Cronologia delle interruzioni di Spreedly

1. 2 settembre 2026 alle ore 15:11 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly ha rilevato un problema potenzialmente risultante in prestazioni degradate sulle API transazionali. Mentre stiamo fornendo una notifica precoce nel tentativo di avvisarti il più rapidamente possibile, stiamo ancora indagando sull'effettiva portata e impatto e fornire un aggiornamento non appena sono disponibili ulteriori dettagli. Grazie per la pazienza.

2. 2 settembre 2026 alle ore 15:57 UTCmonitoring

   Stiamo lavorando per risolvere un ritardo di performance che riguarda alcuni processi di pagamento (specificamente l'acquisto, la cattura e la creazione di metodi di pagamento) relativi alla recente manutenzione del database. Una soluzione è in corso, e il nostro team sta monitorando attivamente il sistema. Si prega di controllare qui per aggiornamenti in tempo reale.

3. 2 settembre 2026 alle ore 21:32 UTCresolved

   Questo incidente è stato risolto.

Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

1. 14 agosto 2026 alle ore 16:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an increase in 5xx errors on the Core Transactional API. Some transactions may be failing or returning unexpected error responses during this time. We will provide an update as soon as we have more information.

2. 14 agosto 2026 alle ore 16:34 UTCresolved

   A fix has been implemented and error rates have returned to normal. Some transactions may have failed or returned errors during the affected window. We're continuing to monitor and will follow up with a more detailed post-incident summary.

3. 3 settembre 2026 alle ore 20:55 UTCpostmortem

   ### Service Disruption on Transaction Endpoints ### ‌High Level Summary On August 14, 2026, Spreedly experienced a brief service disruption affecting some transaction-related API endpoints for approximately 20 minutes \(4:06 PM – 4:26 PM ET\). During this window, some requests to endpoints involving transaction lookups, captures, voids, credits, and payment method operations may have received error responses. The issue was identified and resolved quickly by our engineering team. ### What Happened A routine database schema update caused a subset of existing database connections to reference outdated schema information, resulting in intermittent errors on affected requests. Once identified, our team refreshed the affected database connections, which fully resolved the issue. ### Next Steps We are reviewing our schema migration process to add additional safeguards that will prevent this class of issue from recurring, and are improving automated testing coverage for this scenario. We have added auto-retry and recovery mechanisms so that if a connection does reference an outdated schema it will not affect transactions going forward.

1. 27 luglio 2026 alle ore 13:50 UTCinvestigating

   Stiamo attualmente indagando su questo problema.

2. 27 luglio 2026 alle ore 14:00 UTCidentified

   Il problema è stato identificato e si sta attuando una correzione.

3. 27 luglio 2026 alle ore 15:00 UTCmonitoring

   Spreedly ha rilevato un problema che potrebbe avere un impatto sulle prestazioni delle transazioni core. Mentre il problema sembra essere risolto, il nostro team sta monitorando attivamente i sistemi per garantire la stabilità continua. Forniamo un aggiornamento finale una volta che la nostra indagine sull'intero campo e l'impatto è completo. Si prega di continuare a seguire il nostro StatusPage per l'ultimo aggiornamento.

4. 27 luglio 2026 alle ore 21:41 UTCresolved

   Dopo un attento monitoraggio e conferma che tutti i sistemi sono stabilizzati e funzionanti come previsto, questo incidente viene considerato risolto. Non è previsto alcun ulteriore impatto del cliente. Stiamo completando la nostra indagine sulle cause dell'incidente e qualsiasi impatto residuo. Ci scusiamo per qualsiasi inconveniente o disturbo.

5. 3 settembre 2026 alle ore 20:57 UTCpostmortem

   ### Sommario di alto livello Il 27 luglio 2026, Spreedly ha sperimentato errori intermittenti su un sottoinsieme di richieste di transazioni, tra cui acquisti, autorizzazioni e webhooks. ## What Happened Una migrazione del database ha aggiornato lo schema di un servizio interno che gestisce i metodi di pagamento memorizzati. Ciò ha causato errori sulle connessioni esistenti che fanno riferimento a una cache stante. Abbiamo rimboccato il cambiamento e ciclizzato quei collegamenti, risolvendo completamente il problema. ## Prossimo passo Stiamo rivedendo il nostro processo di migrazione schema per aggiungere ulteriori garanzie che impediranno a questa classe di emissione di ricorrenti, e stanno migliorando la copertura di test automatizzata per questo scenario. Abbiamo aggiunto meccanismi di auto-ricerca e di recupero in modo che se una connessione fa riferimento a uno schema obsoleto non influenzerà le transazioni in corso.

Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

1. 11 luglio 2026 alle ore 14:33 UTCinvestigating

   Stiamo indagando tassi di errore elevati che interessano determinate richieste API. Alcuni endpoint di lista e di recupero possono restituire 500 risposte intermittenti mentre lavoriamo per identificare la causa principale.

2. 11 luglio 2026 alle ore 15:38 UTCresolved

   Abbiamo identificato e risolto il problema causando risposte intermittenti 500 su un certo elenco e punti finali di recupero. Un aggiornamento di configurazione è stato implementato per evitare che le richieste vengano terminate prematuramente e continuiamo a monitorare il servizio.

Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

1. 8 luglio 2026 alle ore 15:22 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly ha rilevato un problema potenzialmente risultante in prestazioni degradate sulle transazioni di credito Cybersource. Mentre stiamo fornendo questa notifica precoce in uno sforzo per avvisarvi il più rapidamente possibile, stiamo ancora indagando sull'effettiva portata e impatto. Forniremo un aggiornamento non appena saranno disponibili ulteriori dettagli.

2. 8 luglio 2026 alle ore 16:08 UTCidentified

   Abbiamo identificato un errore di risoluzione DNS interno transitorio che si è verificato tra le 15:00 e le 15:05 UTC causando selezioni di 500 errori nei servizi Spreedly. Continuiamo a indagare l'impatto completo e forniremo ulteriori informazioni come diventa disponibile.

3. 8 luglio 2026 alle ore 16:54 UTCresolved

   Dopo un attento monitoraggio e conferma che tutti i sistemi sono stabilizzati e funzionanti come previsto, questo incidente viene considerato risolto. Non è previsto alcun ulteriore impatto del cliente. Stiamo completando la nostra indagine sulle cause dell'incidente e qualsiasi impatto residuo. Ci scusiamo per qualsiasi inconveniente o disturbo.

Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

1. 17 giugno 2026 alle ore 14:55 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly ha rilevato un problema potenzialmente risultante in prestazioni degrate con operazioni asincrono. Mentre stiamo fornendo una notifica precoce nel tentativo di avvisarti il più rapidamente possibile, stiamo ancora indagando sull'effettiva portata e impatto e fornire un aggiornamento non appena sono disponibili ulteriori dettagli. Grazie per la pazienza.

2. 17 giugno 2026 alle ore 15:00 UTCmonitoring

   Abbiamo implementato una correzione e stabilizzato le transazioni asincrono. Il nostro team sta monitorando la situazione da vicino per garantire che non ci siano ulteriori impatti. Si prega di continuare a seguire il nostro StatusPage per l'ultimo aggiornamento.

3. 17 giugno 2026 alle ore 16:03 UTCmonitoring

   Stiamo monitorando da vicino per eventuali ulteriori problemi o ulteriori impatti. Continua a seguire il nostro StatusPage per gli ultimi aggiornamenti.

4. 17 giugno 2026 alle ore 21:42 UTCresolved

   Dopo un periodo di monitoraggio, abbiamo confermato che il problema è stato risolto e i sistemi sono operativi normalmente. Se si continua a sperimentare qualsiasi problema, si prega di raggiungere il supporto.

5. 24 giugno 2026 alle ore 20:10 UTCpostmortem

   24 giugno 2026 — Disturbazione dell'elaborazione delle transazioni asincrona **Riepilogo di alto livello ** Il 17 giugno 2026 dalle 10:02 alle 10:41 AM UTC, Spreedly ha sperimentato una disgregazione che interessa le transazioni di gateway asincrono e i flussi di autenticazione 3DS. Durante la finestra di 39 minuti, circa 1.634 operazioni sono state lasciate in uno stato in sospeso senza un risultato confermato, che rappresenta meno dell'1% del volume totale delle transazioni durante quel periodo. Che cosa è successo? Una distribuzione del codice ha introdotto un problema di compatibilità tra le istanze delle applicazioni di nuova distribuzione e quelle in esecuzione. Durante un processo di rollback, alcune richieste sono state indirizzate attraverso le versioni di codice misto, causando guasti durante l'elaborazione degli aggiornamenti di stato di transazione asincrono. I tipi di transazione interessati includono operazioni di gateway asincrono \(portavia specifica 3DS, e altre verifiche asincrono, autorizzazioni e acquisti\) e autenticazione globale 3DS. Le transazioni che hanno inserito il flusso interessato durante questa finestra possono riflettere un risultato indeterminato, lo stato di transazione al gateway può differire da quello che Spreedly segnala. # Next Steps # Si consiglia di rivedere le transazioni dalla finestra 10:02-10:41 AM UTC il 17 giugno che rimangono in uno stato in sospeso: Le verifiche possono essere recuperate in modo sicuro. Le autorizzazioni dovrebbero essere annullate al gateway prima di riprovare. Gli acquisti portano un rischio di duplicazione, si consiglia di rimborsare prima di riprovare. Si prega di raggiungere Spreedly supporto se avete bisogno di assistenza per identificare le transazioni interessate o determinare il percorso di bonifica appropriato. Stiamo lavorando attivamente per prevenire questa classe di emissione attraverso una migliore protezione di distribuzione e un rilevamento automatico rollback. - Il Team Spreedly

Tradotto automaticamente dall'aggiornamento ufficiale dell'incidente.

1. 8 maggio 2026 alle ore 18:00 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring results.

2. 8 maggio 2026 alle ore 18:05 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19 marzo 2026 alle ore 15:13 UTCidentified

   We are currently investigating performance of the Dodgeball service.

2. 19 marzo 2026 alle ore 15:30 UTCidentified

   We are working to resolve an issue with delayed processing of requests to the Dodgeball services.

3. 19 marzo 2026 alle ore 15:55 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the Dodgeball component that was experiencing a partial outage. We are continuing to monitor

4. 19 marzo 2026 alle ore 16:07 UTCmonitoring

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

5. 19 marzo 2026 alle ore 16:09 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 16 marzo 2026 alle ore 17:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating elevated errors on API endpoints

2. 16 marzo 2026 alle ore 17:51 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring to ensure services are operating correctly

3. 16 marzo 2026 alle ore 18:07 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

4. 19 marzo 2026 alle ore 19:07 UTCpostmortem

   ### Mar 18th 2026 — _Decryption Errors on API endpoints_ ### Summary Between 5:40 PM and 5:43 PM UTC on March 16, 2026, we experienced a brief issue during a key rotation that caused a small subset of API requests to fail due to decryption errors. These errors occurred within our system before any external processing took place. The issue was quickly identified, and traffic was immediately redirected to a stable environment, restoring normal service. ### What Happened At 5:36 PM UTC, we routed traffic to a newly deployed cluster of our encryption service running with the latest security keys. Shortly after, we observed decryption errors affecting a small subset of records, which resulted in some requests returning 500 error responses. We promptly redirected traffic back to the existing cluster, restoring normal operation. Further investigation determined that these records were still associated with a key in the process of rotation, and we updated them as a follow-up action to prevent the issue from recurring. ### Next Steps We have enhanced our process to ensure that a key’s usage is fully verified before it is removed from the encryption service. -The Spreedly Team

1. 26 febbraio 2026 alle ore 16:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting customers using Dodgeball. The production database backing Dodgeball has reached critically low available storage, which is expected to result in elevated error rates. Customers may begin experiencing errors within the next 10 minutes as the system’s ability to process requests degrades. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working to restore normal capacity as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

2. 26 febbraio 2026 alle ore 16:59 UTCmonitoring

   The engineering team has successfully resolved the storage issue affecting the Dodgeball production PostgreSQL instance. Capacity has been restored and the system is now operating normally. At this time, we are not observing any elevated error rates for customers using Dodgeball. We will continue to monitor the system closely to ensure stability. Further updates will be provided if necessary.

3. 26 febbraio 2026 alle ore 18:44 UTCresolved

   The storage issue affecting the Dodgeball production instance has been fully resolved. Capacity has been restored and systems are operating normally. We are no longer observing elevated error rates for customers using Dodgeball. Thank you for your patience while we worked to resolve this issue.

1. 25 febbraio 2026 alle ore 19:18 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating performance of the Dodgeball service.

2. 25 febbraio 2026 alle ore 19:48 UTCidentified

   We are working to resolve an issue with processing of Checkpoints that is causing latency and errors for requests to the Dodgeball services.

3. 25 febbraio 2026 alle ore 20:35 UTCmonitoring

   Service has resumed and we are monitoring for further impact. We apologize for any inconvenience this has caused

4. 25 febbraio 2026 alle ore 21:52 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

1. 5 febbraio 2026 alle ore 15:56 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue where credit transactions referencing Capture transactions are failing in production. Some customers may see errors when attempting to issue credits against Capture transactions. Capture transactions themselves are processing successfully. Our engineering team is actively investigating this behavior to determine the cause and confirm whether this is a regression or an unintended change. We will provide updates as soon as more information is available.

2. 5 febbraio 2026 alle ore 16:25 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve deployed a revert to address the issue where credit transactions referencing Capture transactions were failing. We’re actively monitoring to ensure credit requests referencing Captures are processing as expected. At this time, we’re not seeing further errors related to this behavior.

3. 5 febbraio 2026 alle ore 17:01 UTCresolved

   After monitoring the system post-deploy, we’re no longer seeing errors related to credits referencing Capture transactions, and processing has returned to normal. Thank you for your patience.

4. 10 febbraio 2026 alle ore 17:22 UTCpostmortem

   ### February 10, 2026 — Credits Referencing Capture Transactions Failing ### ‌High Level Summary Between approximately 1:56 PM UTC and 4:15 PM UTC on February 5, 2026, credit transactions where the reference transaction was a capture failed with the error "The specified `reference_token` corresponds to a transaction which cannot be used as a reference." ### What Happened At approximately 1:56 PM UTC on February 5, 2026, Spreedly rolled out a change to support credits on the CyberSource Rest gateway. This included a change in the way we validated reference transaction types used in credits. Specifically, there was an unintended side-effect which caused captures to no longer be treated as a valid reference type for credits on gateways other than CyberSource Rest. Once this was discovered, the code was reverted at 4:01PM UTC. By 4:15 PM UTC, credit requests against captures were fully functional. ### Next Steps * Any credit attempts that failed with this error are safe to retry * We are making improvements to our code review processes and regression test suite to ensure we catch similar errors before they make it into production * We have identified a gap in our observability surrounding validation errors that we will be prioritizing ‌ -The Spreedly Team

1. 4 febbraio 2026 alle ore 18:15 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue that is affecting multiple customers using Payflow Pro where some transactions fail with the error: “Invalid Request. Malicious string found in XML document”. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 4 febbraio 2026 alle ore 19:52 UTCmonitoring

   We are no longer seeing errors at this time, and the issue appears to have subsided. We are working with Payflow Pro to identify the root cause. Our team continues to monitor the situation closely to ensure stability. Please continue to follow our StatusPage for the latest updates.

3. 4 febbraio 2026 alle ore 19:56 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 27 gennaio 2026 alle ore 19:59 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue related to a dodgeball component experiencing a partial outage. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 27 gennaio 2026 alle ore 20:12 UTCresolved

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the Dodgeball component that was experiencing a partial outage. After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

1. 27 gennaio 2026 alle ore 19:08 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue potentially resulting in a high number of pending 3DS2 Global transactions. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 27 gennaio 2026 alle ore 19:25 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the 3DS2 Global transactions. Our team is monitoring the situation closely to ensure there are no additional impacts. Please continue to follow our StatusPage for the latest update.

3. 27 gennaio 2026 alle ore 19:29 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

4. 3 febbraio 2026 alle ore 15:38 UTCpostmortem

   ### February 3rd, 2026 — 3DS2 Global Transactions Pending ‌ Between 5:40 pm UTC and 7:24 PM UTC on January 27, 2026 the latest version of the Spreedly iFrame \(`iframe-v1`\) was configured to use version 1.180 which contained a bug related to the handling of device fingerprinting for `Sca::Authentications` in an end user's browser. As a result there was an elevated number of `Sca::Authentications` stuck in a pending flow with a `required_action` of `device_fingerprint`. These transactions were held in a pending state and never completed. Our team identified the issue and updated the version of iFrame \(`iframe-v1`\) to utilize `1.179`. ### What Happened At 5:40 pm UTC on January 27th, 2026 a new version of iFrame was released \(1.180\) and updated the version to be used in the `iframe-v1.min.js` asset to point to `1.180`. This change was meant to improve the error handling for the loading of 3rd party critical SDKs however it caused the SDK to enter a permanently error-ed state when attempting to perform device fingerprinting due to a race condition with loading the SDKs. At 7:20 pm UTC on January 27th, 2026 the change was rolled back and by 7:24 pm UTC, 2026 the `iframe-v1.min.js` asset globally was pointing to version `1.179`. ### Next Steps We have identified a gap in our observability and alerting within the iFrame service related to the managing of 3DS lifecycle flows that we will be prioritizing. -The Spreedly Team

1. 9 gennaio 2026 alle ore 18:46 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 9 gennaio 2026 alle ore 18:52 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 9 gennaio 2026 alle ore 19:07 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been deployed and we are seeing systems recover. We will continue to monitor to ensure stability and will provide further updates as needed.

4. 9 gennaio 2026 alle ore 19:10 UTCresolved

   After a period of monitoring, we have confirmed that the issue has been resolved and systems are operating normally. If you continue to experience any issues, please reach out to Support.

1. 29 dicembre 2025 alle ore 16:50 UTCresolved

   Between 7:00 PM EST on Saturday, December 27th, and 1:00 AM EST on Sunday, December 28th, we identified a period of higher-than-normal latency caused by a pre-planned customer event that resulted in a significant traffic spike. Although we did not observe any service failures or timeouts, our systems experienced degraded service due to the increased latency. Systems recovered quickly once peak traffic subsided and are now operating normally. We expect performance to remain stable moving forward.

1. 16 dicembre 2025 alle ore 21:56 UTCresolved

   Between 3:59 and 4:03 EST, customers may have experienced degraded performance when processing transactions that required 3D Secure (3DS) authentication via our Global 3DS service. Performance has since returned to normal, and no further impact has been observed. If you have any questions about potential impact to your transactions during this time window, please reach out to Spreedly Support for assistance.

2. 18 dicembre 2025 alle ore 21:26 UTCpostmortem

   # _December 18, 2025 — Delayed Processing of Some 3DS Global Transactions_ ‌ _A targeted update intended for Gateway-Specific 3DS processing impacted a subset of 3DS Global transactions. This caused a small number of transactions to remain in a "Pending" state rather than progressing to completion._ ### What Happened Between 08:59 PM and 09:03 PM UTC on December 16, 2025, a deployment intended to update Gateway-Specific 3DS logic inadvertently affected the processing of 3DS Global transactions. As a result, 52 transactions failed to reach a final state and remained "pending." During this 4-minute window, customers attempting a 3DS-authenticated operation would have encountered an interruption, preventing their transactions from completing. Our team identified the impact immediately and rolled back the change to restore normal service. ### Next Steps _We have successfully identified and corrected the underlying logic error within the change. We are also enhancing our automated deployment tests to better catch cross-module dependencies of this nature. We sincerely apologize for any disruption this caused to your operations._ ‌ — The Spreedly Team

1. 9 dicembre 2025 alle ore 15:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where roughly 30–40% of transactions are not appearing in Spreedly reporting since 12/03. Primary datastores and secondary services show no data loss, indicating the issue lies within the reporting ingestion process. Please reach out to Spreedly Support if you need assistance.

2. 10 dicembre 2025 alle ore 06:53 UTCinvestigating

   Our team continues to investigate the root cause of the missing transaction data appearing in Spreedly reporting. All primary datastores and transactional processing are functioning normally, and there is no indication of data loss at the source. The issue appears to be isolated to the reporting ingestion process.

3. 10 dicembre 2025 alle ore 14:42 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified and fixed the issue that was causing some transaction data to be missing from Spreedly reporting. Our team is now working on backfilling the missing reporting data to ensure completeness and accuracy. All primary processing systems continue to operate normally, and there is no impact to transaction processing.

4. 10 dicembre 2025 alle ore 20:04 UTCresolved

   Our team has completed the backfill process, and all missing transaction data has now been fully restored in Spreedly reporting. Transaction reporting is up to date and functioning as expected. All primary processing systems continued to operate normally throughout this incident, and no transaction processing impact occurred.

5. 2 gennaio 2026 alle ore 21:44 UTCpostmortem

   ### _Postmortem: January 2, 2026_ — _Transaction Reporting Degraded_ ### ‌High Level Summary Select data related to transactions did not make it into our downstream systems, causing inaccurate reports in [app.spreedly.com](http://app.spreedly.com) ### What Happened After completing system updates on December 3, 2025, approximately 30-40% of data related to transactions did not make it into our reporting tools due to a latent bug in one of our supporting applications. This caused inaccurate reports in [app.spreedly.com](http://app.spreedly.com). This did not impact any primary system functionality and no data was lost. ### Next Steps * Our team has since identified and fixed the affected application. The missing data was backfilled and subsequent data continues to flow normally * We are adding additional monitoring in order to more quickly flag discrepancies * We are continuing to make updates to simplify our data pipeline that will prevent similar issues in the future -The Spreedly Team

1. 20 ottobre 2025 alle ore 15:41 UTCidentified

   The major AWS outage on October 20, 2025, has been largely resolved for most affected services, though some residual issues may persist. Spreedly’s core platform remains stable and fully available. However, due to downstream impact from the AWS outage, some of Spreedly’s indexing endpoints and callback processing are experiencing delays. This is related to dependencies on third-party systems that were affected by the outage and are still undergoing recovery. As a result, you may continue to see intermittent latency or delayed responses for API requests involving these systems. We are actively monitoring the situation as AWS and its downstream services continue recovery efforts. For ongoing updates, please refer to the AWS status page here

2. 20 ottobre 2025 alle ore 20:22 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected.

3. 23 ottobre 2025 alle ore 18:27 UTCpostmortem

   ### Postmortem: October 24, 2025 — _AWS outage_ Monday's AWS outage had downstream impact on some 3rd-party systems utilized by Spreedly's platform. Namely, our indexing endpoints and callbacks lagged behind due to the outage and recovery steps. ### What Happened Spreedly's 3DS global service and legacy smart routing product both faced a period of failures due to 3rd-party systems relying on AWS. ### Next Steps Spreedly will improve its response to our alerts platform, and are actively working on multi-region support slated for 2026, which should mitigate the impact of similar events going forward. -The Spreedly Team