Cronologia delle interruzioni di Confluence

1. 1 ottobre 2026 alle ore 02:55 UTCinvestigating

   L'elaborazione del lavoro e la pianificazione del lavoro è degradata, che sta influenzando il lavoro pianificato e asincrono su diversi prodotti, tra cui Jira, Confluence e Bitbucket Cloud. Gli utenti interessati possono vedere ritardo o mancante esecuzione del lavoro, compreso l'elaborazione e-mail-to-ticket ritardato e gli orari che non vengono eseguiti come previsto.

2. 1 ottobre 2026 alle ore 03:47 UTCidentified

   I nostri team hanno identificato la causa principale di questo incidente e ora sta attivamente lavorando per mitigare il problema. Forniremo ulteriori aggiornamenti entro un'ora o prima se abbiamo alcun progresso significativo da condividere.

3. 1 ottobre 2026 alle ore 04:03 UTCidentified

   I nostri team hanno preso misure correttive per mitigare il problema e stanno osservando alcuni miglioramenti. Continuiamo a monitorare la situazione e prenderemo le azioni necessarie fino a quando l'incidente è completamente recuperato.

4. 1 ottobre 2026 alle ore 05:00 UTCidentified

   I nostri team continuano a lavorare sul recupero fino a quando l'incidente non sarà completamente risolto. Forniamo ulteriori aggiornamenti se abbiamo progressi significativi da condividere. Oltre all'impatto sul lavoro programmato e asincrono su diversi prodotti, abbiamo anche identificato la componente SLA in Jira Service Management non appare come previsto.

5. 1 ottobre 2026 alle ore 07:01 UTCidentified

   I nostri team continuano a lavorare sul recupero fino a quando l'incidente non sarà completamente risolto. Forniamo ulteriori aggiornamenti se abbiamo progressi significativi da condividere. C'è anche un impatto per i nuovi biglietti di supporto creati in termini di componente SLA mancante, le notifiche che possono influenzare i tempi di risposta e la gestione backlog di alcuni biglietti.

6. 1 ottobre 2026 alle ore 07:51 UTCresolved

   Il 01 ottobre 2026, tra 01:00 UTC e 07:25 UTC, gli utenti possono aver visto l'esecuzione mancante del lavoro, tra cui l'elaborazione e-mail ritardata-to-ticket e gli orari che non vengono eseguiti come previsto. Abbiamo ora implementato una correzione e i servizi sono stati ripristinati al normale funzionamento per i clienti interessati. L'impatto per sostenere i biglietti con il componente SLA mancante e le notifiche ritardate hanno anche confermato il recupero. Nota: Per i clienti di Bitbucket, se c'era qualche pipeline programmata che non è stata eseguita durante la finestra incidente, si può aspettare la prossima esecuzione programmata o avviarli manualmente.

7. 9 ottobre 2026 alle ore 18:24 UTCpostmortem

   ## Il 1o ottobre 2026, tra le 01:00 e le 07:25 UTC, l'elaborazione di lavoro degradata e la pianificazione hanno colpito i prodotti atlanti, tra cui Bitbucket Cloud, Confluence, Forge app, Jira, e Jira Service Management in tutte le regioni cloud commerciali. Ciò ha causato compiti di sfondo ritardati o mancati, come l'elaborazione e-mail-to-ticket e pipeline programmate; l'uso interattivo del prodotto non è stato interessato. L'evento è stato attivato quando un volume inaspettato di compiti programmati è stato dovuto simultaneamente, schiacciando la nostra piattaforma di pianificazione di lavoro condivisa. Il monitoraggio automatizzato ha rilevato l'incidente entro tre minuti. Il recupero è iniziato intorno alle 03:45 UTC come capacità scalata di ingegneria e la piattaforma ha lavorato attraverso il backlog, con risoluzione completa raggiunta in 6 ore e 25 minuti. ### IMPACT La maggior parte delle attività programmate ha smesso di funzionare alle 01:00 UTC e ha ripreso da circa 03:45 UTC. La maggior parte dei lavori ritardati erano stati catturati da circa 06:00 UTC, e i restanti ritardi erano sgomberati da 07:25 UTC. Prodotti interessati: - Le attività programmate di riscossione o ritardo delle piste dovute durante l'incidente; le piste saltate non sono state automaticamente rielaborate e le attività riprese alla prossima volta prevista. - La maggior parte delle attività programmate ha funzionato in ritardo; un piccolo numero potrebbe non aver funzionato. - Regole di automazione, comprese le regole programmate, corse normalmente, tranne come indicato di seguito. Bitbucket Cloud Le tubazioni programmate dovute tra le 01:00 e le 03:50 UTC non sono state eseguite. Se una pipeline programmata non è stata eseguita durante l'incidente, è possibile attendere la prossima esecuzione programmata o avviarlo manualmente. Altre tubazioni non sono state influenzate. Confluenza Alcuni promemoria di eventi di calendario a causa tra le 01:00 e circa 03:45 UTC non sono stati inviati. Forge app I trigger programmati si fermarono alle 01:00 UTC e ripresero a partire dalle 04:00 UTC; le invocazioni mancate non furono rielaborate. Obiettivi Inizio dei promemoria e-mail del mese per aggiornare gli obiettivi potrebbe essere ritardato. Gestione dei servizi Jira e Jira Le email in arrivo sono state nelle loro caselle di posta e sono state elaborate automaticamente dopo il recupero. Le notifiche programmate, come gli abbonamenti ai filtri, sono state ritardate. In alcuni progetti di servizio, regole di automazione e notifiche innescate da SLAs o tempo in stato eseguito tardi. I dati del timer SLA sono rimasti intatti. Supporto Atlassian Fino alle 07:25 UTC, i problemi con i nostri strumenti di supporto possono aver rallentato alcune delle nostre risposte. Sulla base della nostra indagine fino ad oggi, non abbiamo identificato alcuna perdita di oggetti di lavoro, pagine, repository, o e-mail in arrivo. ## ROOT CAUSE La nostra piattaforma di pianificazione del lavoro condivisa opera ad alta scala in condizioni normali. Uno dei consumatori della piattaforma ha programmato un volume anormalmente elevato di compiti da eseguire contemporaneamente il 1 ottobre alle 01:00 UTC. Questo sovraccarico di accuratezza ha superato i nostri limiti architettonici e di scaling, creando un backlog di elaborazione attraverso i servizi dipendenti. Ingegneria ha aumentato manualmente la capacità di gestire il carico anormale, consentendo al servizio di elaborare il backlog e tornare alle operazioni normali. ### AZIONI REMEDIALI PLAN & NEXT STES Sappiamo che il lavoro ritardato e mancato influisce sulla vostra produttività. Stiamo privilegiando queste azioni per contribuire a ridurre la probabilità e l'impatto di incidenti simili: - ** Isolamento del carico di lavoro di impedenza Implement fair scheduling guardrails in modo che il volume sbalzi da un'unica fonte non affamare o ritardare i compiti in altri prodotti. - **Controlli di sovratensione rinforzati: ** Aggiunga le capacità operative per regolare rapidamente o mettere in pausa i carichi di lavoro programmati da fonti specifiche durante i picchi di traffico inaspettati. - **Miglioramento del sistema e recupero: ** Migliorare la capacità della piattaforma e ottimizzare i processi di scaling per gestire punte di domanda estreme e recuperare più rapidamente. Ci scusiamo con i clienti i cui servizi sono stati influenzati durante questo incidente. Grazie. Atlanti

Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

1. 27 agosto 2026 alle ore 04:22 UTCinvestigating

   I nostri team hanno identificato questo problema sta anche influenzando Jira Service Management. Ci aggiorneremo più presto possibile.

2. 27 agosto 2026 alle ore 04:25 UTCinvestigating

   Stiamo indagando su un problema con l'accesso di prodotti che sta influenzando i clienti di Confluence, Jira Cloud e Jira Serivce Management. Il nostro team sta indagando urgentemente su questo problema e forniremo ulteriori dettagli entro un'ora o prima se le informazioni sono disponibili.

3. 27 agosto 2026 alle ore 04:33 UTCidentified

   I nostri team hanno identificato una possibile soluzione per i problemi che interessano Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management e Confluence. Questo è ora in fase di elaborazione per le regioni colpite e si aggiornerà entro un'ora, o prima se sono disponibili ulteriori informazioni.

4. 27 agosto 2026 alle ore 04:51 UTCmonitoring

   I problemi relativi al caricamento di Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management e Confluence sono ora in recupero. Continueremo a monitorare da vicino per confermare la stabilità e fornire un aggiornamento entro un'ora, o prima che ulteriori informazioni siano disponibili.

5. 27 agosto 2026 alle ore 05:16 UTCresolved

   Il 27 agosto 2026 UTC, i prodotti atlanti, tra cui Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management e Confluence, hanno sperimentato una disgregazione e i servizi non erano disponibili per gli utenti interessati. Il problema è stato risolto, e il servizio funziona normalmente per tutti i clienti interessati. Un postmortem pubblico per questo incidente sarà reso disponibile su questa pagina quando la nostra indagine completa dell'incidente è stato completato.

6. 7 settembre 2026 alle ore 02:53 UTCpostmortem

   ** ************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************** Il 27 agosto 2026, tra le 03:51 e le 04:35 UTC, i clienti atlanti nelle regioni dell'Europa occidentale e dell'APAC sudorientale non sono stati in grado di raggiungere i prodotti Atlassian Cloud, tra cui Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search e Talent. L'evento è stato innescato da un cambio di codice difettoso allo strato di routing di una delle nostre flotte proxy. Ciò ha portato a errori HTTP 404 che vengono serviti a tutto il traffico dei clienti attraverso queste flotte proxy in Europa occidentale e regioni APAC sud-orientale. L'incidente è stato rilevato entro 1 minuto dai nostri sistemi di monitoraggio automatizzati, e mitigato tornando al precedente rilascio di configurazione, che ha messo la flotta proxy in un noto buon stato. Dopo il recupero della flotta proxy, alcuni clienti Jira e Confluence (indipendentemente dalla posizione) hanno ricevuto errori HTTP 503 tra 04:33 e 04:53 UTC come flotte server regolate all'afflusso del traffico. # IMPACT # L'impatto complessivo è stato suddiviso in due periodi distinti: - Primo, il 27 agosto 2026, tra 03:51 e 04:35 UTC su Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, e Talent. L'incidente ha causato interruzioni di servizio al traffico dei clienti provenienti dalle regioni dell'Europa occidentale e dell'APAC sudorientale, con errori HTTP 404 restituiti. Non c'è stato alcun impatto sul traffico API del cliente, indipendentemente dalla posizione di origine. - In secondo luogo, il 27 agosto 2026, tra 04:33 e 04:53 UTC, alcuni clienti Jira e Confluence indipendentemente dalla posizione ha ricevuto errori HTTP 503 dopo che gli errori HTTP 404 sono stati risolti: ~32% delle richieste in ap-southeast-2, ~4% delle richieste in eu-west-1, ~2,5% delle richieste in noi-west-2 e ap-southeast-1, e <1% delle richieste in tutte le restanti regioni globali. # ROOT CAUSE # L'evento è stato innescato da un cambio di codice a una delle nostre flotte proxy. Tuttavia, c'era un difetto nel codice distribuito che non è stato rilevato da test manuali e automatizzati. Ciò ha portato a una cattiva configurazione di una funzionalità di ricerca inquilino nel livello proxy, che ha portato al traffico non avendo un percorso di rete valido, con conseguente errori HTTP 404 essere servita a tutto il traffico dei clienti attraverso queste flotte proxy in Europa occidentale e regioni APAC sud-orientale. Dopo il recupero dell'impatto del proxy, un secondo periodo di impatto è stato causato ad alcuni clienti di Jira e Confluence. A causa della riduzione del traffico servito a Jira e Confluence dalla flotta proxy, i livelli di servizio Jira e Confluence erano automaticamente scalati nel numero di server che servono il traffico dei clienti. Una volta ripristinata la funzionalità della flotta proxy, l'ondata di traffico ha sopraffatto il livello di servizio Jira, che ha restituito una velocità elevata di HTTP 503s fino a quando non ha ridimensionato automaticamente. ** AZIONI REMEDIALI PLAN & NEXT STEPS ** Sappiamo che le interruzioni influiscono sulla vostra produttività. Mentre abbiamo un certo numero di processi di test e di prevenzione in atto, questo problema specifico non è stato identificato perché il cambiamento era legato a un tipo molto specifico di caso bordo che non è stato raccolto dai nostri suite di distribuzione continua automatizzati e script di test manuali. Stiamo privilegiando le seguenti azioni di miglioramento per evitare di ripetere questo tipo di incidente: -**Aggiunta ulteriori garanzie di distribuzione:** La pipeline di distribuzione per la configurazione del livello di proxy colpito stava utilizzando un sistema legacy e non aveva le caratteristiche di rollout regionali lente appropriate configurate correttamente. Abbiamo già aggiunto le garanzie corrette, e lo stiamo spostando al nostro standard di distribuzione aziendale che include tutti i nostri controlli di sicurezza abilitati per impostazione predefinita. Stiamo anche verificando tutti i servizi di rete per convalidare che sono tutti sul nuovo servizio standard di distribuzione pipeline. - ** Migliorare le politiche di scaling della flotta di servizi La configurazione di scaling automatico per le nostre flotte di servizio Jira e Confluence è stata configurata per scalare in modo troppo aggressivo. Stiamo esaminando e aggiorniamo tutte le complesse politiche di auto scaling Jira e Confluence per garantire che questo non accada di nuovo. Ci scusiamo con i clienti i cui servizi sono stati influenzati durante questo incidente; stiamo prendendo misure immediate per migliorare le prestazioni e la disponibilità della piattaforma. Grazie. Supporto clienti Atlassian

Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

1. 25 agosto 2026 alle ore 08:42 UTCinvestigating

   Stiamo indagando attivamente i rapporti di degrado delle prestazioni con conseguente aumento della latenza per le notifiche e-mail, mobile e slack per Jira, JSM e Confluence. I nostri team stanno indagando sul problema e ulteriori informazioni saranno condivise entro il prossimo 1 ora.

2. 25 agosto 2026 alle ore 09:44 UTCinvestigating

   I nostri team hanno identificato le regioni colpite e stanno lavorando attivamente per mitigare il problema. Forniamo ulteriori aggiornamenti entro un'ora, o prima se abbiamo progressi significativi da condividere.

3. 25 agosto 2026 alle ore 10:49 UTCinvestigating

   I nostri team hanno preso alcune misure correttive per mitigare il problema in una delle regioni colpite e stanno osservando alcuni miglioramenti. Continuiamo a monitorare la situazione e prenderemo le azioni necessarie fino a quando l'incidente è completamente recuperato. Forniamo ulteriori aggiornamenti entro le prossime due ore, o prima se abbiamo progressi significativi da condividere.

4. 25 agosto 2026 alle ore 13:01 UTCmonitoring

   I nostri team continuano a mitigare il problema e stanno osservando alcuni miglioramenti. Continuiamo a monitorare la situazione e prenderemo le azioni necessarie fino a quando l'incidente è completamente recuperato. Forniamo ulteriori aggiornamenti entro le prossime due ore, o prima se abbiamo progressi significativi da condividere.

5. 25 agosto 2026 alle ore 14:33 UTCresolved

   Il 25 agosto 2026, alcuni utenti potrebbero aver sperimentato una maggiore latenza nelle notifiche via e-mail, mobile e slack. Il problema è stato risolto e il servizio funziona normalmente per tutti i clienti.

Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

1. 24 agosto 2026 alle ore 19:22 UTCinvestigating

   Stiamo indagando attivamente i rapporti di degrado delle prestazioni con conseguente aumento della latenza per le notifiche e-mail, mobile e Slack per JIRA, JSM e Confluence. Condividiamo gli aggiornamenti qui come ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili.

2. 24 agosto 2026 alle ore 20:25 UTCinvestigating

   I nostri team hanno identificato tre regioni colpite, e continuano a indagare l'aumento della latenza che riguarda le notifiche e-mail, mobile e Slack per JIRA, JSM e Confluence.

3. 24 agosto 2026 alle ore 21:30 UTCidentified

   Abbiamo identificato la probabile causa del problema, e i nostri team stanno diligentemente lavorando su una mitigazione. Gli utenti interessati possono sperimentare una maggiore latenza nelle notifiche e-mail, mobile e Slack per JIRA, JSM e Confluence. Continueremo a condividere aggiornamenti aggiuntivi qui come ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili.

4. 24 agosto 2026 alle ore 23:15 UTCresolved

   Il 24 agosto 2026, alcuni utenti di JIRA, JSM e Confluence possono aver sperimentato il degrado delle prestazioni con conseguente aumento della latenza nelle notifiche di posta elettronica, mobile e Slack. Il problema è stato risolto per le notifiche appena create, e il servizio è operativo normalmente. Ci possono essere notifiche più vecchie che vengono elaborate, e ci aspettiamo che siano completate nelle prossime ore.

Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

1. 21 agosto 2026 alle ore 07:16 UTCidentified

   Abbiamo identificato la causa principale di un problema che colpisce le macro di Marketplace App in Confluence. Gli utenti possono sperimentare le macro non rendering correttamente o visualizzando errori. Il nostro team di ingegneri ha identificato la causa principale e la bonifica è in corso. Vi forniremo ulteriori aggiornamenti nei prossimi 60 minuti.

2. 21 agosto 2026 alle ore 08:15 UTCidentified

   Una correzione è stata identificata e attualmente viene implementata. Gli utenti dovrebbero iniziare a vedere l'app MarketPlace impattata - Collegare le macro per avviare il rendering correttamente, una volta che la correzione è stata completamente propagata. Forniamo ulteriori aggiornamenti entro le prossime 2 ore.

3. 21 agosto 2026 alle ore 10:10 UTCresolved

   Il 21 agosto 2026, tra 04:26 UTC e 09:33 UTC, alcuni utenti possono avere problemi con le macro non rendering correttamente in Confluence. Il problema è stato risolto e il servizio funziona normalmente per tutti i clienti.

Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

1. 12 agosto 2026 alle ore 20:11 UTCidentified

   Some Confluence Cloud users visiting public links saw a Something went wrong error page. The issue affected anonymous access paths for public links, and some related Confluence areas could also show the same error message.

2. 12 agosto 2026 alle ore 22:13 UTCresolved

   On August 12, 2026 some Confluence users utilizing anonymous access via public links, may have experienced a 'Something went wrong' error message. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 6 luglio 2026 alle ore 09:23 UTCinvestigating

   Stiamo indagando su questioni che riguardano i vostri servizi. Stiamo lavorando attivamente per identificare la causa e risolvere il problema. Forniremo ulteriori aggiornamenti entro un'ora.

2. 6 luglio 2026 alle ore 10:04 UTCmonitoring

   Abbiamo applicato con successo la correzione e stiamo vedendo il recupero. Le capacità di automazione vengono ripristinate e devono funzionare normalmente in avanti. Le richieste di trattamento dei dati presentate durante il periodo di estrazione non sono state completate a causa dell'invalidità del servizio. Continuiamo a monitorare la situazione e ci aspettiamo il recupero completo entro l'ora successiva. Vi forniremo aggiornamenti aggiuntivi nelle prossime un'ora o prima.

3. 6 luglio 2026 alle ore 11:46 UTCinvestigating

   Stiamo ancora vedendo alcuni problemi con l'utente-search, user-picker e le attività attraverso con l'UE-Region. Continuiamo a indagare la situazione e fornirà ulteriori aggiornamenti nelle prossime un'ora o prima.

4. 6 luglio 2026 alle ore 12:25 UTCmonitoring

   Abbiamo applicato la correzione per mitigare il problema e stiamo vedendo il recupero. Continuiamo a monitorare la situazione e dobbiamo essere pienamente recuperati presto. Dovremmo essere in grado di fornire più aggiornamenti nelle prossime un'ora o prima.

5. 6 luglio 2026 alle ore 13:04 UTCresolved

   Il 6 luglio 2026, tra 06:51 UTC a 09:39 UTC alcuni utenti possono avere sperimentato problemi relativi Automazione, e tra 08:10 UTC a 11:50 UTC alcuni utenti possono avere sperimentato problemi relativi a user-search, user-picker e attività nella UE-Region. I problemi sono stati risolti e i servizi sono operativi normalmente per tutti i clienti.

6. 17 luglio 2026 alle ore 16:59 UTCpostmortem

   # Il 6 luglio 2026, tra le 06:51 e le 20:17 UTC, i clienti atlanti che utilizzano i prodotti cloud nelle regioni europee (UE) hanno sperimentato interruzioni di servizio che riguardano l'esecuzione delle regole di automazione, la ricerca degli utenti, il raccoglitore degli utenti e i flussi di lavoro correlati. L'incidente è iniziato quando un servizio di identità principale ha sperimentato la saturazione di database nelle regioni dell'UE, aumentando la latenza e i tassi di errore. Mentre i rispondenti hanno lavorato per ripristinare la capacità, è stata applicata una mitigazione di emergenza che ha bloccato le regole di automazione dall'accesso al endpoint dell'identità. Parallelamente, l'elevata latenza dell'identità ha contribuito a un fallimento in cascata in un servizio di ricerca utente a valle, degradando la ricerca degli utenti e le esperienze di raccoglitore degli utenti attraverso più prodotti. Il servizio è stato ripristinato progressivamente dopo l'aggiunta di ulteriori capacità di lettura del database, il blocco di emergenza è stato rimosso, e il servizio di ricerca utente è stato scalato manualmente. ## Impact L'incidente ha colpito i clienti attraverso più prodotti atlanti nelle regioni dell'UE il 6 luglio 2026 tra 06:51 e 20:17 UTC. - **Degrado dei servizi di identità: ** sono stati osservati tassi di accesso intermittente elevati nei prodotti delle regioni dell'UE. - **Insufficienza di esecuzione delle regole di automazione:** regole di automazione utilizzando l'utente predefinito (Automation for Jira) in Jira, Gestione dei servizi Jira e Jira Product Discovery nelle regioni dell'UE non sono riusciti con un errore di autorizzazioni. - **User search and user picker fails:** i tassi di successo della ricerca utente sono diminuiti significativamente nelle regioni dell'UE, con la capacità di picker degli utenti in gran parte non disponibili tra i prodotti. # Causa radice # L'incidente ha avuto origine da un recente cambiamento di configurazione che ha ridotto la durata della cache per un servizio di identità core. Mentre il traffico della giornata di lavoro dell'UE è salito il 6 luglio 2026, una maggior parte delle richieste ha cominciato a raggiungere il database di supporto direttamente piuttosto che essere servito dalla cache. I database dell'UE non hanno una capacità regionale sufficiente per assorbire il carico aumentato, e la CPU del database ha raggiunto la saturazione, causando elevati tassi di accesso intermittente negati. Nell'ambito della mitigazione, è stato applicato un blocco di emergenza per ridurre il carico sul database dei servizi di identità saturi e prioritarizzare il ripristino del servizio di identità core. Questo inavvertitamente ha impedito alle regole di automazione di passare i loro controlli di autorizzazione pre-esecuzione, causando loro il fallimento. L'estensione della durata è dovuta principalmente a un'onda secondaria di guasti delle regole di automazione causati dal limite di elaborazione. Parallelamente, il degrado sostenuto ha causato un aumento della latenza e dei guasti intermittenti tra i prodotti che dipendono da questi controlli, e ha contribuito a un fallimento in cascata in un servizio di ricerca utente a valle. Di conseguenza, la ricerca degli utenti e le esperienze di raccoglitore degli utenti sono diventate in gran parte non disponibili nelle regioni dell'UE fino a quando il servizio di autorizzazioni recuperato e il servizio di ricerca degli utenti è stato scalato fino a ripristinare la capacità. ## Remedial Actions Plan & Next Steps Sappiamo che le interruzioni influiscono sulla produttività dei clienti. Atlassian sta privilegiando le seguenti azioni per prevenire incidenti simili in futuro: - ** Migliorare le protezioni per le mitigazioni di emergenza ad alto impatto:** Harden tooling operativo in modo da misure di mitigazione che potrebbero disabilitare i flussi di lavoro rispetto al cliente richiedono una revisione aggiuntiva. - **Strengthen capacità dell'infrastruttura di identità e cambiamento di sicurezza: ** Esaminare il dimensionamento del database regionale e la caparra di capacità per ridurre il rischio di saturazione durante i periodi di traffico di picco, e affinare il processo di valutazione per le modifiche di configurazione in modo che l'impatto del carico a valle sia valutato prima del rollout di produzione. - **Strengthen resilienza contro i fallimenti derivanti dal degrado a monte:** Gestione della backpressure Audit, configurazione dell'interruttore e comportamento di autoscaling nei servizi, in modo che il degrado a monte non causa più ampio impatto del prodotto attraverso la ricerca dell'utente, il raccoglitore dell'utente e le esperienze correlate. - ** Meccanismi di riproduzione di Harden per i guasti delle regole di automazione: ** Aumentare la resilienza delle regole di automazione per ridurre l'impatto associato a incidenti che si verificano dipendenze.. Riconosciamo quanto siano critici i flussi di lavoro affidabili per i nostri clienti, e ci scusiamo con i clienti che hanno avuto un impatto su questo incidente. Grazie. Supporto clienti Atlassian

Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

1. 16 giugno 2026 alle ore 13:46 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is investigating degraded performance affecting your service. We are actively working to identify the cause and resolve the issue. We will provide further updates within one hour.

2. 16 giugno 2026 alle ore 14:28 UTCidentified

   We have identified the source of degraded performance affecting some Confluence Cloud users. A subset of users may experience errors or slowness when viewing or editing pages. Our team has initiated a remediation and is actively monitoring recovery. We will provide another update within one hour or once the issue is fully resolved.

3. 16 giugno 2026 alle ore 14:53 UTCmonitoring

   We have been able to apply the fix to mitigate the issue and we are seeing recovery. We continue to monitor the situation and should be fully recovered soon. We should be able to provide more updates in the next one hour or earlier.

4. 16 giugno 2026 alle ore 15:56 UTCresolved

   On June 16, 2026, Confluence Cloud users for some customers may have experienced performance degradation of view and edit page experiences. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23 giugno 2026 alle ore 18:25 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary ### On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT ### The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ### ROOT CAUSE ### 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ### We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. We have already deployed the following fix: - Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: - Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. - Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12 giugno 2026 alle ore 07:39 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing experiencing degraded performance in Confluence Cloud affecting view page and edit page functionality. Our teams are actively investigating and will be sharing more updates in next 1 hour or sooner.

2. 12 giugno 2026 alle ore 08:45 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing degraded performance with view content, create and edit functionality on Confluence Cloud primarily in the EU region. Our teams are actively working to identify the root cause of the issue. We will share additional updates in next 2 hours or sooner as more information is available.

3. 12 giugno 2026 alle ore 10:29 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause of this issue and implemented a fix. We are beginning to observe signs of recovery, with some affected users regaining access to view, create, and edit content on Confluence Cloud. We will provide a further update within one hour, or sooner if we confirm full recovery for all affected customers.

4. 12 giugno 2026 alle ore 11:15 UTCresolved

   On June 12th 2026, between 07:04 to 11:06 UTC, some Confluence users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23 giugno 2026 alle ore 18:28 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ‌ ### ROOT CAUSE ‌ 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ‌ ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ‌ We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. ‌ We have already deployed the following fix: * Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: * Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. * Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ ‌ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 10 giugno 2026 alle ore 06:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating reports of extended delays being experienced across tasks such as processing of Incoming Emails, Notifications relating to changes or creation of Work Items, in addition to delays in processing Scheduled Triggers from Marketplace apps. Our team is looking into this with urgency and we will provide further update within one hour as our investigation continues.

2. 10 giugno 2026 alle ore 06:14 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause for this issue and has now deployed a fix that is rolling out across impacted products. At this time we are monitoring for the recovery of these events across Jira Service Management, Jira Cloud and Ecosystem app Scheduled Triggers. We will provide further update within one hour or when we have seen a full recovery of all task processing across these products.

3. 10 giugno 2026 alle ore 06:14 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has now determined that performance has returned to expected levels for those impacted by this incident. Additional products that are now known to have been impacted by this incident are Confluence, Customer Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery. These products would have seen similar impact where email notifications or processing of events may have been delayed while this incident was underway. We are now monitoring for the full recovery of performance across all products and will update when we are confident this issue is fully resolved, or within one hour, whichever is sooner.

4. 10 giugno 2026 alle ore 06:31 UTCresolved

   We are now confident that any of the tasks that were impacted by this incident and were delayed should now be operating as expected. We apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.

1. 27 maggio 2026 alle ore 06:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where customers attempting to view Calendars receive an error message on Confluence Cloud pages. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 27 maggio 2026 alle ore 07:06 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause and are in process of deploying a fix. We will share further updates in next 1 hours, or sooner if we have any meaningful developments to report.

3. 27 maggio 2026 alle ore 07:48 UTCresolved

   Between 00:50 UTC and 07:30 UTC on 27 May 2026, some users were facing errors when attempting to view Calendars in Confluence. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and this incident has been fully restored.

1. 26 maggio 2026 alle ore 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where some custom extensions may fail to load when editing Confluence Cloud pages. Affected users may see 'Error loading the extension!' messages or notice that certain macros are missing from the editor's extension selection menu. Viewing published pages is not affected. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 26 maggio 2026 alle ore 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating an issue affecting the editing macros in Confluence Cloud editor. Our team is working to identify the root cause. We will provide an update within approximately one hour.

3. 26 maggio 2026 alle ore 13:55 UTCresolved

   Between 08:30 UTC and 13:51 UTC on 26 May 2026, some users were unable to load or edit certain macros in the Confluence Cloud page editor. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and macro functionality has been fully restored.

1. 14 maggio 2026 alle ore 04:54 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue with multiple Atlassian products that is impacting a large number of Confluence and Jira Cloud customers. We are continuing to investigate and will add further details about additional impact as our investigation continues. We will provide more details within the next hour or sooner if further information becomes available

2. 14 maggio 2026 alle ore 05:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware that the current issues with accessing Atlassian products are impacting additional products. We have now expanded the impact of the incident to cover the known impacted products at this time. We will provide further update within one hour or sooner as information is available.

3. 14 maggio 2026 alle ore 05:11 UTCidentified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

4. 14 maggio 2026 alle ore 05:24 UTCidentified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

5. 14 maggio 2026 alle ore 05:34 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

6. 14 maggio 2026 alle ore 05:43 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

7. 14 maggio 2026 alle ore 06:40 UTCmonitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

8. 14 maggio 2026 alle ore 06:41 UTCmonitoring

   We are approaching full system recovery at this time, and are performing final confirmations that services are restored.

9. 14 maggio 2026 alle ore 06:48 UTCresolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

10. 19 maggio 2026 alle ore 19:04 UTCpostmortem

    ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 8 maggio 2026 alle ore 01:31 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 8 maggio 2026 alle ore 04:10 UTCidentified

   We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

3. 8 maggio 2026 alle ore 04:10 UTCidentified

   Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

4. 8 maggio 2026 alle ore 04:10 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

5. 8 maggio 2026 alle ore 05:53 UTCmonitoring

   The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

6. 8 maggio 2026 alle ore 08:03 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

7. 8 maggio 2026 alle ore 11:12 UTCmonitoring

   Our services are now fully operational. We continue to replay any events that were missed during the incident, and are making good progress. We will provide a further update once replays are complete. If you experience any ongoing issues, please contact our support team. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

8. 8 maggio 2026 alle ore 19:45 UTCresolved

   On May 8, 2026, some customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

9. 20 maggio 2026 alle ore 06:55 UTCpostmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support.

1. 14 aprile 2026 alle ore 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a partial service disruption affecting Rovo, specifically for customers using automation rules that invoke Rovo agents. Some customers may find that these automations are not completing as expected. We'll share updates here as more information becomes available.

2. 14 aprile 2026 alle ore 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified that this incident also affects automation rules in Confluence that use Rovo agents. We are investigating and will provide updates as we learn more.

3. 14 aprile 2026 alle ore 14:11 UTCidentified

   We have identified the issue, and our teams are working to resolve it and restore normal operations as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as they become available.

4. 14 aprile 2026 alle ore 15:46 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

5. 14 aprile 2026 alle ore 16:11 UTCresolved

   On April 14, 2026, affected users may have experienced some service disruption with automation rules that use Rovo agents. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 13 aprile 2026 alle ore 07:29 UTCmonitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 13 aprile 2026 alle ore 08:33 UTCmonitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 13 aprile 2026 alle ore 10:17 UTCresolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 21 aprile 2026 alle ore 02:33 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 8 aprile 2026 alle ore 06:01 UTCinvestigating

   The impact of this incident is now understood to also be impacting search in Jira and Confluence, as well as additional downstream impacts to Rovo Chat, User Management, Administration and Guard. Our team is continuing to investigate with urgency and we will provide further update within 1 hour.

2. 8 aprile 2026 alle ore 06:25 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is aware that users are currently experiencing errors while attempting to search in Confluence and Jira. Our team is investigating with urgency and will be providing an update within 1 hour.

3. 8 aprile 2026 alle ore 07:40 UTCidentified

   Confluence and Jira search reliability is improving, and we expect full recovery shortly; we will continue to closely monitor the services to ensure they remain stable.

4. 8 aprile 2026 alle ore 08:33 UTCidentified

   We have restored core search functionality and services are operating again, but some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour while new data continues to be indexed. We are actively working to complete reindexing and will update this page as performance fully recovers.

5. 8 aprile 2026 alle ore 09:03 UTCidentified

   We are also aware of impact as a result of these search failures to Customer Service Management, Asset Reports, Jira Service Management and dashboards within Focus. Our team have identified the potential root cause of the issue and our teams are working with urgency on a resolution. We will provide further update within 1 hour.

6. 8 aprile 2026 alle ore 09:03 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally. Some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour, while new data continues to be indexed. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

7. 8 aprile 2026 alle ore 11:43 UTCresolved

   The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

8. 17 aprile 2026 alle ore 16:24 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. A configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high‑density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers. The root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC. ### **IMPACT** During the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period. Impacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context. **Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions. **Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue. **Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC. **Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC. **Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC. ### **ROOT CAUSE** Atlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. An infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \(CPU & Memory\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products. The change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst‑affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: * **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types** Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly. * **Strengthen automated pre‑deploy validation for resource changes** Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads. * **Improve post‑deploy verification and alerting** Enhance monitoring and post‑deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod‑IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out. * **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits** Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts. * **Enhance recovery automation** Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12 marzo 2026 alle ore 13:38 UTCinvestigating

   Confluence Cloud users may experience errors when accessing certain Marketplace macros. Affected customers are seeing the message Error rendering macro 'static-macro': Page loading failed. Our team is actively investigating this issue. We will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner.

2. 12 marzo 2026 alle ore 13:38 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the cause of this issue, and a fix is currently being deployed. We are monitoring the deployment, and we will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner if needed.

3. 13 marzo 2026 alle ore 00:26 UTCresolved

   On March 12, 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 10 marzo 2026 alle ore 00:15 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of customers experiencing delays with their automations within Jira, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Jira Product Discovery and Confluence. Our team is investigating with urgency and we will provide an update within one hour.

2. 10 marzo 2026 alle ore 00:15 UTCidentified

   Our team has now identified the cause of this issue relating to delayed automation events and has put a hotfix in place to help restore automation performance. We will continue to monitor performance as the backlog of issues is now being processed.

3. 10 marzo 2026 alle ore 00:51 UTCmonitoring

   The performance degradation of automations has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. 10 marzo 2026 alle ore 00:59 UTCresolved

   On 9 March UTC, Automation users in the APAC region may have experienced performance degradation within Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Confluence. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 20 febbraio 2026 alle ore 04:14 UTCidentified

   Customers using Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours as we continue our investigation.

2. 20 febbraio 2026 alle ore 12:26 UTCidentified

   We understand that customers using Customer Service Management, Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours or sooner based on significant progress.

3. 20 febbraio 2026 alle ore 12:26 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved and all services are functional.