las próximas 8 horas o antes una vez tengamos más información para compartir.

8. 18 de mayo de 2026 a las 18:09 UTCidentified

   Nuestros equipos siguen trabajando diligentemente en la mitigación. Durante este tiempo, te recomendamos que no muevas ni copies cartas o listas entre tablas. Para usuarios cuyas tablas están afectadas por este problema, puede crear y eliminar tarjetas y editar descripciones de tarjetas como de costumbre, pero no podrá ver comentarios o el registro de actividad detallado de las tarjetas. Estimamos que la reconstrucción tomará otras 24 horas para completar. Actualizaremos esta página ya que tenemos más información.

9. 18 de mayo de 2026 a las 22:45 UTCidentified

   Queremos proporcionar más transparencia en relación con este incidente dada su duración. Estábamos optimizando una de nuestras bases de datos más grandes, específicamente la única que almacena comentarios y la actividad de la tarjeta. Al final de este proceso, un fallo causó que algunas particiones de bases de datos fueran en directo sin sus índices. Esto significa que las consultas a esas particiones son puntuales, por lo que aproximadamente el 40% de las tablas están experimentando fallos. Sus datos son seguros. Cualquier comentario añadido durante este incidente se está guardando y reaparecerá una vez que el proceso esté completo. Actualmente estamos reconstruyendo los índices perdidos. Hemos asignado importantes recursos informáticos a esta tarea para avanzar lo más rápido posible, pero el volumen de datos es enorme. Estimamos que tardará aproximadamente 20 horas más para alcanzar la resolución completa. La mayoría de las características impactadas incluyen, pero no se limitan a: - Comentarios (ver, añadir, notificaciones) - Vistas de actividad sobre tarjetas - Adjuntos, Power-Ups, exportaciones de juntas - Página principal / 'Actualizaciones' vista - Buscar - Algunas cartas mostrando 'Card Not Found' - Moving/copying cards or lists Por favor, evite mover o copiar tarjetas entre tablas por ahora. Si su junta está trabajando normalmente, puede continuar su trabajo, ya que la mayoría de las tablas siguen sin afectar. Sabemos que Trello es donde vive tu trabajo y estamos comprometidos a volver a la normalidad. Proporcionaremos la siguiente actualización en ocho horas o antes mientras avanzamos.

10. 19 de mayo de 2026 a las 7:03 UTCidentified

    Continuamos monitoreando el proceso de reconstrucción del índice en todos los fragmentos afectados y proporcionaremos actualizaciones a medida que cada fase se complete. Proporcionaremos la siguiente actualización en ocho horas o antes mientras avanzamos.

11. 19 de mayo de 2026 a las 14:26 UTCmonitoring

    La reconstrucción del índice es completa y la funcionalidad debe ser restaurada para los usuarios. Somos conscientes de que las tarjetas movidas por los usuarios durante el incidente pueden estar en un estado incompleto y estamos investigando soluciones. No tenemos indicación de pérdida de datos durante el incidente. Seguiremos monitoreando y proporcionaremos las siguientes actualizaciones en 4 horas o antes.

12. 19 de mayo de 2026 a las 18:01 UTCmonitoring

    Los usuarios deben estar experimentando funcionalidad restaurada a sus tableros y tarjetas. Estamos ejecutando scripts para repetir acciones que ocurrieron durante el incidente. Actualizaremos una vez estos estén completos.

13. 20 de mayo de 2026 a las 19:06 UTCmonitoring

    Los usuarios deben estar experimentando funcionalidad restaurada a sus tableros y tarjetas. El equipo sigue remediando posibles cuestiones pendientes de datos que ocurrieron en juntas y tarjetas durante el incidente. A continuación se muestra una lista de cuestiones pendientes que pueden seguir ocurriendo, pero actualmente estamos trabajando para resolver mediante el procesamiento a nuestro fin. Estos problemas fueron causados por movimientos de tarjetas entre juntas durante el incidente. - Etiquetas de tarjetas perdidas - Restricciones de acceso que no se aplican en tarjetas movidas - Los cesionarios de la lista de verificación que no son miembros de la junta actual pueden linger incorrectamente - Los cesionarios de tarjetas que no sean miembros de la junta actual pueden haber recibido incorrectamente los recordatorios de la fecha prevista Tenga en cuenta que las tarjetas son seguras de editar, pero pueden ser excluidas de ciertos trabajos de restauración si son editadas. Apreciamos mucho su paciencia mientras trabajamos a través de estos temas. Proporcionaremos otra actualización cuando se resuelvan las cuestiones anteriores. Mientras tanto, comuníquese con nuestro equipo de apoyo si necesita más asistencia.

14. 21 de mayo de 2026 a las 21:29 UTCmonitoring

    El equipo continúa remediando posibles problemas de datos pendientes que ocurrieron en Juntas y Tarjetas durante el incidente (los detalles están en la actualización de ayer). Los usuarios deben estar experimentando funcionalidad restaurada a sus tableros y tarjetas. Tenga en cuenta que mientras las tarjetas son seguras de editar, pueden ser excluidas de ciertos trabajos de restauración si son editadas. Apreciamos mucho su paciencia mientras trabajamos a través de estos temas. Por favor, contacte con nuestro equipo de apoyo si necesita más asistencia.

15. 22 de mayo de 2026 a las 19:51 UTCmonitoring

    Los usuarios deben estar experimentando funcionalidad restaurada a sus tableros y tarjetas. Nuestro equipo ha resuelto errores de "tarjeta no encontrada", y continúa remediando posibles problemas de datos pendientes que ocurrieron en Juntas y Tarjetas durante el incidente: - Etiquetas de tarjetas perdidas - Restricciones de acceso que no se aplican en tarjetas movidas - Los cesionarios de la lista de verificación que no son miembros de la junta actual pueden linger incorrectamente - Los cesionarios de tarjetas que no sean miembros de la junta actual pueden haber recibido incorrectamente los recordatorios de la fecha prevista Tenga en cuenta que mientras las tarjetas son seguras de editar, pueden ser excluidas de ciertos trabajos de restauración si son editadas. Proporcionaremos otra actualización cuando se resuelvan las cuestiones anteriores. Mientras tanto, comuníquese con nuestro equipo de apoyo si necesita más asistencia.

16. 26 de mayo de 2026 a las 13:27 UTCinvestigating

    El equipo sigue remediando posibles cuestiones de datos pendientes que ocurrieron en las juntas y tarjetas durante el incidente

17. 26 de mayo de 2026 a las 13:27 UTCmonitoring

    Nuestro equipo sigue trabajando para fijar incoherencias de datos menores en tarjetas que fueron trasladadas entre juntas durante el incidente. Se sigue abordando lo siguiente: -Etiquetas de tarjeta de identificación -Las restricciones de acceso no se aplican en tarjetas movidas - Información del cesionario de la lista de verificación en algunas tarjetas. -Incorrecto recordatorios de la fecha de vencimiento enviados a algunos cesionarios Sus tarjetas son seguras de editar. Si usted hace cambios en una tarjeta antes de que nuestra fijación automatizada lo alcance, sus ediciones se conservarán, y la restauración automatizada para esa tarjeta será saltada. No se perderán datos en ningún escenario. Proporcionaremos otra actualización una vez que los artículos anteriores se resuelvan completamente. Si necesita ayuda mientras tanto, por favor contacte con nuestro equipo de apoyo.

18. 26 de mayo de 2026 a las 21:12 UTCresolved

    Gracias por su paciencia ya que nuestro equipo trabajó diligentemente para resolver problemas pendientes. Aunque nuestro equipo encontró escenarios de bordes durante el fin de semana, creemos que todos los problemas de 'tarjeta no encontrada' se resuelven. Las inconsistencias de datos menores que se enumeran a continuación pueden estar presentes si las tarjetas se trasladaron entre las tablas durante el incidente: - Etiquetas de tarjetas perdidas - Restricciones de acceso que no se aplican en tarjetas movidas - Información del cesionario de la lista de verificación en algunas tarjetas - recordatorios incorrectos de la fecha de vencimiento enviados a algunos cesionarios Tengan la seguridad de que nuestro equipo continúa el trabajo necesario para resolver cuestiones anteriores; sin embargo, dado el impacto y el alcance de las cuestiones pendientes, ahora estamos moviendo el canal de comunicación a Apoyo en lugar de esta página de estado. Si cree que sigue viendo los impactos persistentes de este incidente, por favor no dude en contactar con nuestro equipo de soporte para más asistencia.

19. 26 de junio de 2026 a las 19:42 UTCpostmortem

    # Resumen El 17 de mayo de 2026 a las 12:00 UTC un subconjunto de usuarios de Trello experimentó una degradación de algunas funcionalidades básicas incluyendo pero no limitadas a: problemas con comentarios, registros de actividad de visualización, acceso a datos de tarjetas, exportaciones de tableros, Power-Ups, archivos adjuntos, actualizaciones de página principal y funcionalidad de búsqueda. Algunas tarjetas móviles muestran errores de 'Card Not Found'. Estos problemas persistieron durante varios días. La mayoría de los problemas encontrados al interactuar con Trello (comending, viewing activity) se resolvieron para el 19 de mayo de 2026 a las 08:31 UTC, sin embargo hubo un problema persistente de integridad de datos que se manifestó como errores "Card Not Found" al intentar abrir tarjetas. √90% de estas tarjetas fueron reparadas para el 28 de mayo a las 17:20 UTC. El resto tomó un poco más de tiempo y fue completamente reparado para el 5 de junio 2026 a las 21:37 UTC. Queríamos compartir un análisis más detallado de los temas que encontramos, así como lo que estamos haciendo para asegurar que nada similar ocurra en el futuro. # Root Cause El incidente fue causado por un fallo en nuestra base de datos (MongoDB) que surgió durante un proyecto para optimizar el rendimiento y la escala de una de nuestras mayores colecciones. La colección afectada contiene comentarios de tarjetas y otra actividad y se utiliza en gran parte de la funcionalidad de Trello. El proyecto de optimización era redimensionar la colección en una nueva clave. Esto nos permite eliminar un llamado “punto caliente inerte” que es donde todas las entradas de bases de datos recién creadas terminan en una sola partición de bases de datos (aka shard). Después de redimensionar, la carga se extendería uniformemente a través de los diversos servidores que componen el cluster de bases de datos. Esto disminuye latencia y mejora el rendimiento de consulta para los usuarios. Durante las etapas finales de la operación de redimensionamiento (que es un proceso automatizado de larga duración), 12 de los 30 fragmentos pertinentes se quedaron sin espacio de disco mientras que los índices de construcción. En lugar de abortar el proceso de redimensionamiento, el fallo de la base de datos causó que el clúster pusiera los nuevos servidores de la base de datos en rotación sin sus índices, a pesar de registros y métricas diciendo lo contrario. Debido a la enorme cantidad de datos en esta colección, no tener índices significa que no hay forma de preguntar por los datos que desea (es decir, "darme todos los comentarios para esta tarjeta") sin realizar un análisis de colección extremadamente lento e ineficiente. # Plan de acción correctiva Lo primero que hicimos fue iniciar una reconstrucción completa de todos los índices de bases de datos para la colección. Desafortunadamente esto lleva mucho tiempo completar (días múltiples) y es compute-intensivo. Hemos escalado todos los servidores de bases de datos para ayudar al proceso a moverse más rápido, sin embargo debido a la naturaleza única de este proceso, más compute no equiparaba a más velocidad. Además, hemos habilitado un ajuste de bases de datos que causó todas las consultas que darían lugar a un análisis completo de la colección que no se arrastrara en el fondo y consumiría los recursos de la base de datos antes de fracasar. Esto ayudó a las partes de Trello que todavía estaban trabajando mantener la respuesta. Una vez completado el proceso de reindex, se restableció toda la funcionalidad. Sin embargo, descubrimos que las tarjetas que fueron trasladadas a un tablero diferente durante la reconstrucción quedaron en un estado roto. Sus registros de actividad y comentarios estaban esencialmente varados en el tablero antiguo, mientras que la tarjeta estaba ahora en el nuevo tablero. Esto se manifestó como un error “Card Not Found” al intentar abrir tal tarjeta. El equipo se trasladó a una nueva fase de código de escritura para remediar con seguridad todos los problemas de datos restantes en lotes, con el lote final de las correcciones completadas para el 5 de junio de 2026 a las 21:37 UTC. # Next Steps Sabemos que Trello es donde tu trabajo vive y problemas como este pueden causar mucha perturbación. Para asegurarnos de que no nos topemos con este tema de nuevo en el futuro, el equipo está tomando las siguientes acciones: - Trabajar estrechamente con nuestro proveedor de bases de datos para asegurar que el fallo original se fije (actualizar: la solución es el envío en la próxima versión) - Trabajar para crear un conjunto estándar de herramientas y procesos para asegurar que los índices reconstruyan proceder lo más rápido posible en una emergencia como esta - Diseñar e implementar cambios para hacer que las operaciones de mudanza de tarjetas sean más atómicas (ya sea que toda la operación tenga éxito, o toda la operación falla, en lugar de un fracaso parcial)

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. 15 de mayo de 2026 a las 15:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating degraded performance of some Trello features. We will provide more details within the next hour.

2. 15 de mayo de 2026 a las 15:31 UTCinvestigating

   Trello engineers are actively working on resolving issues that our users may be seeing around commenting on cards, deleting comments, and adding new attachments. Users may also find that recent changes to cards are not reflected in search results. We are continuing to work on it and will provide more updates within the hour.

3. 15 de mayo de 2026 a las 16:40 UTCidentified

   The Trello team has identified and mitigated most of the issues with cards and comments. Users may still see delays in search indexing for short time while it catches up to realtime.

4. 15 de mayo de 2026 a las 17:36 UTCmonitoring

   The team has resolved the previous issues and is now monitoring the system to ensure a full return to baseline. Search indexing is still approximately 1h delayed, but will be up to date shortly. Thank you for your patience

5. 15 de mayo de 2026 a las 18:04 UTCresolved

   Search is now fully up to date for all users, and all issues with previous degraded functionality have been resolved.

1. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:24 UTCidentified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

2. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:34 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

3. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:43 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

4. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 6:40 UTCmonitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

5. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 6:41 UTCmonitoring

   We are approaching full system recovery at this time, and are performing final confirmations that services are restored.

6. 14 de mayo de 2026 a las 6:48 UTCresolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

7. 19 de mayo de 2026 a las 19:10 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 1:31 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 4:10 UTCidentified

   We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

3. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 4:10 UTCidentified

   Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

4. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 4:10 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

5. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 5:53 UTCmonitoring

   The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

6. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 8:03 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

7. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 10:25 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

8. 8 de mayo de 2026 a las 10:26 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

9. 20 de mayo de 2026 a las 6:46 UTCpostmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 21 de febrero de 2026 a las 15:32 UTCinvestigating

   Impact Trello users are experiencing issues with websocket connections, leading to difficulties in maintaining active sessions. Affected users may notice disruptions in service as connections are intermittently dropping. Current Status Efforts are underway to restore normal service. Teams are actively engaged in identifying the best path to full resolution. Next Steps The incident team is focusing on pinpointing the root cause and implementing necessary fixes. The next communication will be shared in 30 minutes.

2. 21 de febrero de 2026 a las 15:32 UTCresolved

   Impact Trello users are experiencing issues with websocket connections, leading to difficulties in maintaining active sessions. Affected users may notice disruptions in service as connections are intermittently dropping. Current Status Efforts are underway to restore normal service. Teams are actively engaged in identifying the best path to full resolution. Next Steps The incident team is focusing on pinpointing the root cause and implementing necessary fixes. The next communication will be shared in 30 minutes.

1. 19 de febrero de 2026 a las 15:06 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation affecting Trello. We will share updates here as more information is available.

2. 19 de febrero de 2026 a las 15:10 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

3. 19 de febrero de 2026 a las 15:22 UTCresolved

   On February 19, 2026, Trello users may have experienced performance degradation. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 9 de febrero de 2026 a las 8:20 UTCmonitoring

   Trello performance was degraded and the performance degradation of Trello has been resolved. All the services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

2. 9 de febrero de 2026 a las 8:36 UTCresolved

   Trello users experienced performance degradation. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

3. 18 de febrero de 2026 a las 8:33 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Summary** On Feb 9, 2026, between 07:12 UTC and 08:05 UTC, Atlassian customers were unable to access Trello. The event was triggered by Trello servers reaching maximum memory limits and a subsequent failure to automatically scale for the traffic. The incident was detected within 5 minutes by automated monitoring systems, engaging Trello teams for resolution. Two parallel mitigation efforts were undertaken to restore access: 1\) manual scaling to address concerns with high utilization of hosts, and 2\) temporarily limiting traffic from free customers. This intervention put Trello systems in a known good state with a total time to resolution of ~53 minutes. ### **IMPACT** The overall impact occurred on Feb 9, 2026 between 07:12 AM UTC and 08:05 AM UTC for Trello customers and caused service disruption for all customers, making Trello inaccessible during that time. Access was restored for paid users approximately 43 minutes after the onset, with full service restoration for free users 10 minutes later. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The issue was cause by increased memory requirements during the transition from the weekend to EU business hours, combined with Auto Scaling group scaling rules based on CPU utilization. Memory allocation on our instances outpaced the CPU usage, which caused processes to hit Out-Of-Memory \(OOM\) errors and crash before reaching CPU usage thresholds that would trigger the auto scaling policies. As a result, Trello went down and users received HTTP 502 errors until the incident was resolved. ### **REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a suite of automated infrastructure management in place, this specific issue required manual intervention to restore Trello access to users. To avoid repeating this type of incident, we are prioritizing the following remedial action items: * Pre-scale capacity before EU morning traffic - This change has already been introduced to prevent further incidents while we implement additional safeguards. * Adjust Trello’s Auto Scaling group settings - This change will ensure that unhealthy hosts will be replaced more rapidly and scaling policies will consider memory usage. * Refine Trello host memory commitments - This change will decrease the likelihood of memory overcommitment on hosts and associated OOM errors. * Increase isolation for OOM errors - This change will improve the ability for hosts to recover in the event of a single worker experiencing an OOM error. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 27 de diciembre de 2025 a las 4:42 UTCmonitoring

   We have taken steps to mitigate the issue and are seeing recovery in the affected services. Our teams will continue to closely monitor the situation and are actively working to confirm that all services are fully restored. We will provide further updates as we make additional progress.

2. 27 de diciembre de 2025 a las 5:20 UTCresolved

   We have successfully mitigated the incident and all affected services are now fully operational. Our teams have verified that normal functionality has been restored across all areas. Thank you for your patience and understanding while we worked to resolve this issue.

3. 30 de enero de 2026 a las 4:09 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On **December 27, 2025**, between **02:48 UTC and 05:20 UTC**, some Atlassian cloud customers experienced failures in sending and receiving emails and mobile notifications. Core Jira and Confluence functionality remained available. The issue was triggered when **TLS certificates used by Atlassian’s monitoring infrastructure expired**, causing parts of our metrics pipeline to stop accepting traffic. Services responsible for email and mobile notifications had a critical path dependency on monitoring path leading to service disruptions. All impacted services were fully restored by **05:20 UTC**, around **2.5 hours** after customer impact began. ### IMPACT During the impact window, customers experienced: * **Outbound product email failures** \(notifications and other product emails did not send\). * **Identity and account flow failures** where emails were required \(e.g. sign‑ups, password resets, one‑time‑password / step‑up challenges\). * **Jira and Confluence mobile push notifications** * **Customer site activations and some admin policy changes** failing and requiring later reprocessing. ### ROOT CAUSE The incident was caused by: 1. **Expired TLS certificates** on domains used by our monitoring and metrics infrastructure caused by **misconfigured DNS authorization record** which prevented automatic renewal. 2. **Tight coupling of services to metrics publishing**, which caused them to fail when monitoring endpoints became unavailable, instead of degrading gracefully. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS We recognize that outages like this have a direct impact on customers’ ability to receive important notifications, complete account tasks, and operate their sites. We are prioritizing the following actions to improve our existing testing, monitoring and certificate management processes: * **Hardening monitoring and certificate infrastructure** * We are refining DNS and certificate configuration across our monitoring domains and strengthening proactive checks to detect and address failed renewals and certificate issues well before expiry. * We are also improving alerting on our monitoring and metrics pipeline. * **Decoupling monitoring from critical customer flows** We are updating services such as outbound email, identity, mobile push, provisioning, and admin policy changes so they no longer depend on metrics publishing to operate. If monitoring becomes unavailable, these services will continue to run and degrade gracefully by dropping or buffering metrics instead of failing customer operations. We apologize to customers impacted during this incident. We are implementing the improvements above to help ensure that similar issues are avoided. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12 de diciembre de 2025 a las 6:40 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting Trello users. We'll share updates here as they become available or within the hour.

2. 12 de diciembre de 2025 a las 7:28 UTCmonitoring

   Our engineering team has implemented a fix, and services have now recovered. We will continue to closely monitor the situation.

3. 12 de diciembre de 2025 a las 7:41 UTCresolved

   On December 12, 2025, from 05:51 UTC to 08:09 UTC, Trello users may have experienced service disruptions on the web page and mobile apps. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

4. 6 de enero de 2026 a las 17:06 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On December 12, 2025, between 05:31 UTC and 07:11 UTC, Trello customers experienced errors or slow loading times due to a dependency library upgrade that caused high resource usage. The incident was detected within 1 minute by the automated monitoring system and mitigated by rolling back the version of the dependency library which put Atlassian systems into a known good state. The total time to resolution was 1 hour and 41 minutes. ### **IMPACT** The issue caused service disruption for all Trello customers on December 12, 2025 between 05:31 UTC and 07:11 UTC. Users experienced degraded service between 05:31 UTC and 06:32 UTC, and most users were unable to load Trello between 06:32 UTC to 07:07 UTC. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The issue was caused by an upgrade to a dependency library. As a result, there was an increase in system memory consumption causing startups to take longer than expected. When the startup time exceeded the allowed threshold, the worker process was flagged as unresponsive and restarted as an automated recovery action. Because every worker on the instance failed to startup within the expected time, the instance entered a startup loop that required intervention. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have several testing and preventive processes in place, we didn’t anticipate that the upgrade would consume more memory, which ultimately caused the startup failure loop and service disruption. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions designed to avoid this issue in the future: * Review our automated detection of unresponsive workers and adjust the detection thresholds during initialization. * Improve monitoring during workers startup and restarts due to unresponsiveness. * Enhance the stricter standard process for confirming memory/other data processing resource requirements for planned updates. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 21 de noviembre de 2025 a las 14:55 UTCinvestigating

   Multiple Atlassian services are seeing outages and we are investigating the same. We shall keep you posted on the progress in 60 minutes, if not sooner

2. 21 de noviembre de 2025 a las 15:30 UTCinvestigating

   Multiple Atlassian services are experiencing degraded performance. We are investigating and will provide an update within the hour.

3. 21 de noviembre de 2025 a las 16:14 UTCmonitoring

   The Trello performance degradation affecting some customers has been resolved. A subset of customers may have experienced intermittent errors on some of our other products, but these should also now be resolved too. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

4. 21 de noviembre de 2025 a las 16:49 UTCresolved

   The Trello performance degradation has been resolved. Also, some intermittent errors on some of our other products, has also now been resolved. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 8 de diciembre de 2025 a las 5:12 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On November 21, 2025, between 13:44 and 15:16 UTC, Trello customers were intermittently unable to view and update data on their boards. Customers also may have experienced issues authenticating with Atlassian products, and creating new GitHub and Slack integrations. The event was triggered by a bug encountered in the software running our edge proxy fleet, which proxies customer traffic to Atlassian cloud services. The changes included the migration of our edge proxy fleet to hosts running an ARM CPU architecture, rather than the AMD64 CPU architecture they had previously been running, which impacted US East customers. The incident was detected within 1 minute by our automated monitoring systems, and mitigated by a scale up of of fleet size, which put Atlassian systems into a known good state. This was followed by a global migration of edge proxy fleet hosts back to AMD64 CPU architecture the following day. ### **IMPACT** During the impact window, US East customers intermittently could not view or update data in Trello. The same underlying issue also impacted our Identity services and integrations with GitHub and Slack, meaning some customers had trouble signing in to Atlassian products or creating new integrations. At the incident’s peak, the incident impacted up to: * 52% of new Trello network connections. * 9% of new GitHub and Slack integrations. * 8% of new Identity network connections. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The issue was caused by a change to CPU architecture from AMD64 to ARM on our edge proxy fleet. This led to a bug that caused these instances to stall under high load, and refuse up to 52% of new connections. As a result, some customers of the products above could not make new connections to Atlassian services, and customers received CloudFront 504 gateway timeout error responses. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we deploy our changes progressively by cloud region to avoid broad impact, on this occasion, our pre-change load testing had not accurately reflected production loads. As part of our response to this incident, and to help prevent recurrence, we rolled back all edge proxy fleets from ARM to AMD64 CPU architecture globally. To minimise the impact of breaking changes to our environments, we plan to implement additional preventative measures such as: * Adding improved load tests into edge proxy fleet deployment pipelines to catch load-related bugs before deployment to production. * Adding alerts to our edge proxy fleet to catch rises in TCP connect times before customer impact. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking steps to help improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 14 de noviembre de 2025 a las 17:43 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation affecting Trello automations. We'll share updates here as more information is available.

2. 14 de noviembre de 2025 a las 19:02 UTCidentified

   We have identified the cause of the issue, and our teams are diligently working on applying mitigations. We are seeing good signs of recovery, however, some users may experience some delays in Trello Automations executing. We’ll share additional updates at 19:45 UTC, or sooner, as more information is available.

3. 14 de noviembre de 2025 a las 19:49 UTCmonitoring

   We have applied mitigations and continue to see improvements in Trello Automation processing times. However, some users may still experience delays in automation execution. We will provide another update by 20:45 UTC, or sooner if more information becomes available.

4. 14 de noviembre de 2025 a las 20:30 UTCresolved

   On November 14, 2025 Trello users may have experienced delays on the execution of Trello automations. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers. Note: All automations identified as impacted by this incident will be automatically rerun, no customer actions are needed to rerun these automations.

1. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 7:56 UTCinvestigating

   We have noticed that Atlassian Cloud services are impacted and our teams are actively investigating the same. We shall keep you informed of the progress every hour.

2. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 8:24 UTCinvestigating

   Atlassian Cloud services are impacted and we are aware that our customers might not be able to create support tickets. Our teams are actively investigating the same. We shall keep you informed of the progress every hour.

3. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 9:24 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing an outage due to some issue at the end of our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to get this resolved or mitigated as quickly as possible. ETA of the same is not know at the moment. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

4. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 9:58 UTCidentified

   We understand that our public cloud provider has identified the cause of the issue. We are starting to see some recovery and is working towards mitigation. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

5. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 11:07 UTCidentified

   We continue to work with our public cloud provider towards mitigating the issue at the earliest. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

6. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 12:06 UTCidentified

   Atlassian team is actively engaged and continues to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue at the earliest. We are starting to see partial operations succeed. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

7. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 13:58 UTCidentified

   Our public cloud provider is working to mitigate this issue quickly. We are seeing some early positive indicators and are continuing to monitor. We appreciate your patience and will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner.

8. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 14:02 UTCidentified

   We understand your pain and mitigating or fixing this issue is of utmost importance. Our public cloud provider is actively working to mitigate this issue on priority. We have been seeing partial operational success. We appreciate your patience and will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner.

9. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 16:36 UTCidentified

   Update - Thank you for your continued patience. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority. Our public cloud provider is still actively working to mitigate this issue with urgency and while we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will be providing hourly updates on this issue.

10. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 17:27 UTCidentified

    Update - We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority. Our public cloud provider is actively working to mitigate this issue with urgency. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner as new information becomes available.

11. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 17:43 UTCidentified

    We are currently aware of an ongoing incident impacting Atlassian Cloud services due to an outage with our public cloud provider, AWS. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority and we are closely monitoring the health of AWS services. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner as new information becomes available.

12. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 18:38 UTCmonitoring

    There have been no changes since our last update. We will provide our next updated by 9:00PM UTC or sooner as new information becomes available. We are currently aware of an ongoing incident impacting Atlassian Cloud services due to an outage with our public cloud provider, AWS. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority and we are closely monitoring the health of AWS services. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation.

13. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 21:26 UTCmonitoring

    Monitoring - We've started seeing continued product experience improvement. While we still have a backlog of event processing, we are seeing improvements in systems operational capabilities across all products. We estimate a significant improvement with the next few hours and will continue to monitor the health of AWS services and the effects on Atlassian customers. We appreciate your continued patience and remain committed to full resolution as we work through this situation. We will post our next update in two hours.

14. 20 de octubre de 2025 a las 22:58 UTCmonitoring

    Our teams are continuing to monitor the recovery of systems across Atlassian products. This update is to inform that the Atlassian Support portal is fully operational at this time for customers that wish to contact support.

15. 21 de octubre de 2025 a las 0:03 UTCmonitoring

    Our team is now seeing recovery across all impacted Atlassian products. We are continuing to monitor for individual products that may still be processing backlogged items now that services are restored. The Atlassian Support portal is currently still displaying a message directing customers to our temporary support channel. Please note that our support portal is currently fully functional for those attempting to raise requests. We are continuing to look into this alert to remove this message. We will provide further update on our recovery status in one hour.

16. 21 de octubre de 2025 a las 1:07 UTCmonitoring

    We continue to see recovery progressing across all impacted products as backlogged items continue to be processed. The Atlassian Support portal is currently displaying a message directing customers to our temporary support channel. Please note that our support portal is currently fully functional for those attempting to raise requests. We are continuing to look into this alert to remove this message. We will provide further update on our recovery status in two hours.

17. 21 de octubre de 2025 a las 3:24 UTCmonitoring

    The issue relating to the Atlassian Support portal displaying a message to customers to use our temporary support channel has now been resolved. The Atlassian Support portal is fully functional for any ongoing support issues. With regards to other Atlassian products, we continue to see recovery continuing across all impacted products and our teams are continuing to monitor as the recovery continues. We will provide further update on our recovery status within two hours.

18. 21 de octubre de 2025 a las 5:24 UTCresolved

    Our team is now able to see full recovery across the vast majority of Atlassian products. We are aware of some ongoing issues with specific components such as migrations and JSM virtual service agents, and our team is continuing to investigate with urgency. We apologise for the inconvenience that this incident has caused and we will provide further information when the Post Incident Investigation has been completed.

19. 24 de octubre de 2025 a las 17:55 UTCpostmortem

    ### Postmortem publish date: Nov 19th, 2025 ### Summary All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. Customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 04:05. The service disruptions were triggered due to an [AWS DynamoDB outage](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=1%3A50%20PM.-,DynamoDB,-Between%2011%3A48) and further affected by subsequent failures in [AWS EC2](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) and [AWS Network Load Balancer](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) within the us-east-1 region. The incident started at Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and was detected within six minutes by our automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore all core services by Oct 21, 2025 04:05. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues was completed on Oct 22, 2025. We recognize the critical role our products play in your daily operations, and we offer our sincere apologies for any impact this incident had on your teams. We are taking immediate steps to enhance the reliability and performance of our services, so that you continue to receive the standard of service you have come to trust. ### IMPACT Before examining product-level impacts, it's helpful to understand Atlassian's service topology and internal dependencies. Products such as Jira and Confluence are deployed across multiple AWS regions. The data for each tenant is stored and processed exclusively within its designated host region. This design is intentional and represents the desired operational state, as it limits the impact of any regional outage strictly to tenants in-region, in this case us-east-1. While in-scope application data is pinned to the region selected by the customer, there are times when systems need to call other internal services that may be based in a different region. If a problem occurs in the main region where these services operate, systems are designed to automatically fail over to a backup region, usually within three minutes. However, if unexpected issues arise during this failover, it can take longer to restore services. In rare cases, this could affect customers in more than one region. It’s important to note that all in-scope application data for supported products is pinned according to a customer’s chosen region. **Jira** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 20:00, customers with tenants hosted in the us-east-1 region experienced increased error rates when accessing core entities such as Issues, Boards, and Backlogs. This disruption was caused by AWS's inability to allocate AWS EC2 instances and elevated errors in AWS Network Load Balancer \(NLB\). During this window, users may also have observed intermittent timeouts, slow page loads, and failures when performing operations like creating or updating issues, loading board views, and executing workflow transitions. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced elevated failure rates when attempting to load Jira pages. This disruption was caused by the regional frontend service entering an unhealthy state during this specific time interval. Normally, the frontend service connects to the primary AWS DynamoDB instance located in the us-east-1 to retrieve the most recent configuration data necessary for proper operation. Additionally, the service is designed with a fallback mechanism that references static configuration data in the event that the primary database becomes inaccessible. Unfortunately, a latent bug existed in the local fallback path. When the frontend service nodes restarted, they were unable to load critical operational configuration data from primary or fallback sources, leading to the observed failures experienced by customers. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 06:30, customers experienced significant delays and missing Jira in-app notifications across all regions. The notification ingestion service, which is hosted exclusively in us-east-1, exhibited an increased failure rate when processing notification messages due to AWS EC2 and NLB issues. This issue resulted in notifications being delayed - and in some cases, not delivered at all - to users worldwide. **Jira Service Management \(JSM\)** JSM was impacted similarly to Jira above, with the same timeframes and for the same reasons. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced significantly elevated failure rates when attempting to load JSM pages. This affected all JSM experiences including the Help Centre, Portal, Queues, Work Items, Operations, and Alerts. **Confluence** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 02:45, customers using Confluence in the us-east-1 region experienced elevated failure rates when performing common operations such as editing pages or adding comments. The primary cause of this service degradation was the system's inability to auto-scale due to AWS EC2 issues to manage peak traffic load effectively. Though the AWS outage ended at Oct 20, 21:09, a subset of customers continued to experience failures as some Confluence web server nodes across multiple clusters remained in an unhealthy state. This was ultimately mitigated by recycling the affected nodes. To protect our systems while AWS recovered, we made a deliberate decision to enable node termination protection. This action successfully preserved our server capacity but, as a trade-off, it extended the time required for a full recovery once AWS services were restored. **Automation** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 23:59, automation customers whose rules are processed in us-east-1 experienced delays of up to 23 hours in rule execution. During this window, some events triggering rule executions were processed out of order because they arrived later during backlog processing. This caused potential inconsistencies in workflow executions, as rules were run in the order events were received, not when the action causing the event occurred. Additionally, some rule actions failed because they depend on first-party and third-party systems, which were also affected by the AWS outage. Customers can see most of these failures in their audit logs; however, a few updates were not logged due to the nature of the outage. By Oct 21, 2025 5:30, the backlog of rule runs in us-east-1 was cleared. Although most of these delayed rules were successfully handled, there were some additional replays of events to ensure completeness. Our investigation confirmed that a few events may never have triggered their associated rules due to the outage. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 11:20, all non-us-east-1 regional automation services experienced delays of up to 4 hours in rule execution. This was caused by an upstream service that was unable to deliver events as expected. The delivery service encountered a failure due to a cross-region dependency call to a service hosted in the us-east-1 region. Because of this dependency issue, the delivery service was unable to successfully deliver events throughout this time frame, resulting in customer-defined rules not being executed in a timely manner. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:33, Bitbucket experienced intermittent unavailability across core services. During this period, users faced increased error rates and latency when signing in, navigating repositories, and performing essential actions such as creating, updating, or approving pull requests. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage that impacted downstream services. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 22:46, numerous Bitbucket Pipeline steps failed to start, stalled mid-execution, or experienced significant queueing delays. Impact varied, with partial recoveries followed by degradation as downstream components re-synchronized. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage, compounded by instability in AWS EC2 instance availability and AWS Network Load Balancers. Furthermore, Bitbucket Pipelines continued to experience a low but persistent rate of step timeouts and scheduling errors due to AWS bare-metal capacity shortages in select availability zones. Atlassian coordinated with AWS to provision additional bare-metal hosts and addressed a significant backlog of pending pods, successfully restoring services by 01:30 on Oct 21, 2025. **Trello** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 15:25, users of Trello experienced widespread service degradation and intermittent failures due to upstream AWS issues affecting multiple components, including AWS DynamoDB and subsequent AWS EC2 capacity constraints. During this period, customers reported elevated error rates when loading boards, opening cards, adding comments or attachments. **Login** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, a small subset of users experienced failures when attempting to initiate new login sessions using SAML tokens. This resulted in an inability for those users to access Atlassian products during that time period. However, users who already had valid active sessions were not affected by this issue and continued to have uninterrupted access. The issue impacted all regions globally because regional identity services relied on a write replica located in the us-east-1 region to synchronize profile data. When the primary region became unavailable, the failover to a secondary database in another region failed, which delayed recovery. This failover defect has since been addressed. **Statuspage** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, Statuspage customers who were not already logged in to the management portal were unable to log in to create or update incident statuses. This impact was restricted only to users who were not already logged in at the time. The root cause was the same as described in the Login section above, and it was resolved by the same remediation steps. ### REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN & NEXT STEPS We have completed the following critical actions designed to help prevent cross-region impact from similar issues: * Resolved the code defect in the fallback option to ensure that Jira Frontend Services in other regions remain unaffected during a region-wide outage. * Fixed the issue that prevented timely failover of the identity service which impacted new login sessions. * Resolved the code defect so that delivery services in unaffected regions remain operational during region-wide outages. Additionally, we are prioritizing the following improvement actions: * Implement mitigation strategies to strengthen resilience against region-wide outages in the notification ingestion service. Although disruptions to our cloud services are sometimes unavoidable during outages of the underlying cloud provider, we continuously evaluate and improve test coverage to strengthen resilience of our cloud services against these issues. We recognize the critical importance of our products to your daily operations and overall productivity, and we extend our sincere apologies for any disruptions this incident may have caused your teams. If you were impacted and require additional details for internal post-incident reviews, please reach out to your Atlassian support representative with affected timeframes and tenant identifiers so we can correlate logs and provide guidance. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 11 de septiembre de 2025 a las 13:56 UTCmonitoring

   The performance degradation of Trello has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

2. 11 de septiembre de 2025 a las 14:18 UTCresolved

   On Thursday, September 11, 2025 1:00PM UTC, Trello users may have experienced performance degradation. The issues has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 27 de agosto de 2025 a las 19:39 UTCinvestigating

   We're receiving reports of connectivity problems while accessing Trello. You may see a "You are disconnected from Trello message" in the bottom left corner of your window notifying you that you've been disconnected. We're currently investigating the cause, and will post updates here as we determine it.

2. 27 de agosto de 2025 a las 21:01 UTCmonitoring

   We are now seeing recovery and monitoring.

3. 27 de agosto de 2025 a las 21:12 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 30 de julio de 2025 a las 7:16 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30 de julio de 2025 a las 8:13 UTCresolved

   We have resolved this incident.

1. 15 de julio de 2025 a las 3:43 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of some users experiencing issues where Email to Board functionality is failing with an error message similar to 'This message could not be delivered due to a recipient error. Please try again later.' Our team is investigating with urgency and will provide an update as soon as possible.

2. 15 de julio de 2025 a las 5:17 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is continuing to investigate the cause of errors relating to Email to Board actions in Trello. For those continuing to experience issues with Email to Board we encourage users to manually create their cards in Trello directly in the meantime. We apologise for any inconvenience caused and we will provide further updates as the investigation continues.

3. 15 de julio de 2025 a las 5:45 UTCresolved

   Our team has been able to identify a faulty configuration internally that was causing the errors relating to Email to Board functionality in Trello. The faulty configuration has now been reverted and Email to Board functionality should now be working as expected. For those that experienced Email to Board failures these emails can now be re-submitted if required to create the cards in Trello. We apologise again for any inconvenience caused by this issue.

1. 25 de junio de 2025 a las 9:38 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating reports of errors loading Users and Groups pages in Atlassian Administration, and errors affecting user IDP syncing. We will provide more details once we identify the root cause.

2. 25 de junio de 2025 a las 10:21 UTCidentified

   We continue to work on resolving the user syncing functionality for Confluence, Jira Work Management, Jira Service Management, Jira, Trello, and Guard. We have identified the root cause and expect recovery shortly.

3. 25 de junio de 2025 a las 10:41 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified the root cause of the issue and have mitigated the problem. We are now monitoring closely.

4. 25 de junio de 2025 a las 10:57 UTCresolved

   Between 07:40 UTC and 10:31 UTC, we experienced issues affecting user syncing in Atassian Administration. This affected Confluence, Jira Work Management, Jira Service Management, Jira, Trello, and Guard. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.

1. 4 de junio de 2025 a las 17:17 UTCinvestigating

   We were experiencing cases of degraded performance for outgoing emails from Confluence, Jira Work Management, Jira Service Management, Jira, Trello, Atlassian Bitbucket, Guard, Jira Align, Jira Product Discovery, Atlas and Compass Cloud customers. The system is recovering and mail is being processed normally as of 16:45 UTC. We will continue to monitor system performance and will provide more details within the next hour.

2. 4 de junio de 2025 a las 17:59 UTCresolved

   Between 2025-06-04 14:11 UTC to 20:18 UTC, we experienced delays in delivering emails for Confluence, Jira Work Management, Jira Service Management, Jira, Trello, Atlassian Bitbucket, Guard, Jira Align, Jira Product Discovery, Atlas, Compass. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.

1. 2 de junio de 2025 a las 12:08 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently experiencing an issue with Trello, as the search bar functionality is not working properly. Our team is diligently working to restore services as quickly as possible. We will keep you updated with further developments.

2. 2 de junio de 2025 a las 12:58 UTCidentified

   We are currently experiencing an issue with Trello, as the search bar functionality is not working properly. We have identified the issue and are in the process of mitigating the impact. We'll keep you posted with further updates.

3. 2 de junio de 2025 a las 13:19 UTCmonitoring

   The issues causing Trello’s search bar functionality to malfunction have been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will monitor it closely to ensure stability.

4. 2 de junio de 2025 a las 13:24 UTCresolved

   On June 2nd, Trello's search bar functionality was not working correctly. The issue has now been resolved, and the service operates normally for all affected customers.

1. 15 de mayo de 2025 a las 14:27 UTCidentified

   We are aware that Trello was temporarily inaccessible for all customers. The system has already been recovered, and we are monitoring the situation.

2. 15 de mayo de 2025 a las 15:21 UTCresolved

   A fix has been implemented, and the issue is now resolved.

3. 27 de mayo de 2025 a las 19:04 UTCpostmortem

   ### **SUMMARY** On May 15, 2025, between 13:55 and 14:18 UTC, Atlassian customers using the Trello product experienced errors or slow loading times when attempting to view their cards and boards. The event was triggered by a database plan cache expiring and high resource usage caused by subsequent database query planning operations. The particular database shard that was impacted held data that was required for every card load. The incident was detected within two minutes by the automated monitoring system and mitigated by increasing resources available to the affected database shard, which put Atlassian systems into a known good state. The total time to resolution was about 23 minutes. ### **IMPACT** The overall impact was between May 15, 2025, 13:55 and May 15, 2025, 14:18 UTC on the Trello product. The incident caused service disruption for all Trello customers. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The issue was caused by a query plan expiring from the database cache, which caused incoming queries to go through a replanning operation. These queries had multiple plans that could satisfy them, and depending on the size of the query, one plan might be significantly more efficient than another. This caused the query planner to perform a great many more replanning operations than usual, which consumed all of the CPU on the server for a brief moment. Once the CPU was consumed, the planning operations themselves began taking too long and therefore required constant replanning in an effort to find more efficient options. This negative feedback loop could not be broken without intervention. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn’t identified because it would only occur under very distinct conditions, including the amount of load and the order of database queries. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to avoid repeating this type of incident: * Review our capacity planning thresholds and ensure that all shards have sufficient overhead to handle unexpected load. * Improve query planner performance by: * Implement hinting for known problematic query shapes to circumvent the query planner. * Investigate long-term generalized solutions to prevent query planner thrashing. Furthermore, we are prioritizing the following additional measures to reduce the impact of any future incidents: * Analyze and reduce single points of failure for loading Trello boards and cards. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support