Historique des pannes de Circleapp

1. 5 octobre 2026 à 09:44 UTCinvestigating

   Nous enquêtons actuellement sur cette question.

2. 5 octobre 2026 à 10:21 UTCresolved

   Cet incident a été résolu. L'incident a été causé par une configuration manquante dans l'application que nous utilisons pour déployer des modifications de code à l'application Circle. Après enquête, nous avons immédiatement appliqué un correctif temporaire pour rétablir la disponibilité. Nous avons ensuite identifié la cause profonde et mis en œuvre une correction permanente. Tous les services fonctionnent normalement.

3. 5 octobre 2026 à 15:46 UTCpostmortem

   Résumé Application en cercle a connu un incident entre 5:44 et 5:57 AM EST Nous sommes désolés pour la perturbation #### Ce qui s'est passé \(haut niveau\) L'incident a été causé par une configuration manquante dans l'application que nous utilisons pour déployer de nouvelles modifications de code à l'application Circle #### Atténuation et correction immédiate Après enquête, nous avons immédiatement corrigé cette application avec un changement temporaire qui a rétabli la disponibilité de l'application. Plus tard aujourd'hui, nous avons identifié la cause racine et appliqué une correction définitive. État Tous les services fonctionnent normalement.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 3 octobre 2026 à 08:13 UTCinvestigating

   Nous enquêtons actuellement sur cette question.

2. 3 octobre 2026 à 08:18 UTCresolved

   Cet incident a été résolu.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 1 septembre 2026 à 13:59 UTCinvestigating

   Nous enquêtons actuellement sur cette question.

2. 1 septembre 2026 à 15:43 UTCresolved

   Plus tôt aujourd'hui, nous avons connu une brève interruption de service de 9h59 à 10h50. ET lors d'une mise à jour de sécurité prévue. Le service a été entièrement rétabli, et nous avons mis en place des mesures de protection pour empêcher que cela ne se reproduise. Nous nous excusons pour tout désagrément.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 27 août 2026 à 22:25 UTCinvestigating

   Nous enquêtons actuellement sur cette question.

2. 27 août 2026 à 22:30 UTCresolved

   Cet incident a été résolu.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 20 août 2026 à 17:51 UTCinvestigating

   Nous enquêtons actuellement sur cette question.

2. 20 août 2026 à 17:54 UTCresolved

   Cet incident a été résolu.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 20 août 2026 à 13:04 UTCinvestigating

   Nous enquêtons actuellement sur cette question.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 19 août 2026 à 08:52 UTCinvestigating

   Nous enquêtons actuellement sur cette question.

2. 19 août 2026 à 09:15 UTCresolved

   Cet incident a été résolu.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 28 mai 2026 à 16:44 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 28 mai 2026 à 17:12 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 28 mai 2026 à 18:46 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 28 mai 2026 à 20:12 UTCresolved

   The issue has been fully resolved and all systems are operating normally. A detailed post-mortem report will be published here shortly. Thank you for your patience and cooperation.

5. 1 juin 2026 à 15:06 UTCpostmortem

   ## Delays in Asynchronous Actions and Workflows ‌ **Issue Summary** On May 28, 2026, we experienced an incident that caused delays in asynchronous actions and automated workflows. **Timeline \(UTC\)** * **11:29** – The issue began, causing delays in newly scheduled automated workflows. * **15:51** – Our engineering team identified the root cause of the scheduling interruption. * **16:42** – A fix was deployed, restoring normal operations to the background processing framework. * **18:45** – The resulting backlog of delayed tasks was completely cleared and normal service was confirmed. **Root Cause** A routine system update included a software dependency upgrade that unexpectedly conflicted with our background processing framework. This conflict prevented scheduled background jobs from moving into the active processing queue. As a result, automated workflows and other asynchronous actions were delayed, though no underlying data was lost or corrupted during this time. **Resolution** Upon investigating the anomaly in the scheduling queue, our engineering team determined that the recent dependency upgrade was responsible. We immediately reverted the update, which restored the flow of scheduled tasks. To resolve the issue as swiftly as possible, we temporarily scaled up our infrastructure's processing capacity to rapidly clear the backlog of delayed actions. **Preventative Measures** To prevent this type of issue from occurring in the future, we are planning on implementing the following improvements: * **Enhanced Alerting:** We are deploying strict, automated alerts specifically designed to detect anomalies in scheduled task queues, drastically reducing our time to detection. * **Upgraded Telemetry:** We are adding granular, time-series visualizations to our monitoring systems to better track the exact states of background jobs \(scheduled, enqueued, and processed\) in real time. We sincerely apologize for any disruption this may have caused to your operations. The issue was fully mitigated, and all backlogged tasks have been successfully processed.

1. 22 mai 2026 à 13:26 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 22 mai 2026 à 19:20 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 20 mai 2026 à 16:12 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 20 mai 2026 à 16:15 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 9 mai 2026 à 03:12 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 9 mai 2026 à 03:43 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 30 avril 2026 à 18:00 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30 avril 2026 à 19:43 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

3. 30 avril 2026 à 19:43 UTCpostmortem

   Some users experienced an issue where app.circle.so was unavailable. This was caused by the Redis cluster reaching 100% CPU due to a large volume of workflow jobs being re-enqueued. We identified the root cause, scaled down the background deployment pods to relieve the load, and restored service within approximately 3 minutes. We are continuing to investigate and address the underlying issue.

1. 30 avril 2026 à 14:35 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30 avril 2026 à 15:39 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 30 avril 2026 à 11:36 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30 avril 2026 à 12:19 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 30 avril 2026 à 10:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 30 avril 2026 à 11:03 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19 avril 2026 à 16:50 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 19 avril 2026 à 18:32 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19 avril 2026 à 01:01 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 19 avril 2026 à 05:23 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 17 avril 2026 à 18:53 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 17 avril 2026 à 19:01 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 15 avril 2026 à 20:01 UTCresolved

   Search functionality was degraded starting at approximately 6:52 PM EDT on April 14. The issue was caused by Elasticsearch cluster degradation. An incident report was filed internally. This issue should have had a status page entry since customers reported broken search. Customers checking [status.circle.so](http://status.circle.so) saw 'All Systems Operational' during this period.

2. 15 avril 2026 à 20:01 UTCpostmortem

   Search functionality was degraded starting at approximately 6:52 PM EDT on April 14. The issue was caused by Elasticsearch cluster degradation. An incident report was filed internally. This issue should have had a status page entry since customers reported broken search. Customers checking [status.circle.so](http://status.circle.so/) saw 'All Systems Operational' during this period.

1. 14 avril 2026 à 04:17 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 14 avril 2026 à 04:36 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

3. 15 avril 2026 à 19:50 UTCpostmortem

   Communities experienced approximately 19 minutes of downtime starting at 12:17 AM EDT. The database crashed due to an out-of-memory error at the infrastructure level, a known AWS RDS bug. Our team raised a second escalation to AWS \(case 177616832700336\), and both cases have been escalated to AWS's highest priority tier. We are actively working with AWS to resolve the underlying infrastructure issue and have additional safeguards in place.