Cronologia delle interruzioni di Loom

We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

Our services are now fully operational. We continue to replay any events that were missed during the incident, and are making good progress. We will provide a further update once replays are complete. If you experience any ongoing issues, please contact our support team. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

On May 8, 2026, some customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support.

We are investigating degraded performance issues affecting Loom's core functionalities - authentication, recording, viewing and editing looms. We will provide more details within the next hour.

The Team has identified the root cause and the issue has now been resolved, and the impacted services are operating normally. Team will continue to monitor the impacted services.

Customers utilizing Confluence and Jira Mobile may experience disruptions in OAuth authentication flows. Forge installations and invocations might also be disrupted. Our team is actively investigating the same and we shall keep you informed of the progress within next 60 mins or sooner.

Team has identified the root cause and the issue has now been resolved, and the impacted services are operating normally. Team will continue to monitor the impacted services.

We are aware of some customers that are experiencing no audio when viewing their Loom recordings. Our team has identified this issue and is working urgently to restore the audio for these recordings. Please rest assured that the audio has been recorded correctly, and we expect this to be fully available when this incident is resolved. New recordings are no longer impacted by this issue. We will provide an update within two hours with our progress as the team continues to investigate.

Our team believes that we have identified the cause of the issue impacting audio during playback of videos for some customers. As mentioned in our previous updates, new recordings will be working as expected, however videos recorded between 19 Nov 16:51 UTC and 19 Nov 21:30 UTC are expected to be impacted by this issue. A fix for this issue to restore audio to these recordings is now being developed and tested, and we expect to have further update within 2 hours on progress for this resolution.

The fix to resolve issues on audio recordings impacted by this incident is now being prepared for deployment. Currently the expected duration of the rollout is 3 hours, at which point we expect the audio from the impacted recordings to be fully restored. We will provide further update at that time with the progress of the restoration and provide any additional information that may be required.

The rollout of the fix for impacted videos without audio has now completed. Customers should now be able to review existing videos without audio and see that it has been properly restored. If you are continuing to see any issues with playback of your videos, please reach out to Loom support for assistance. We apologize for any inconvenience caused by this issue.

We are investigating an issue with Recording, Loom AI, Authentication, and billing that is impacting some Loom Cloud customers. We will provide more details within the next hour.

We are continuing to investigate the issue with Recording, Loom AI, Authentication, and billing that is impacting some Loom Cloud customers. We are investigating and will post updates at 17:35 UTC or sooner.

We are continuing to investigate the issue with Recording, Loom AI, Authentication, and billing that is impacting some Loom Cloud customers. We will post another update at 18:35 UTC or sooner, as things progress.

We are continuing to actively investigate the issue with Recording, Loom AI, Authentication, and billing that is impacting some Loom Cloud customers. We appreciate your patience. We will post another update at 19:35 UTC or sooner, as things progress.

We have identified the root cause of the issue with Recording, Loom AI, Authentication, and billing which is impacting some Loom Cloud customers. We have implemented mitigations to address the problem and are now monitoring closely. We will provide another update at 20:00 UTC or sooner, as things progress.

We are actively implementing further mitigations to resolve the issue affecting Recording, Loom AI, Authentication, and billing for some Loom Cloud customers. We will continue to monitor closely and provide another update at 21:00 UTC or sooner, as things progress.

We have implemented further mitigations to resolve the issue affecting Recording, Loom AI, Authentication, and billing for some Loom Cloud customers. We are seeing good signs of recovery and all services are operational. We will continue to monitor closely and provide another update at 22:00 UTC or sooner, as things progress.

On Oct 27, 2025, between 12:30 and 22:15 UTC, we experienced degraded performance affecting Recording, Loom AI, Authentication, and Billing services for some Loom customers. We have deployed a fix to mitigate the issue and have verified that the services have recovered. The conditions that cause the issue have been addressed and we're actively working on a permanent fix. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally. Once we complete our internal incident review process, we will publish a more detailed postmortem of what went wrong, along with steps we're taking to prevent this from happening again in the future. Note: As a result of this incident, some Looms recorded during the period of degraded performance may have remained in an "uploading" state. These videos are not recoverable, and have been Archived from users' libraries.

### Summary On October 27, 2025 between 12:30 and 20:55 UTC, Loom was significantly degraded for all customers. Users also experienced short periods of degradation on October 28, 2025 from 20:26 to 20:33 UTC and October 30, 2025 19:22 to 19:27 UTC. During the incident, users experienced issues with intermittent or failing playback, recordings, transcript generation, issues logging in, and general errors or slowness across the service. Our monitoring shows that between 20% and 80% of user interactions were failing during these periods, with failures growing in the later half of the incident. We know that outages impact your productivity and we apologize to customers who were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve Loom’s reliability based on our learnings from this incident. ### Analysis Beginning on October 25, 2025, Loom’s primary database cluster showed early indicators of a problem. Resource usage was growing slowly and replication slots were not keeping up. Engineers were alerted on October 26, 2025 and began investigating. We saw no signs of customer impact at this time, however, we did identify an issue with a retrying background job running unsuccessfully in a loop. We shipped a temporary fix for this issue and planned to investigate further the next day. On Monday, October 27, 2025, the issue resurfaced significantly as usage increased, and we began observing customer impact. Engineers were monitoring the issue closely and engaged immediately. It was clear that our database was not performing as expected, and over the next few hours, we made multiple attempts at mitigation. Notably, we scaled up the database writer and two readers to relieve resource pressure. This did not help, and user impact remained unchanged. Over the next several hours, we made multiple attempts to restore normal database performance. We rolled back recent changes, optimized individual query performance, added new indexes, updated database configurations, and vacuumed large system and application tables. These changes provided some short-term relief, but performance repeatedly worsened. Dropping our replication slots did resolve resource pressure, but did not improve overall query performance. We then observed that identical queries were planning and executing much faster on the writer than on our reader instances, so we decided to shift all query traffic to the single writer instance. This change immediately mitigated the customer impact. While this action resolved the immediate issue, it was not a stable state for our service long term. Over the next few days, we made multiple attempts to revert to our typical single-writer, dual-reader architecture. Each time, we saw the same issues resurface, resulting in short periods of degradation. In between each of these attempts, we made further optimizations to our database usage, but we were still not seeing the performance we expected when adding back our reader instances. This was especially challenging because our services worked as expected with a single reader, and we only observed this degradation when adding a second reader to the cluster. On October 31, 2025, we tried the failover with a smaller instance size, similar to our original architecture before the vertical scaling attempt. This succeeded, restoring the Loom architecture to normal and fully mitigating the incident. ### Root Cause Broadly speaking, this incident can be divided into two parts. First, the initial degradation was caused by multiple Loom changes made in the months before the incident. Second, the extended mitigation resulted unexpectedly from our attempt to mitigate scaling up the instance sizes. The first part of this incident was caused by a complex interaction of multiple old and recent changes to Loom services: * For years, Loom has had a background job that uses nested database transactions, a rare pattern in our codebase. A parent transaction is opened for the entire job, with child transactions for each batch of work. This job has been reliable, but it will retry multiple times in the event of failure. This job is relatively low-volume and usually quick, but can require significant database work in rare cases. * Over the last few months, in order to support upcoming features and migrations, baseline load and activity on Loom’s database increased significantly. * On October 14, 2025, also to support an upcoming feature, a broad change was made to how the Loom app handles database transactions. This change was only intended to take effect in our test and staging environments, but in special cases related to nested transactions, it also applied in production. * On October 25, 2025, the combined changes triggered a slow, increasing degradation of our database. Several large background job runs combined and failed, causing retries to keep a permanent open transaction on the database. This degraded replication slots and autovacuum, leading to table bloat across the database. On October 27th, 2025, this degradation began impacting our users. * After removing the initial triggers, the database continued to degrade and required significant manual intervention to stabilize. Recovery was complicated because one attempted mitigation \(vertical instance scaling\) triggered a new problem. The second part of this incident was caused by our earlier mitigation attempt of scaling up our instance sizes to handle the increased load from the first part: * Early on in the incident, in response to increased database resource usage, we attempted to mitigate by vertically scaling our instances to larger sizes. We generally consider this a safe and often effective mitigation. * This change unexpectedly made the database degradation worse. The kind of degradation we observed from the larger instances was similar to the kind of degradation we already observed in the first part of the incident. After the incident we learned directly from our cloud provider that the larger instance sizes use a separate memory architecture that performs significantly worse on our workload. * This performance difference between the instance types is especially evident when opening new connections. As part of our investigation, we also found an issue with our connection pooler that leads to excess connection churn when pointing at a DNS load-balanced reader endpoint. This explains why we only observed issues when adding a second reader to the cluster, and not with a single-writer single-reader configuration. ### **Remediations and Improvements** As part of our investigation and mitigation efforts during the incident, we have already completed several key actions to address similar issues, including: * Optimized transaction handling within our application. * Improved performance of high-volume and poor-performing queries. * Improved monitoring and observability of vacuum status and table bloat. * Internal tooling improvements for easier debugging * In-product banner to alert users during incidents. Additionally, we are prioritizing the following improvement actions: * Further improvements to transaction handling and monitoring. * Optimization of our connection pooling configuration. * Database index usage optimizations. * Database configuration improvements. * Improvements to autovacuum parameters. * Improvements to how we measure and monitor customer impact.   Thank you, Atlassian

We have noticed that Atlassian Cloud services are impacted and our teams are actively investigating the same. We shall keep you informed of the progress every hour.

Atlassian Cloud services are impacted and we are aware that our customers might not be able to create support tickets. Our teams are actively investigating the same. We shall keep you informed of the progress every hour.

We are experiencing an outage due to some issue at the end of our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to get this resolved or mitigated as quickly as possible. ETA of the same is not know at the moment. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

We understand that our public cloud provider has identified the cause of the issue. We are starting to see some recovery and is working towards mitigation. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

We continue to work with our public cloud provider towards mitigating the issue at the earliest. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

Atlassian team is actively engaged and continues to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue at the earliest. We are starting to see partial operations succeed. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

Our public cloud provider is working to mitigate this issue quickly. We are seeing some early positive indicators and are continuing to monitor. We appreciate your patience and will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner.

We understand your pain and mitigating or fixing this issue is of utmost importance. Our public cloud provider is actively working to mitigate this issue on priority. We have been seeing partial operational success. We appreciate your patience and will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner.

Update - Thank you for your continued patience. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority. Our public cloud provider is still actively working to mitigate this issue with urgency and while we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will be providing hourly updates on this issue.

Update - We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority. Our public cloud provider is actively working to mitigate this issue with urgency. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner as new information becomes available.

We are currently aware of an ongoing incident impacting Atlassian Cloud services due to an outage with our public cloud provider, AWS. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority and we are closely monitoring the health of AWS services. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner as new information becomes available.

There have been no changes since our last update. We will provide our next updated by 9:00PM UTC or sooner as new information becomes available. We are currently aware of an ongoing incident impacting Atlassian Cloud services due to an outage with our public cloud provider, AWS. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority and we are closely monitoring the health of AWS services. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation.

Monitoring - We've started seeing continued product experience improvement. While we still have a backlog of event processing, we are seeing improvements in systems operational capabilities across all products. We estimate a significant improvement with the next few hours and will continue to monitor the health of AWS services and the effects on Atlassian customers. We appreciate your continued patience and remain committed to full resolution as we work through this situation. We will post our next update in two hours.

Our teams are continuing to monitor the recovery of systems across Atlassian products. This update is to inform that the Atlassian Support portal is fully operational at this time for customers that wish to contact support.

Our team is now seeing recovery across all impacted Atlassian products. We are continuing to monitor for individual products that may still be processing backlogged items now that services are restored. The Atlassian Support portal is currently still displaying a message directing customers to our temporary support channel. Please note that our support portal is currently fully functional for those attempting to raise requests. We are continuing to look into this alert to remove this message. We will provide further update on our recovery status in one hour.

We continue to see recovery progressing across all impacted products as backlogged items continue to be processed. The Atlassian Support portal is currently displaying a message directing customers to our temporary support channel. Please note that our support portal is currently fully functional for those attempting to raise requests. We are continuing to look into this alert to remove this message. We will provide further update on our recovery status in two hours.

The issue relating to the Atlassian Support portal displaying a message to customers to use our temporary support channel has now been resolved. The Atlassian Support portal is fully functional for any ongoing support issues. With regards to other Atlassian products, we continue to see recovery continuing across all impacted products and our teams are continuing to monitor as the recovery continues. We will provide further update on our recovery status within two hours.

Our team is now able to see full recovery across the vast majority of Atlassian products. We are aware of some ongoing issues with specific components such as migrations and JSM virtual service agents, and our team is continuing to investigate with urgency. We apologise for the inconvenience that this incident has caused and we will provide further information when the Post Incident Investigation has been completed.

### Postmortem publish date: Nov 19th, 2025 ### Summary All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. Customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 04:05. The service disruptions were triggered due to an [AWS DynamoDB outage](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=1%3A50%20PM.-,DynamoDB,-Between%2011%3A48) and further affected by subsequent failures in [AWS EC2](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) and [AWS Network Load Balancer](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) within the us-east-1 region. The incident started at Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and was detected within six minutes by our automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore all core services by Oct 21, 2025 04:05. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues was completed on Oct 22, 2025. We recognize the critical role our products play in your daily operations, and we offer our sincere apologies for any impact this incident had on your teams. We are taking immediate steps to enhance the reliability and performance of our services, so that you continue to receive the standard of service you have come to trust. ### IMPACT Before examining product-level impacts, it's helpful to understand Atlassian's service topology and internal dependencies. Products such as Jira and Confluence are deployed across multiple AWS regions. The data for each tenant is stored and processed exclusively within its designated host region. This design is intentional and represents the desired operational state, as it limits the impact of any regional outage strictly to tenants in-region, in this case us-east-1. While in-scope application data is pinned to the region selected by the customer, there are times when systems need to call other internal services that may be based in a different region. If a problem occurs in the main region where these services operate, systems are designed to automatically fail over to a backup region, usually within three minutes. However, if unexpected issues arise during this failover, it can take longer to restore services. In rare cases, this could affect customers in more than one region. It’s important to note that all in-scope application data for supported products is pinned according to a customer’s chosen region. **Jira** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 20:00, customers with tenants hosted in the us-east-1 region experienced increased error rates when accessing core entities such as Issues, Boards, and Backlogs. This disruption was caused by AWS's inability to allocate AWS EC2 instances and elevated errors in AWS Network Load Balancer \(NLB\). During this window, users may also have observed intermittent timeouts, slow page loads, and failures when performing operations like creating or updating issues, loading board views, and executing workflow transitions. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced elevated failure rates when attempting to load Jira pages. This disruption was caused by the regional frontend service entering an unhealthy state during this specific time interval. Normally, the frontend service connects to the primary AWS DynamoDB instance located in the us-east-1 to retrieve the most recent configuration data necessary for proper operation. Additionally, the service is designed with a fallback mechanism that references static configuration data in the event that the primary database becomes inaccessible. Unfortunately, a latent bug existed in the local fallback path. When the frontend service nodes restarted, they were unable to load critical operational configuration data from primary or fallback sources, leading to the observed failures experienced by customers. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 06:30, customers experienced significant delays and missing Jira in-app notifications across all regions. The notification ingestion service, which is hosted exclusively in us-east-1, exhibited an increased failure rate when processing notification messages due to AWS EC2 and NLB issues. This issue resulted in notifications being delayed - and in some cases, not delivered at all - to users worldwide. **Jira Service Management \(JSM\)** JSM was impacted similarly to Jira above, with the same timeframes and for the same reasons. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced significantly elevated failure rates when attempting to load JSM pages. This affected all JSM experiences including the Help Centre, Portal, Queues, Work Items, Operations, and Alerts. **Confluence** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 02:45, customers using Confluence in the us-east-1 region experienced elevated failure rates when performing common operations such as editing pages or adding comments. The primary cause of this service degradation was the system's inability to auto-scale due to AWS EC2 issues to manage peak traffic load effectively. Though the AWS outage ended at Oct 20, 21:09, a subset of customers continued to experience failures as some Confluence web server nodes across multiple clusters remained in an unhealthy state. This was ultimately mitigated by recycling the affected nodes. To protect our systems while AWS recovered, we made a deliberate decision to enable node termination protection. This action successfully preserved our server capacity but, as a trade-off, it extended the time required for a full recovery once AWS services were restored. **Automation** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 23:59, automation customers whose rules are processed in us-east-1 experienced delays of up to 23 hours in rule execution. During this window, some events triggering rule executions were processed out of order because they arrived later during backlog processing. This caused potential inconsistencies in workflow executions, as rules were run in the order events were received, not when the action causing the event occurred. Additionally, some rule actions failed because they depend on first-party and third-party systems, which were also affected by the AWS outage. Customers can see most of these failures in their audit logs; however, a few updates were not logged due to the nature of the outage. By Oct 21, 2025 5:30, the backlog of rule runs in us-east-1 was cleared. Although most of these delayed rules were successfully handled, there were some additional replays of events to ensure completeness. Our investigation confirmed that a few events may never have triggered their associated rules due to the outage. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 11:20, all non-us-east-1 regional automation services experienced delays of up to 4 hours in rule execution. This was caused by an upstream service that was unable to deliver events as expected. The delivery service encountered a failure due to a cross-region dependency call to a service hosted in the us-east-1 region. Because of this dependency issue, the delivery service was unable to successfully deliver events throughout this time frame, resulting in customer-defined rules not being executed in a timely manner. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:33, Bitbucket experienced intermittent unavailability across core services. During this period, users faced increased error rates and latency when signing in, navigating repositories, and performing essential actions such as creating, updating, or approving pull requests. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage that impacted downstream services. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 22:46, numerous Bitbucket Pipeline steps failed to start, stalled mid-execution, or experienced significant queueing delays. Impact varied, with partial recoveries followed by degradation as downstream components re-synchronized. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage, compounded by instability in AWS EC2 instance availability and AWS Network Load Balancers. Furthermore, Bitbucket Pipelines continued to experience a low but persistent rate of step timeouts and scheduling errors due to AWS bare-metal capacity shortages in select availability zones. Atlassian coordinated with AWS to provision additional bare-metal hosts and addressed a significant backlog of pending pods, successfully restoring services by 01:30 on Oct 21, 2025. **Trello** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 15:25, users of Trello experienced widespread service degradation and intermittent failures due to upstream AWS issues affecting multiple components, including AWS DynamoDB and subsequent AWS EC2 capacity constraints. During this period, customers reported elevated error rates when loading boards, opening cards, adding comments or attachments. **Login** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, a small subset of users experienced failures when attempting to initiate new login sessions using SAML tokens. This resulted in an inability for those users to access Atlassian products during that time period. However, users who already had valid active sessions were not affected by this issue and continued to have uninterrupted access. The issue impacted all regions globally because regional identity services relied on a write replica located in the us-east-1 region to synchronize profile data. When the primary region became unavailable, the failover to a secondary database in another region failed, which delayed recovery. This failover defect has since been addressed. **Statuspage** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, Statuspage customers who were not already logged in to the management portal were unable to log in to create or update incident statuses. This impact was restricted only to users who were not already logged in at the time. The root cause was the same as described in the Login section above, and it was resolved by the same remediation steps. ### REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN & NEXT STEPS We have completed the following critical actions designed to help prevent cross-region impact from similar issues: * Resolved the code defect in the fallback option to ensure that Jira Frontend Services in other regions remain unaffected during a region-wide outage. * Fixed the issue that prevented timely failover of the identity service which impacted new login sessions. * Resolved the code defect so that delivery services in unaffected regions remain operational during region-wide outages. Additionally, we are prioritizing the following improvement actions: * Implement mitigation strategies to strengthen resilience against region-wide outages in the notification ingestion service. Although disruptions to our cloud services are sometimes unavoidable during outages of the underlying cloud provider, we continuously evaluate and improve test coverage to strengthen resilience of our cloud services against these issues. We recognize the critical importance of our products to your daily operations and overall productivity, and we extend our sincere apologies for any disruptions this incident may have caused your teams. If you were impacted and require additional details for internal post-incident reviews, please reach out to your Atlassian support representative with affected timeframes and tenant identifiers so we can correlate logs and provide guidance. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

From 5:03 AM ET to 4:15 PM ET, some customers were unable to record Zoom meetings using Loom Meeting Recordings. Attempts made during this time may appear in your library but will not be playable, as no recording was captured. Unfortunately, these recordings cannot be recovered. We have released a fix and we are monitoring recovery.

The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.

From 5:20AM to 3:45PM UTC today some customers using the Loom Chrome Extension experienced issues with recording. Looms recorded during this time may show up in the library but will not be playable. Unfortunately we are unable to recover these videos. If you are still experiencing this issue please make sure you are recording with extension version 5.5.121.

We are investigating reports of issues for Loom customers. Including names showing as IDs. We will provide more details once we identify the cause.

We have identified the cause of the issues and we are monitoring recovery.

Between 18:45 and 19:35 UTC we experienced degraded functionality for Loom. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.

Customers are unable to choose a monthly plan when upgrading or purchasing from loom.com. We are investigating this issue.

A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results

This issue is now resolved and customers can checkout as expected.