Historique des pannes de Pubnub

1. 26 octobre 2026 à 21:14 UTCinvestigating

   Les utilisateurs peuvent éprouver des erreurs élevées avec les lecteurs d'histoire au point de présence de Francfort. Nous travaillons à la remise en état et nous le mettrons à jour à mesure que nous progresserons. Si vous croyez que vous êtes touché et que vous souhaitez discuter, veuillez contacter [email protected]

2. 26 octobre 2026 à 21:17 UTCmonitoring

   Un correctif a été mis en place et nous suivons les résultats. Si vous pensez avoir été touché par cela, veuillez contacter [email protected].

3. 26 octobre 2026 à 21:46 UTCresolved

   Cet incident a été résolu. Si vous vous sentez touché, veuillez contacter [email protected].

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 26 octobre 2026 à 21:07 UTCinvestigating

   Les utilisateurs peuvent connaître des taux d'erreur et de latence élevés avec l'API Présence. Nous travaillons à la remise en état et nous le mettrons à jour à mesure que nous progresserons. Si vous croyez que vous êtes touché et que vous souhaitez discuter, veuillez contacter [email protected]

2. 26 octobre 2026 à 21:12 UTCmonitoring

   Une solution à ce problème a été mise en œuvre et nous suivons les résultats. Si vous pensez avoir été touché par cela, veuillez contacter [email protected].

3. 26 octobre 2026 à 21:17 UTCmonitoring

   Nous restons à l'affût de tout autre problème.

4. 26 octobre 2026 à 21:55 UTCresolved

   Cet incident a été résolu, et nous procéderons à un suivi post mortem. Si vous avez des questions ou des préoccupations, veuillez contacter [email protected].

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 22 octobre 2026 à 16:02 UTCinvestigating

   Les utilisateurs peuvent rencontrer des taux d'erreur et de latence élevés de nos points de présence de Francfort et de Bombay. Nous travaillons à la remise en état et nous le mettrons à jour à mesure que nous progresserons. Si vous êtes touché, contactez [email protected].

2. 22 octobre 2026 à 16:12 UTCidentified

   Le problème a été identifié et une solution est en cours de mise en oeuvre.

3. 22 octobre 2026 à 16:19 UTCmonitoring

   Un correctif a été mis en place et nous suivons les résultats. Si vous avez été touché par ce problème, ou si vous avez l'impression d'être encore touché, veuillez contacter [email protected].

4. 22 octobre 2026 à 16:35 UTCresolved

   Cet incident a été résolu. Si vous vous sentez touché, veuillez contacter [email protected].

5. 26 octobre 2026 à 21:36 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Description, impact et résolution du problème** Le 22 octobre, d'environ 14h45 à 16h13 UTC, les utilisateurs de nos points de présence de Frankfurt \(FRA\) et de Mumbai \(BOM\) ont peut-être vu des taux d'erreur et de latence élevés sur les appels d'API Présence. D'autres services PubNub n'ont pas été touchés. Le problème a commencé lors d'une mise à jour logicielle du service Présence à Francfort. La nouvelle version n'était pas compatible avec la version précédente alors que les deux étaient en cours d'exécution en même temps. Cela a fait redémarrer à plusieurs reprises les serveurs Présence dans la région, et des requêtes qui ne pouvaient atteindre un serveur sain ont retourné des erreurs. Notre équipe a identifié la mise à jour comme étant la cause et l'a retournée. Le service est revenu à la normale vers 16h13 UTC. **Étapes d'atténuation et mesures préventives futures recommandées** Nous corrigeons l'incompatibilité avant que cette mise à jour ne soit de nouveau publiée. Nous ajoutons également des tests qui exécutent des versions anciennes et nouvelles côte à côte avant chaque sortie de Présence, la mise à jour d'une zone de disponibilité à la fois, et l'amélioration de notre procédure de retour afin qu'il n'exécute pas des versions incompatibles ensemble.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 22 octobre 2026 à 01:11 UTCinvestigating

   Une erreur dans la mise à jour des certificats de sécurité peut causer des problèmes de connexion à certains clients. Nous enquêtons et nous mettrons à jour à mesure que nous en apprendrons davantage.

2. 22 octobre 2026 à 01:17 UTCinvestigating

   Nous continuons d'enquêter sur cette question.

3. 22 octobre 2026 à 01:55 UTCidentified

   Nous avons cerné la question et nous en sommes bien à l'assainissement. Veuillez contacter [email protected] si vous rencontrez des problèmes.

4. 22 octobre 2026 à 02:12 UTCmonitoring

   Nous avons terminé l'assainissement de cette question. L'impact était mineur: un seul utilisateur final a signalé un problème, mais nous surveillons l'impact supplémentaire. Veuillez contacter [email protected] si vous avez un problème connexe à signaler.

5. 22 octobre 2026 à 02:47 UTCresolved

   Nous n'avons pas eu d'autres rapports sur cette question. Si vous vous sentez touché, veuillez contacter [email protected]. Un post mortem suivra.

6. 26 octobre 2026 à 21:30 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Description, impact et résolution du problème** De 19h26 UTC le 21 octobre jusqu'à environ 02h04 UTC le 22 octobre, certains terminaux PubNub ont servi des certificats TLS que notre autorité de certification avait révoqués. Les clients qui vérifient la révocation du certificat auraient pu ne pas se connecter aux paramètres touchés pendant cette fenêtre. Notre autorité de certification a constaté qu'environ 400 000 certificats qu'elle avait délivrés contenaient des renseignements sur la politique qui ne correspondaient pas à sa politique de certification publiée. Les certificats n'ont pas été compromis, mais les règles de l'industrie exigent que ces certificats soient révoqués et remplacés. Les certificats de PubNub pour \*.pubnub.com, \*.pubnub.net, \*.pndsn.com et \*.pubnubapi.com étaient parmi eux et ont été révoqués le 21 octobre. Nos certificats de remplacement n'ont pas été déployés sur tous nos paramètres avant l'entrée en vigueur de la révocation. Les clients qui ne vérifient pas la révocation du certificat n'ont pas été touchés, ni les connexions à l'origine SDK par défaut [ps.pndsn.com](http://ps.pndsn.com). Nous avons été alertés par un utilisateur final d'un de nos clients. Nous avons déployé les certificats de remplacement dans toutes les régions, terminant vers 02h04 UTC le 22 octobre. Les noms d'hôte et la date d'expiration du certificat \(7 janvier 2027\) sont inchangés. **Étapes d'atténuation et mesures préventives futures recommandées** Nous ajoutons une surveillance qui avertit notre équipe des opérations si un certificat que nous servons est révoqué. Nous changeons également notre processus de remplacement des certificats afin que les remplacements soient déployés rapidement à la production une fois délivrés et que les mises à jour des certificats atteignent toutes les régions plus rapidement.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 9 octobre 2026 à 18:45 UTCresolved

   À partir de 17h32 UTC le 9 octobre 2026, nous avons observé des taux d'erreur et de latence 5XX élevés sur le paramètre Subscribe à l'échelle mondiale. La question a été résolue par 18:18 UTC et les services sont revenus à des niveaux normaux. Un nombre limité de clients peut avoir été affecté. Une analyse des causes profondes sera publiée dans les prochains jours. Nous nous excusons sincèrement de tout impact que cela aurait pu avoir. Si vous pensez avoir été touché et que vous souhaitez en discuter, veuillez envoyer un courriel à [email protected].

2. 14 octobre 2026 à 17:19 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Description, impact et résolution du problème** Le 9 octobre 2026, entre 17h30 et 18h20 UTC, nous avons observé des erreurs HTTP 5xx élevées affectant le paramètre Subscribe pour un sous-ensemble de clients. Certaines demandes d'abonnement peuvent avoir échoué, et un sous-ensemble de messages peut avoir été retardé ou non livré en temps réel. Aucun message n'a été perdu, et les clients ayant la Persistance de Message activée ont pu récupérer les messages affectés de l'historique. L'incident a été causé par une augmentation inattendue du trafic à partir d'un essai de charge à volume élevé contre un ensemble de clés de développement qui n'avait pas les limites prévues. La charge résultante a temporairement épuisé la mémoire dans certaines infrastructures partagées, ce qui a causé le problème. Nous avons stabilisé l'infrastructure touchée en appliquant une limite de taux à l'ensemble de clés générant la charge excédentaire. Le service est revenu à la normale à 18h20 UTC. (en milliers de dollars) **Étapes d'atténuation et mesures préventives futures recommandées** Nous avons appliqué une limite de tarifs de publication temporaire pour contenir le trafic inattendu et restaurer le service tout en préservant la disponibilité des clés affectées. Afin de prévenir des incidents similaires, PubNub ajoute des contrôles supplémentaires pour s'assurer que les mesures de protection sont correctement en place pour détecter et limiter automatiquement les charges inhabituelles avant qu'elles n'affectent d'autres trafics partageant la même infrastructure. Nous mettons également à jour les procédures opérationnelles relatives à la mémoire des abonnés et aux changements d'échelle automatique pour nous assurer que les ajustements de capacité demeurent efficaces pendant l'atténuation des incidents.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 25 août 2026 à 13:22 UTCinvestigating

   À partir de 12h15 UTC, les utilisateurs de notre US East PoP rencontrent actuellement un problème avec le service Publish et Subscribe qui provoque certains messages à ne pas apparaître dans les appels à ce service. Aucune erreur n'est retournée du service, malgré le fait que les messages ne soient pas retournés correctement. Nous enquêtons sur la question.

2. 25 août 2026 à 14:10 UTCmonitoring

   À partir de 13h55 UTC, la question touchant les services Publish et Subscribe dans le PoP East des États-Unis a été atténuée. La surveillance synthétique est revenue à la normale, et aucun message manqué n'a été détecté. L'incident serait actuellement lié à une défaillance de la surveillance. Une enquête plus approfondie est en cours et le service continue d'être surveillé de près.

3. 25 août 2026 à 14:51 UTCresolved

   Aucun autre problème n'ayant été observé au cours des 30 dernières minutes, l'incident a été réglé. Nous allons bientôt procéder à une analyse des causes profondes. Si vous croyez avoir eu un impact lié à cet incident, veuillez le signaler au support PubNub à [email protected].

4. 28 août 2026 à 17:46 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Description, impact et résolution du problème** Le mardi 25 août 2026, à 12h10 UTC, notre surveillance interne nous a alerté sur un problème où un très petit sous-ensemble de messages dans une zone de disponibilité d'une région \(notre point de présence est américain\) n'a peut-être pas été immédiatement livré aux abonnés dans cette même région. Tous les messages ont persisté normalement au sein du service PubNub Persistence, **donc aucune donnée de message n'a été perdue**. La circulation à destination ou en provenance d'une autre région ou d'une ZA n'a pas été affectée, et aucun autre service PubNub n'a été affecté. Aucun client n'a signalé d'impact. ### **La cause de la mort** Au cours des tests de charge interne prévus, un groupe de serveurs de routage interne a été retiré du service. En raison d'un défaut de configuration, leurs adresses réseau n'ont pas été complètement retirées et sont restées en cache par notre couche de publication. Cela ne posait pas de problème pour la plupart. Toutefois, une adresse a par la suite été réaffectée à un élément interne non lié qui répondait normalement au même protocole et au même port. Comme cette réponse semblait réussie, le calque de publication n'a reçu aucune erreur, et les messages envoyés à cette adresse ont été acheminés incorrectement. Un redémarrage en continu des serveurs touchés a effacé les adresses obsolètes à 13h25 UTC. **Étapes d'atténuation et mesures préventives futures recommandées** * Une fois les serveurs touchés identifiés, un redémarrage a été effectué pour effacer les adresses de routage obsolètes. * À la suite d'une enquête qui a confirmé la cause profonde, une correction garantissant que les adresses de routage interne dépassées sont correctement retirées a été déployée sur tous les serveurs d'édition dans le monde le 25 août 2026 à 22h00 UTC.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 14 août 2026 à 14:29 UTCresolved

   De 13h55 à 14h15 UTC, les utilisateurs du monde entier ont peut-être connu des erreurs avec un échec sur Publish, et les messages publiés peuvent ne pas avoir été reçus par les abonnés. Nous avons également connu des erreurs et des échecs avec les fonctions PubNub, et des retards avec Events & Actions pendant la période. Les services sont revenus à la normale et nous sommes activement surveillés. Une analyse des causes profondes sera publiée dans les prochains jours. Si vous croyez que vous avez été touché et que vous souhaitez nous parler, veuillez signaler l'impact à [email protected].

2. 20 août 2026 à 16:57 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution**  At approximately **13:55 UTC on Aug 14, 2026**, we observed elevated publish errors and message replication failures in our publish/subscribe service, which also caused latency in other PubNub services globally. Customers may have experienced increased publish error rates, delayed or missed message delivery, delayed message persistence, and increased latency for Functions and Events & Actions workflows. ‌The root cause of the incident was an unusually large concentration of global publish traffic that was not limited by our throttling layers. That traffic created resource pressure in the publish and replication layers, increased load on storage systems, and caused downstream processing delays in dependent services. We mitigated the issue by adjusting targeted traffic controls, increasing capacity for affected publish and replication components, and isolating the high-volume traffic pattern to reduce broader platform impact. The issue was resolved at approximately **14:15 UTC on Aug 14, 2026**. ‌This issue occurred because of an issue with our automated controls specific to this exceptional traffic pattern. As a result, the increased load affected multiple services before a mitigation could be fully applied.  ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, we have isolated the identified high-volume traffic pattern onto dedicated infrastructure and also increased baseline capacity for the affected components across our PoPs. We are also further strengthening our traffic detection and management processes for this exceptional load pattern so it will be identified and contained earlier without cascading impact across dependent services.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 10 juin 2026 à 20:14 UTCinvestigating

   Starting at 17:00 UTC on June 10, a subset of publishes originating from the North America POP failed to replicate to subscribers globally. PubNub Technical Staff is investigating, and more information will be posted as it becomes available.

2. 10 juin 2026 à 20:27 UTCmonitoring

   The PubNub Technical Staff identified that failures are limited to publishes from US-East and has identified, have applied a fix, and are now monitoring the results. If you are experiencing issues that you believe to be related to this incident, please report the details to PubNub Support ([email protected]).

3. 10 juin 2026 à 20:45 UTCresolved

   Services have returned to normal. A root cause analysis will be published in the coming days. If you believe you were impacted and would like to speak with us, please report impact to [email protected].

4. 15 juin 2026 à 23:58 UTCpostmortem

   ## Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution  At 19:50 UTC on June 10, 2026, we observed a small fraction of publishes originating from US-EAST-1 failing to replicate to subscribers globally. We removed the degraded publisher pod from service and the issue was resolved at 21:21 UTC on June 10, 2026.  The root cause of the incident was triggered by a single process that fell into a degraded state where it continued receiving inbound traffic and passing health checks, but traffic sent outbound from the process was failing at an abnormally high rate. Our automated health check/recovery system did not auto-detect and replace the degraded process because its health check API reported itself as healthy.  ## Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures  To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, we are improving the data within our health check APIs to return more complete performance metrics over a rolling time window. We are enhancing the issue detection logic to detect more patterns that infer process failure, even if the process itself is reporting as healthy.

1. 9 juin 2026 à 14:00 UTCresolved

   From 13:20 to 13:48 UTC, users globally may have experienced errors with failure on Publish, and published messages may not have been received by subscribers. We also experienced errors and failures with PubNub Functions, and delays with Events & Actions during the period. Services have returned to normal and we are actively monitoring. A root cause analysis will be published in the coming days. If you believe you were impacted and would like to speak with us, please report impact to [email protected].

2. 12 juin 2026 à 18:31 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution**  At approximately **13:20 UTC on June 9, 2026**, we observed elevated publish errors and message replication failures in our publish/subscribe service, which also caused latency in other PubNub services globally. Customers may have experienced increased publish error rates, delayed or missed message delivery, delayed message persistence, and increased latency for Functions and Events & Actions workflows. ‌ The root cause of the incident was an unusually large concentration of global publish traffic that was not limited by our throttling layers. That traffic created resource pressure in the publish and replication layers, increased load on storage systems, and caused downstream processing delays in dependent services. We mitigated the issue by adjusting targeted traffic controls, increasing capacity for affected publish and replication components, and isolating the high-volume traffic pattern to reduce broader platform impact. The issue was resolved at approximately **13:48 UTC on June 9, 2026**. ‌ This issue occurred because we did not have sufficient automated controls and isolation processes in place to protect shared infrastructure from this type of exceptional traffic pattern. As a result, the increased load affected multiple services before mitigation could be fully applied.  ‌ ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, we have isolated the identified high-volume traffic pattern onto dedicated infrastructure and also increased baseline capacity for the affected components across our PoPs. ‌ We are also further strengthening our traffic detection and management processes for exceptional load patterns so they can be identified and contained earlier without cascading impact across dependent services.

1. 24 mars 2026 à 20:21 UTCinvestigating

   As of 19:27 UTC, we are investigating reports of connectivity issues affecting a subset of subscriptions across several global regions. While the majority of the PubNub network is operating normally, users on the affected segment may experience: - Connection delays and increased latency. - Intermittent errors when subscribing to channels. Our engineering team has identified the cause and is actively working to restore stability. We will provide updates as soon as more information is available.

2. 24 mars 2026 à 21:12 UTCresolved

   The incident has been resolved. If you believe you were impacted by the incident and wish to discuss it with our team, please contact us by email at [email protected]

3. 25 mars 2026 à 22:35 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution**  On March 24, 2026, at 19:27 UTC, one network shard experienced intermittent connectivity affecting a subset of customers. The affected users may have experienced elevated latency and temporary error responses related to their subscription requests. The instability was caused by an atypical surge in message volume within a shared processing environment that had improperly configured resource limits. This led to high resource utilization and triggered automated system restarts. PubNub Engineering resolved the issue by implementing the proper limits after expanding infrastructure capacity to accommodate the increased load. Service was fully stabilized once the environment was tuned to the new traffic profile. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures**  **Infrastructure Tuning:** Adjusted automated scaling parameters to provide greater headroom for rapid traffic fluctuations. **Enhanced Traffic Management:** Deployed refined monitoring heuristics to better isolate and manage high-volume traffic patterns without impacting shared resources. **Dynamic Resource Allocation:** Accelerating the rollout of enhanced vertical scaling technology to allow individual processing nodes to adapt more fluidly to demand spikes. **Operational Coordination:** Strengthening internal protocols for high-capacity events to ensure large-scale traffic shifts are proactively transitioned to dedicated environments.

1. 1 janvier 2026 à 00:25 UTCinvestigating

   Starting at 12:13AM GMT, we began seeing delays in published messages being written to history storage. Users may be unable to access recently stored messages through History API calls. The messages will eventually be published. Our engineers are actively working to address the issue and we will provide updates here. If you feel your service has been impacted and you would like to discuss, please email [email protected].

2. 1 janvier 2026 à 00:44 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been applied and we are monitoring the results. Published messages waiting on queue to be written to history have now been successfully written. We will continue to monitor for the next 15 minutes.

3. 1 janvier 2026 à 01:00 UTCresolved

   The incident has been resolved. Published messages continue to be written to history storage normally. No messages were lost during the incident. If you believe you were impacted by the incident and wish to discuss it with our team, please contact us by email at [email protected]

4. 5 janvier 2026 à 17:01 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution**  On January 1, 2026 at 00:00 UTC, we observed elevated latency in our History service across multiple regions. Customers may have experienced delays in message persistence and history availability during this period. The issue was caused by a mismatch in newly created persistence tables. Specifically, required columns for message metadata were missing from the new tables, resulting in failed write operations and backed-up queues. This created downstream pressure on our storage systems, leading to higher latency in history processing. We mitigated the issue by manually applying the correct updates across all affected persistence spaces. After the updates were applied, message processing returned to normal and queue latency cleared. This issue occurred because we did not have proper controls in place to ensure schema consistency for newly generated monthly persistence tables. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures**  To resolve the issue, we manually applied the required schema updates globally. In the coming days, we will update our change management processes to ensure schema changes are correctly applied to all future monthly tables. We are also auditing our schema tracking and automating validation to prevent inconsistencies across environments. These improvements will ensure that future table generation includes all necessary columns and reduce the risk of similar issues impacting History service performance.

1. 20 novembre 2025 à 17:36 UTCresolved

   Increased errors (5XX) observed On Nov. 20, 2025 between 16:36 UTC and 16:48 UTC, publish and replication errors (5xx) were observed in North American and Asia Pacific regions, and immediately resolved. Please contact [email protected] if you believe you were impacted by the issue and would like to discuss it with our team.

2. 25 novembre 2025 à 01:05 UTCpostmortem

   **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** Starting at 16:46 UTC on Nov. 20, 2025, we noticed a small number of errors with the publish API in the North American and Asia Pacific regions. The system automatically recovered with all functionality fully restored by 16:50 UTC on Nov. 20, 2025.

1. 20 octobre 2025 à 13:37 UTCinvestigating

   Beginning at 12:40 UTC, we observed increased latency and errors in our US-West region for multiple services. PubNub Technical Staff is currently investigating, and more updates will follow once available.

2. 20 octobre 2025 à 13:47 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 20 octobre 2025 à 14:21 UTCinvestigating

   Apologies, but we are continuing to investigate this issue.

4. 20 octobre 2025 à 15:13 UTCidentified

   We are still working with our infrastructure provider to mitigate the effects of the ongoing issues. We have been monitoring and handling traffic to minimize disruptions. While points of presence in the US may see slightly higher latencies, we are stable. Please reach out to PubNub support to report issues.

5. 20 octobre 2025 à 16:43 UTCidentified

   We are still stable, but seeing minor issues. We are still working with our infrastructure provider to address the remaining issues. Please reach out to PubNub support with any issues.

6. 20 octobre 2025 à 17:25 UTCmonitoring

   PubNub remains stable and fully operational. Our infrastructure provider is continuing to apply mitigation steps to restore normal health across their network and related services. We are closely monitoring the situation and coordinating with them to ensure continued stability. Please reach out to PubNub Support if you experience any service issues.

7. 20 octobre 2025 à 17:25 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

8. 20 octobre 2025 à 18:00 UTCidentified

   PubNub continues to remains stable, with only minor issues being observed. Our infrastructure provider is making progress in restoring their services, with early signs of recovery in several regions. We continue to work closely with them as they complete mitigations across the remaining areas. Please reach out to PubNub Support if you experience any impact.

9. 20 octobre 2025 à 18:37 UTCidentified

   PubNub remains stable, with only minor issues being observed. Our infrastructure provider is making progress in restoring their services, with early signs of recovery in several regions. We continue to work closely with them as they complete mitigations across the remaining areas. Please reach out to PubNub Support if you experience any impact.

10. 20 octobre 2025 à 19:06 UTCidentified

    Our status is the same: stable, and working with our infrastructure provider to restore services to their normal state. Our normal policy is to update every 30 minutes, but we will stop issuing this status; we will update this page when a change to the status occurs. As always, reach out to PubNub support with any issues.

11. 20 octobre 2025 à 20:25 UTCmonitoring

    PubNub remains stable, and our infrastructure provider continues to make steady progress in restoring services. System performance and reliability are improving, and functionality across affected components is returning to normal levels. We continue to monitor closely and will share additional updates as recovery progresses. We will provide another update when there are any changes in status which we expect within the hour. Please contact PubNub Support if you experience any impact.

12. 20 octobre 2025 à 22:32 UTCmonitoring

    PubNub remains stable, and our infrastructure provider has restored normal service capacity. Systems are now operating at pre-event levels, and most dependent services are performing as expected. We continue to monitor closely and will share further updates as needed. Please contact PubNub Support if you experience any impact.

13. 20 octobre 2025 à 23:48 UTCresolved

    This incident has been fully resolved. Our infrastructure provider has restored normal operations, and all systems are functioning as expected. Service performance and reliability have returned to pre-event levels. PubNub continues to monitor systems closely to ensure ongoing stability and we will provide an RCA in in the next couple of day. Thank you for your patience and understanding throughout this event. If you experience any further issues, please reach out to PubNub Support.

14. 27 octobre 2025 à 18:33 UTCpostmortem

    ### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution**  On October 20th, 2025 at 07:06 UTC, our monitoring systems alerted us to elevated error levels across multiple PubNub services in the IAD region \(US-East\). Some customers may have experienced increased error rates and latency, as well as intermittent issues with Presence service availability across IAD \(US-East\), SJC \(US-West\), and HND \(AP-Northeast\). We quickly determined the issue was caused by a broader infrastructure outage affecting our cloud provider \(AWS\) in the IAD region. We initiated regional failover procedures and re-routed new connections to alternate regions. However, due to undefined steps in some of our failover processes and delays accessing some tools due to the provider issue, existing connections for some services remained degraded for longer than expected. To restore full service, we manually reset established connections, re-routed Presence traffic to Frankfurt \(EU-Central\), and brought on additional infrastructure in other regions to absorb traffic. Errors were mitigated by 09:20 UTC. Later in the day, additional regional load in US-West triggered a new wave of service degradation. We responded by isolating the US-East region again and scaling up balancer capacity in US-West. PubNub services were stabilized by 13:20 UTC, and remained in a monitoring state while our infrastructure provider worked to fully resolve the underlying issue. By 22:35 UTC, our provider reported full restoration of service. After validating stability in US-East, we completed rebalancing traffic by 23:48 UTC, and declared the incident resolved. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures**  While this incident was caused by an external infrastructure outage, we’ve identified several opportunities to strengthen our internal readiness and response procedures. We are consolidating and centralizing our regional failover procedures to ensure they are immediately accessible and complete for all production services. Any gaps in our process documentation for newer services will be addressed to ensure readiness before they are fully adopted into production. Additionally, we are reviewing and resolving issues with internal tooling, including inventory and DNS resolution problems, which made mitigation more difficult during the incident. These improvements will ensure faster and more consistent responses to future infrastructure-level disruptions, and reduce potential impact on customer traffic across regions.

1. 20 octobre 2025 à 07:32 UTCinvestigating

   At approximately 07:02 UTC, PubNub services began experiencing elevated latencies and server errors in the US-West and US-East regions. PubNub Technical Staff is currently investigating, and more updates will follow once available.

2. 20 octobre 2025 à 07:58 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 20 octobre 2025 à 08:45 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 20 octobre 2025 à 09:19 UTCresolved

   With no further issues observed for the past 30 minutes, the incident has been resolved. We will follow up soon with a root cause analysis. If you believe you experienced an impact related to this incident, please report it to PubNub Support at [email protected].

5. 27 octobre 2025 à 18:21 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution**  On October 20th, 2025 at 07:06 UTC, our monitoring systems alerted us to elevated error levels across multiple PubNub services in the IAD region \(US-East\). Some customers may have experienced increased error rates and latency, as well as intermittent issues with Presence service availability across IAD \(US-East\), SJC \(US-West\), and HND \(AP-Northeast\). We quickly determined the issue was caused by a broader infrastructure outage affecting our cloud provider \(AWS\) in the IAD region. We initiated regional failover procedures and re-routed new connections to alternate regions. However, due to undefined steps in some of our failover processes and delays accessing some tools due to the provider issue, existing connections for some services remained degraded for longer than expected. To restore full service, we manually reset established connections, re-routed Presence traffic to Frankfurt \(EU-Central\), and brought on additional infrastructure in other regions to absorb traffic. Errors were mitigated by 09:20 UTC. Later in the day, additional regional load in US-West triggered a new wave of service degradation. We responded by isolating the US-East region again and scaling up balancer capacity in US-West. PubNub services were stabilized by 13:20 UTC, and remained in a monitoring state while our infrastructure provider worked to fully resolve the underlying issue. By 22:35 UTC, our provider reported full restoration of service. After validating stability in US-East, we completed rebalancing traffic by 23:48 UTC, and declared the incident resolved. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures**  While this incident was caused by an external infrastructure outage, we’ve identified several opportunities to strengthen our internal readiness and response procedures. We are consolidating and centralizing our regional failover procedures to ensure they are immediately accessible and complete for all production services. Any gaps in our process documentation for newer services will be addressed to ensure readiness before they are fully adopted into production. Additionally, we are reviewing and resolving issues with internal tooling, including inventory and DNS resolution problems, which made mitigation more difficult during the incident. These improvements will ensure faster and more consistent responses to future infrastructure-level disruptions, and reduce potential impact on customer traffic across regions.

1. 17 octobre 2025 à 06:42 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an incident that could lead to some missed messages by subscribers in the IAD region. All messages are being received and persisted, and can be retrieved from the Storage service. This incident started around 22:07 UTC (03:07 PDT) on 16th Oct 2025. We suspect a moderate impact. Please report any impact related to this incident to [email protected] with any details that you can provide.

2. 17 octobre 2025 à 06:48 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 17 octobre 2025 à 07:08 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 17 octobre 2025 à 08:06 UTCresolved

   There have been no further issues for the past 45 minutes. We are resolving this issue, and we will follow up with a post-mortem soon.

5. 22 octobre 2025 à 22:20 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution**  On October 17, 2025 at 04:51 UTC, some customers may have experienced elevated latency and error rates with the Pub/Sub service in the IAD region \(US-East\). Our engineering teams began immediate investigation and identified a spike in errors related to a recent update to the Pub/Sub service. We began formal incident response and initiated rollback of the service deployment shortly thereafter. The issue was fully resolved by 06:50 UTC, and rollback across all regions was completed by 08:00 UTC. The issue occurred because a misconfiguration in the release caused incorrect behavior in the channel cleanup logic. Additionally, our alerting configuration did not include coverage for the synthetic test failures that would have surfaced this issue sooner, delaying detection. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures**  To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, our engineering teams have written a simpler and more reliable replacement for the faulty logic. That code is currently undergoing rigorous testing before being reintroduced in a future release. We are also addressing the lack of proper alerting that contributed to a delayed response. Synthetic tests have been reviewed, and appropriate alerting will be implemented to ensure similar regressions are detected earlier. In parallel, we are updating our development and testing processes to catch such issues before code reaches production. Lastly, we are conducting a refresher training on our incident response process to ensure faster execution and coordination in the future.

1. 6 octobre 2025 à 10:13 UTCinvestigating

   At about 08:40 UTC, the Event & Action publish operation began to experience elevated error rates. Our Technical Staff is actively investigating, and more information will be posted as it becomes available. If you are experiencing issues that you believe are related to this incident, please report the details to PubNub Support ([email protected]).

2. 6 octobre 2025 à 10:34 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 6 octobre 2025 à 10:36 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 6 octobre 2025 à 11:00 UTCresolved

   With no further issues observed, the incident has been resolved. We will follow up soon with a root cause analysis. If you believe you experienced an impact related to this incident, please report it to PubNub Support at [email protected].

5. 6 octobre 2025 à 20:37 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution**  At 08:40 UTC on October 6, 2025, we observed elevated error rates in the Events & Actions service in our EU-Central \(FRA\) region, which led to delays in processing publish-triggered events. Some customers may have experienced slower-than-expected execution of their event workflows during this time. We identified a malformed payload that was causing backend consumers to fail when attempting to process the queue. We deployed an updated build with improved parsing logic, which cleared the blockage and restored normal service. The issue was fully resolved by 11:00 UTC on October 6, 2025. This issue occurred because our event processing service did not correctly handle a malformed message format, which caused the processing queue to stall. Additionally, the alerting system in place was not configured to detect this failure mode promptly, delaying our response. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures**  To reduce the risk of similar delays in the future, we are refining our alert thresholds and naming conventions to improve early detection and clarity during response. We are also reviewing validation logic to ensure malformed messages are consistently isolated before reaching backend queues.

1. 7 septembre 2025 à 18:45 UTCmonitoring

   We experienced increased latencies and error rates in our Tokyo, San Jose, and Virginia points-of-presence from 18:14 - 18:17 UTC. A fix was deployed and we are monitoring the situation.

2. 7 septembre 2025 à 19:02 UTCresolved

   The issues affected the Presence service from 18:14 - 18:17 UTC. We will follow up with a post-mortem soon. We apologize for the impact this may have had on your service. Please reach out to us by contacting PubNub Support ([email protected]) if you wish to discuss the impact on your service.

3. 12 septembre 2025 à 23:19 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution**  At 18:14 UTC on September 7, 2025 we observed increased error rates and latency for our Presence service in our San Jose, Virginia, and Tokyo regions. We increased capacity in those regions and the issue was resolved at 18:17 UTC. This issue was a recurrence of the issue [experienced on September 2, 2025](https://status.pubnub.com/incidents/1n8xk6w5y9lk), where a bug in one of our APIs allowed a request to execute an operation that exceeded assumed limits in extreme cases, causing out-of-memory conditions for the Presence service. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures**  In the previous instance of this issue, we placed restrictions on the API in question; those changes were not restrictive enough, which allowed for this recurrence. We have corrected that oversight, as well as increased memory capacities in this area of our system as an additional safeguard.

1. 2 septembre 2025 à 18:34 UTCmonitoring

   At about 11:09, the Presence began to experience elevated latencies and error rates. PubNub Technical Staff is investigating and more information will be posted as it becomes available. If you are experiencing issues that you believe to be related to this incident, please report the details to PubNub Support ([email protected]).

2. 2 septembre 2025 à 18:50 UTCresolved

   The issues affected the Presence service from 18:08 to 18:16 UTC. We will follow up with a post-mortem soon. We apologize for the impact this may have had on your service. Please reach out to us by contacting PubNub Support ([email protected]) if you wish to discuss the impact on your service.

3. 5 septembre 2025 à 22:27 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution**  At 18:09 UTC on September 2, 2025 we observed increased error rates and latency for our Presence service in our San Jose, Virginia, and Tokyo regions. We increased capacity in those regions and the issue was resolved at 18:16 UTC. This issue occurred because a bug in one of our APIs allowed a request to execute an operation that exceeded assumed limits in extreme cases. In this case, a large number of such requests were executed that resulted in out-of-memory conditions for the Presence service. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures**  To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future we have enforced the intended limit on the API in question. We have also added additional testing and monitoring in this area.

1. 31 juillet 2025 à 22:14 UTCinvestigating

   We have detected elevated error levels with the Presence service in multiple regions. Our Engineers are actively working to mitigate the issues and return service to normal levels. We will provide updates here. If you believe you have been impacted by the issue, please report impact to [email protected].

2. 31 juillet 2025 à 22:36 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented. We will provide updates here as progress is made.

3. 31 juillet 2025 à 22:44 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 31 juillet 2025 à 23:14 UTCresolved

   With no further issues observed, the incident has been resolved. We will follow up soon with a root cause analysis. If you believe you experienced an impact related to this incident, please report it to PubNub Support at [email protected].

5. 4 août 2025 à 15:26 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution**  On August 1, 2025 at 22:15 UTC, we observed elevated 5xx errors across the Presence service in multiple regions. Customers may have experienced intermittent failures when attempting to receive or update presence messages. We identified a subset of channels exhibiting highly concentrated activity patterns and applied a targeted configuration change to rebalance traffic across the cluster. The issue was resolved by 23:15 UTC on August 1, 2025. This issue occurred because our infrastructure lacked proactive safeguards to evenly distribute presence traffic across nodes in scenarios where a small number of channels receive a disproportionately high number of presence updates. This resulted in resource saturation on some nodes without triggering early mitigation. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures**  To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, we have applied a sharding configuration to affected channel patterns, which redistributes load more evenly across infrastructure components. This approach reduces the risk of overload caused by concentrated traffic. In the coming days we will be: * Reviewing long-term suitability of the sharding configuration applied during this incident. * Investigating automation options for dynamically applying sharding logic based on real-time usage patterns. * Enhancing internal tooling and monitoring to better detect and respond to load imbalance scenarios before they cause service degradation.

1. 26 juillet 2025 à 00:16 UTCresolved

   Between 15:33-15:59 UTC we observed elevated levels of latency and errors with our presence service in our FRA region. The issue has been resolved and remains stable. We apologize for the impact this may have had on your service. Please reach out to us by contacting PubNub Support ([email protected]) if you wish to discuss the impact on your service.

2. 26 juillet 2025 à 00:19 UTCpostmortem

   ### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution**  At 14:43 UTC on July 22, 2025, we observed elevated latency and service degradation in our Presence system in the FRA region, impacting customers' ability to receive timely presence events. We implemented changes in our infrastructure to mitigate the pressure on the system, and the incident ended at 15:06 UTC on July 22, 2025. Unfortunately, before we were able to conclusively determine and address the root cause, the issue re-occurred from 15:33 to 15:59 UTC on July 24, 2025. The failures started with an out-of-memory condition in some Presence service nodes. The root cause of the memory condition was a caching system—operated by a third-party vendor—that we rely heavily on for this service began responding slowly at first, and later timing out. While nodes that run into critical issues are generally taken out of service and replaced automatically, this issue began affecting our system faster than new capacity could be brought online to mitigate the incident. Furthermore, a bug in a downstream internal system caused it to also experience failures under the pressure due to a misconfiguration in how it retried failed requests caused by the Presence system’s issues. On the 22nd, we took manual action to break the retry cycle, scale capacity, and allow the Presence service to recover. On the 24th, we identified and addressed the root cause at the caching layer. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures**  In the short term, we have scaled the capacity of the Presence system and we implemented changes in the affected caching layer to mitigate the issue of the vendor-provided cache system. Longer term, we are working with the vendor to fix their underlying issue, while also exploring alternatives. We also changed the retry configuration to prevent this kind of retry storm from happening again. We implemented monitoring and alerts for this failure mode, to allow us to more quickly identify this kind of issue.