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    Cronologia delle interruzioni di Octopus

    55 Octopus incidents · luglio 2023 — official updates, affected components, duration and resolution details.

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    I clienti con istanze che utilizzano GitHub potrebbero essere colpiti da GitHub outage

    Inizio 22 ottobre 2026 alle ore 17:17 UTC · 1h 44m

    Pending
    1. 22 ottobre 2026 alle ore 17:17 UTCmonitoring

      Mentre Octopus non è direttamente interessato, le istanze Octopus con tubazioni o configurazioni che si affidano a GitHub possono sperimentare errori di schermo, distribuzioni fallite e altri problemi successivi a causa dell'attuale outage GitHub. Per ulteriori informazioni sull'outage GitHub, visitare: https://www.githubstatus.com Stiamo monitorando per ulteriori relazioni e aggiorneremo se le informazioni sono disponibili.

    2. 22 ottobre 2026 alle ore 19:02 UTCresolved

      Secondo GitHub, i loro servizi hanno ripreso il normale funzionamento. Potete scoprire di più visitando: https://www.githubstatus.com

    Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

    Permissioni non applicate correttamente

    Inizio 5 ottobre 2026 alle ore 15:48 UTC · 8h 8m

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    1. 5 ottobre 2026 alle ore 15:48 UTCinvestigating

      Attualmente

    2. 5 ottobre 2026 alle ore 15:53 UTCinvestigating

      Stiamo indagando su questo problema.

    3. 5 ottobre 2026 alle ore 16:46 UTCinvestigating

      Stiamo indagando su questo problema. Ciò sembra aver interessato solo alcune istanze.

    4. 5 ottobre 2026 alle ore 17:06 UTCmonitoring

      Questo problema sembra essere stato intermittente e probabilmente causato da un servizio esterno. Stiamo monitorando le relazioni.

    5. 5 ottobre 2026 alle ore 23:56 UTCresolved

      Abbiamo identificato e risolto un problema (https://github.com/OctopusDeploy/Issues/issues/10288) che ha portato gli utenti a non essere in grado di visualizzare la pagina del registro di audit. Questo è fissato dal 2026.4.6234.

    Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

    https://g.octopushq.com Questioni di certificazione

    Inizio 31 luglio 2026 alle ore 13:32 UTC · 1h 32m

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    Componenti interessati
    Octopus.comOctopus Cloud
    1. 31 luglio 2026 alle ore 13:32 UTCinvestigating

      Attualmente stiamo indagando su problemi con il nostro certificato per https://g.octopushq.com. I clienti possono vedere i problemi con i server di costruzione che cercano di scaricare il CLI utilizzando V5 e sotto costruire passi del server.

    2. 31 luglio 2026 alle ore 14:02 UTCmonitoring

      Abbiamo identificato e mitigato i problemi del certificato per https://g.octopushq.com con il nostro servizio di abbreviazione URL. Tutti gli URL g.octopushq.com dovrebbero ora presentare il certificato. Più in particolare, i clienti dovrebbero ora essere in grado di scaricare l'attrezzo Octopus CLI quando si utilizzano versioni passo prima di 6. Si prega di e-mail [email protected] se stai ancora vedendo problemi, continueremo a monitorarlo nelle prossime ore.

    3. 31 luglio 2026 alle ore 15:04 UTCresolved

      Questo problema è stato risolto. Grazie per la vostra pazienza mentre abbiamo indagato l'incidente. Se avete ulteriori problemi, si prega di e-mail [email protected].

    Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

    Problemi di connettività di servizio a causa dell'outage Azure a monte

    Inizio 23 luglio 2026 alle ore 16:08 UTC · 4h 19m

    IssuesIncidente minore
    Componenti interessati
    Octopus.com
    1. 23 luglio 2026 alle ore 16:08 UTCidentified

      A causa di problemi a monte Azure nella regione degli Stati Uniti, alcuni servizi potrebbero non avere o connettività intermittente. Stiamo continuando a monitorare l'impatto sui nostri sistemi.

    2. 23 luglio 2026 alle ore 16:09 UTCidentified

      Servizi riconosciuti: - Il blog di Octopus.com

    3. 23 luglio 2026 alle ore 18:35 UTCmonitoring

      La mitigazione di Azure ha consentito l'accesso ai servizi colpiti. Continueremo a monitorare la disponibilità dei servizi.

    4. 23 luglio 2026 alle ore 20:28 UTCresolved

      Azure ha risolto questo problema.

    Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

    Le distribuzioni di bicep possono fallire dopo l'aggiornamento a 2026.3.4658 o più tardi

    Inizio 3 luglio 2026 alle ore 00:25 UTC · 32d 11h

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    1. 3 luglio 2026 alle ore 00:25 UTCidentified

      Abbiamo identificato un problema in Octopus Server 2026.3.4658 o più tardi quando le implementazioni Bicep esistenti possono iniziare a non funzionare. Abbiamo un problema pubblico che lo traccia con un workaround https://github.com/OctopusDeploy/Issues/issues/10129 Stiamo lavorando a una correzione e aggiorneremo questo incidente e il problema pubblico quando è risolto.

    2. 4 agosto 2026 alle ore 12:23 UTCresolved

      The fix has been live across all Octopus Cloud servers for several weeks now without further issues.

    Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

    Ability to deploy in West US 2 might be affected

    Inizio 29 maggio 2026 alle ore 06:10 UTC · 18h 28m

    IssuesIncidente minore
    Componenti interessati
    Octopus Cloud
    1. 29 maggio 2026 alle ore 06:10 UTCmonitoring

      Our upstream provider, Azure in West US2, is currently experiencing an issue which might be affecting your ability to deploy. We will resolve this incident once we have received confirmation the issue has been resolved from our upstream provider.

    2. 30 maggio 2026 alle ore 00:38 UTCresolved

      Our upstream provider, Azure in West US2, has resolved their issue. While the issue was ongoing, some Octopus Cloud instances in West US2 may have experienced brief downtime and network communication issues. For more details, see Azure's incident report (Tracking ID: GHRP-84G) at https://azure.status.microsoft/en-us/status/history/.

    Amazon ECS Service Steps fail with 'Container.image contains invalid cha...

    Inizio 15 maggio 2026 alle ore 12:36 UTC · 2d 22h

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    Componenti interessati
    Octopus Cloud
    1. 15 maggio 2026 alle ore 12:36 UTCidentified

      We have identified the issue and are working on a fix. If you are experiencing this please see the Github issue below for workarounds - https://github.com/OctopusDeploy/Issues/issues/10026

    2. 18 maggio 2026 alle ore 10:49 UTCresolved

      We have pushed out a fix for this issue and it should be rolling out to Octopus Cloud customers over the next few days. Please contact [email protected] if you are seeing this issue and we can arrange to get your instance upgraded.

    Dynamic Worker issues in West US 2

    Inizio 5 maggio 2026 alle ore 13:18 UTC · 1d 17h

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    Componenti interessati
    Octopus Cloud
    1. 5 maggio 2026 alle ore 13:18 UTCidentified

      We have observed issues provisioning Dynamic Workers in our West US 2 region. We are working on mitigations and monitoring. A small number of customers have experienced lease failures.

    2. 5 maggio 2026 alle ore 13:25 UTCidentified

      We are in the process of switching Octopus Cloud instances in the West US 2 region to use dynamic workers in our standby region (Central US). Customers who have experienced leasing failures should retry their deployments or runbook runs.

    3. 5 maggio 2026 alle ore 13:43 UTCmonitoring

      We have completed switching Octopus Cloud instances in the West US 2 region to use dynamic workers in our standby region (Central US). This should mitigate this issue for all customers. We will update this incident when dynamic workers in West US 2 are stable and we have reverted all Cloud instances back to using workers in West US 2.

    4. 7 maggio 2026 alle ore 00:51 UTCmonitoring

      We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

    5. 7 maggio 2026 alle ore 06:40 UTCresolved

      We have not observed any further issues in the West US 2 region so all Octopus Cloud instances in the West US 2 region are using dynamic workers in West US 2 once again.

    AWS Deployment Failures for Cloud Customers

    Inizio 1 aprile 2026 alle ore 08:06 UTC · 6d 20h

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    Componenti interessati
    Octopus Cloud
    1. 1 aprile 2026 alle ore 08:06 UTCinvestigating

      We are aware of an issue affecting Octopus Cloud customers running deployments that interact with AWS, including EKS/Kubernetes targets and AWS health checks. Impacted customers may see authentication errors when running these deployments. Our team is actively investigating and working to resolve the issue. Workaround: If you are affected, adding your AWS region as an environment variable in your script steps may resolve the issue: export AWS_REGION= for Bash $env:AWS_REGION = " " for Powershell E.g export AWS_REGION=ap-southeast-2 $env:AWS_REGION = "ap-southeast-2" We apologise for the disruption and will share further updates as our investigation progresses. If you need help in the meantime, please contact us at [email protected]

    2. 1 aprile 2026 alle ore 08:36 UTCinvestigating

      We are aware of an issue affecting Octopus Cloud customers running deployments that interact with AWS, including EKS/Kubernetes targets and AWS health checks. Impacted customers may see authentication errors when running these deployments. Our team is actively investigating and working to resolve the issue. Workaround: If you are affected, adding your AWS region as an environment variable in your script steps may resolve the issue: export AWS_REGION=[REGION] for Bash $env:AWS_REGION = "[REGION]" for Powershell E.g export AWS_REGION=ap-southeast-2 $env:AWS_REGION = "ap-southeast-2" We apologise for the disruption and will share further updates as our investigation progresses. If you need help in the meantime, please contact us at [email protected]

    3. 8 aprile 2026 alle ore 04:11 UTCresolved

      This incident has been resolved.

    Deployments using AWS-dependent resources may fail with “No RegionEndpoint or ServiceURL configured.”

    Inizio 30 marzo 2026 alle ore 12:43 UTC · 0m

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    Componenti interessati
    Octopus Cloud
    1. 30 marzo 2026 alle ore 12:43 UTCresolved

      We have identified the cause of this issue and have produced a fix in Octopus version 2026.2.3825. Please email [email protected] if you are seeing AWS region endpoint errors in your deployments similar to the one in the title and we can discuss upgrade options.

    gRPC port (8443) shows Octopus Cloud instance is Undergoing Maintenance

    Inizio 24 marzo 2026 alle ore 04:13 UTC · 1d 1h

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    Componenti interessati
    Octopus Cloud
    1. 24 marzo 2026 alle ore 04:13 UTCinvestigating

      We have identified the cause and are working to complete it as quickly as possible. We will provide another update once the issue is resolved.

    2. 24 marzo 2026 alle ore 04:13 UTCidentified

      The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

    3. 24 marzo 2026 alle ore 05:58 UTCmonitoring

      We have a resolution for the issue, and it should be rolled out to customer instances during their next maintenance windows. If this blocks your deployments in the meantime, please reach out to support.

    4. 25 marzo 2026 alle ore 06:09 UTCresolved

      This incident has been resolved. Please don't hesitate to reach out to our support team if you are still having any related problems.

    Emails are currently not being delivered

    Inizio 26 febbraio 2026 alle ore 01:51 UTC · 3h 56m

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    Componenti interessati
    Control Center (billing.octopus.com)Octopus CloudSign-in/Sign-up (octopus.com)
    1. 26 febbraio 2026 alle ore 01:51 UTCidentified

      Our upstream email provider is currently experiencing issues delivering emails from Octopus. This impacts all emails, including email verification during authentication, Octopus Cloud subscription invitations, and billing notifications. We're currently investigating and will update this page when we know more.

    2. 26 febbraio 2026 alle ore 05:11 UTCidentified

      We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

    3. 26 febbraio 2026 alle ore 05:32 UTCidentified

      Sign-in/sign-up emails have been restored. Note: emails will now be sent from [email protected]

    4. 26 febbraio 2026 alle ore 05:47 UTCresolved

      Email services have now been restored. Please contact [email protected] if you encounter any issues with email delivery.

    Ubuntu Dynamic Workers are failing to lease

    Inizio 2 febbraio 2026 alle ore 21:31 UTC · 1d 0h

    OutageIncidente critico
    Componenti interessati
    Octopus Cloud
    1. 2 febbraio 2026 alle ore 21:31 UTCinvestigating

      Octopus Cloud instances are failing to lease Ubuntu Dynamic Workers due to an issue with our upstream provider. We are currently investigating and working on mitigating the issue.

    2. 2 febbraio 2026 alle ore 22:09 UTCidentified

      Azure have identified the following issue on their side that affects the Dynamic Workers: Virtual Machines and dependent services - Service management issues in multiple regions. They are actively working to mitigate impact and expect it to be resolved by approximately 00:00 UTC. See Azure status page for additional details: https://azure.status.microsoft/en-gb/status

    3. 2 febbraio 2026 alle ore 23:46 UTCmonitoring

      Azure have rolled out a fix for this issue and we are seeing Dynamic Workers return to normal operation across all regions.

    4. 2 febbraio 2026 alle ore 23:49 UTCmonitoring

      We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

    5. 3 febbraio 2026 alle ore 21:38 UTCresolved

      Azure has resolved the issue that was causing our Dynamic Workers lease failures and we haven't seen any additional failures since yesterday.

    6. 13 febbraio 2026 alle ore 04:58 UTCpostmortem

      # Summary On 2 Feb 2026, between 20:13:34 to 22:56:04 UTC, Octopus Cloud customers in `West US 2` and `West Europe` may have experienced failed deployments or failed runbook runs due to `Ubuntu Dynamic Worker` steps failing on Leasing timeout.  This disruption was caused by Azure failing to provision Virtual Machines across multiple regions - see Azure Issue `FNJ8-VQZ` on [Azure Status History](https://azure.status.microsoft/en-us/status/history/).  # Background Octopus Cloud [Dynamic Workers](https://octopus.com/docs/octopus-cloud/dynamic-worker) are isolated virtual machines that we provide as part of our Octopus Cloud Subscription offering as a way to execute deployment and runbook steps and scripts, without needing to run on the Octopus Server or deployment targets themselves. Customers can use both Windows and Ubuntu Dynamic Workers.  Octopus provides a [dynamic worker pool](https://octopus.com/docs/infrastructure/workers/dynamic-worker-pools) of these virtual machine types from which, as required by your deployment/runbook steps, your Octopus Cloud will exclusively lease a freshly provisioned dynamic worker VM for a limited time. ## Dynamic Workers Lifecycle 1. **Provisioning** - a new Azure Virtual Machine is provisioned, using the requested [Dynamic Worker image](https://octopus.com/docs/infrastructure/workers/dynamic-worker-pools#dynamic-worker-images) \(Windows/Ubuntu with a set of pre-installed tools\). 2. **Pool** - the newly created Dynamic Worker \(VM\) is placed in a worker pool until an instance requests a Dynamic Worker in one of its deployments/runbooks steps. Each region \(US, Europe and Australia\) has different pools for Windows and Ubuntu workers, with additional standby pools that can be turned on in cases of a temporary outage in an Azure region \(see below\). Octopus Cloud continuously monitors the pools’ levels and provision new workers automatically to keep them full. 3. **Leasing** - When a [deployment/runbook that uses a Dynamic Worker](https://octopus.com/docs/infrastructure/workers#where-steps-run) starts, if the instance doesn’t have a leased worker already \(in which case, it will continue using this worker, extending the worker’s lease for the new run\), the Octopus Server will request a new worker from the appropriate pool. This worker will be exclusively leased to this instance until it is no longer needed \(i.e. wasn’t used for an hour\) or until its maximum lifespan is reached \(3 days by default\).  4. **Deletion** - After a worker is no longer needed or it has reached its maximum lifespan, it is considered expired and will be deleted by the system automatically. The next time that the same instance will require a worker, it will lease a new one from the pool \(see above\). ## System Resilience & Safeguards Octopus Cloud implements multiple layers of protection to ensure Dynamic Workers’ availability and minimize customer impact in cases of service disruptions: * **Pre-provisioned Worker Pools:** We maintain multiple [dynamic worker pools](https://octopus.com/docs/infrastructure/workers/dynamic-worker-pools) \(for the different virtual machine OS and sizes\) with ready-to-use workers to provide immediate availability when deployments/runbooks are triggered, rather than waiting for on-demand provisioning. This also provides a safety buffer in cases where we can’t provision new Dynamic Workers due to temporary outages. * **Standby Services in Multiple Regions:** We maintain standby Dynamic Worker services in alternate Azure regions that we activate to provide continuity when a primary region experiences issues # Key Timing ‌ # Timeline and Impact All dates and times below are in UTC **Feb 2 2026:** **18:52:** 1st failed Dynamic Worker provisioning - At this point, our Dynamic Workers Service continued supplying workers successfully from the pools. However, since we couldn’t provision new workers, the pools started depleting.  **20:13:** 1st Ubuntu Dynamic Worker lease failed in `West US2` Azure region \(once the pool was depleted\) - start of customer impact **20:47:** Octopus on-call was paged after 3 Dynamic Worker lease requests failed in `West US2`. The on-call then started the incident to investigate the issue **20:47-21:20**:  * Octopus engineers started setting up a Dynamic Workers Service on a different Azure region in the US to mitigate the issue.  * During the investigation we saw that Dynamic Workers were also failing to provision in the `West Europe` and `East Australia` Azure regions. At this point we realized that this was a multi-region outage in Azure and decided to open a support ticket with them. * Octopus Engineers turned off non-essential services \(e.g. Instance Upgrades\) to preserve the available Dynamic Workers for customer use. **21:24:** an on-call engineer opened a Sev A support ticket with Azure **21:31:** We published the initial partial outage alert for Octopus Cloud on [https://status.octopus.com/](https://status.octopus.com/)  **21:33:** 1st Dynamic Worker lease failed in `West Europe` **21:42:** Azure acknowledged the multi-region issue and reported that they are investigating it. **22:56:** We saw the last Dynamic Worker lease failure. After this time, we were able to provision the required Virtual Machines and return the Dynamic Workers successfully to all lease requests. **23:46:** After verifying that all Dynamic Worker pools have been restored and we didn’t see any additional provisioning failures, we updated the incident status to “Mitigated”, and updated the Status page. ‌ **Feb 3 2026:** **6:05:** Azure confirmed that the issue was fully resolved on their side. **21:38:** Incident was resolved and Status page updated ‌ # Technical Details Octopus Cloud uses Azure Virtual Machines in order to supply Dynamic Workers to customers. During this Azure outage, we couldn’t provision new Azure Virtual Machines for our Ubuntu Dynamic Workers. Our pre-provisioned Dynamic Workers’ pools continued supplying Dynamic Workers for additional  * 1:21 hours in `West US 2` and  * 2:41 hours in `West Europe`  before they were depleted and customer requests for new Dynamic Workers started failing. It’s worth noting that `East Australia` customers were not impacted because the pools in this region didn’t deplete during the incident. Additionally, customers that already had a Dynamic Worker leased at the time of the outage were not impacted \(unless their Dynamic Worker expired so a new one was requested during the incident\). ‌ We made preparations to switch to our Dynamic Workers Standby Service on different Azure regions. However, once we realized that this was a multi-region outage, we decided to revert the switch since it wouldn’t have resolved the issue. ‌ Once we saw that we couldn’t supply Dynamic Workers from our standby regions, we turned off non-essential services \(e.g. Instance Upgrades\) to preserve the available Dynamic Workers for customer use.  ‌ Once Azure mitigated the issue on their side, our system recovered automatically and resumed providing new Dynamic Workers successfully.  ‌ # Remediation Octopus takes service availability seriously. Despite the difficulty with upstream cloud provider outages, especially ones that are widespread across multiple regions, we fully review and remediate any outages that occur. We do this so that we’re continuously improving and maintaining the best possible service we can. Following our post mortem, we identified the following improvements to our system to help identify and mitigate \(where possible\) similar issues earlier: * **Page an on-call earlier -**  add an alert to page the on-call when multiple Dynamic Workers in the same region fail to provision. This will allow us to detect similar incidents quicker and give us more time to mitigate the issue, before any Dynamic Worker leases fail and customers are impacted. * **Improve our Dynamic Workers Incident Playbook** to identify multi-regions incidents quicker in order to engage Azure support earlier to resolve the root cause of similar incidents.  # Conclusion We apologize to our customers for any disruption and inconvenience as a result of this incident. We have started work on the identified remediations to ensure that we can detect similar incidents more quickly and reduce the impact on our customers as much as possible.

    OctopusID signin intermittent for cloud customers

    Inizio 25 novembre 2025 alle ore 12:34 UTC · 2h 23m

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    Componenti interessati
    Sign-in/Sign-up (octopus.com)
    1. 25 novembre 2025 alle ore 12:58 UTCinvestigating

      We are currently investigating issues with cloud customers accessing their instance via OctopusID. For some customers, this issue seems to be auto resolving after around 5 minutes. Whilst we are investigating the root cause, we recommend attempting to sign in whenever convenient incase you are able to access the instance.

    2. 25 novembre 2025 alle ore 14:00 UTCmonitoring

      We have performed some changes that based on customer feedback, has mitigated this issue. We are still monitoring to ensure this issue does not reoccur, but customers should be able to sign in via OctopusID again.

    3. 25 novembre 2025 alle ore 14:56 UTCmonitoring

      After monitoring the platform following our earlier mitigation, we can confirm that the issue has not resurfaced. OctopusID sign-in is functioning normally, and the incident has been resolved.

    4. 25 novembre 2025 alle ore 14:57 UTCresolved

      Resolved.

    5. 8 dicembre 2025 alle ore 21:27 UTCpostmortem

      # Intermittent sign-in issues for Octopus Cloud instances ## Summary Between November 25, at 10:24 pm AEST, and November 26, at 12:58 am AEST, customers experienced sporadic issues signing into Octopus Cloud instances. These issues stemmed from a database connection leak, which caused some sign-in requests to time out. We apologize for the inconvenience this has caused our customers and are taking steps to prevent it from happening again. ### Timings Time to detection: 9hrs 41mins Time to incident declaration: 9hrs 41mins Time to resolution: 12hrs 15mins ## What happened? \(All dates and times below are in AEST\) ### November 25 **12:43 pm** We deployed a change to our authorization service. This change introduced a bug resulting in database connection leaks. The connection leak only became apparent in high-traffic scenarios, which our current test suite doesn't replicate. As a result, our test suite didn't detect the issue. **10:24 pm** A DevOps Support Engineer declared an incident after receiving reports from customers that they were having difficulty signing into Octopus Cloud instances. **10:24 pm - 11:41 pm** Investigations showed that the issue was due to database connection timeouts. **11:42 pm** Temporary mitigations implemented, including restarting services to release database connections. **11:42 pm - 11:59 pm** Effects of mitigations observed and deemed successful. Incident marked as mitigated. ### November 26 **12:00 am - 12:57 am** Incident responders continue to watch systems. **12:58 am** Mitigation steps considered successful, and the incident marked as resolved. **6:55 am** Root cause of database connection timeouts identified as a connection leak. **6:55 am - 8:33 am** Permanent fix implemented and deployed. ## Remediation and next steps We deployed a new service version to remove the database connection leak. We have also conducted an incident review to identify process improvements to prevent this from occurring in the future. We continue to work towards improving the reliability and security of our authentication and authorization services.

    GitHub upstream outage causing issues with VCS-backed elements

    Inizio 18 novembre 2025 alle ore 21:11 UTC · 3h 36m

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    1. 18 novembre 2025 alle ore 21:11 UTCidentified

      GitHub is experiencing issue with git operations, resulting in in-product git operations to be degraded or fail. We're continuing to monitor this upstream outage.

    2. 18 novembre 2025 alle ore 22:01 UTCmonitoring

      GitHub reports that git operations have been restored. We will continue to monitor this situation.

    3. 19 novembre 2025 alle ore 00:47 UTCresolved

      We have observed no further errors stemming from this issue.

    Octopus.com and billing portal may be unavailable in certain regions

    Inizio 29 ottobre 2025 alle ore 16:31 UTC · 8h 42m

    OutageIncidente critico
    Componenti interessati
    Octopus GitHub AppControl Center (billing.octopus.com)Octopus.comOctopus CloudSign-in/Sign-up (octopus.com)
    1. 29 ottobre 2025 alle ore 16:31 UTCinvestigating

      We are currently investigating the issue.

    2. 29 ottobre 2025 alle ore 16:39 UTCidentified

      It appears this outage is due to a DNS issue with our upstream provider. We are currently awaiting for mitigation from the upstream provider to restore Octopus.com and related services.

    3. 29 ottobre 2025 alle ore 19:00 UTCidentified

      Customers may notice intermittent access to Octopus.com and Octopus services. Our upstream provider has made progress to mitigate the issue. We will continue to monitor the situation. We have contingency plans we are prepared to deploy if service recovery progress from the upstream provider mitigation stalls.

    4. 29 ottobre 2025 alle ore 21:13 UTCidentified

      As we continue to monitor Octopus.com and Octopus services, metrics are showing services becoming more reliably available. Our upstream provider is currently estimating full or near full mitigation approximately 2 hours from now (approximately 23:20 UTC on 29 October 2025). We will provide additional updates as the situation necessitates.

    5. 29 ottobre 2025 alle ore 23:57 UTCidentified

      As we continue to monitor Octopus.com and Octopus services, metrics are showing services becoming more reliably available. We are still waiting for our upstream provider's resolution and expect to give another update approximately 1 hour from now (approximately 00:55 UTC on 30 October 2025). We will continue to provide additional updates as the situation necessitates.

    6. 30 ottobre 2025 alle ore 01:13 UTCresolved

      All Octopus services affected by this outage are now operational.

    Docker Hub is down

    Inizio 20 ottobre 2025 alle ore 07:34 UTC · 17h 37m

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    Componenti interessati
    Octopus.comOctopus Cloud
    1. 20 ottobre 2025 alle ore 07:34 UTCidentified

      Docker Hub experienced issues that prevented access to container images, resulting in deployment failures for projects relying on those images.

    2. 20 ottobre 2025 alle ore 12:44 UTCmonitoring

      Docker Hub experienced issues that prevented access to container images, resulting in deployment failures for projects relying on those images.

    3. 20 ottobre 2025 alle ore 12:48 UTCmonitoring

      Most of the Docker Hub services seem to be operational but the incident is still on-going.

    4. 21 ottobre 2025 alle ore 00:15 UTCmonitoring

      Most of the Docker Hub services seem to be operational and we are continuing to monitor the situation

    5. 21 ottobre 2025 alle ore 01:11 UTCresolved

      Docker Hub have resolved their incident and we have not observed any further issues

    Kubernetes deployments using Kubernetes agent may fail

    Inizio 12 ottobre 2025 alle ore 23:43 UTC · 41m

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    1. 12 ottobre 2025 alle ore 23:43 UTCidentified

      We have identified an issue where Kubernetes deployments using the Kubernetes agent may fail due to a failure to pull the octopusdeploy/kubernetes-agent-tools-base docker image.

    2. 12 ottobre 2025 alle ore 23:45 UTCmonitoring

      We have fixed the issue and pushed the missing tags to DockerHub. Kubernetes agent deployments should be working again.

    3. 13 ottobre 2025 alle ore 00:24 UTCresolved

      This has been resolved. All missing tags have been published to DockerHub and we are seeing successful deployments using these new tags.

    Docker Hub authentication issues

    Inizio 25 settembre 2025 alle ore 01:06 UTC · 3h 12m

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    Componenti interessati
    Octopus.comOctopus Cloud
    1. 25 settembre 2025 alle ore 01:06 UTCidentified

      Docker Hub is experiencing an active incident: https://www.dockerstatus.com/pages/incident/533c6539221ae15e3f000031/68d47a2f93c09e05486d93a9 Octopus customers may experience issues pulling images from Docker Hub, including: 1. Octopus Server self-host images 2. Deployment process container images including execution containers and reference packages hosted by Docker Workarounds are available, please contact [email protected].

    2. 25 settembre 2025 alle ore 01:23 UTCmonitoring

      Docker has implemented a fix and we are monitoring.

    3. 25 settembre 2025 alle ore 04:18 UTCresolved

      The Docker Hub incident is resolved and we have not observed any ongoing issues.

    4. 9 ottobre 2025 alle ore 03:37 UTCpostmortem

      # **Incident Summary** Docker Hub experienced authentication issues that prevented access to container images, resulting in deployment failures for projects relying on those images. ## **What We're Doing** Following this incident, we've identified several improvements to enhance service resilience and customer communication: ### **Visibility & Monitoring** * Communicate third-party service outages more clearly on our status page * Explore in-app messaging to alert customers during service disruptions ### **Resilience & Good Practices** * Review image retrieval reliability and address identified risks * Share good practices with customers to help reduce impacts when Docker Hub is unavailable

    Intermittent Azure authentication issues

    Inizio 15 settembre 2025 alle ore 03:11 UTC · 2h 54m

    OutageIncidente maggiore
    Componenti interessati
    Octopus Cloud
    1. 15 settembre 2025 alle ore 03:11 UTCinvestigating

      We are investigating reports of intermittent Azure authentication issues during deployments and runbook runs. We are working with Microsoft to resolve this issue.

    2. 15 settembre 2025 alle ore 05:57 UTCmonitoring

      The downstream issue with running `az login` commands in Azure steps appears to be working again. We will be continuing to monitor this.

    3. 15 settembre 2025 alle ore 06:05 UTCresolved

      The downstream issue with Azure CLI login commands has been resolved by Azure.