Historique des pannes de Smarty

1. 26 septembre 2026 à 15:51 UTCmonitoring

   À 15 h 23 UTC, nous avons commencé à enquêter sur les rapports selon lesquels certains services n'étaient pas disponibles de façon intermittente. Le service a depuis été entièrement restauré et tous les systèmes fonctionnent normalement. Nous suivons de près et continuons d'étudier la cause profonde.

2. 26 septembre 2026 à 16:49 UTCresolved

   L'incident a été résolu. Nous menons une enquête plus approfondie pour découvrir la cause profonde.

3. 28 septembre 2026 à 19:03 UTCpostmortem

   **Résumé des événements** Le 26 septembre, 2026, de 15:28 à 15:39 UTC, les demandes à nos API ont échoué sporadiquement. Une grande partie des demandes ont été rejetées pendant plusieurs minutes. Quelques régions ont brièvement récupéré une capacité partielle à 15 h 30 UTC. Ce qui s'est passé : un serveur d'un système interne dont dépendent nos balanceurs de charge est sorti de l'espace disque, mais n'a pas échoué correctement à un nœud pair. Lorsque ce système a cessé de répondre, divers équilibreurs de charge dans les régions ont commencé à redémarrer automatiquement. Nos ingénieurs ont déplacé le système affecté vers un serveur sain à 15h37 UTC, et le service a été entièrement restauré par 15h39 UTC. Ce que nous faisons: nous avons augmenté la capacité du disque et changé la conservation du journal sur le système affecté de sorte qu'il ne peut pas manquer de l'espace de cette façon à nouveau. Nous changeons également la façon dont nos balanceurs de charge se comportent lorsque ce système n'est pas disponible, de sorte qu'ils continuent de servir le trafic au lieu d'arrêter, et nous ajoutons des alertes qui auraient attrapé le problème avant qu'il ne vous affecte.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 10 septembre 2026 à 20:14 UTCinvestigating

   Nous enquêtons actuellement sur les questions de Login et espérons avoir une résolution sous peu. Les API produits ne sont pas affectées et sont pleinement opérationnelles.

2. 10 septembre 2026 à 20:18 UTCinvestigating

   Nous continuons d'enquêter sur cette question.

3. 10 septembre 2026 à 22:37 UTCresolved

   La question a été réglée. Le seul service touché était le Portail de gestion de compte. Cet incident n'a PAS affecté le trafic de production vers nos API (vérification d'adresse, autocomplète, géocodage, etc.)

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 19 août 2026 à 00:49 UTCinvestigating

   Un petit nombre d'erreurs intermittentes de 503 pour l'API [Adresse] de US Street affectent quelques requêtes. Cette question fait actuellement l ' objet d ' une enquête.

2. 19 août 2026 à 21:13 UTCresolved

   Cet incident a été résolu.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 21 juillet 2026 à 22:30 UTCidentified

   À partir de 19h00 UTC, l'entrée inattendue se traduit par un petit pourcentage de demandes qui retournent 503 codes de réponse de l'API de l'adresse municipale américaine. La résolution est en cours, et une mise à jour sera affichée sur cette page une fois qu'elle sera terminée.

2. 21 juillet 2026 à 22:33 UTCidentified

   Nous continuons de travailler sur une solution à ce problème.

3. 21 juillet 2026 à 22:56 UTCmonitoring

   Un correctif a été mis en place et est en cours de déploiement pour la flotte. Nous surveillons les résultats.

4. 21 juillet 2026 à 23:10 UTCmonitoring

   Le déploiement est terminé. Nous continuons de surveiller.

5. 22 juillet 2026 à 00:34 UTCresolved

   Cet incident a été résolu.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 3 juin 2026 à 20:17 UTCresolved

   SUMMARY We are rotating the Let's Encrypt intermediate certificates used to issue the TLS certificates that secure our services. Our certificates will continue to chain to the same trusted root — ISRG Root X1 — but through Let's Encrypt's new "Generation Y" intermediate hierarchy. For the vast majority of customers, no action is required. If your systems validate our certificates against the public root store — the default for virtually all browsers, operating systems, and HTTP client libraries — this change is completely transparent. The only customers who may be affected are those who pin a specific Let's Encrypt intermediate certificate. WHY WE'RE MAKING THIS CHANGE The intermediate certificates currently in our chain are approaching the end of their lifecycle, with the existing intermediate path expiring in approximately nine months. Rotating well ahead of that deadline guarantees uninterrupted certificate issuance and renewal with no disruption to your integrations. THE CHAIN OF TRUST A TLS certificate is never validated on its own. It is verified through a chain that links the connection back to a root certificate your device already trusts. Today, our certificates chain like this: Your connection → Smarty leaf certificate → Let's Encrypt intermediate → ISRG Root X1 After this update, they will chain like this: Your connection → Smarty leaf certificate → Let's Encrypt Generation Y intermediate (YR / YE) → ISRG Root YR / YE → ISRG Root X1 (via cross-sign) The destination is unchanged. Both the old and new paths terminate at ISRG Root X1, the RSA root that ships in every current major trust store. Let's Encrypt cross-signed its new Generation Y roots with the existing X1 and X2 roots specifically so that anything already trusting X1 continues to work without modification. The path is longer; the anchor of trust is identical.

1. 24 avril 2026 à 17:39 UTCresolved

   At 00:00 UTC on April 17, A scheduled certificate renewal updated the CA chain served by api.smartystreets.com. The change was made without advance notice to integrators, and the new chain is anchored by Sectigo roots (USERTrust ECC Certification Authority and USERTrust RSA Certification Authority) that are not present in some older trust stores. Clients on current operating systems, browsers, and runtimes continue to work without change. Connections may fail for systems that: - Use a custom or pinned TLS trust bundle that does not include USERTrust ECC Certification Authority. - Run Java 8 installations predating update 51 (mid-2015) or earlier Java versions — these do not ship USERTrust ECC Certification Authority in the default cacerts keystore. - Run other environments with outdated trust stores, including older Android devices, legacy embedded and IoT hardware, and air-gapped systems. To restore connectivity, affected systems should either update to a current runtime or add the Sectigo roots (USERTrust ECC Certification Authority and USERTrust RSA Certification Authority) to their trust store. Please reach out to support for assistance.

1. 16 mars 2026 à 22:35 UTCresolved

   Around 22:00 UTC the US [Address] Autocomplete Pro API service in one of our datacenters went offline due to a misconfiguration. The problem was quickly identified and rectified. All other datacenters were unaffected.

1. 6 mars 2026 à 17:59 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an increase in 503 Service Unavailable errors. We will provide an update as soon as more information is available.

2. 6 mars 2026 à 21:16 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been identified and we are currently monitoring overall system health.

3. 10 mars 2026 à 15:58 UTCresolved

   The issue has been resolved. A small number of nodes experienced large memory consumption which resulted in a few 503 errors being returned. This has been resolved and measures have been put in place to mitigate this in the future. Additional alerts and monitors have also been put in place.

1. 18 février 2026 à 00:40 UTCresolved

   Around 19:15 UTC an incorrect configuration was deploy to our US Extract API service. The problem was quickly detected and reverted.

1. 27 novembre 2025 à 00:32 UTCmonitoring

   We've identified an issue affecting one of our redundant facilities. As a precaution, it has been taken out of active rotation while we investigate.

2. 1 décembre 2025 à 17:07 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 30 octobre 2025 à 22:36 UTCmonitoring

   During a routine data deployment, we noticed a brief spike in 5xx error responses. Systems have since stabilized, and we're investigating the root cause to confirm the issue is fully resolved and to prevent similar behavior in future deployments.

2. 4 novembre 2025 à 15:35 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 18 juillet 2025 à 16:25 UTCresolved

   We have become aware that Google services have been exhibiting some intermittent failures. As a result, anyone using "Login with Google" to access their account dashboard on our website may also experience a failure to login. When Google is able to resolve the issues they are having, the login will continue to work as normal. In the meantime, if you have created a username and password, you should be able to use those to login.

1. 15 mai 2025 à 14:32 UTCresolved

   We discovered that the "API Keys" page in our Account dashboard web site was not able to retrieve the lists of keys from the backend service. This has now been fixed.

1. 18 mars 2025 à 22:11 UTCresolved

   Around 19:10 UTC, increased traffic exposed resource limitations caused by a previously implemented algorithm update, leading to issues on several servers hosting some of our services (US Street API, US Extract API) in one of our data centers due to insufficient RAM. To ensure stability and service reliability, the affected servers have been decommissioned and replaced with upgraded hardware.

1. 26 février 2025 à 20:31 UTCresolved

   The US Enrichment API intermittently returned HTTP 500 codes in a single data center on 2025 February 26 around 17:00 UTC. The issue has been resolved as of 17:35 UTC.

1. 7 février 2025 à 21:15 UTCresolved

   Around 18:00 UTC, one of our facilities experienced a network routing issue that lasted for about 30 minutes. The facility was removed from DNS rotation until the network issue had been resolved. If you have not yet read through our "Technical Requirements" and "Best Practices" documentation, this could be a good opportunity to become familiar with those important and helpful documents. - https://www.smarty.com/docs/cloud/requirements#retry - https://www.smarty.com/docs/cloud/best-practices

1. 10 janvier 2025 à 21:12 UTCresolved

   From 01/08 12pm UTC to 01/09 9am UTC some requests to the US Street [Address] API instances experienced an intermittent issue with certain malformed addresses that caused some requests to not get a response, returning HTTP 503 errors to those requests. This affected a small number of requests and the error has since been resolved.

1. 30 décembre 2024 à 22:32 UTCresolved

   During a regular upgrade of our control plane, several controller nodes became unresponsive. This resulted in various routing issues which were manifest by intermittent HTTP 503 errors visible in the HTTP response to some callers. Our monitoring systems alerted our Operations Engineering Team of the anomaly and, as a result, the affected cluster, located in our US Central region (Chicago), was immediately removed from production rotation. The affected cluster has been restored to full health by provisioning new cloud resources using our IaC (infrastructure as code) systems. Following this, the cluster was confirmed to be was healthy via our automated monitoring and was subsequently re-introduced into active rotation.

1. 20 décembre 2024 à 16:11 UTCresolved

   On 2024 December 19, around 22-24:00 UTC, some users may have received the HTTP 299 code in response to requests from one of our loadbalancers. The reason for this response has been identified and remediated. We would like to take this opportunity to remind our users to familiarize themselves with our best practices. https://www.smarty.com/docs/cloud/best-practices

1. 9 décembre 2024 à 19:45 UTCresolved

   Around 15:00 (3pm) UTC on 2024 November 28, a single IP address at one of our datacenters experienced a routing issue that caused some requests to be "null routed", which may have resulted in some clients experiencing 500 level errors during that time. This issue persisted until 17:00 (5pm) UTC on 2024 November 28, at which time our upstream provider resolved the issue. Our recommendation to clients to mitigate an issue such as this in the future is to maintain a pool of active TCP connections to the server nodes and to only send traffic over active, healthy TCP connections. Then a background "thread" (or programmatic equivalent) could attempt to connect to the suspect IPv4 address. Once that connection has determined to be healthy, regular traffic can be resumed over that TCP connection.