Historique des pannes de Spreedly

1. 2 septembre 2026 à 15:11 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly a détecté un problème pouvant entraîner une dégradation des performances sur les API transactionnelles. Alors que nous fournissons une notification rapide afin de vous alerter le plus rapidement possible, nous enquêtons encore sur la portée et l'impact réels et fournirons une mise à jour dès que plus de détails sont disponibles. Merci de votre patience.

2. 2 septembre 2026 à 15:57 UTCmonitoring

   Nous travaillons à résoudre un décalage de performance affectant certains processus de paiement (notamment l'achat, la capture et la création de méthodes de paiement) liés à la maintenance récente de la base de données. Une solution est en cours et notre équipe surveille activement le système. Veuillez vérifier ici les mises à jour en temps réel.

3. 2 septembre 2026 à 21:32 UTCresolved

   Cet incident a été résolu.

4. 9 septembre 2026 à 21:50 UTCpostmortem

   ### 9 septembre 2026 — Taux d'erreur élevés affectant le traitement des transactions Résumé de haut niveau Le 2 septembre 2026, entre 14:35 et 15:19 UTC, Spreedly a connu une période de taux d'erreur élevés affectant un sous-ensemble de demandes de transaction entre les paramètres. Le problème a duré environ 44 minutes et a été causé par un problème d'infrastructure avec notre plateforme de base de données. Notre équipe a identifié et résolu le problème le même jour. Ce qui s'est passé Lors d'une mise à jour de routine du schéma, un défaut dans notre plate-forme de base de données sous-jacente a fait que l'un de nos nœuds de base de données est devenu indisponible. Cela a temporairement réduit la redondance d'une partie de nos données de transaction, ce qui a conduit certaines demandes à sortir ou à recevoir une réponse d'erreur système \(HTTP 500\) au lieu de traiter normalement. Notre équipe a travaillé directement avec notre fournisseur de base de données pour identifier la cause fondamentale et confirmer la récupération complète de l'infrastructure touchée. Prochaines étapes Nous avons identifié la cause sous-jacente comme un problème connu dans le logiciel de notre fournisseur de base de données. Un correctif fourni par le fournisseur doit être appliqué pendant la maintenance normale prévue. Parallèlement, nous ajoutons une surveillance supplémentaire pour détecter cette catégorie de problèmes plus tôt et ajustons nos procédures internes concernant les travaux de maintenance de la base de données afin de réduire davantage le risque d'un incident similaire à venir. - L'équipe Spreedly

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 14 août 2026 à 16:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an increase in 5xx errors on the Core Transactional API. Some transactions may be failing or returning unexpected error responses during this time. We will provide an update as soon as we have more information.

2. 14 août 2026 à 16:34 UTCresolved

   A fix has been implemented and error rates have returned to normal. Some transactions may have failed or returned errors during the affected window. We're continuing to monitor and will follow up with a more detailed post-incident summary.

3. 3 septembre 2026 à 20:55 UTCpostmortem

   ### Service Disruption on Transaction Endpoints ### ‌High Level Summary On August 14, 2026, Spreedly experienced a brief service disruption affecting some transaction-related API endpoints for approximately 20 minutes \(4:06 PM – 4:26 PM ET\). During this window, some requests to endpoints involving transaction lookups, captures, voids, credits, and payment method operations may have received error responses. The issue was identified and resolved quickly by our engineering team. ### What Happened A routine database schema update caused a subset of existing database connections to reference outdated schema information, resulting in intermittent errors on affected requests. Once identified, our team refreshed the affected database connections, which fully resolved the issue. ### Next Steps We are reviewing our schema migration process to add additional safeguards that will prevent this class of issue from recurring, and are improving automated testing coverage for this scenario. We have added auto-retry and recovery mechanisms so that if a connection does reference an outdated schema it will not affect transactions going forward.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 27 juillet 2026 à 13:50 UTCinvestigating

   Nous enquêtons actuellement sur cette question.

2. 27 juillet 2026 à 14:00 UTCidentified

   Le problème a été identifié et une solution est en cours de mise en oeuvre.

3. 27 juillet 2026 à 15:00 UTCmonitoring

   Spreedly a détecté un problème qui peut avoir eu une incidence sur la performance transactionnelle de base. Bien que le problème semble maintenant résolu, notre équipe surveille activement les systèmes afin d'assurer une stabilité continue. Nous fournirons une mise à jour finale lorsque notre enquête sur la portée et l'impact sera terminée. Continuez à suivre notre page d'état pour la dernière mise à jour.

4. 27 juillet 2026 à 21:41 UTCresolved

   Après une surveillance étroite et la confirmation que tous les systèmes sont stabilisés et fonctionnent comme prévu, cet incident est considéré résolu. Aucun autre impact client n'est attendu. Nous terminons notre enquête sur les causes de l'incident et sur tout impact résiduel. Nous nous excusons pour tout désagrément ou perturbation.

5. 3 septembre 2026 à 20:57 UTCpostmortem

   Résumé de haut niveau Le 27 juillet 2026, Spreedly a connu des erreurs intermittentes sur un sous-ensemble de demandes de transaction, y compris des achats, des autorisations et des webhooks. Ce qui s'est passé Une migration de base de données a mis à jour le schéma d'un service interne qui gère les méthodes de paiement stockées. Cela a causé des erreurs sur les connexions existantes faisant référence à un cache. Nous avons repoussé le changement et accéléré ces connexions, en résolvant complètement le problème. Prochaines étapes Nous sommes en train d'examiner notre processus de migration des schémas afin d'ajouter des garanties supplémentaires qui empêcheront cette catégorie de problèmes de se reproduire, et nous améliorons la couverture des tests automatisés pour ce scénario. Nous avons ajouté des mécanismes d'auto-répétition et de récupération de sorte que si une connexion fait référence à un schéma obsolète, elle n'affectera pas les transactions futures.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 11 juillet 2026 à 14:33 UTCinvestigating

   Nous enquêtons sur des taux d'erreur élevés affectant certaines demandes d'API. Certains paramètres de liste et de récupération peuvent renvoyer 500 réponses intermittentes pendant que nous travaillons à identifier la cause racine.

2. 11 juillet 2026 à 15:38 UTCresolved

   Nous avons identifié et résolu le problème, ce qui a provoqué 500 réponses intermittentes sur certaines listes et certains paramètres de récupération. Une mise à jour de la configuration a été déployée pour éviter que les demandes ne cessent prématurément, et nous continuons de surveiller le service.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 8 juillet 2026 à 15:22 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly a détecté un problème pouvant entraîner une dégradation des performances sur les transactions de crédit Cybersource. Alors que nous fournissons cette notification rapide afin de vous alerter le plus rapidement possible, nous enquêtons encore sur la portée et l'impact réels. Nous fournirons une mise à jour dès que plus de détails seront disponibles.

2. 8 juillet 2026 à 16:08 UTCidentified

   Nous avons identifié une erreur de résolution interne transitoire du DNS qui s'est produite entre 15h00 et 15h05 UTC causant une sélection de 500 erreurs dans les services Spreedly. Nous continuons d'étudier l'impact complet et fournirons des renseignements supplémentaires au fur et à mesure qu'ils seront disponibles.

3. 8 juillet 2026 à 16:54 UTCresolved

   Après une surveillance étroite et la confirmation que tous les systèmes sont stabilisés et fonctionnent comme prévu, cet incident est considéré résolu. Aucun autre impact client n'est attendu. Nous terminons notre enquête sur les causes de l'incident et sur tout impact résiduel. Nous nous excusons pour tout désagrément ou perturbation.

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 17 juin 2026 à 14:55 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly a détecté un problème pouvant conduire à des performances dégraissées avec des transactions asynchrones. Alors que nous fournissons une notification rapide afin de vous alerter le plus rapidement possible, nous enquêtons encore sur la portée et l'impact réels et fournirons une mise à jour dès que plus de détails sont disponibles. Merci de votre patience.

2. 17 juin 2026 à 15:00 UTCmonitoring

   Nous avons mis en œuvre une correction et stabilisé les transactions asynchrones. Notre équipe surveille la situation de près pour s'assurer qu'il n'y a pas d'impact supplémentaire. Continuez à suivre notre page d'état pour la dernière mise à jour.

3. 17 juin 2026 à 16:03 UTCmonitoring

   Nous suivons de près toute autre question ou incidence supplémentaire. Veuillez continuer à suivre notre page Statut pour les dernières mises à jour.

4. 17 juin 2026 à 21:42 UTCresolved

   Après une période de surveillance, nous avons confirmé que le problème avait été résolu et que les systèmes fonctionnaient normalement. Si vous continuez d'éprouver des problèmes, veuillez communiquer avec Support.

5. 24 juin 2026 à 20:10 UTCpostmortem

   24 juin 2026 — Perturbation du traitement asynchrone des transactions **Résumé de haut niveau** Le 17 juin 2026, de 10h02 à 10h41 UTC, Spreedly a connu une perturbation affectant les transactions de passerelle asynchrones et les flux d'authentification 3DS. Au cours de la période de 39 minutes, environ 1 634 transactions ont été laissées en attente sans résultat confirmé, ce qui représente moins de 1 % du volume total des transactions au cours de cette période. **Ce qui s'est passé** Un déploiement de code a introduit un problème de compatibilité entre les instances d'application nouvellement déployées et qui étaient déjà en cours d'exécution. Au cours d'un processus de retour en arrière, certaines demandes ont été acheminées à travers des versions de codes mixtes, causant des défaillances lors du traitement des mises à jour de l'état des transactions asynchrones. Les types de transactions touchés comprennent les transactions de passerelle asynchrones \(spécifiques de passerelle 3DS, et d'autres vérifications asynchrones, autorisations et achats\) et l'authentification globale 3DS. Les transactions qui ont entré le flux affecté pendant cette fenêtre peuvent refléter un résultat indéterminé, l'état de la transaction à votre passerelle peut différer de ce que Spreedly déclare. **Prochaines étapes** Nous recommandons d'examiner les transactions de la fenêtre UTC de 10 h 02 à 10 h 41 le 17 juin qui demeurent en suspens : Les vérifications peuvent être réévaluées en toute sécurité. Les autorisations devraient être annulées à la passerelle avant de réessayer. Les achats comportent un risque de duplication, nous recommandons de rembourser avant de réessayer. Veuillez communiquer avec Spreedly si vous avez besoin d'aide pour identifier les transactions touchées ou déterminer la voie d'assainissement appropriée. Nous nous employons activement à prévenir cette catégorie de problèmes en améliorant les garanties de déploiement et la détection automatisée des retours. - L'équipe Spreedly

Traduit automatiquement depuis la mise à jour officielle de l'incident.

1. 8 mai 2026 à 18:00 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring results.

2. 8 mai 2026 à 18:05 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19 mars 2026 à 15:13 UTCidentified

   We are currently investigating performance of the Dodgeball service.

2. 19 mars 2026 à 15:30 UTCidentified

   We are working to resolve an issue with delayed processing of requests to the Dodgeball services.

3. 19 mars 2026 à 15:55 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the Dodgeball component that was experiencing a partial outage. We are continuing to monitor

4. 19 mars 2026 à 16:07 UTCmonitoring

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

5. 19 mars 2026 à 16:09 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 16 mars 2026 à 17:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating elevated errors on API endpoints

2. 16 mars 2026 à 17:51 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring to ensure services are operating correctly

3. 16 mars 2026 à 18:07 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

4. 19 mars 2026 à 19:07 UTCpostmortem

   ### Mar 18th 2026 — _Decryption Errors on API endpoints_ ### Summary Between 5:40 PM and 5:43 PM UTC on March 16, 2026, we experienced a brief issue during a key rotation that caused a small subset of API requests to fail due to decryption errors. These errors occurred within our system before any external processing took place. The issue was quickly identified, and traffic was immediately redirected to a stable environment, restoring normal service. ### What Happened At 5:36 PM UTC, we routed traffic to a newly deployed cluster of our encryption service running with the latest security keys. Shortly after, we observed decryption errors affecting a small subset of records, which resulted in some requests returning 500 error responses. We promptly redirected traffic back to the existing cluster, restoring normal operation. Further investigation determined that these records were still associated with a key in the process of rotation, and we updated them as a follow-up action to prevent the issue from recurring. ### Next Steps We have enhanced our process to ensure that a key’s usage is fully verified before it is removed from the encryption service. -The Spreedly Team

1. 26 février 2026 à 16:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting customers using Dodgeball. The production database backing Dodgeball has reached critically low available storage, which is expected to result in elevated error rates. Customers may begin experiencing errors within the next 10 minutes as the system’s ability to process requests degrades. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working to restore normal capacity as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

2. 26 février 2026 à 16:59 UTCmonitoring

   The engineering team has successfully resolved the storage issue affecting the Dodgeball production PostgreSQL instance. Capacity has been restored and the system is now operating normally. At this time, we are not observing any elevated error rates for customers using Dodgeball. We will continue to monitor the system closely to ensure stability. Further updates will be provided if necessary.

3. 26 février 2026 à 18:44 UTCresolved

   The storage issue affecting the Dodgeball production instance has been fully resolved. Capacity has been restored and systems are operating normally. We are no longer observing elevated error rates for customers using Dodgeball. Thank you for your patience while we worked to resolve this issue.

1. 25 février 2026 à 19:18 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating performance of the Dodgeball service.

2. 25 février 2026 à 19:48 UTCidentified

   We are working to resolve an issue with processing of Checkpoints that is causing latency and errors for requests to the Dodgeball services.

3. 25 février 2026 à 20:35 UTCmonitoring

   Service has resumed and we are monitoring for further impact. We apologize for any inconvenience this has caused

4. 25 février 2026 à 21:52 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

1. 5 février 2026 à 15:56 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue where credit transactions referencing Capture transactions are failing in production. Some customers may see errors when attempting to issue credits against Capture transactions. Capture transactions themselves are processing successfully. Our engineering team is actively investigating this behavior to determine the cause and confirm whether this is a regression or an unintended change. We will provide updates as soon as more information is available.

2. 5 février 2026 à 16:25 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve deployed a revert to address the issue where credit transactions referencing Capture transactions were failing. We’re actively monitoring to ensure credit requests referencing Captures are processing as expected. At this time, we’re not seeing further errors related to this behavior.

3. 5 février 2026 à 17:01 UTCresolved

   After monitoring the system post-deploy, we’re no longer seeing errors related to credits referencing Capture transactions, and processing has returned to normal. Thank you for your patience.

4. 10 février 2026 à 17:22 UTCpostmortem

   ### February 10, 2026 — Credits Referencing Capture Transactions Failing ### ‌High Level Summary Between approximately 1:56 PM UTC and 4:15 PM UTC on February 5, 2026, credit transactions where the reference transaction was a capture failed with the error "The specified `reference_token` corresponds to a transaction which cannot be used as a reference." ### What Happened At approximately 1:56 PM UTC on February 5, 2026, Spreedly rolled out a change to support credits on the CyberSource Rest gateway. This included a change in the way we validated reference transaction types used in credits. Specifically, there was an unintended side-effect which caused captures to no longer be treated as a valid reference type for credits on gateways other than CyberSource Rest. Once this was discovered, the code was reverted at 4:01PM UTC. By 4:15 PM UTC, credit requests against captures were fully functional. ### Next Steps * Any credit attempts that failed with this error are safe to retry * We are making improvements to our code review processes and regression test suite to ensure we catch similar errors before they make it into production * We have identified a gap in our observability surrounding validation errors that we will be prioritizing ‌ -The Spreedly Team

1. 4 février 2026 à 18:15 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue that is affecting multiple customers using Payflow Pro where some transactions fail with the error: “Invalid Request. Malicious string found in XML document”. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 4 février 2026 à 19:52 UTCmonitoring

   We are no longer seeing errors at this time, and the issue appears to have subsided. We are working with Payflow Pro to identify the root cause. Our team continues to monitor the situation closely to ensure stability. Please continue to follow our StatusPage for the latest updates.

3. 4 février 2026 à 19:56 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 27 janvier 2026 à 19:59 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue related to a dodgeball component experiencing a partial outage. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 27 janvier 2026 à 20:12 UTCresolved

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the Dodgeball component that was experiencing a partial outage. After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

1. 27 janvier 2026 à 19:08 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue potentially resulting in a high number of pending 3DS2 Global transactions. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 27 janvier 2026 à 19:25 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the 3DS2 Global transactions. Our team is monitoring the situation closely to ensure there are no additional impacts. Please continue to follow our StatusPage for the latest update.

3. 27 janvier 2026 à 19:29 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

4. 3 février 2026 à 15:38 UTCpostmortem

   ### February 3rd, 2026 — 3DS2 Global Transactions Pending ‌ Between 5:40 pm UTC and 7:24 PM UTC on January 27, 2026 the latest version of the Spreedly iFrame \(`iframe-v1`\) was configured to use version 1.180 which contained a bug related to the handling of device fingerprinting for `Sca::Authentications` in an end user's browser. As a result there was an elevated number of `Sca::Authentications` stuck in a pending flow with a `required_action` of `device_fingerprint`. These transactions were held in a pending state and never completed. Our team identified the issue and updated the version of iFrame \(`iframe-v1`\) to utilize `1.179`. ### What Happened At 5:40 pm UTC on January 27th, 2026 a new version of iFrame was released \(1.180\) and updated the version to be used in the `iframe-v1.min.js` asset to point to `1.180`. This change was meant to improve the error handling for the loading of 3rd party critical SDKs however it caused the SDK to enter a permanently error-ed state when attempting to perform device fingerprinting due to a race condition with loading the SDKs. At 7:20 pm UTC on January 27th, 2026 the change was rolled back and by 7:24 pm UTC, 2026 the `iframe-v1.min.js` asset globally was pointing to version `1.179`. ### Next Steps We have identified a gap in our observability and alerting within the iFrame service related to the managing of 3DS lifecycle flows that we will be prioritizing. -The Spreedly Team

1. 9 janvier 2026 à 18:46 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 9 janvier 2026 à 18:52 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 9 janvier 2026 à 19:07 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been deployed and we are seeing systems recover. We will continue to monitor to ensure stability and will provide further updates as needed.

4. 9 janvier 2026 à 19:10 UTCresolved

   After a period of monitoring, we have confirmed that the issue has been resolved and systems are operating normally. If you continue to experience any issues, please reach out to Support.

1. 29 décembre 2025 à 16:50 UTCresolved

   Between 7:00 PM EST on Saturday, December 27th, and 1:00 AM EST on Sunday, December 28th, we identified a period of higher-than-normal latency caused by a pre-planned customer event that resulted in a significant traffic spike. Although we did not observe any service failures or timeouts, our systems experienced degraded service due to the increased latency. Systems recovered quickly once peak traffic subsided and are now operating normally. We expect performance to remain stable moving forward.

1. 16 décembre 2025 à 21:56 UTCresolved

   Between 3:59 and 4:03 EST, customers may have experienced degraded performance when processing transactions that required 3D Secure (3DS) authentication via our Global 3DS service. Performance has since returned to normal, and no further impact has been observed. If you have any questions about potential impact to your transactions during this time window, please reach out to Spreedly Support for assistance.

2. 18 décembre 2025 à 21:26 UTCpostmortem

   # _December 18, 2025 — Delayed Processing of Some 3DS Global Transactions_ ‌ _A targeted update intended for Gateway-Specific 3DS processing impacted a subset of 3DS Global transactions. This caused a small number of transactions to remain in a "Pending" state rather than progressing to completion._ ### What Happened Between 08:59 PM and 09:03 PM UTC on December 16, 2025, a deployment intended to update Gateway-Specific 3DS logic inadvertently affected the processing of 3DS Global transactions. As a result, 52 transactions failed to reach a final state and remained "pending." During this 4-minute window, customers attempting a 3DS-authenticated operation would have encountered an interruption, preventing their transactions from completing. Our team identified the impact immediately and rolled back the change to restore normal service. ### Next Steps _We have successfully identified and corrected the underlying logic error within the change. We are also enhancing our automated deployment tests to better catch cross-module dependencies of this nature. We sincerely apologize for any disruption this caused to your operations._ ‌ — The Spreedly Team

1. 9 décembre 2025 à 15:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where roughly 30–40% of transactions are not appearing in Spreedly reporting since 12/03. Primary datastores and secondary services show no data loss, indicating the issue lies within the reporting ingestion process. Please reach out to Spreedly Support if you need assistance.

2. 10 décembre 2025 à 06:53 UTCinvestigating

   Our team continues to investigate the root cause of the missing transaction data appearing in Spreedly reporting. All primary datastores and transactional processing are functioning normally, and there is no indication of data loss at the source. The issue appears to be isolated to the reporting ingestion process.

3. 10 décembre 2025 à 14:42 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified and fixed the issue that was causing some transaction data to be missing from Spreedly reporting. Our team is now working on backfilling the missing reporting data to ensure completeness and accuracy. All primary processing systems continue to operate normally, and there is no impact to transaction processing.

4. 10 décembre 2025 à 20:04 UTCresolved

   Our team has completed the backfill process, and all missing transaction data has now been fully restored in Spreedly reporting. Transaction reporting is up to date and functioning as expected. All primary processing systems continued to operate normally throughout this incident, and no transaction processing impact occurred.

5. 2 janvier 2026 à 21:44 UTCpostmortem

   ### _Postmortem: January 2, 2026_ — _Transaction Reporting Degraded_ ### ‌High Level Summary Select data related to transactions did not make it into our downstream systems, causing inaccurate reports in [app.spreedly.com](http://app.spreedly.com) ### What Happened After completing system updates on December 3, 2025, approximately 30-40% of data related to transactions did not make it into our reporting tools due to a latent bug in one of our supporting applications. This caused inaccurate reports in [app.spreedly.com](http://app.spreedly.com). This did not impact any primary system functionality and no data was lost. ### Next Steps * Our team has since identified and fixed the affected application. The missing data was backfilled and subsequent data continues to flow normally * We are adding additional monitoring in order to more quickly flag discrepancies * We are continuing to make updates to simplify our data pipeline that will prevent similar issues in the future -The Spreedly Team

1. 20 octobre 2025 à 15:41 UTCidentified

   The major AWS outage on October 20, 2025, has been largely resolved for most affected services, though some residual issues may persist. Spreedly’s core platform remains stable and fully available. However, due to downstream impact from the AWS outage, some of Spreedly’s indexing endpoints and callback processing are experiencing delays. This is related to dependencies on third-party systems that were affected by the outage and are still undergoing recovery. As a result, you may continue to see intermittent latency or delayed responses for API requests involving these systems. We are actively monitoring the situation as AWS and its downstream services continue recovery efforts. For ongoing updates, please refer to the AWS status page here

2. 20 octobre 2025 à 20:22 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected.

3. 23 octobre 2025 à 18:27 UTCpostmortem

   ### Postmortem: October 24, 2025 — _AWS outage_ Monday's AWS outage had downstream impact on some 3rd-party systems utilized by Spreedly's platform. Namely, our indexing endpoints and callbacks lagged behind due to the outage and recovery steps. ### What Happened Spreedly's 3DS global service and legacy smart routing product both faced a period of failures due to 3rd-party systems relying on AWS. ### Next Steps Spreedly will improve its response to our alerts platform, and are actively working on multi-region support slated for 2026, which should mitigate the impact of similar events going forward. -The Spreedly Team