Cronologia delle interruzioni di Google Cloud

1. 1 settembre 2026 alle ore 16:03 UTCresolved

   # Sommario # Più prodotti in noi-central1-b stanno vivendo il degrado del servizio di rete. #Descrizione # Stiamo vivendo un problema di networking a partire da martedì, 2026-09-01 07:41 US/Pacific. Il problema riguarda una parte della zona us-central1-b. Le restanti zone della regione non sono colpite. Il nostro team di ingegneria di rete ha messo in mitigazioni e stiamo vedendo i servizi che iniziano a recuperare. Forniamo ulteriori informazioni entro martedì, 2026-09-01 09:30 US/Pacific con i dettagli attuali. Ci scusiamo con tutti coloro che sono colpiti dalla rottura. # I sintomi del cliente # I clienti stanno sperimentando perdite e errori dei pacchetti elevati. # BigQuery # * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud SQL * Motore dell'app * Cloud Run * AlloyDB * Cloud Bigtable * Cloud Spanner * Motore di calcolo * Cloud VPN * Interconnessione cloud * Cloud NAT * Cloud Filestore * Connettività ibrida cloud * Nuvola privata virtuale * Google Kubernetes Engine * Looker (Google Cloud core) # Workaround # * I clienti con retries di livello di servizio possono vedere i completamenti di successo come solo una parte della zona è interessata. * I clienti che sono gravemente colpiti e hanno servizi disponibili in zone alternative possono fallire in zone alternative.

2. 1 settembre 2026 alle ore 16:19 UTCresolved

   # Sommario # Più prodotti in noi-central1-b stanno vivendo il degrado del servizio di rete. #Descrizione # Il problema riguarda una parte della zona us-central1-b. Le restanti zone della regione non sono colpite. Dopo gli sforzi di mitigazione del livello di rete, l'infrastruttura di rete sottostante è completamente recuperata. I team di ingegneria del prodotto in Cloud stanno attualmente convalidando lo stato di recupero dei singoli servizi. Forniamo ulteriori informazioni entro martedì, 2026-09-01 10:00 US/Pacifico con i dettagli attuali. # I sintomi del cliente # I clienti stanno sperimentando perdite e errori dei pacchetti elevati. # BigQuery # * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud SQL * Motore dell'app * Cloud Run * AlloyDB * Cloud Bigtable * Cloud Spanner * Motore di calcolo * Cloud VPN * Interconnessione cloud * Cloud NAT * Cloud Filestore * Connettività ibrida cloud * Nuvola privata virtuale * Google Kubernetes Engine * Looker (Google Cloud core) * Apigee * Google SecOps SOAR # Workaround # * I clienti con retries di livello di servizio possono vedere i completamenti di successo come solo una parte della zona è interessata. * I clienti che sono gravemente colpiti e hanno servizi disponibili in zone alternative possono fallire in zone alternative.

3. 1 settembre 2026 alle ore 17:09 UTCresolved

   # Sommario # Più prodotti in noi-central1-b stanno vivendo il degrado del servizio di rete. #Descrizione # Il problema riguarda una parte della zona us-central1-b. Le restanti zone della regione non sono colpite. La maggior parte dei prodotti sono stati recuperati e il team di ingegneria sta ancora convalidando alcuni impatti prodotti rimanenti. Forniamo ulteriori informazioni entro martedì, 2026-09-01 11:00 US/Pacifico con i dettagli attuali. # I sintomi del cliente # I clienti stanno sperimentando perdite e errori dei pacchetti elevati. * Cloud Run * Motore dell'app Dopo i prodotti recuperati # BigQuery # * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud Bigtable * Motore di calcolo * Connettività ibrida cloud * Cloud Filestore * Nuvola privata virtuale * Cloud Spanner * Google Kubernetes Engine * Cloud SQL * AlloyDBCloud VPN * Apigee * Interconnessione cloud * Cloud NAT * Looker (Google Cloud core) * Google SecOps SOAR * Cloud Firestore # Workaround # * I clienti con retries di livello di servizio possono vedere i completamenti di successo come solo una parte della zona è interessata. * I clienti che sono gravemente colpiti e hanno servizi disponibili in zone alternative possono fallire in zone alternative.

4. 1 settembre 2026 alle ore 18:01 UTCresolved

   # Sommario # Più prodotti in noi-central1-b stanno vivendo il degrado del servizio di rete. #Descrizione # Il problema riguarda una parte della zona us-central1-b. Le restanti zone della regione non sono colpite. La maggior parte dei prodotti sono stati recuperati e il team di ingegneria sta ancora convalidando alcuni impatti prodotti rimanenti. La manutenzione della rete di routine ha innescato problemi in noi-central1-b. Abbiamo recuperato la capacità di rete che è stata influenzata e ripristinata tutti i servizi zonali e regionali. La manutenzione nella regione è stata arrestata mentre vengono effettuati audit proattivi. Forniamo ulteriori informazioni entro martedì, 2026-09-01 12:30 US/Pacific con i dettagli attuali. # I sintomi del cliente # I clienti stanno sperimentando perdite e errori dei pacchetti elevati. * Cloud Run * Motore dell'app Dopo i prodotti recuperati # BigQuery # * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud Bigtable * Motore di calcolo * Connettività ibrida cloud * Cloud Filestore * Nuvola privata virtuale * Cloud Spanner * Google Kubernetes Engine * Cloud SQL * AlloyDBCloud VPN * Apigee * Interconnessione cloud * Cloud NAT * Looker (Google Cloud core) * Google SecOps SOAR * Cloud Firestore # Workaround # * I clienti con retries di livello di servizio possono vedere i completamenti di successo come solo una parte della zona è interessata.

5. 1 settembre 2026 alle ore 18:36 UTCresolved

   # Sommario # Più prodotti in noi-central1-b stanno vivendo il degrado del servizio di rete. #Descrizione # Il problema riguarda una parte della zona us-central1-b. Le restanti zone della regione non sono colpite. La maggior parte dei prodotti sono stati recuperati. I prodotti colpiti Cloud Run e App Engine stanno anche vedendo il recupero e gli errori hanno abbassato i livelli pre-incidenti. L'ingegneria continua a monitorare e convalidare. La manutenzione del percorso del tessuto di rete di routine ha innescato problemi inaspettati in due cluster in us-central1-b. Abbiamo recuperato la capacità di rete che è stata influenzata e ripristinata tutti i servizi zonali e regionali. La manutenzione nella regione è stata arrestata mentre vengono effettuati audit proattivi. Forniamo ulteriori informazioni entro martedì, 2026-09-01 12:30 US/Pacific con i dettagli attuali. # I sintomi del cliente # I clienti stanno sperimentando perdite e errori dei pacchetti elevati. * Cloud Run * Motore dell'app Dopo i prodotti recuperati # BigQuery # * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud Bigtable * Motore di calcolo * Connettività ibrida cloud * Cloud Filestore * Nuvola privata virtuale * Cloud Spanner * Google Kubernetes Engine * Cloud SQL * AlloyDBCloud VPN * Apigee * Interconnessione cloud * Cloud NAT * Looker (Google Cloud core) * Google SecOps SOAR * Cloud Firestore # Workaround # * I clienti con retries di livello di servizio possono vedere i completamenti di successo come solo una parte della zona è interessata.

6. 1 settembre 2026 alle ore 19:12 UTCresolved

   # Sommario # Più prodotti in noi-central1-b esperto degrado di servizio di rete. #Descrizione # Il problema riguardava una parte della zona us-central1-b. Le restanti zone della regione non sono state colpite. Tutti i prodotti colpiti sono stati recuperati. Dall'analisi preliminare, la manutenzione del percorso del tessuto di rete di routine ha innescato problemi inaspettati in un cluster in noi-central1-b. Abbiamo recuperato la capacità di rete che è stata influenzata e ripristinata tutti i servizi zonali e regionali. La manutenzione nella regione è stata arrestata mentre vengono effettuati audit proattivi. Vi ringraziamo per la vostra pazienza mentre abbiamo lavorato per risolvere il problema. # I sintomi del cliente # I clienti hanno sperimentato perdite e errori dei pacchetti elevati. # Workaround # Il problema è stato mitigato.

7. 3 settembre 2026 alle ore 17:47 UTCresolved

   ## Relazione preliminare sugli incidenti Ci scusiamo sinceramente per la disgregazione che questo incidente ha causato alla vostra attività. Sappiamo quanto si fa affidamento su Google Cloud, e ci dispiace per l'impatto sul vostro ambiente. Stiamo lavorando per affrontare la causa principale e impedire che questo accada in futuro. Si prega di notare che queste informazioni si basano sulle nostre migliori conoscenze al momento della pubblicazione e sono soggette a modifiche mentre la nostra indagine continua. Una relazione finale sugli incidenti con azioni preventive sarà pubblicata una volta completata la nostra indagine. Se avete avuto un impatto al di fuori di quanto indicato di seguito, si prega di raggiungere il supporto di Google Cloud utilizzando https://cloud.google.com/supporto ## Data/ora del problema (Tutte le volte US/Pacifico) **Incident Start**: 1 settembre 2026 07:41 **Incident End**: 1 settembre 2026 11:52 4 ore, 11 minuti # Martedì 1 settembre 2026, alcuni clienti in noi-central1-b hanno sperimentato il degrado dei servizi di rete e l'isolamento delle istanze per una durata di 4 ore e 11 minuti. Ai nostri clienti le cui aziende sono state influenzate durante questa interruzione, ci scusiamo sinceramente. Questo non è il livello di qualità e affidabilità che ci sforziamo di offrire, e stiamo facendo passi immediati per migliorare le prestazioni e la disponibilità della piattaforma. ## Causa di radice preliminare Il trigger tecnico immediato per questo evento è stato la disconnessione fisica involontaria dei cavi fibra ottica di rete durante una procedura di manutenzione hardware di routine. Un ingegnere stava eseguendo un aggiornamento di capacità programmata sui router datacenter che supportano una frazione di capacità nella zona us-central1-b. L'architettura di rete per ogni datacenter è progettata con ridondanza su più dispositivi di routing. Il sistema è progettato per essere resiliente a tutti i guasti del singolo dispositivo o della fibra, e la maggior parte delle doppie o triple-failure non influiscono sul traffico del cliente. Per garantire questo, i dispositivi e i percorsi in fibra sono fisicamente separati in ogni datacenter, con diverse fonti di energia. Un errore procedurale ha significato che l'azione di manutenzione fisica sequenziale scompigliata al 100% di percorsi in fibra attraverso tutti i dispositivi entro 13 minuti. La natura dell'errore, combinato con la velocità dell'azione, ha impedito avvisi di azione errata raggiungendo l'ingegnere prima di completa disconnessione. Ciò ha portato a una capacità di calcolo nella zona colpita isolata dalla rete. I clienti non erano in grado di raggiungere le loro macchine virtuali, e quelle macchine virtuali non potevano stabilire connessioni al di fuori della loro zona. ## Remediation Il problema è stato rilevato immediatamente da sistemi automatizzati di monitoraggio della perdita di rete e sonde proattive, che hanno rapidamente impegnato i team di ingegneria della rete e risposta agli incidenti. Per mitigare l'impatto immediato del cliente, i team ingegneristici hanno spostato attivamente il traffico dall'infrastruttura impattata, spostando automaticamente il traffico di carico di lavoro compatibile a una capacità sana altrove nella regione. Contemporaneamente, i tecnici delle operazioni hardware sul sito hanno identificato i collegamenti ottici scollegati e fisicamente rivestiti le fibre. Una volta che i collegamenti fisici sono stati completamente restaurati, i tassi di flusso del traffico normalizzati e il traffico è stato reindirizzato indietro per restituire la capacità di servizio. ## Descrizione dell'impatto Martedì 1 settembre, dalle 07:41 alle 11:52 US/Pacific, una parte della zona us-central1-b ha sperimentato un grave degrado della rete e l'isolamento delle risorse. ***Prodotti multipli interessati: ** La disgregazione di rete da / per una parte di noi-central1-b ha colpito più prodotti GCP per alcuni clienti in quella zona. # Tasso di errore # I tassi di caduta del flusso di traffico per le risorse ospitate nell'area interessata hanno raggiunto il 100% durante il picco dell'incidente, con conseguente macchine virtuali irraggiungibili e elevata perdita di pacchetti. ** Servizi e funzionalità interessate** * **Google Compute Engine:** Incapacità di accedere a macchine virtuali esternamente, e incapacità per le VM di raggiungere le risorse remote. # Google Kubernetes Engine # cluster e nodi regionali/zonali non accessibili all'interno della zona interessata, richiedendo tempi di recupero del cluster ritardati. ***Cloud Run / Google App Engine:** Picchi di latenza temporanea e aborti di coda in attesa come carichi di lavoro backend automaticamente evacuati e spostati a capacità sane. Un sottoinsieme di carichi di lavoro nell'area specificamente colpita ha sperimentato il degrado fino a 11:52 US/Pacifico. * **Cloud SQL, AlloyDB for PostgreSQL, Cloud Spanner, Google Cloud Bigtable, Cloud Filestore:** L'accesso ai dati e la connettività si à ̈ ridotta per esempio localizzata strettamente all'infrastruttura colpita. * **Virtual Private Cloud (VPC), Cloud NAT, Apigee, Google BigQuery, Google Cloud Dataflow, Looker, Google SecOps SOAR, Hybrid Connectivity, Cloud Interconnect:** Perdita di pacchetti di rete elevata, gocce di connettività e timeout API nella zona colpita.

Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

1. 20 agosto 2026 alle ore 16:44 UTCresolved

   **Summary** We are investigating an issue where customers may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products in the us-west1 region. **Description** We are experiencing an issue with multiple products, beginning on Thursday, 2026-08-20 08:40 PDT. Our engineering team continues to investigate the issue. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-08-20 10:30 PDT with details. We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption. **Diagnosis / Customer Symptoms** Customers in us-west1 may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products. **Workaround** None at this time.

2. 20 agosto 2026 alle ore 17:13 UTCresolved

   **Summary** We are investigating an issue where customers may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products in the us-west1 region. **Description** Mitigation actions are implemented by our engineering teams, recovery trends have been observed across infrastructure layers. Active efforts remain underway to bring impacted cloud services back to full operation. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-08-20 10:45 PDT with details. **Diagnosis / Customer Symptoms** Customers in us-west1 may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products. **Workaround** We recommend customers to failover to other regions where feasible.

3. 20 agosto 2026 alle ore 17:32 UTCresolved

   **Summary** We are investigating an issue where customers may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products in the us-west1 region. **Description** Mitigation actions are implemented by our engineering teams, recovery trends have been observed across infrastructure layers. Active efforts remain underway to bring impacted cloud services back to full operation. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-08-20 11:00 PDT with details. **Diagnosis / Customer Symptoms** Customers in us-west1 may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products. **Workaround** We recommend customers to failover to other regions where feasible.

4. 20 agosto 2026 alle ore 18:03 UTCresolved

   **Summary** The issue causing timeouts, degradations, errors, and latencies across multiple us-west1 products has been mitigated and we are working to recover all products. **Description** Mitigation actions have been completed by our engineering teams and we are seeing recovery from multiple products. We are continuing to work to recover the remaining products. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-08-20 11:45 PDT with details. **Diagnosis / Customer Symptoms** Customers in us-west1 may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products. **Workaround** No workarounds needed at this time.

5. 20 agosto 2026 alle ore 18:53 UTCresolved

   **Summary** The issue causing timeouts, degradations, errors, and latencies across multiple us-west1 products has been mitigated and we are working to recover all products. **Description** Mitigation actions have been completed by our engineering teams and we are seeing recovery from multiple products. We are continuing to work to recover the remaining products. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-08-20 12:30 PDT with details. **Diagnosis / Customer Symptoms** Customers in us-west1 may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products. **Workaround** No workarounds needed at this time.

6. 20 agosto 2026 alle ore 19:21 UTCresolved

   **Summary** The issue causing timeouts, degradations, errors, and latencies across multiple us-west1 products has been mitigated and we are working to recover all products. **Description** Mitigation actions have been completed by our engineering teams and we are seeing recovery from multiple products. We are continuing to work to recover the remaining products. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-08-20 13:30 PDT with details. **Diagnosis / Customer Symptoms** Customers in us-west1 may experience timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products. **Workaround** No workarounds needed at this time.

7. 20 agosto 2026 alle ore 19:37 UTCresolved

   **Summary** The issue causing timeouts, degradations, errors, and latencies across multiple us-west1 products has been mitigated. **Description** We have mitigated the issue impacting multiple products in our us-west1 region as of Thursday, 2026-08-20 10:22 PDT. Our engineering teams have restored capacity on a planned optical maintenance that caused unexpected congestion in Dalles, Oregon metro /us-west1 region. Our systems stabilized and services have recovered once capacity was restored. Our teams are continuing to monitor for any residual impact. We will publish an analysis of this incident once we have completed our internal investigation. We thank you for your patience while we worked on resolving the issue. **Diagnosis / Customer Symptoms** Customers in us-west1 may have experienced timeouts, service degradations, errors, and elevated latencies across multiple products. **Workaround** This issue is now mitigated.

8. 25 agosto 2026 alle ore 06:20 UTCresolved

   # Preliminary Incident Report We sincerely apologize for the disruption this incident caused to your business operations. Recognizing your reliance on Google Cloud, we express our sincere regrets for any operational impact experienced. Our engineering teams are actively addressing the underlying root cause to prevent future recurrences. Please note that the information provided herein reflects our current understanding as of the time of publication and remains subject to revision as the investigation progresses. A comprehensive Incident Report detailing preventive measures will be issued upon conclusion of our inquiry. If you have experienced impact outside of what is listed below, please reach out to Google Cloud Support using https://cloud.google.com/support. ## Date/Time of the Issue (All time US/Pacific) * Incident Start: 20 August 2026 08:00 * Incident End: 20 August 2026 10:22 * Duration: 2 hours, 22 minutes ## Summary On Thursday, 20 August 2026, multiple Google Cloud services encountered elevated latency, provisioning failures, increased error rates, and service degradations lasting for a duration of 2 hours and 22 minutes. ## Preliminary Root Cause The disruption originated during scheduled fiber optic maintenance, which unexpectedly compromised network capacity between data centers within the us-west1 region. Automated rerouting mechanisms failed to properly redistribute traffic to alternate capacity, resulting in network congestion as volumes exceeded available bandwidth in the affected area. This underlying network degradation subsequently impacted higher-level service components through request throttling, increased latency, and cascading retries. Consequently, both control plane operations and data plane requests failed to execute successfully across several dependent Google Cloud services, producing the observed latency and elevated error rates. ## Remediation Internal monitoring alerted Google engineers to the incident, confirming that multiple services across us-west1 were affected. To mitigate the immediate operational impact, engineers initiated traffic draining protocols, re-routing service workloads away from the degraded network infrastructure. Following the restoration of inter-campus network capacity and the resolution of the core issue, engineers systematically restored traffic to the us-west1 region and confirmed service normalization. Long-term engineering solutions are currently being finalized and assigned to address the root cause and strengthen system resilience regarding fiber maintenance procedures. ## Description of Impact On Thursday, August 20, between 08:00 and 10:22 US/Pacific, Google Cloud customers in the us-west1 region encountered elevated latency, provisioning failures, and increased error rates. * Proportionate Impact / Error Rates: The precise scope of impact—including the proportion of affected projects and applications—and detailed error metrics will be published in the comprehensive Root Cause Analysis, as the reduced capacity caused request throttling, latency spikes, and increased retry volume. * Scope Exclusion: Services and workloads operating in regions other than us-west1 remained fully operational and unaffected. **Affected Services and Features** The following services experienced elevated latencies and/or increased error rates, across their respective data planes and control planes: * AlloyDB * Apache Kafka * Apigee Edge Public Cloud * Apigee X * Artifact Registry * BigQuery & BigQuery Data Transfer Service * Cloud Build * Cloud Data Fusion * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud Filestore * Cloud Key Management Service (KMS) * Cloud Monitoring * Cloud Run * Cloud SQL * Contact Center AI Platform * Dataproc Metastore * Google App Engine * Google Cloud Bigtable * Google Cloud Pub/Sub * Google Cloud Storage (GCS) * Google Compute Engine (GCE) * Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) * Identity and Access Management (IAM) * Managed Airflow (Cloud Composer) *Managed Service for Apache Spark (Dataproc) Persistent Disk

9. 27 agosto 2026 alle ore 21:45 UTCresolved

   # Incident Report ## Summary On Thursday, 20 August 2026, from 08:00 to 10:22 US/Pacific (15:00 to 17:22 UTC), multiple Google Cloud services in the us-west1 region experienced elevated latency, provisioning failures, increased error rates, and widespread service degradations for a total duration of 2 hours and 22 minutes. The incident impacted a wide range of core services — including Persistent Disk, Google Kubernetes Engine, Google Compute Engine, Cloud Run, Google Cloud Bigtable, Cloud Storage, and Identity and Access Management — across both control plane operations and data plane requests. We sincerely apologize for the disruption this incident caused to your business operations and critical workloads. We recognize the vital role Google Cloud plays in supporting your organization, and we deeply regret the impact on your business operations and critical workloads. Engineering and infrastructure teams are actively implementing measures to address the root causes and strengthen network resiliency to prevent recurrences in the future. Specifically, teams are monitoring recovery progress, refining safety checks for planned optical maintenance, and optimizing regional traffic routing mechanisms to safeguard against unexpected capacity constraints. ## Root Cause The disruption originated during scheduled fiber optic maintenance, which unexpectedly compromised network capacity between data centers within the us-west1 region. Automated rerouting mechanisms failed to properly redistribute traffic to alternate capacity, resulting in network congestion as volumes exceeded available bandwidth in the affected area. This underlying network degradation subsequently impacted higher-level service components through severe packet loss, request throttling, and increased latency across inter-campus dependencies. Core infrastructure services, including Spanner Paxos consensus and the Unified Metadata Server (UMS), experienced significant latency spikes, which cascaded into timeouts and elevated error rates for downstream dependent products such as Cloud Storage, Cloud IAM, Persistent Disk, and Google Kubernetes Engine. Consequently, both control plane operations and data plane requests failed to execute successfully across multiple Google Cloud services in us-west1 throughout the duration of the incident. ## Remediation and Prevention Internal monitoring systems initially detected widespread service anomalies and alerted Google engineers, who promptly confirmed that multiple core services operating across the us-west1 region were severely impacted. In response to the immediate operational risks, engineering teams promptly executed emergency traffic draining protocols to reroute active service workloads away from the compromised inter-campus network infrastructure and minimize further customer disruption. Once teams restored inter-campus fiber network capacity, engineers systematically reintroduced production traffic back to us-west1 through controlled validation stages, ultimately confirming full service normalization across all impacted platforms. Longer term engineering remediations and architectural enhancements are actively being finalized and assigned to owning teams. Key focus areas include reforming scheduled maintenance protocols, establishing stricter safety checks and circuit redundancy requirements prior to routine maintenance, and refining automated regional traffic failover mechanisms to automatically handle sudden capacity degradation without incurring severe network congestion. ## Detailed Description of Impact On Thursday, August 20, between 08:00 and 10:22 US/Pacific, Google Cloud customers in the us-west1 region encountered elevated latency, provisioning failures, and increased error rates. * **Impact / Error Rates:** The reduced capacity caused request throttling, latency spikes, and increased retry volume. * **Scope Exclusion:** Services and workloads operating in regions other than us-west1 remained fully operational and unaffected. **Affected Services and Features** The following services experienced elevated latencies and/or increased error rates, across their respective data planes and control planes: * AlloyDB * Apache Kafka * Apigee Edge Public Cloud * Apigee X * Artifact Registry * BigQuery & BigQuery Data Transfer Service * Cloud Build * Cloud Data Fusion * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud Filestore * Cloud Key Management Service (KMS) * Cloud Monitoring * Cloud Run * Cloud SQL * Contact Center AI Platform * Dataproc Metastore * Google App Engine * Google Cloud Bigtable * Google Cloud Pub/Sub * Google Cloud Storage (GCS) * Google Compute Engine (GCE) * Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) * Identity and Access Management (IAM) * Managed Airflow (Cloud Composer) * Managed Service for Apache Spark (Dataproc) * Persistent Disk The regional incident in us-west1 followed a structured three-phase recovery dictated by platform dependency layers: While core platform connectivity and live request serving were restored by 10:22 US/Pacific, certain services took additional time to fully recover due to asynchronous backlog processing and localized control-plane state reconciliation for a very small set of customers. For event-driven and pipeline services, inbound error rates dropped to 0 immediately, but some operations experienced elevated latency while workers processed through backlogs accumulated during the outage, clearing later for Cloud Pub/Sub, Cloud Build & Deploy, Cloud Dataflow, and Cloud Storage lifecycle deletions. Concurrently, while primary read/write traffic was healthy across the region, specific long-running lifecycle workflows required extra time to clear locks and reconcile distributed state machines. Compute Engine VM provisioning in zone us-west1-c and Cloud Filestore control plane instance allocation locks and resource validation checks took longer to normalize across regional storage backends.

1. 16 luglio 2026 alle ore 03:30 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE), Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, and Bare Metal Solution (BMS) services are experiencing temperature alerts in europe-west4-a. **Description** **GCVE:** Our engineering teams are currently working with data center facility teams to address the rising temperatures. A shutdown has already occurred for some private clouds, and we expect that others will shut down as well. **We recommend shutting down your VMware workload VMs for precaution so that recovery is safer. A shutdown of all systems started at 19:00 PDT \[4:00 Local Time (GMT+2)\]** We will notify you as soon as your Private Cloud has been powered back up and it is safe to restart the VMs. **BMS:** Some Bare Metal Solution servers are experiencing high temperatures and we are in the process of shutting them down. Customers may be unable to access their systems until we resolve the issue. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes** Our engineering team has proactively shut down ONTAP clusters to protect the data stored on them. Customers may experience unavailability of Cloud NetApp Volumes until this issue is resolved. There is no estimated time for resolution. We will provide an update by Wednesday, 2026-07-15 21:30 PDT with current details. We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption. **Customer Symptoms** **GCVE:** Customers may have already observed a loss of connectivity to their private cloud. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and a recovery, we are shutting down all Private Clouds in this zone. **BMS:** Customers may have already lost connectivity to their BMS machines. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and a recovery, we are shutting down servers in this zone. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes** Customers may have already lost connectivity to ONTAP clusters, or will lose connectivity to them shortly, as we proactively shut them down for their protection. Only Standard, Premium, and Extreme service levels are affected. **Workaround** There are no workarounds available for this issue at this time. Customers with multi-regional deployments are advised to route traffic to an alternate site.

2. 16 luglio 2026 alle ore 04:17 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE), Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, and Bare Metal Solution (BMS) services are experiencing temperature alerts in europe-west4-a **Description** The datacenter serving europe-west4-a for GCVE, BMS, and NetApp has experienced a power failure, which subsequently caused a cooling failure. Google has proactively turned down workloads in order to protect customer data from any risks posed by running infrastructure in a high temperature environment. The datacenter operator team is working diligently to bring cooling and power back online so we can safely restart affected workloads. **GCVE:** Our engineering teams have shut down private clouds, and we expect that others will shut down as well. We will notify customers as soon as their private cloud has been powered back up and it is safe to restart the VMs. **BMS:** Some Bare Metal Solution servers are experiencing high temperatures and we are in the process of shutting them down. Customers may be unable to access their systems until we resolve the issue. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes** Our engineering team has proactively shut down ONTAP clusters to protect the data stored on them. Customers may experience unavailability of Cloud NetApp Volumes until this issue is resolved. There is no estimated time for resolution. We will provide an update by Wednesday, 2026-07-15 22:30 PDT with current details. We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption. **Customer Symptoms** **GCVE:** Customers would have already observed a loss of connectivity to their private cloud. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and a recovery, we have shut down all private clouds in this zone. **BMS:** Customers may have already lost connectivity to their BMS machines. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and a recovery, we are shutting down some servers in this zone. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes** Customers would have already lost connectivity to ONTAP clusters, as we proactively shut them down for their protection. Only Standard, Premium, and Extreme service levels are affected. **Workaround** There are no workarounds available for this issue at this time. Customers with multi-regional deployments are advised to route traffic to an alternate site.

3. 16 luglio 2026 alle ore 04:41 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE), Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, and Bare Metal Solution (BMS) services are experiencing a service outage in europe-west4-a due to a cooling failure **Description** The datacenter serving europe-west4-a for GCVE, BMS, and NetApp has experienced a power failure, which subsequently caused a cooling failure. Google has proactively turned down workloads in order to protect customer data from any risks posed by running infrastructure in a high temperature environment. The datacenter operator team is working diligently to bring cooling and power back online so we can safely restart affected workloads. Some cooling has been restored, and we are working to restore affected workloads as available capacity allows. **GCVE:** Cooling has been restored at the site. As a precautionary measure, our engineering teams had shut down private clouds to protect these clouds from any damage. We are beginning service restoration and will notify customers as soon as their private cloud has been powered back up and it is safe to restart the VMs. **BMS:** Some Bare Metal Solution servers experienced high temperatures and we proactively shut them down. We are starting to bring the servers back online, and will provide an update once they are ready. Customers may be unable to access these systems until service is restored. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes:** Our engineering team has proactively shut down ONTAP clusters to protect the data stored on them. Customers may experience unavailability of Cloud NetApp Volumes until this issue is resolved. There is no estimated time for resolution. We will provide an update by Wednesday, 2026-07-15 23:30 PDT with current details. We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption. **Customer Symptoms** **GCVE:** Customers would have already observed a loss of connectivity to their private cloud. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and recovery, we have shut down all private clouds in this zone. **BMS:** Customers may have lost connectivity to their BMS machines. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and recovery, we shut down some servers in this zone, and are actively restoring them. Customers may be unable to access these systems until restoration is complete. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes:** Customers would have already lost connectivity to ONTAP clusters, as we proactively shut them down to protect these clusters from any damage. Only Standard, Premium, and Extreme service levels are affected. **Workaround** There are no workarounds available for this issue at this time. However, customers with multi-regional deployments are advised to route traffic to an alternate site.

4. 16 luglio 2026 alle ore 06:29 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE), Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, and Bare Metal Solution (BMS) services are experiencing a service outage in europe-west4-a due to a cooling failure. **Description** The datacenter serving europe-west4-a for GCVE, BMS, and NetApp has experienced a power failure, which subsequently caused a cooling failure. Google proactively turned down workloads in order to protect customer data from any risks posed by running infrastructure in a high temperature environment. Cooling and power have been restored at the site. The datacenter operator team is now working to safely restart affected workloads. **GCVE:** As a precautionary measure, our engineering teams had shut down private clouds to protect these clouds from any damage. Service restoration is still in progress. We will notify customers as soon as their private cloud has been powered back up and it is safe to restart the VMs. **BMS:** We are continuing to restore servers and monitor their health. Customers may be unable to access these systems until service restoration is complete. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes:** Our engineering team had proactively shut down ONTAP clusters to protect the data stored on them. Customers may experience unavailability of Cloud NetApp Volumes until this issue is resolved. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-07-16 00:30 PDT with current details. **Customer Symptoms** **GCVE:** Customers would have already observed a loss of connectivity to their private cloud. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and recovery, we have shut down all private clouds in this zone. **BMS:** Customers may have lost connectivity to their servers. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and recovery, we shut down some servers in this zone. We are continuing to restore servers and monitor their health. Customers may be unable to access these systems until service restoration is complete. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes:** Customers would have already lost connectivity to ONTAP clusters, as we proactively shut them down to protect these clusters from any damage. Only Standard, Premium, and Extreme service levels are affected. **Workaround** There are no workarounds available for this issue at this time. However, customers with multi-regional deployments are advised to route traffic to an alternate site.

5. 16 luglio 2026 alle ore 07:39 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE), Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, and Bare Metal Solution (BMS) services are experiencing a service outage in europe-west4-a due to a cooling failure. **Description** The datacenter serving europe-west4-a for GCVE, BMS, and NetApp has experienced a power failure, which subsequently caused a cooling failure. Google proactively turned down workloads in order to protect customer data from any risks posed by running infrastructure in a high temperature environment. Cooling and power have been restored at the site. The datacenter operator team is now working to safely restart affected workloads. **GCVE:** As a precautionary measure, our engineering teams had shut down private clouds to protect these clouds from any damage. Network fabric has been restored, and Private Cloud restoration remains underway. We will notify affected customers once their Private Clouds are restored to allow for VM operational verification. **BMS:** We are continuing to restore servers and monitor their health. Customers may be unable to access these systems until service restoration is complete. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes:** Our engineering team had proactively shut down ONTAP clusters to protect the data stored on them. Recovery is currently in progress. Customers may experience unavailability of Cloud NetApp Volumes until this issue is resolved. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-07-16 01:30 PDT with current details. **Customer Symptoms** **GCVE:** Customers would have already observed a loss of connectivity to their private cloud. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and recovery, we have shut down all private clouds in this zone. **BMS:** Customers may have lost connectivity to their servers. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and recovery, we shut down some servers in this zone. We are continuing to restore servers and monitor their health. Customers may be unable to access these systems until service restoration is complete. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes:** Customers would have already lost connectivity to ONTAP clusters, as we proactively shut them down to protect these clusters from any damage. Only Standard, Premium, and Extreme service levels are affected. **Workaround** There are no workarounds available for this issue at this time. However, customers with multi-regional deployments are advised to route traffic to an alternate site.

6. 16 luglio 2026 alle ore 08:32 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE), Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, and Bare Metal Solution (BMS) services experienced a service outage in europe-west4-a due to a cooling failure. **Description** The datacenter serving europe-west4-a for GCVE, BMS, and NetApp has experienced a power failure, which subsequently caused a cooling failure. Google proactively turned down workloads in order to protect customer data from any risks posed by running infrastructure in a high temperature environment. Cooling and power have been restored at the site. The datacenter operator team is now validating site stability. **GCVE:** Network fabric has been restored, and Private Cloud restoration remains underway. We are notifying the affected customers as their Private Clouds are restored to allow for VM operational verification. **BMS:** Server restoration is largely complete, with most systems now online and reporting a healthy status. We are actively working through the remaining validation efforts to achieve full recovery. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes:** Service restoration is complete, and all affected servers are now operational. We continue to monitor these for full service recovery. If customers are still experiencing impact from this issue, please contact Support, and we will work with you to resolve any residual impact. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-07-16 02:30 PDT with current details. **Customer Symptoms** **GCVE:** Customers would have observed a loss of connectivity to their private cloud. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and recovery, we had shut down all Private Clouds in this zone. We are in the process of bringing all restored Private Clouds online. **BMS:** Customers may have lost connectivity to their servers. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and recovery, we had shut down some servers in this zone. We are continuing to restore servers and monitor their health. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes:** Customers would have lost connectivity to ONTAP clusters, as they were proactively shut down to protect these clusters from any damage. Only Standard, Premium, and Extreme service levels were affected. Customers should now be able to access their volumes again. **Workaround** There are no workarounds available for this issue at this time. However, customers with multi-regional deployments are advised to route traffic to an alternate site.

7. 16 luglio 2026 alle ore 09:21 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE), Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, and Bare Metal Solution (BMS) services experienced a service outage in europe-west4-a due to a cooling failure. **Description** The datacenter serving europe-west4-a for GCVE, BMS, and NetApp has experienced a power failure, which subsequently caused a cooling failure. Google proactively turned down workloads in order to protect customer data from any risks posed by running infrastructure in a high temperature environment. Cooling and power have been restored at the site. The datacenter operator team is now validating site stability. **GCVE:** Network fabric has been restored, and Private Cloud restoration remains underway. We are notifying the affected customers as their Private Clouds are restored to allow for VM operational verification. **BMS:** Server restoration is largely complete, with most systems now online and reporting a healthy status. We are actively working through the remaining validation efforts to achieve full recovery. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes:** Service restoration is complete, and all affected servers are now operational. We continue to monitor these for full service recovery. If customers are still experiencing impact from this issue, please contact Support, and we will work with you to resolve any residual impact. We will provide an update by Thursday, 2026-07-16 03:30 PDT with current details. **Customer Symptoms** **GCVE:** Customers would have observed a loss of connectivity to their private cloud. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and recovery, we had shut down all Private Clouds in this zone. We are in the process of bringing all restored Private Clouds online. **BMS:** Customers may have lost connectivity to their servers. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and recovery, we had shut down some servers in this zone. We are continuing to restore servers and monitor their health. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes:** Customers would have lost connectivity to ONTAP clusters, as they were proactively shut down to protect these clusters from any damage. Only Standard, Premium, and Extreme service levels were affected. Customers should now be able to access their volumes again. **Workaround** None at this time.

8. 16 luglio 2026 alle ore 10:14 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE), Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, and Bare Metal Solution (BMS) services experienced a service outage in europe-west4-a due to a cooling failure. **Description** The datacenter serving europe-west4-a for GCVE, BMS, and NetApp has experienced a power failure, which subsequently caused a cooling failure. Google proactively turned down workloads in order to protect customer data from any risks posed by running infrastructure in a high temperature environment. Cooling and power have been restored at the site. The issue with GCVE and Google Cloud NetApp Volumes has been resolved for all affected users. We continue to recover the impact for BMS at the moment. **GCVE [Mitigated]:** Service restoration is complete across all the Private Clouds. Customers have been informed about this restoration and requested to verify that their VMs are fully operational. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes [Mitigated]:** Service restoration is complete, and all affected servers are now operational. We continue to monitor these for full service recovery. **BMS:** Server restoration is largely complete, with most systems now online and reporting a healthy status. We are actively working through the remaining validation efforts to achieve full recovery. For Google Cloud NetApp Volumes and GCVE, if customers are still experiencing impact from this issue, please contact Support, and we will work with you to resolve any residual impact. We will provide the BMS restoration status update by Thursday, 2026-07-16 04:30 PDT with current details. **Customer Symptoms** The issue is now resolved for GCVE and Google Cloud NetApp Volumes. We continue to recover the impact for BMS at the moment. **GCVE [Mitigated]:** Customers would have observed a loss of connectivity to their private cloud. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes [Mitigated]:** Customers would have lost connectivity to ONTAP clusters, as they were proactively shut down to protect these clusters from any damage. Only Standard, Premium, and Extreme service levels were affected. Customers should now be able to access their volumes again. **BMS:** Customers may have lost connectivity to their servers. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and recovery, we had shut down some servers in this zone. We are continuing to restore servers and monitor their health. **Workaround** None at this time.

9. 16 luglio 2026 alle ore 11:39 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE), Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, and Bare Metal Solution (BMS) services experienced a service outage in europe-west4-a due to a cooling failure. **Description** The datacenter serving europe-west4-a for GCVE, BMS, and NetApp has experienced a power failure, which subsequently caused a cooling failure. Google proactively turned down workloads in order to protect customer data from any risks posed by running infrastructure in a high temperature environment. Cooling and power have been restored at the site. The issue with GCVE and Google Cloud NetApp Volumes has been resolved for all affected users. We continue to recover the impact for BMS at the moment. **GCVE [Mitigated]:** Service restoration is complete across all the Private Clouds. Customers have been informed about this restoration and requested to verify that their VMs are fully operational. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes [Mitigated]:** Service restoration is complete, and all affected servers are now operational. We continue to monitor these for full service recovery. **BMS:** Server restoration is largely complete, with most systems now online and reporting a healthy status. We are actively working through the remaining validation efforts to achieve full recovery. For Google Cloud NetApp Volumes and GCVE, if customers are still experiencing impact from this issue, please contact Support, and we will work with you to resolve any residual impact. We will provide the BMS restoration status update by Thursday, 2026-07-16 05:30 PDT with current details. **Customer Symptoms** The issue is now resolved for GCVE and Google Cloud NetApp Volumes. We continue to recover the impact for BMS at the moment. **GCVE [Mitigated]:** Customers would have observed a loss of connectivity to their private cloud. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes [Mitigated]:** Customers would have lost connectivity to ONTAP clusters, as they were proactively shut down to protect these clusters from any damage. Only Standard, Premium, and Extreme service levels were affected. Customers should now be able to access their volumes again. **BMS:** Customers may have lost connectivity to their servers. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and recovery, we had shut down some servers in this zone. We are continuing to restore servers and monitor their health. **Workaround** None at this time.

10. 16 luglio 2026 alle ore 12:25 UTCresolved

    **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE), Google Cloud NetApp Volumes, and Bare Metal Solution (BMS) services experienced a service outage in europe-west4-a due to a cooling failure. **Description** The datacenter serving europe-west4-a for GCVE, BMS, and NetApp has experienced a power failure, which subsequently caused a cooling failure. Google proactively turned down workloads in order to protect customer data from any risks posed by running infrastructure in a high temperature environment. Cooling and power have been restored at the site. The issue with GCVE and Google Cloud NetApp Volumes has been resolved for all affected users as of Thursday, 2026-07-16 02:31 PDT and 01:00 PDT respectively. The issue with BMS is largely resolved and is believed to be affecting a very small number of customers. Our Engineering will continue to recover this residual impact directly with the impacted customers. If you have questions or are still impacted, please open a case with the Support Team and we will work with you until this issue is resolved. **GCVE:** Service restoration is complete across all the Private Clouds. Customers have been informed about this restoration and requested to verify that their VMs are fully operational. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes:** Service restoration is complete, and all affected servers are now operational. **BMS:** Service restoration is largely complete. We continue working with a very small number of remaining affected customers to achieve full recovery. We thank you for your patience while we continue to fully resolve the issue. **Customer Symptoms** The issue is now resolved for GCVE and Google Cloud NetApp Volumes. The issue with BMS is largely resolved and our engineering will continue to recover this residual impact directly with the impacted customers. **GCVE:** Customers would have observed a loss of connectivity to their private cloud. **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes:** Customers would have lost connectivity to ONTAP clusters, as they were proactively shut down to protect these clusters from any damage. Only Standard, Premium, and Extreme service levels were affected. **BMS:** Customers may have lost connectivity to their servers. As a protective measure for hardware integrity and recovery, we had shut down some servers in this zone. **Workaround** None at this time.

11. 18 luglio 2026 alle ore 00:22 UTCresolved

    # Preliminary Incident Report We sincerely apologize for the disruption this incident caused to your business. We know how much you rely on Google Cloud, and we regret the impact on your productivity. Please note, this information is based on our best knowledge at the time of posting and is subject to change as our investigation continues. A final Incident Report with preventative actions will be posted once our investigation is complete. If you have experienced impact outside of what is listed below, please reach out to Google Cloud Support using https://cloud.google.com/support. ## Date/Time of the Issue (All time US/Pacific) **Google Cloud VMware Engine Impact:** - Start: 15 July 2026 17:09 - End: 16 July 2026 2:33 - Duration: 9 Hours, 24 Minutes **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes Impact:** - Start: 15 July 2026 16:39 - End: 16 July 2026 01:10 - Duration: 8 Hours 31 Minutes **Bare Metal Solution Impact:** - Start: 15 July 2026 18:37 - End: 16 July 2026 07:34 - Duration: 12 Hours 57 Minutes ## Summary On Wednesday, 15 July 2026, Google Cloud VMware Engine, Bare Metal Solution, and Google Cloud NetApp Volumes experienced service interruptions for a total duration of 14 hours, 55 minutes. We are taking immediate steps to ensure this doesn’t happen again. ## Preliminary Root Cause A regional data center hosting services in europe-west4-a experienced a loss of utility power and subsequent cooling capacity. The sequence of events leading to customer impact was as follows: - An electrical fault occurred on the utility grid upstream of the data center, disrupting the electrical distribution gear and cooling equipment. - The loss of cooling infrastructure resulted in ambient temperatures rising rapidly within the affected data halls. Host servers, storage clusters, and network switches were shut down to prevent equipment damages due to the extreme heat. - The high temperatures in the data hall resulted in disruption to customer workloads and control plane operations across the affected services. Google engineers have begun a full root cause analysis and we will provide additional information once it is available. ## Remediation Google engineering teams were alerted to the issue via automated temperature and hardware unreachability telemetry starting at 16:39 US/Pacific. Engineers collaborated with the third-party facility provider to safely restore primary utility power and cooling systems, returning ambient room temperatures to safe operational levels. With the environment stabilized, field support engineers and remote teams systematically booted and verified the server hosts, storage nodes, and network fabric in a controlled sequence. Automated recovery playbooks were executed to restore underlying network switches and routing infrastructure, allowing storage appliances and compute clusters to be brought back online and verified for health. The underlying infrastructure has been fully recovered, and normal operations have been successfully restored. ## Description of Impact On 15 July 2026 from 16:39 to 16 July 2026 07:34 US/Pacific, customers experienced service disruptions across several products in europe-west4-a zone: - **Google Cloud VMware Engine:** Customers lost connectivity to their private clouds and workloads as foundational hosts and network switches were powered off for thermal protection. - **Bare Metal Solution:** Customers experienced connectivity loss to their database servers and storage appliances as the underlying hardware was powered down. - **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes:** Customers in the STANDARD, PREMIUM, and EXTREME service levels were unable to access their storage volumes. Control plane operations, including the creation of new storage pools, volumes, and backups, experienced failures in the affected region.

12. 25 luglio 2026 alle ore 13:16 UTCresolved

    ## \# Incident Report ## \#\# Summary On Wednesday, 15 July 2026, Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE), Bare Metal Solution (BMS), and Google Cloud NetApp Volumes (GCNV) experienced service interruptions for a total duration of 14 hours, 55 minutes. The root cause for this outage is a 3ms voltage drop in the power feed from the utility provider and subsequent utility breaker protective action. This incident was mitigated by the data center provider rectifying the failed systems followed by the Google engineering team restoring the services. ## \#\# Root Cause A regional data center hosting services in europe-west4-a experienced an upstream voltage transient affecting both utility power feeds A and B. During this event, the utility breakers on both A and B feeds tripped and initiated the transfer to the back-up power source DRUPS (Diesel Rotary Uninterruptible Power Supply). The transition of side B to DRUPS system was successful without any power interruption. The DRUPS back-up power system for side A failed to take over the facility load due to electrical component failures. The DRUPS failure to take over load initiated automatic transfer of the affected 3 rows from feed A to redundant power feed B. Rows 1 and 2 transferred to power feed B successfully. Row 3 failed to transfer to power feed B and experienced complete power loss due to an overload protection breaker trip. The root cause of the failed transfer on the affected row was identified as load deployment discrepancy which is under further investigation by Google engineering team. This resulted in loss of both redundant power feeds to the single row. During the voltage transient event, the server data hall experienced an increased temperature due to a cooling system failure. The chiller controller dropped offline during the voltage transient event, failing to signal the chilled water distribution pumps to restart and ultimately causing the chiller system A to shut down. The redundant source was not available due to known ongoing construction work at the facility. This resulted in the data hall temperatures reaching 44°C and subsequent shutdown of the affected data hall machines. Google engineering teams initiated machine shutdown procedures for the remainder of reachable devices as part of the cooling emergency shutdown process. A timeline of events during the incident is provided below. ### DataCenter Events | Timestamp(PST) | Event Description | | :---- | :---- | | 07-15-2026 16:24 | An electrical fault occurred on the utility grid upstream of the data center, disrupting the electrical distribution. | | 07-15-2026 16:24 | DRUPS back-up power system for side A failed to take over the data hall load. | | 07-15-2026 16:24 | The chiller controller dropped offline during the voltage transient event causing distribution pumps to stop and unable to restart. | | 07-15-2026 16:37 | Rows 1 and 2 transferred to power feed B successfully. Row 3 failed to transfer to power feed B and lost power. | | 07-15-2026 18:29 | Data hall temperatures reached 44C and crossed the safe machine operating threshold. | | 07-15-2026 19:55 | Machine shutdown procedures implemented. | | 07-15-2026 21:05 | Cooling system fully recovered and temperatures in the data hall returned to normal operating range. | | 07-15-2026 21:24 | Notification about cooling recovery sent by provider | | 07-15-2026 21:46 | Notification about power recovery sent by provider | ### GCVE Timelines | Timestamp(PST) | Event Description | | :---- | :---- | | 07-15-2026 16:30 | GCVE service power monitoring alert received | | 07-15-2026 16:41 | First symptom detected, servers reporting redundancy power feed failure. | | 07-15-2026 17:05 | Switch temperature \>60°C alerts triggered. | | 07-15-2026 17:09 | Start of user impact, first prober alert failure for north south traffic for customers. | | 07-15-2026 19:00 | Server / Network devices shutdown initiated. | | 07-15-2026 19:55 | All reachable server/network devices were shut down. | | 07-15-2026 21:24 | Cooling system fully recovered and temperatures in the datahall were returning to normal operating range. | | 07-15-2026 21:56 | Network restoration started with reachable hydra devices. | | 07-15-2026 22:40 | Onsite technician arrived, to recover the console servers. | | 07-15-2026 23:10 | Console server reboot/recovery complete. | | 07-16-2026 00:33 | Network recovery for all Placement Groups complete. | | 07-16-2026 02:36 | Incident mitigated, after recovering all the customer PCs are fully healthy. | This outage impacted 24 private clouds of 20 distinct customers in europe-west4-a region. ### Bare Metal Solutions (BMS) Timelines | Timestamp(PST) | Event Description | | :---- | :---- | | 07-15-2026 16:41 | First symptom detected, servers and storage reporting redundancy power feed failure | | 07-15-2026 17:52 | Automated monitoring detected rising temperatures | | 07-15-2026 18:37 | Four Netapp SAN storage nodes failed and were shut down due to overheating, resulting in storage availability issue | | 07-15-2026 18:37 | Customer impact started, first server shutdown detected | | 07-15-2026 18:59 | Reserve and buffer servers started to get powered off | | 07-15-2026 20:43 | Drop in the temperature has been detected | | 07-15-2026 20:52 | Four Netapp SAN storage nodes recovered, mitigating storage availability issue | | 07-15-2026 21:05 | The cooling system fully recovered and temperatures in the datahall were returning to normal operating range. | | 07-15-2026 23:23 | First customer server reboot started | | 07-16-2026 06:32 | Last customer server reboot started | | 07-16-2026 08:42 | Incident mitigated. All impacted customer servers were rebooted and confirmed in healthy state. | This outage impacted 9 distinct BMS customers in europe-west4 ### NetApp Timelines | Timestamp(PST) | Event Description | | :---- | :---- | | 07-15-2026 16:32 | Netapp facility remote monitoring alert on high temp and network switches switches failure received | | 07-15-2026 17:32 | All 6 clusters failed and were shut down automatically due to high temperature | | 07-15-2026 21:05 | Cooling capacity restored | | 07-15-2026 22:08 | Cluster recovery process initiated for all 6 clusters. 1st cluster recovered | | 07-15-2026 23:55 | All 6 Netapp Clusters and all customers recovered and validated as healthy & operational | ## \#\# Remediation and Prevention Google engineers were alerted to the infrastructure power loss on Wednesday, 15 July 2026 at 16:30 US/Pacific and subsequent increase in data hall temperatures at 17:44 US/Pacific via our automated monitoring and telemetry, and immediately began investigating. During the voltage transient event, the chillers maintained power but shut down because the distribution pumps failed to restart, resulting in no water flow. The pumps were manually switched from auto to hand mode to restore circulation and cooling. The facility team deployed an interim portable UPS to support the chiller controllers and prevent localized controller power loss. Upon confirmation of utility power restoration, the facility returned to utility power via automatic switching with the exception of two Remote Power Panels (RPPs), which required manual verification before restoration of power to affected server row. To provide full resiliency the facility team aligned a swing DRUPS unit to restore the redundant configuration on the A feed and is working on repairing the faulty DRUPS. To remediate the power loss at Row 3, once the electrical fault was confirmed to be fully isolated, teams reset the tripped breakers, successfully restoring both redundant power to the impacted server racks. Google is committed to preventing a repeat of this issue in the future and is completing the following actions: * Detailed investigation by the engineering team of the sequence of events that prevented transfer of load to DRUPS system and identified system improvements **\[ETA Aug 2026\].** * Determine and resolve the cause of overload conditions that caused power loss to Row 3 **\[ETA Aug 2026\].** * Perform investigation of chiller pump control system redundancy setup to ensure cooling system resiliency **\[ETA Sep 2026\].** * Implement improvements to facility system monitoring alerts for power events and configure early alert thresholds for cooling excursion detection. **\[ETA Aug 2026\].** * The GCVE engineering team is working to improve the automated triggering of shutdown during quickly evolving thermal runoff situations **\[ETA Oct 2026\]**. * The BMS engineering team is working with partner teams to update the incident classification and SLO definitions to improve personnel availability during major datacenter events **\[ETA Sep 2026\]**. * The GCNV engineering team is collaborate with the data center team to review incident handling SLA and runbooks, identify potential future occurrences and create playbooks to address/mitigate them, establish monthly joint emergency drill, and review if the Netapp cluster recovery process can be expedited **\[ETA Aug 2026\].** ## \#\# Detailed Description of Impact On 15 July 2026 from 16:39 to 16 July 2026 07:34 US/Pacific, customers experienced service disruptions across several products in europe-west4-a zone: * **Google Cloud VMware Engine**: Customers lost connectivity to their private clouds and workloads as foundational hosts and network switches were powered off for thermal protection. * **Bare Metal Solution**: Customers experienced connectivity loss to their database servers and storage appliances as the underlying hardware was powered down. * **Google Cloud NetApp Volumes**: Customers in the STANDARD, PREMIUM, and EXTREME service levels were unable to access their storage volumes. Control plane operations, including the creation of new storage pools, volumes, and backups, experienced failures in the affected region.

1. 14 luglio 2026 alle ore 20:24 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) Stretched Cluster customers are experiencing zonal outages impacting network connectivity across multiple regions. **Description** We are experiencing an issue with Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) beginning Tuesday, 2026-07-14 at 10:00 PDT. We are continuing to investigate and mitigate the issue. We believe this disruption is isolated to network connectivity issues for stretch clusters, while Storage and Compute services appear to be unaffected. GCVE VMs are running as expected but customers may experience connectivity issues to the VMs. We will provide another update by Tuesday, 2026-07-14 14:00 PDT with current details. **Customer Symptoms** Some GCVE customers may experience inter-site communication failures to their GCVE environments within the affected zones. **Workaround** None at this time.

2. 14 luglio 2026 alle ore 21:31 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) Stretched Cluster customers are experiencing zonal outages impacting network connectivity across multiple regions. **Description** We are experiencing an inter-site communication issue with Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) stretched cluster customers beginning Tuesday, 2026-07-14 at 10:00 PDT. We have identified the customers that are affected by this issue and we are working with them on mitigation. Our preliminary investigation indicates this is stemming from an underlying network connectivity issue affecting the infrastructure that links the zones within a stretch cluster. This disruption is causing synchronization issues between the affected zones. We believe Storage and Compute services remain unaffected, and VMs are running as expected, though connectivity to them may be degraded. We will provide another update by Tuesday, 2026-07-14 15:00 PDT with current details. **Customer Symptoms** Some GCVE customers using Stretched Cluster may experience inter-site communication failures to their GCVE environments within the affected zones. **Workaround** While we work on restoring full connectivity, we recommend the following workarounds to restore access to your workloads: - VM Migration (recommended): Where possible, migrate your affected VMs to the healthy and unaffected side of the stretch cluster. We strongly recommend consulting with Google Support before proceeding.

3. 14 luglio 2026 alle ore 22:16 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) Stretched Cluster customers are experiencing zonal outages impacting network connectivity across multiple regions. **Description** We are experiencing an inter-site communication issue with Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) stretched cluster customers beginning Tuesday, 2026-07-14 at 10:00 PDT. We have identified the customers that are affected by this issue and we are working with them on mitigation. Our investigation has identified underlying inter-zone communication failures and Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) session flapping between cluster zones. Specifically, network connectivity has been lost between the affected zones and the witness appliance. Because the witness appliance is currently unreachable, the cluster zones are unable to safely synchronize state. As a result, VMs on the affected sites are becoming isolated and may be left without writable data. **Failover / VM Migration:** Migrating affected VMs to the healthy, secondary zone of your stretch cluster remains the primary mitigation strategy. Because of the complexities surrounding failover risks and secondary zone health, we highly encourage you to open a ticket with Google Cloud Support if you are severely impacted. We do not currently have an ETA for resolution. We will provide another update by Tuesday, 2026-07-14 16:00 PDT with current details. **Customer Symptoms** Some GCVE customers using Stretched Cluster may experience inter-site communication failures to their GCVE environments within the affected zones. **Workaround** While we work on restoring full connectivity, we recommend the following workarounds to restore access to your workloads: - VM Migration (recommended): Where possible, migrate your affected VMs to the healthy and unaffected side of the stretch cluster. We strongly recommend consulting with Google Support before proceeding.

4. 14 luglio 2026 alle ore 23:05 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) Stretched Cluster customers are experiencing zonal outages impacting network connectivity across multiple regions. **Description** We are experiencing an inter-site communication issue with Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) stretched cluster customers beginning Tuesday, 2026-07-14 at 10:00 PDT. We have identified the customers that are affected by this issue and we are working with them on mitigation. Our investigation has identified a recent configuration update that is the likely cause of the inter-zone network disruption. Teams are working on remediation. **Failover / VM Migration:** Migrating affected VMs to the healthy, secondary zone of your stretch cluster remains the primary mitigation strategy. Because of the complexities surrounding failover risks and secondary zone health, we highly encourage you to open a ticket with Google Cloud Support if you are severely impacted. We do not currently have an ETA for resolution. We will provide another update by Tuesday, 2026-07-14 17:00 PDT with current details. **Customer Symptoms** Some GCVE customers using Stretched Cluster may experience inter-site communication failures to their GCVE environments within the affected zones. **Workaround** While we work on restoring full connectivity, we recommend the following workarounds to restore access to your workloads: - VM Migration (recommended): Where possible, migrate your affected VMs to the healthy and unaffected side of the stretch cluster. We strongly recommend consulting with Google Support before proceeding.

5. 15 luglio 2026 alle ore 00:13 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) Stretched Cluster customers are experiencing zonal outages impacting network connectivity across multiple regions. **Description** We are experiencing an inter-site communication issue with Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) stretched cluster customers beginning Tuesday, 2026-07-14 at 10:00 PDT. We have identified the customers that are affected by this issue and we are working with them on mitigation. A remediation rollout is currently in progress to address the underlying network issue. **Failover / VM Migration:** Migrating affected VMs to the healthy, secondary zone of your stretch cluster remains the primary mitigation strategy. Because of the complexities surrounding failover risks and secondary zone health, we highly encourage you to open a ticket with Google Cloud Support if you are severely impacted. We do not currently have an ETA for resolution. We will provide another update by Tuesday, 2026-07-14 18:00 PDT with current details. **Customer Symptoms** Some GCVE customers using Stretched Cluster may experience inter-site communication failures to their GCVE environments within the affected zones. Upon further investigation we identified that the northamerica-northeast2 region was not impacted. **Workaround** While we work on restoring full connectivity, we recommend the following workarounds to restore access to your workloads: - VM Migration (recommended): Where possible, migrate your affected VMs to the healthy and unaffected side of the stretch cluster. We strongly recommend consulting with Google Support before proceeding.

6. 15 luglio 2026 alle ore 01:15 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) Stretched Cluster customers are experiencing zonal outages impacting network connectivity across multiple regions. **Description** We are experiencing an inter-site communication issue with Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) stretched cluster customers beginning Tuesday, 2026-07-14 at 10:00 PDT. We have identified the customers that are affected by this issue and we are working with them on mitigation. A remediation rollout is currently in progress to address the underlying network issue. **Failover / VM Migration:** Migrating affected VMs to the healthy, secondary zone of your stretch cluster remains the primary mitigation strategy. Because of the complexities surrounding failover risks and secondary zone health, we highly encourage you to open a ticket with Google Cloud Support if you are severely impacted. We do not currently have an ETA for resolution. We will provide another update by Tuesday, 2026-07-14 19:00 PDT with current details. **Customer Symptoms** Some GCVE customers using Stretched Cluster may experience inter-site communication failures to their GCVE environments within the affected zones. **Workaround** While we work on restoring full connectivity, we recommend the following workarounds to restore access to your workloads: - VM Migration (recommended): Where possible, migrate your affected VMs to the healthy and unaffected side of the stretch cluster. We strongly recommend consulting with Google Support before proceeding.

7. 15 luglio 2026 alle ore 01:55 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) Stretched Cluster customers are experiencing zonal outages impacting network connectivity across multiple regions. **Description** We are experiencing an inter-site communication issue with Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) stretched cluster customers beginning Tuesday, 2026-07-14 at 10:00 PDT. We have identified the customers that are affected by this issue and we are working with them on mitigation. A remediation rollout is currently in progress to address the underlying network issue. **Failover / VM Migration:** Migrating affected VMs to the healthy, secondary zone of your stretch cluster remains the primary mitigation strategy. Because of the complexities surrounding failover risks and secondary zone health, we highly encourage you to open a ticket with Google Cloud Support if you are severely impacted. We do not currently have an ETA for resolution. We will provide another update by Tuesday, 2026-07-14 20:30 PDT with current details. **Customer Symptoms** Some GCVE customers using Stretched Cluster may experience inter-site communication failures to their GCVE environments within the affected zones. **Workaround** While we work on restoring full connectivity, we recommend the following workarounds to restore access to your workloads: - VM Migration (recommended): Where possible, migrate your affected VMs to the healthy and unaffected side of the stretch cluster. We strongly recommend consulting with Google Support before proceeding.

8. 15 luglio 2026 alle ore 03:27 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) Stretched Cluster customers are experiencing zonal outages impacting network connectivity across multiple regions. **Description** We are experiencing an inter-site communication issue with Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) stretched cluster customers beginning Tuesday, 2026-07-14 at 10:00 PDT. We have identified the customers that are affected by this issue and we are working with them on mitigation. A remediation rollout is currently in progress to address the underlying network issue. **Failover / VM Migration:** Migrating affected VMs to the healthy, secondary zone of your stretch cluster remains the primary mitigation strategy. Because of the complexities surrounding failover risks and secondary zone health, we highly encourage you to open a ticket with Google Cloud Support if you are severely impacted. We do not currently have an ETA for resolution. We will provide another update by Tuesday, 2026-07-14 22:00 PDT with current details. **Customer Symptoms** Some GCVE customers using Stretched Cluster may experience inter-site communication failures to their GCVE environments within the affected zones. **Workaround** While we work on restoring full connectivity, we recommend the following to restore access to your workloads: * VM Migration (recommended): Where possible, migrate your affected VMs to the healthy and unaffected side of the stretch cluster. We strongly recommend consulting with Google Cloud Support before proceeding.

9. 15 luglio 2026 alle ore 05:34 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) Stretched Cluster customers may have experienced zonal outages impacting network connectivity across multiple regions. **Description** We experienced an inter-site communication issue with Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) Stretched Cluster customers beginning Tuesday, 2026-07-14 at 10:00 PDT. We identified the affected customers, and have worked with them to fully mitigate the issue by Tuesday, 2026-07-14 at 21:46 PDT. Preliminary analysis indicates that a network configuration update was the cause of the inter-zone network disruption. Our engineering team mitigated the issue by rolling back the faulty configuration to its last-known good value. If customers are still experiencing impact from this issue, please contact Support, and we will work with you to resolve any residual impact. We thank you for your patience while we worked to resolve this issue. **Customer Symptoms** Some GCVE customers using Stretched Cluster may have experienced inter-site communication failures to their GCVE environments within the affected zones. **Workaround** The issue is now mitigated.

10. 20 luglio 2026 alle ore 18:31 UTCresolved

    ## Preliminary Incident Report We sincerely apologize for the disruption this incident caused to your business. We know how much you rely on Google Cloud, and we regret the impact on your productivity. We are working to address the root cause and prevent this from occurring in the future. Please note, this information is based on our best knowledge at the time of posting and is subject to change as our investigation continues. A final Incident Report with preventative actions will be posted once our investigation is complete. If you have experienced impact outside of what is listed below, please reach out to Google Cloud Support using [**https://cloud.google.com/support**](https://cloud.google.com/support). ## Date/Time of the Issue (All time US/Pacific) Incident Start: 14 July 2026 10:00 Incident End: 14 July 2026 20:40 Duration: 10 hours, 40 minutes ## Summary On Tuesday, 14 July 2026, Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) Stretched Cluster customers in the australia-southeast2 and europe-west3 zones experienced inter-site communication failures. The disruption was traced to a network configuration update that introduced a conflict, causing inter-site communication failures, which triggered VMware Stretch Cluster failover events. Google engineers successfully mitigated the disruption by rolling back the configuration change. ## Preliminary Root Cause A configuration change deployed within the Google Cloud network affected traffic between the VMware Engine stretched cluster zones. This resulted in a loss of connectivity between zones in the stretched cluster deployment. Google engineers are doing a full root cause analysis and will provide additional information once it is available. ## Remediation To stabilize the environment, engineers identified the working network paths and deployed configuration changes to reroute traffic and restore connectivity. GCVE stretch cluster inter-zonal connectivity was completely restored for all supported locations on Tuesday, 14 July 2026 at 20:40 US/Pacific. ## Description of Impact On Tuesday, 14 July 2026 from 10:00 to 20:40 US/Pacific, customers utilizing GCVE stretch clusters in the affected zones (australia-southeast2, and europe-west3) experienced inter-site communication failures. For some customers, depending on their architecture, this disruption led to VMWare HA event causing VM restarts/movement across zones as designed, Host disconnects, VSAN alarms and Intermittent access to VMware Management (vCenter/NSX Manager) components. ---

11. 24 luglio 2026 alle ore 07:10 UTCresolved

    ## Incident Report ## Summary On Tuesday, 14 July 2026 10:00 PT, Google Cloud VMware Engine (GCVE) Stretched Cluster customers in the australia-southeast2 and europe-west3 zones experienced inter-site communication failures. The disruption was traced to a network configuration update that introduced a conflict, causing inter-site communication failures, which triggered VMware Stretched Cluster failover events. Google engineers successfully mitigated the impact by rolling back the issue-causing configuration change and resetting the network state. We sincerely apologize for the disruption this incident caused to your business. We know how much you rely on Google Cloud, and we regret the impact on your productivity. We are working to address the root cause and prevent this from occurring in the future. ## Root Cause A network configuration update intended to prepare the cloud network infrastructure for new capabilities was deployed to the foundational network control plane. While the configuration payload itself was structurally valid, it exposed an implementation gap within the control plane's routing logic. This logical gap caused the underlying network hosts to misconfigure program routing tables. As a result, traffic destined for the private IP address space used by GCVE Stretched Clusters was dropped. Because Stretched Clusters rely on this private address space to establish routing sessions for inter-zonal connectivity, the traffic drops severed communications between the active zones of the clusters, triggering VMware High Availability (HA) failovers. Standard routing health-checking protocols, such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD), remained fully functional because their control plane sessions run on separate, unaffected address spaces. Because the control plane remained healthy, standard failover mechanisms failed to detect that the selective private IP range used for inter-zonal data tunneling was being dropped. Automated safeguards did not block the deployment because the configuration passed initial payload validations. The impact only manifested once the update began routing data traffic through the specific affected IP range. ## Remediation and Prevention To stabilize the environment, engineers identified the working network paths and deployed configuration changes to reroute traffic and restore connectivity. GCVE Stretched Cluster inter-zonal connectivity was completely restored for all supported locations on Tuesday, 14 July 2026 at 20:40 US/Pacific. Google is committed preventing a repeat of this issue in the future and is completing the following actions: * **Expanded Testing:** We are adding more detailed GCVE network setups to our existing testing environments. This allows us to automatically test future network updates against these configurations before they go live. * **Service-Level Data Path Failover:** We are implementing additional service-level data path failover mechanisms that actively probe the specific data-tunneling traffic space. This will ensure a path failover is triggered if the data plane itself is degraded even when the BGP control plane remains functional. * **Detailed Alerting**: We are adding faster, more specific alerts for connection issues between zones. This builds on our current platform monitoring to catch minor disruptions early and speed up our response. * **Improved Cluster Resilience:** We are fine-tuning the cluster's high-availability and storage settings. This makes virtual machines more resilient to short network drops, preventing them from restarting unnecessarily if the main site is still healthy. * **Workload Resilience Alignment (Shared Responsibility):** We are proactively reaching out to customers utilizing non-vSAN replicated virtual machine configurations within Stretched Clusters. Because these workloads are pinned to a single zone without active cross-site replication, they cannot survive inter-site network disruptions. We are ready to assist customers in auditing their storage policies, adjusting Stretched Cluster configurations, and planning the secondary zone capacity required to enable robust high-availability failovers. ## Detailed Description of Impact On Tuesday, 14 July 2026 from 10:00 to 20:40 US/Pacific, customers utilizing GCVE Stretched Clusters in the affected zones (australia-southeast2, and europe-west3) experienced inter-site communication failures. For some customers, depending on their architecture, this disruption led to a VMWare HA event causing VM restarts/movement across zones as designed, host disconnects, VSAN alarms and intermittent access to VMware Management (vCenter/NSX Manager) components.

1. 10 giugno 2026 alle ore 01:13 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Network traffic to Google Cloud originating from Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai and surrounding areas is experiencing intermittent periods of elevated latency and possible packet loss. **Description** A fire at a third-party data center facility required an emergency power shutdown of networking equipment, isolating a non-compute local Point of Presence (POP) in Delhi and reducing available network capacity in the metro area. We rerouted significant traffic from the impacted facility in Delhi to address reduced local serving capabilities. As a result, a subset of Hybrid Connectivity and Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) customers may be impacted by the routing changes made to address reduced local, latency-optimized serving capabilities in Delhi. Affected customers may experience intermittent latency spikes due to demand exceeding capacity across Indian metros and regional ISPs. We are investigating additional traffic mitigations and Internet Edge peering augmentation to alleviate the latency issues affecting our customers. We will provide our next update by Wednesday, 2026-06-10 17:00 PDT. **Symptoms** Customers may experience slightly elevated latency and non-optimal network routing into Google Cloud until the affected facility is fully restored. **Workaround** There is no workaround at this time.

2. 10 giugno 2026 alle ore 22:25 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Network traffic to Google Cloud originating from Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai and surrounding areas is experiencing intermittent periods of elevated latency and possible packet loss. **Description** A fire at a third-party data center facility required an emergency power shutdown of networking equipment, isolating a non-compute local Point of Presence (POP) in Delhi and reducing available network capacity in the metro area. We rerouted significant traffic from the impacted facility in Delhi to address reduced local serving capabilities. As a result, a subset of Hybrid Connectivity and Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) customers may be impacted by the routing changes made to address reduced local, latency-optimized serving capabilities in Delhi. Affected customers may experience intermittent latency spikes due to demand exceeding capacity across Indian metros and regional ISPs. We are investigating additional traffic mitigations and Internet Edge peering augmentation to alleviate the latency issues affecting our customers. We are continuing to work with the ISP partners in the region to mitigate any additional impact from unplanned failures. We will provide our next update by Thursday, 2026-06-11 17:00 PDT. **Symptoms** Customers may experience slightly elevated latency and non-optimal network routing into Google Cloud until the affected facility is fully restored. **Workaround** There is no workaround at this time.

3. 11 giugno 2026 alle ore 23:25 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Network traffic to Google Cloud originating from Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai and surrounding areas is experiencing intermittent periods of elevated latency and possible packet loss. **Description** A fire at a third-party data center facility required an emergency power shutdown of networking equipment, isolating a non-compute local Point of Presence (POP) in Delhi and reducing available network capacity in the metro area. We rerouted significant traffic from the impacted facility in Delhi to address reduced local serving capabilities. As a result, a subset of Hybrid Connectivity and Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) customers may be impacted by the routing changes made to address reduced local, latency-optimized serving capabilities in Delhi. Affected customers may experience intermittent latency spikes due to demand exceeding capacity across Indian metros and regional ISPs. Initial traffic mitigations have yielded positive results for some Cloud customers. In parallel, we are pursuing additional Internet Edge peering capacity to reduce existing fragility in the metro. We are also optimizing capacity across network backbones to increase additional headroom for VPC customers in the affected region. Additionally, we are planning to augment our local Delhi POP and migrating select peering partners to further increase regional capacity. We will continue to closely monitor latency deviations and packet drops. We will provide our next update by Friday, 2026-06-12 at 17:00 PDT. **Symptoms** Customers may experience slightly elevated latency and non-optimal network routing into Google Cloud until the affected facility is fully restored. **Workaround** There is no workaround at this time.

4. 12 giugno 2026 alle ore 22:50 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Network traffic to Google Cloud originating from Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai and surrounding areas is experiencing intermittent periods of elevated latency and possible packet loss. **Description** A fire at a third-party data center facility required an emergency power shutdown of networking equipment, isolating a non-compute local Point of Presence (POP) in Delhi and reducing available network capacity in the metro area. We rerouted significant traffic from the impacted facility in Delhi to address reduced local serving capabilities. As a result, a subset of Hybrid Connectivity and Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) customers may be impacted by the routing changes made to address reduced local, latency-optimized serving capabilities in Delhi. Affected customers may experience intermittent latency spikes due to demand exceeding capacity across Indian metros and regional ISPs. Initial traffic mitigations have yielded positive results for some Cloud customers. In parallel, we are pursuing additional Internet Edge peering capacity to reduce latency in the local Delhi metropolitan area. Further, we are augmenting out-of-region Internet Edge regional peering capacity in Chennai to provide additional load-balancing and redundancy to large ISPs in India (expected to be done by Wednesday, 2026-06-17 PDT). We have optimized capacity across network backbones to increase available headroom. Additionally, we are further augmenting our Delhi backbone capacity (expected to be complete by Monday, 2026-06-15 PDT). We will continue to closely monitor latency deviations and packet drops. We will provide our next update by Monday, 2026-06-15 17:00 PDT. **Symptoms** Customers may experience slightly elevated latency and non-optimal network routing into Google Cloud until the affected facility is fully restored. **Workaround** There is no workaround at this time.

5. 15 giugno 2026 alle ore 23:11 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Network traffic to Google Cloud originating from Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai and surrounding areas is experiencing intermittent periods of elevated latency and possible packet loss. **Description** A fire at a third-party data center facility required an emergency power shutdown of networking equipment, isolating a non-compute local Point of Presence (POP) in Delhi and reducing available network capacity in the metro area. We rerouted significant traffic from the impacted facility in Delhi to address reduced local serving capabilities. As a result, a subset of Hybrid Connectivity and Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) customers may be impacted by the routing changes made to address reduced local, latency-optimized serving capabilities in Delhi. Affected customers may experience intermittent latency spikes due to demand exceeding capacity across Indian metros and regional ISPs. Media CDN customers may have experienced higher latencies than normal. Initial traffic mitigations have yielded positive results for some Cloud customers. We have restored a portion of Internet Edge peering capacity to reduce latency in the local Delhi metropolitan area. Further, we are augmenting out-of-region Internet Edge regional peering capacity in Chennai to provide additional load-balancing and redundancy to large ISPs in India (expected to be done by Wednesday, 2026-06-17 PDT). We have optimized capacity across network backbones to increase available headroom. Additionally, we have augmented our Delhi backbone capacity over the weekend. We will continue to closely monitor latency deviations and packet drops. We will provide our next update by Wednesday, 2026-06-17 at 17:00 PDT. **Symptoms** Customers may experience slightly elevated latency and non-optimal network routing into Google Cloud until the affected facility is fully restored. **Workaround** There is no workaround at this time.

6. 17 giugno 2026 alle ore 22:36 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Network traffic to Google Cloud originating from Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai and surrounding areas is experiencing intermittent periods of elevated latency and possible packet loss. **Description** Traffic rerouting from the impacted Delhi facility has caused a subset of Hybrid Connectivity and Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) customers to experience intermittent latency spikes as demand exceeds regional capacity. Media CDN customers may also notice increased latencies. Initial traffic mitigations have yielded positive results for some Cloud customers. We have restored a portion of Internet Edge peering capacity to reduce latency in the local Delhi metropolitan area. Further, we are nearly finished with the augmentation of out-of-region Internet Edge regional peering capacity in Chennai to provide additional load-balancing and redundancy to large ISPs in India. We have optimized capacity across network backbones to increase available headroom. Additionally, we have augmented our Delhi backbone capacity. We have also restored additional capacity between Delhi-Chennai and Delhi-Mumbai. We will continue to closely monitor latency deviations and packet drops. We will provide our next update by Monday, 2026-06-22 17:00 PDT. **Symptoms** Customers may experience slightly elevated latency and non-optimal network routing into Google Cloud until the affected facility is fully restored. **Workaround** There is no workaround at this time.

7. 22 giugno 2026 alle ore 23:51 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Network traffic to Google Cloud originating from Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai and surrounding areas is experiencing intermittent periods of elevated latency and possible packet loss. **Description** Traffic rerouting from the impacted Delhi facility has caused a subset of Hybrid Connectivity and Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) customers to experience intermittent latency spikes as demand exceeds regional capacity. Media CDN customers may also notice increased latencies. Initial traffic mitigations have yielded positive results for some Cloud customers. We have restored a large portion of Internet Edge peering capacity to reduce latency in the local Delhi metropolitan area. Since the last update, we have completed the augmentation of out-of-region Internet Edge regional peering capacity in Chennai to provide additional load-balancing and redundancy to large ISPs in India. Following safety clearance, teams obtained access to the damaged site and will further restore additional incremental user-facing backbone capacity on Tuesday, 2026-06-23. We have optimized capacity across network backbones to increase available headroom, and augmented our Delhi user-facing backbone capacity. We will continue to closely monitor latency deviations and packet drops. We will provide our next update by Tuesday, 2026-06-23 at 17:00 PDT. **Symptoms** Customers may experience slightly elevated latency and non-optimal network routing into Google Cloud until the affected facility is fully restored. **Workaround** There is no workaround at this time.

8. 23 giugno 2026 alle ore 22:52 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Network traffic to Google Cloud originating from Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai and surrounding areas is experiencing intermittent periods of elevated latency and possible packet loss. **Description** Traffic rerouting from the impacted Delhi facility has caused a subset of Hybrid Connectivity and Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) customers to experience intermittent latency spikes as demand exceeds regional capacity. Media CDN customers may also notice increased latencies. Initial traffic mitigations have yielded positive results for some Cloud customers. We have restored a large portion of Internet Edge peering capacity to reduce latency in the local Delhi metropolitan area. Since the last update, we have completed the augmentation of out-of-region Internet Edge regional peering capacity in Chennai to provide additional load-balancing and redundancy to large ISPs in India. Following safety clearance, our team has accessed the damaged site and is continuing to restore additional capacity throughout this week. We have optimized capacity across network backbones to increase available headroom and augmented our Delhi user-facing backbone capacity. We will continue to closely monitor latency deviations and packet drops. We will provide our next update by Monday, 2026-06-29 at 17:00 PDT. **Symptoms** Customers may experience slightly elevated latency and non-optimal network routing into Google Cloud until the affected facility is fully restored. **Workaround** There is no workaround at this time.

9. 29 giugno 2026 alle ore 23:06 UTCresolved

   **Summary** Network traffic to Google Cloud originating from Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai and surrounding areas experienced intermittent periods of elevated latency and possible packet loss. **Description** Traffic rerouting from the impacted Delhi facility caused a subset of Hybrid Connectivity, Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) and Media CDN customers to experience intermittent latency spikes as demand exceeded regional capacity. We completed the augmentation of out-of-region Internet Edge regional peering capacity in Chennai to provide additional load-balancing and redundancy to large ISPs in India. Service to a large portion of Internet Edge peering capacity has been restored to reduce latency in the local Delhi metropolitan area. We are now recovered and returned to normal service as of Friday, 2026-06-26 PDT. Following safety clearance, our team restored all lost capacity. We have restored capacity between Delhi-Chennai and Delhi-Mumbai and will continue to closely monitor latency deviations and packet drops. We thank you for your patience during the resolution of this issue. **Symptoms** The impacted customers may have experienced slightly elevated latency and non-optimal network routing into Google Cloud. **Workaround** None

1. 27 febbraio 2026 alle ore 16:12 UTCresolved

   **Description** \ Between Friday, 2026-02-27, 04:36 and 06:45 PST, customers experienced increased error rates when accessing the Vertex Gemini API Global endpoint. The issue impacted API requests to multiple Gemini models. The incident also caused downstream impact to Dialogflow CX, Agent Assist, Google Cloud Support AI agent, and Customer Experience Agent Studio, which rely on Gemini APIs. Preliminary analysis indicates the issue was triggered by a recent configuration change. Service was fully restored after the configuration change was rolled back. We thank you for your patience while we worked on resolving the issue. **Symptom** \ Customers experienced increased error rates when sending API requests to impacted multiple Gemini models through the global endpoint.

2. 4 marzo 2026 alle ore 23:23 UTCresolved

   # Preliminary Incident Report We apologize for the inconvenience this service disruption may have caused. We would like to provide some information about this incident below. Please note, this information is based on our best knowledge at the time of posting and is subject to change as our investigation continues. A final Incident Report with preventative actions will be posted once our investigation is complete. If you have experienced impact outside of what is listed below, please reach out to Google Cloud Support using https://cloud.google.com/support. ## Date/Time of the Issue (All time US/Pacific) Incident Start: 27 February 2026 04:37 Incident End: 27 February 2026 06:35 Duration: 1 hour, 58 minutes ## Summary On Friday, 27 February 2026 at 04:37 US/Pacific, customers using Vertex AI Gemini API models (including Gemini 2.0, 2.5, and 3.0 previews) experienced increased error rates. Impacted services included Google Cloud Support, Agent Assist, the Vertex Gemini API and Dialogflow CX in US regions and the global endpoint for a duration of 1 hour and 58 minutes. This is not the level of quality and reliability we strive to offer you, and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. ## Preliminary Root Cause This incident was caused by a configuration change to a safety filtering service that supports all Gemini models. This configuration change enabled a code path that interacted poorly with specific requests, leading to service disruption for the safety filtering service. This in turn led to customers seeing overload (429 and 503) errors for their queries. Google engineers have begun a full root cause analysis and will provide additional information once it is available. ## Remediation Google engineers were alerted to the service disruption via automated alert on Friday, 27 February 2026 04:54 US/Pacific and immediately started an investigation. Engineers identified the faulty configuration change for a safety filtering service and initiated a rollback to restore the previous stable configuration. Additionally, engineers added more capacity to the service. Full service restoration was confirmed by 06:35 US/Pacific as the rollback propagated and servers became healthy. ## Description of Impact On Friday, 27 February 2026 between 04:37 and 06:35 US/Pacific, customers accessing Vertex Gemini APIs may have experienced the following: - Affected Models: All Gemini versions were affected, including gemini-2.5-flash, gemini-2.5-flash-lite, gemini-2.5-pro, gemini-3.0-flash-preview, gemini-3.0-pro-preview, gemini-2.0-flash, gemini-2.0-flash-lite. - Error Experience: - PayGo Customers: Experienced primarily 429 Resource Exhausted errors. - Provisioned Throughput (PT) Customers: Received 503 Service Unavailable errors. - For PT customers, most errors stopped at 06:00. For PayGo customers, most errors stopped at 06:20. - Geographic Scope: Global endpoint, us-central1, us-east4, and other US regions were impacted.

3. 9 marzo 2026 alle ore 05:25 UTCresolved

   # Incident Report ## Summary On Friday, 27 February 2026 at 04:37 US/Pacific, customers using Vertex AI Gemini API models experienced increased error rates. Impacted services included Google Cloud Support, Agent Assist, Vertex Gemini API and Dialogflow CX in US regions and the global endpoint. The issue persisted for a duration of 1 hour and 58 minutes. This is not the level of quality and reliability we strive to offer you, and we have taken immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. ## Root Cause This incident was caused by a configuration change to a safety filtering service that supports all Gemini models. For some specific requests, this created code paths that eventually led to service disruptions and capacity loss for the safety filtering service. Consequently, customers encountered overload (429 and 503) errors for their queries, with some users reporting elevated error rates for specific models in US regions. ## Remediation and Prevention Google engineers were alerted to the issue via our automated monitoring system on Friday, 27 February 2026 04:54 US/Pacific and immediately started an investigation. Engineers identified the faulty configuration change and initiated a rollback to restore the previous stable configuration. Engineers also added more capacity to the service to stabilize it. Full service restoration was confirmed by 06:35 US/Pacific as the rollback propagated and servers became healthy. \ \ Google is committed to preventing a repeat of this issue and is taking the following actions: * Reinforcing rollout processes to include mandatory validation checkpoints. * Improving alerting systems to monitor critical dependencies more closely. ## ## Detailed Description of Impact On Friday, 27 February 2026 between 04:37 and 06:35 US/Pacific, customers accessing Vertex Gemini APIs may have experienced the following: * **Affected Models:** All Vertex AI Gemini API models were affected, including gemini-2.5-flash, gemini-2.5-flash-lite, gemini-2.5-pro, gemini-3.0-flash-preview, gemini-3.0-pro-preview, gemini-2.0-flash, gemini-2.0-flash-lite. * **Error Experience:** * **PayGo Customers:** Experienced primarily 429 Resource Exhausted errors. * **Provisioned Throughput (PT) Customers:** Received 503 Service Unavailable errors. * For PT customers, most errors stopped at **06:00**. For PayGo customers, most errors stopped at **06:20**. * **Geographic Scope:** Global endpoint, us-central1, us-east4, and other US regions were impacted.

1. 18 luglio 2025 alle ore 15:54 UTCresolved

   We're currently experiencing elevated latency and error rates for several Cloud services in the us-east1 region, beginning at 7:06 AM PDT today, July 18, 2025. Our initial investigation points to a hardware infrastructure failure as the likely cause. We apologize for any disruption this may be causing. We'll provide an update with more details by 9:15 AM PDT today.

2. 18 luglio 2025 alle ore 16:29 UTCresolved

   Our engineers have confirmed that us-east1-b is partially affected. All other zones in us-east1 are currently operating normally. Our engineers have recovered the failed hardware and are currently recovering the network control plane in the affected zones. We'll provide another update by 10:00 AM US/Pacific, July 18, 2025.

3. 18 luglio 2025 alle ore 16:58 UTCresolved

   Our engineers have successfully recovered the network control plane in the affected us-east1 zones. We're seeing multiple services reporting full recovery, and product engineers are now validating the remaining services. We'll provide another update with more details by 10:30 AM US/Pacific, July 18, 2025.

4. 18 luglio 2025 alle ore 17:32 UTCresolved

   Our engineers have successfully recovered the network control plane in the affected us-east1 zones. We're seeing multiple services reporting full recovery, and product engineers continue to validate the remaining services. We'll provide another update with more details by 11:00 AM US/Pacific, July 18, 2025.

5. 18 luglio 2025 alle ore 18:03 UTCresolved

   The issue has been resolved for all affected products as of 2025-07-18 09:47 US/Pacific. From preliminary analysis, during a routine maintenance of our network in us-east1-b, we experienced elevated packet loss, causing service disruption in the zone. We will publish a full Incident Report with root cause once we have completed our internal investigations. We thank you for your patience while we worked on resolving the issue.

6. 18 luglio 2025 alle ore 22:08 UTCresolved

   # Mini Incident Report We apologize for the inconvenience this service disruption/outage may have caused. We would like to provide some information about this incident below. Please note, this information is based on our best knowledge at the time of posting and is subject to change as our investigation continues. If you have experienced impact outside of what is listed below, please reach out to Google Cloud Support using https://cloud.google.com/support or to Google Workspace Support using help article https://support.google.com/a/answer/1047213. (All Times US/Pacific) **GCP Impact start and end time:** 18 July 2025 08:10 - 09:47 **Duration:** 1 hour 37 minutes **GWS Impact start and end time:** 18 July 2025 08:10 - 08:40 **Duration:** 30 minutes **Regions/Zones:** us-east1 **Description:** On Friday, 18 July 2025 08:10 US/Pacific multiple GCP and GWS products experienced elevated latencies and error rates in the us-east1 region for a duration of up to 1 hour and 37 minutes. Based on the preliminary analysis, the root cause of the issue is a procedural error during a planned hardware maintenance in one of our data centers in the us-east1 region. Our engineering team mitigated the issue by draining traffic away from the clusters and then restoring the affected hardware. Google will be completing a full incident report in the following days that will provide a full root cause and preventive actions. **Customer Impact:** The affected GCP and GWS products experienced elevated latencies and errors rates in the us-east1 region. **Affected Products:** **GCP :** AlloyDB for PostgreSQL, Apigee, Artifact Registry, Cloud Armor, Cloud Billing, Cloud Build, Cloud External Key Manager, Cloud Filestore, Cloud HSM, Cloud Key Management Service, Cloud Load Balancing, Cloud Monitoring, Cloud Run, Cloud Spanner, Cloud Storage for Firebase, Cloud Workflows, Database Migration Service, Dialogflow CX, Dialogflow ES, Google BigQuery, Google Cloud Dataflow, Google Cloud Dataproc, Google Cloud Storage, Google Cloud Support, Google Cloud Tasks, Google Compute Engine, Hybrid Connectivity, Media CDN, Network Telemetry, Private Service Connect, Secret Manager, Service Directory, Vertex AI Online Prediction, Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) **Workspace :** Gmail, Google Meet, Google Drive, Google Chat, Google Calendar, Google Groups, Google Doc/Editors, Google Voice **Google SecOps:** Google SecOps SOAR & Google SecOps

7. 22 luglio 2025 alle ore 13:42 UTCresolved

   ## \# Incident Report ## \#\# Summary On Friday, 18 July 2025 07:50 US/Pacific, several Google Cloud Platform (GCP) and Google Workspace (GWS) products experienced elevated latencies and error rates in the us-east1 region for a duration of up to 1 hour and 57 minutes. **GCP Impact Duration:** 18 July 2025 07:50 \- 09:47 US/Pacific : 1 hour 57 minutes **GWS Impact Duration:** 18 July 2025 07:50 \- 08:40 US/Pacific : 50 minutes We sincerely apologize for this incident, which does not reflect the level of quality and reliability we strive to offer. We are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. ## ## \#\# Root Cause The service interruption was triggered by a procedural error during a planned hardware replacement in our datacenter. An incorrect physical disconnection was made to the active network switch serving our control plane, rather than the redundant unit scheduled for removal. The redundant unit had been properly de-configured as part of the procedure, and the combination of these two events led to partitioning of the network control plane. Our network is designed to withstand this type of control plane failure by failing open, continuing operation. However, an operational topology change while the network control plane was in a failed open state caused our network fabric's topology information to become stale. This led to packet loss and service disruption until services were moved away from the fabric and control plane connectivity was restored. ## \#\# Remediation and Prevention Google engineers were alerted to the outage by our monitoring system on 18 July 2025 07:06 US/Pacific and immediately started an investigation. The following timeline details the remediation and restoration efforts: * **07:39 US/Pacific**: The underlying root cause (device disconnect) was identified and onsite technicians were engaged to reconnect the control plane device and restore control plane connectivity. At that moment, network failure open mechanisms worked as expected and no impact was observed. * **07:50 US/Pacific**: A topology change led to traffic being routed suboptimally, due to the network being in a fail open state. This caused congestion on the subset of links, packet loss, and latency to customer traffic. Engineers made a decision to move traffic away from the affected fabric, which mitigated the impact for the majority of the services. * **08:40 US/Pacific**: Engineers mitigated Workspace impact by shifting traffic away from the affected region. * **09:47 US/Pacific**: Onsite technicians reconnected the device, control plane connectivity was fully restored and all services were back to stable state. Google is committed to preventing a repeat of the issue in the future, and is completing the following actions: * Pause non-critical workflows until safety controls are implemented (complete). * Strengthen safety controls for hardware upgrade workflows by end of Q3 2025\. * Design and implement a mechanism to prevent control plane partitioning in case of dual failure of upstream routers by end of Q4 2025\. ## \#\# Detailed Description of Impact \#\#\# GCP Impact: Multiple products in us-east1 were affected by the loss of network connectivity, with the most significant impacts seen in us-east1-b. Other regions were not affected. The outage caused a range of issues for customers with zonal resources in the region, including packet loss across VPC networks, increased error rates and latency, service unavailable (503) errors, and slow or stuck operations up to loss of networking connectivity. While regional products were briefly impacted, they recovered quickly by failing over to unaffected zones. A small number (0.1%) of Persistent Disks in us-east1-b were unavailable for the duration of the outage: these disks became available once the outage was mitigated, with no customer data loss. \#\#\# GWS Impact: A small subset of Workspace users, primarily around the Southeast US, experienced varying degrees of unavailability and increased delays across multiple products, including Gmail, Google Meet, Google Drive, Google Chat, Google Calendar, Google Groups, Google Doc/Editors, and Google Voice.