Confluence の障害履歴

1. 2026年10月1日 2:55 UTCinvestigating

   ジョブ処理とジョブスケジューリングは、Jira、Confluence、Bitbucket Cloudなどの複数の製品間でスケジュールおよび非同期作業に影響を及ぼす、劣化しています。 欠陥のあるユーザーは、遅延または欠落したジョブの実行を見ることができます。, 遅延したメール・ツー・チケット処理と予想どおりに実行されないスケジュールを含みます.

2. 2026年10月1日 3:47 UTCidentified

   当社のチームは、この事件の根本的な原因を特定し、現在、問題の緩和に積極的に取り組んでいます。 私たちは、共有するための重要な進捗状況がある場合、我々は1時間以内にさらに更新を提供します.

3. 2026年10月1日 4:03 UTCidentified

   私たちのチームは、問題を軽減し、いくつかの改善を観察するための是正措置を取っています。 今後も状況を監視し、事故が完全に回復するまでに必要な行動をとります.

4. 2026年10月1日 5:00 UTCidentified

   事故が完全に解決するまで、当社のチームは回復に引き続き取り組んでいます。 私たちは、共有する大きな進歩を持っている場合は、さらなるアップデートを提供します. いくつかの製品間でスケジュールされた非同期作業に影響を及ぼすとともに、Jira Service ManagementのSLAコンポーネントも期待どおりに表示されません.

5. 2026年10月1日 7:01 UTCidentified

   事故が完全に解決するまで、当社のチームは回復に引き続き取り組んでいます。 私たちは、共有する大きな進歩を持っている場合は、さらなるアップデートを提供します. また、欠落SLAコンポーネントの面で作成された新しいサポートチケット、一部のチケットの応答時間とバックログ管理に影響を与える可能性がある通知にも影響があります.

6. 2026年10月1日 7:51 UTCresolved

   2026年10月01日、01:00 UTCと07:25 UTCの間、ユーザーは、予想通りに実行されない遅延メール・ツー・チケット処理とスケジュールを含む、ジョブの実行が欠落している可能性があります。 被災されたお客様には、修正・サービスを取り戻すようになりました。 SLA コンポーネントが不足しているチケットをサポートし、通知を遅延させる影響も回復を確認しました。 注:Bitbucketの顧客の場合、インシデントウィンドウで実行しなかったスケジュールされたパイプラインがある場合は、次のスケジュールされた実行を待つか、手動でトリガーすることができます.

7. 2026年10月9日 18:24 UTCpostmortem

   #### 概要 2026年10月1日、01:00〜07:25 UTCの間、Bitbucket Cloud、Confluence、Forge apps、Jira、Jira Service Managementなどのインパクトのあるアトラス製品の開発とスケジューリング。 これにより、Eメール・ツー・チケット処理やスケジュールされたパイプラインなどのバックグラウンド・タスクの遅延や欠落が生じました。インタラクティブ・プロダクトの使用は影響を受けませんでした。 スケジュールされたタスクの予期しないボリュームが同時に行われるとイベントがトリガーされ、共有されたジョブスケジューリングプラットフォームを圧倒しました。 3分以内に事故を検知した自動監視 復旧は、エンジニアリングスケールの容量として3時45分UTCの頃に始まり、プラットフォームはバックログを介して機能し、完全な解像度は6時間と25分に達しました。 ##IMPACT ## ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ##IMPACT ほとんどのスケジュールされたタスクは、01:00 UTC で実行を停止し、約 03:45 UTC から再開しました。 ほとんどの遅延作業は、約 06:00 UTC で追い抜かれ、残りの遅延は 07:25 UTC によってクリアされた。 影響を受けたプロダクトを渡して下さい: - スケジュールされたタスクを自動再実行し、タスクは次回の予定時刻で再開しました。 - ほとんどの場合、スケジュールされたタスクが遅く実行される; 小さな番号が実行されていない可能性があります。 - スケジュールされた規則を含むオートメーション規則は、以下に示すように、通常実行されます。 Bitbucketクラウド 01:00 と 03:50 UTC が実行しなかったため、パイプラインをスケジュールしました。 スケジュールされたパイプラインがインシデント中に実行されていない場合、次のスケジュールされた実行を待つか、手動でトリガーすることができます。 他のパイプラインの操業は影響を受けませんでした。 コンフルエンス カレンダーイベントのリマインダーは、01:00～23:45 UTC が送られなかったためです。 フォージアプリ スケジュールされたトリガーは、01:00 UTC で停止し、04:00 UTC から再開しました。 見逃された呼び出しは再生されません。 ゴール 毎月のメールリマインダーから、目標の更新が遅れる可能性があります。 JiraとJiraのサービス管理 メールボックスに滞在し、回復後に自動的に処理された受信メール。 フィルターサブスクリプションなどの通知をスケジュールしました。 一部のサービスプロジェクトでは、SLAによってトリガーされた自動化ルールと通知、またはステータスが遅く実行された時間。 SLA のタイマーデータはそのまま残っています。 Atlassian サポート UTC 07:25までは、サポートツールの問題は、応答の一部を遅くする可能性があります。 弊社では、最新の調査に基づき、業務項目、ページ、リポジトリ、またはメールの受信の損失は認められていません。 ## ROOT CAUSE(ロートキューズ) 当社の共有ジョブスケジューリングプラットフォームは、通常の条件下で高スケールで動作します。 プラットフォームの消費者の1つは、10月1日の01:00 UTCで同時に実行されるタスクの異常な高容量をスケジュールしました。 このオーダー・オブ・マグニチュード・サージは、アーキテクチャとスケーリング・リミットを上回り、依存するサービス全体で処理バックログを作成しました。 異常な負荷を処理する能力を手動で高められた工学は、サービスがバックログを処理し、正常な操作に戻ることを可能にします。 ##ReMEDIALアクションプランとNEXT STEP 遅延や欠落した作業がお客様の生産性に影響を及ぼすことがわかっています。 私たちは、同様の事件の可能性と影響を減らすために、これらの行動を優先しています。 - **Enhanceのワークロードの分離:** 公正なスケジューリングガードレールを実装するので、単一のソースからボリュームサージが他の製品にタスクを主観または遅延しません。 - **力強いサージ制御:** 予期しないトラフィックのスパイク中に特定のソースからスケジュールされたワークロードをすぐにスロットルまたは一時停止するための運用能力を追加します。 - **システムスケーリングと回復の改善:** プラットフォーム容量を高め、スケーリングプロセスを最適化し、極端な需要のスパイクを処理し、より迅速に回復します。 本件中にサービスが影響を受けたお客様には、誠に申し訳ございません。 お問い合わせ アトラスティアン

公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。

1. 2026年8月27日 4:22 UTCinvestigating

   当社のチームは、この問題がJira Service Managementに影響を及ぼすと指摘しています。 できるだけ早く更新します.

2. 2026年8月27日 4:25 UTCinvestigating

   弊社では、Confluence、Jira Cloud、Jira Serivce Managementのお客様に影響を及ぼす製品へのアクセスに関する問題を調査しています。 弊社のチームは、この問題を早期に調査し、情報が利用可能になったらただちに1時間以内に詳細をお届けいたします.

3. 2026年8月27日 4:33 UTCidentified

   当社のチームは、Jira Cloud、Jira Service Management、Confluenceに影響を及ぼす問題の修正を可能としています。 影響を受けた地域に転がり、さらに情報が必要な場合は1時間以内に更新します.

4. 2026年8月27日 4:51 UTCmonitoring

   Jira Cloud、Jira Service Management、Confluenceのロードに関する問題が回復中です。 今後も、安定状態の確認や1時間以内の更新や、より早くより詳細な情報を提供できるよう、厳密に監視してまいります.

5. 2026年8月27日 5:16 UTCresolved

   2026年8月27日、Jira Cloud、Jira Service Management、Confluenceなどのアトラスシアン製品が破壊を経験し、影響を受けたユーザーにサービスが利用できなくなった。 問題は解決され、サービスはすべての影響を受けた顧客のために普通作動しています。 事件の完全調査が完了すると、このページでは、この事件の公正な姿勢が公開されます.

6. 2026年9月7日 2:53 UTCpostmortem

   **概要** 2026年8月27日、アトラスシアン・アナリティクス、コンパス、コンパス、コンフルエンス、フォーカス、ガード、ジャイラ、Jira、JPD、JSM、Opsgenie、Rovo Search、およびタレントを含むアトラスシアン・クラウド製品が、西洋ヨーロッパと東南アジアのアトラスシアン・顧客の間で、Aトラスシアン・クラウド製品に到達できませんでした。 このイベントは、プロキシフリートのルーティングレイヤーに欠陥のあるコード変更によってトリガーされました。 これは、西ヨーロッパと東南アジアAPAC地域のこれらのプロキシ艦隊を介して、すべての顧客のトラフィックに提供されているHTTP 404エラーにつながりました。 インシデントは、自動監視システムによって1分以内に検出され、前回のコンフィギュレーションリリースに戻り、プロキシフリートを既知の良好な状態にしました。 プロキシフリートが回復した後、一部のJiraとConfluenceの顧客は(場所に関係なく)HTTP 503エラーを受け取り、サーバーフリートがトラフィックの流入に調整されるように0433と 04:53 UTCの間でHTTP 503エラーを受け取りました。 **インパクト** 全体的な影響は2つの隔離された期間に分けられました: - まず、アトラスシアン・アナリティクス、コンパス、コンフルエンス、フォーカス、ガード、Jira、JPD、JSM、Opsgenie、Rovo検索、およびタレントで27 8月2026、の間で。 欧米や東南アジアのAPAC地域から発信する顧客トラフィックに対するサービス障害が発生し、HTTP 404エラーが返された。 元の場所に関係なく、顧客の API トラフィックに影響はありません。 - 2 番目, 上 27 8 月 2026, 間に 04:33 と 04:53 UTC, 位置に関係なく、いくつかの Jira と Confluence の顧客は、HTTP 404 エラーが解決された後 HTTP 503 エラー: 〜32% のリクエストの ap-southeast-2, ~4% のリクエストの eu-west-1, ～2.5% のリクエストの us-west-2 と ap-southeast-1, および <1% すべての残りのグローバル地域におけるリクエスト. **ROOT CAUSE****(ルート キューズ)** このイベントは、プロキシ艦隊の1つにコード変更によってトリガーされました。 しかし、マニュアルや自動テストで検出されていないコード展開に不具合がありました。 これは、プロキシ層のテナントルックアップ機能の誤った構成につながり、有効なネットワークパスを持たないトラフィックにつながり、Western Europeと東南アジアAPAC地域のこれらのプロキシフリートを介して、HTTP 404エラーがすべての顧客のトラフィックに配信されるようになりました。 プロキシの層の影響が回復した後、いくつかのJiraとConfluence顧客に影響の2番目の期間が発生した。 プロキシ・フリートによるJiraとConfluenceのトラフィックの減少により、JiraとConfluenceのサービス・ティアは、顧客トラフィックを顧客に提供するサーバー数に自動的にスケールアップしました。 プロキシフリート機能が復元されたら、Jiraサービスティアを圧倒したトラフィックのサージは、自動的にスケールアウトするまでHTTP 503sの上昇率を返しました。 **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** リリース アウトエイジが生産性に影響を及ぼすのは知っています。 そこで、テストや予防プロセスがいくつかありますが、この特定の問題は特定されていませんでした。なぜなら、変更は、自動化された連続デプロイメントスイートと手動テストスクリプトによってピックアップされていない、非常に特定の種類のエッジケースに関連していました。 このタイプのインシデントを繰り返すのを防ぐため、次の改善措置を優先します。 -**さらなる展開保護を追加:** インパクトのあるプロキシ層の構成のための展開パイプラインは、レガシーシステムを使用しており、適切に設定された適切な遅い地域のロールアウト機能を持っていません。 既に正しい保護策を追加しており、デフォルトですべての安全制御が有効になっている当社の標準展開パイプラインにこれを移動しています。 また、すべてのネットワークサービスを監査し、新しい標準パイプラインの展開サービスにあることを検証しています。 - **サービス艦隊のスケーリングポリシーの強化:** JiraとConfluenceサービスのフリートのオートスケーリング設定は、あまりにも積極的にスケールアップするように構成されました。 複雑なJiraとConfluence自動スケーリングポリシーをすべて徹底的に見直し、更新し、これが再び発生しないことを保証します。 弊社では、この事件でサービスに影響を受けたお客様を誠意をもってお詫び申し上げます。当社は、プラットフォームのパフォーマンスと可用性を向上させるために、即時に手順を講じています。 お問い合わせ アトラスシアンカスタマーサポート

公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。

1. 2026年8月25日 8:42 UTCinvestigating

   当社は、Jira、JSM、Confluenceのメール、モバイル、スラック通知のレイテンシの増加によるパフォーマンス劣化のレポートを積極的に調査しています。 当社のチームは、問題の調査を行い、次の1時間以内に詳細情報を共有します.

2. 2026年8月25日 9:44 UTCinvestigating

   当社のチームは、影響を受けた地域を特定し、問題の緩和に積極的に取り組んでいます。 私たちは、共有する重要な進捗状況がある場合、時間内にさらにアップデートを提供します.

3. 2026年8月25日 10:49 UTCinvestigating

   私たちのチームは、影響を受けた地域の一つで問題を軽減し、いくつかの改善を観察するためにいくつかの是正措置をとっています。 今後も状況を監視し、事故が完全に回復するまでに必要な行動をとります。 今後2時間以内のアップデートを予定しております.

4. 2026年8月25日 13:01 UTCmonitoring

   私たちのチームは、問題を軽減し、いくつかの改善を観察しています。 今後も状況を監視し、事故が完全に回復するまでに必要な行動をとります。 今後2時間以内のアップデートを予定しております.

5. 2026年8月25日 14:33 UTCresolved

   2026年8月25日、一部のユーザーは、メール、モバイル、スラック通知でレイテンシが増加した経験があります。 問題は解決され、サービスはすべての顧客のために普通作動しています.

公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。

1. 2026年8月24日 19:22 UTCinvestigating

   JIRA、JSM、Confluenceのメール、モバイル、Slack 通知のレイテンシの増加によるパフォーマンス劣化のレポートを積極的に調査しています。 更新情報はこちらよりお知らせ致します.

2. 2026年8月24日 20:25 UTCinvestigating

   JIRA、JSM、Confluenceのメール、モバイル、Slackの通知に影響を及ぼすレイテンシーを調査し続けて3つのインパクトのある地域を特定しました.

3. 2026年8月24日 21:30 UTCidentified

   私たちは、問題の可能性のある原因を特定し、当社のチームは緩和に従事しています。 JIRA、JSM、Confluence のメール、モバイル、Slack 通知のレイテンシが増加する可能性があります。 今後も追加更新情報を公開してまいります.

4. 2026年8月24日 23:15 UTCresolved

   2026年8月24日、JIRA、JSM、Confluenceのユーザーは、Eメール、モバイル、Slackの通知でレイテンシが増加した結果、パフォーマンスの劣化を経験するかもしれません。 新しく作成した通知を解決し、通常はサービスが運用されています。 処理中の古い通知があり、次の数時間で完了すると予想されます.

公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。

1. 2026年8月21日 7:16 UTCidentified

   マーケットプレースアプリのマクロに影響を与える問題の根本的な原因を特定しました。 ユーザーは、正しくレンダリングしたり、エラーを表示したりしないマクロが発生することがあります。 当社のエンジニアリングチームは、根本的な原因を特定し、是正が進行中です。 今後60分程度のアップデートを予定しております.

2. 2026年8月21日 8:15 UTCidentified

   修正が特定され、現在展開されています。 ユーザーは、影響を受けたMarketPlace App - マクロを接続して、修正が完全に伝播されたら、正しくレンダリングを開始します。 次回2時間以内に順次アップデートを行います.

3. 2026年8月21日 10:10 UTCresolved

   2026年8月21日、0426 UTC と 09:33 UTC の間、一部のユーザーは、Confluence で正しくレンダリングされていないマクロの問題が発生することがあります。 問題は解決され、サービスはすべての顧客のために普通作動しています.

公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。

1. 2026年8月12日 20:11 UTCidentified

   Some Confluence Cloud users visiting public links saw a Something went wrong error page. The issue affected anonymous access paths for public links, and some related Confluence areas could also show the same error message.

2. 2026年8月12日 22:13 UTCresolved

   On August 12, 2026 some Confluence users utilizing anonymous access via public links, may have experienced a 'Something went wrong' error message. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026年7月6日 9:23 UTCinvestigating

   お客様のサービスに影響を及ぼす問題を調査しています。 原因を特定し、問題を解決するために積極的に取り組んでいます。 1時間以内に更新をいたします.

2. 2026年7月6日 10:04 UTCmonitoring

   私達に修理を適用し、回復を見ています。 オートメーション機能が復元され、正常に動作するはずです。 停電期間中に提出されたデータ処理リクエストは、サービス利用不能のため完了していません。 今後も状況を監視し、次の時間内に全回復を期待します。 次回1時間以降にアップデートを追加いたします.

3. 2026年7月6日 11:46 UTCinvestigating

   EU-Region では、ユーザー調査、ユーザーピッカー、アセットに関する問題が引き続き見られます。 今後も状況を調査し、次々に1時間早く追加更新を行います.

4. 2026年7月6日 12:25 UTCmonitoring

   問題を軽減し、回復を見るために修正を適用しました。 今後も状況を監視し、すぐに復旧する。 今後1時間以上前のアップデートを提供できるはずです.

5. 2026年7月6日 13:04 UTCresolved

   7 月 6 日 2026, 間に 06:51 UTC へ 09:39 UTC 一部のユーザーは、関連するオートメーションに関する問題を経験しているかもしれません, 間 08:10 UTC へ 11:50 UTC 一部のユーザーは、EU-Region のユーザー調査に関連するユーザー調査、ユーザー ピッカー、資産に関連した問題が発生する可能性があります. 問題は解決され、サービスはすべての顧客のために正常に動作しています.

6. 2026年7月17日 16:59 UTCpostmortem

   ## 概要 上 7 月 6, 2026, 間に 06:51 と 20:17 UTC, ヨーロッパのクラウド製品を使用してアトラスシアの顧客 (EU) 地域は、自動化ルールの実行に影響を与えるサービスの混乱を経験しました, ユーザ検索, ユーザーピッカー, 関連のワークフロー. 事件は、EU地域のコアアイデンティティサービスがデータベースの飽和を経験したときに始まり、レイテンシとエラー率を高めます。 回答者は、容量を回復するために働いたが、緊急の緩和は、アイデンティティエンドポイントへのアクセスから自動化ルールをブロックした。 並行して、高いアイデンティティレイテンシーは、ダウンストリームのユーザー検索サービスでカスケーディング障害に貢献し、複数の製品でユーザー検索とユーザーピッカーエクスペリエンスを劣化させます。 追加のデータベース読み取り容量を追加した後、サービスが進行的に復元され、緊急ブロックが削除され、ユーザ検索サービスは手動でスケールアップされました。 ## インパクト 事件は、7月6日のEU地域における複数のアトラスシアン製品に遭遇しました, 2026 間 06:51 と 20:17 UTC. -**Core Identityサービス劣化:**EU地域における製品全体で高い断続アクセス拒否率が観察された。 -**Automation ルールの実行失敗:** デフォルトのユーザー(Jira の自動化)を使用して自動化ルール、Jira サービス管理、および EU 地域の Jira 製品ディスカバリーが許可エラーで失敗しました。 -**ユーザー検索とユーザーピッカーの失敗:**ユーザー検索の成功率は、EU地域で大幅に低下し、ユーザーピッカー機能は、主に製品全体で利用できません。 ## 根本原因 最近の設定変更から始まり、コアアイデンティティサービスのキャッシュライフタイムを削減しました。 EU のワークデイ トラフィックが 2026 年 7 月 6 日を上回るにつれて、リクエストのより大きなシェアはキャッシュから提供されるのではなく、直接バックアップ データベースに到達しました。 EUデータベースは、増加した負荷を吸収するのに十分な地域容量がなかったし、データベースCPUは飽和に達し、断続的なアクセス拒否率が上昇しました。 緩和の一環として、飽和アイデンティティサービスデータベースへの負荷を削減し、コアアイデンティティサービスの復元を優先する緊急ブロックを適用しました。 この不正な防止された自動化ルールは、実行前のパーミッションチェックを通過し、失敗します。 延長期間は、主に処理限界回転による自動化ルールの故障の二次波によるものでした。 並行して、持続的な劣化により、これらのチェックに依存する製品間でレイテンシと断続的な失敗が増加し、下流のユーザー検索サービスのカスケーディング障害に貢献しました。 その結果、ユーザー検索とユーザーピッカー体験は、権限サービスが回復するまで、EU地域ではほとんど利用できなくなり、ユーザー検索サービスは容量を回復するためにスケールアップされました。 ## 是正措置計画と次のステップ お客様の生産性に影響を及ぼす可能性を秘めています。 アトラスシアンは、今後同様の事故を防ぐため、次の取り組みを推進しています。 - **影響力の高い緊急緩和のための保護策の改善:** オペレーション・ツールの強化により、顧客向けワークフローを無効にできる緩和手順は、追加のレビューが必要です。 - **堅実なアイデンティティのインフラ容量および変更の安全:** ピークトラフィック期間における飽和のリスクを削減し、設定変更のための評価プロセスを見直し、生産ロールアウト前に下流負荷の影響が評価されます。 - **上流の低下からのcascadingの失敗に対する強い弾性:** 監査のバックプレッシャー処理、回路ブレーカ構成、およびサービスにおける自動スケーリング動作、上流の劣化が、ユーザーの検索、ユーザーピッカー、および関連する経験に及ぼすより広範な製品への影響を引き起こすことはありません。 - **自動化ルールの故障のための再再生機構をハードン:** 自動化ルールのレジリエンスを高め、依存症に発生するインシデントに関連した影響を減らす。 お客さまにとって、重要な確実な製品ワークフローがいかに重要であるかを認識し、この事態に影響を及ぼしたお客様にお詫び申し上げます。 お問い合わせ アトラスシアンカスタマーサポート

公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。

1. 2026年6月16日 13:46 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is investigating degraded performance affecting your service. We are actively working to identify the cause and resolve the issue. We will provide further updates within one hour.

2. 2026年6月16日 14:28 UTCidentified

   We have identified the source of degraded performance affecting some Confluence Cloud users. A subset of users may experience errors or slowness when viewing or editing pages. Our team has initiated a remediation and is actively monitoring recovery. We will provide another update within one hour or once the issue is fully resolved.

3. 2026年6月16日 14:53 UTCmonitoring

   We have been able to apply the fix to mitigate the issue and we are seeing recovery. We continue to monitor the situation and should be fully recovered soon. We should be able to provide more updates in the next one hour or earlier.

4. 2026年6月16日 15:56 UTCresolved

   On June 16, 2026, Confluence Cloud users for some customers may have experienced performance degradation of view and edit page experiences. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 2026年6月23日 18:25 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary ### On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT ### The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ### ROOT CAUSE ### 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ### We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. We have already deployed the following fix: - Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: - Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. - Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年6月12日 7:39 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing experiencing degraded performance in Confluence Cloud affecting view page and edit page functionality. Our teams are actively investigating and will be sharing more updates in next 1 hour or sooner.

2. 2026年6月12日 8:45 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing degraded performance with view content, create and edit functionality on Confluence Cloud primarily in the EU region. Our teams are actively working to identify the root cause of the issue. We will share additional updates in next 2 hours or sooner as more information is available.

3. 2026年6月12日 10:29 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause of this issue and implemented a fix. We are beginning to observe signs of recovery, with some affected users regaining access to view, create, and edit content on Confluence Cloud. We will provide a further update within one hour, or sooner if we confirm full recovery for all affected customers.

4. 2026年6月12日 11:15 UTCresolved

   On June 12th 2026, between 07:04 to 11:06 UTC, some Confluence users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 2026年6月23日 18:28 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ‌ ### ROOT CAUSE ‌ 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ‌ ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ‌ We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. ‌ We have already deployed the following fix: * Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: * Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. * Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ ‌ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年6月10日 6:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating reports of extended delays being experienced across tasks such as processing of Incoming Emails, Notifications relating to changes or creation of Work Items, in addition to delays in processing Scheduled Triggers from Marketplace apps. Our team is looking into this with urgency and we will provide further update within one hour as our investigation continues.

2. 2026年6月10日 6:14 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause for this issue and has now deployed a fix that is rolling out across impacted products. At this time we are monitoring for the recovery of these events across Jira Service Management, Jira Cloud and Ecosystem app Scheduled Triggers. We will provide further update within one hour or when we have seen a full recovery of all task processing across these products.

3. 2026年6月10日 6:14 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has now determined that performance has returned to expected levels for those impacted by this incident. Additional products that are now known to have been impacted by this incident are Confluence, Customer Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery. These products would have seen similar impact where email notifications or processing of events may have been delayed while this incident was underway. We are now monitoring for the full recovery of performance across all products and will update when we are confident this issue is fully resolved, or within one hour, whichever is sooner.

4. 2026年6月10日 6:31 UTCresolved

   We are now confident that any of the tasks that were impacted by this incident and were delayed should now be operating as expected. We apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.

1. 2026年5月27日 6:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where customers attempting to view Calendars receive an error message on Confluence Cloud pages. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 2026年5月27日 7:06 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause and are in process of deploying a fix. We will share further updates in next 1 hours, or sooner if we have any meaningful developments to report.

3. 2026年5月27日 7:48 UTCresolved

   Between 00:50 UTC and 07:30 UTC on 27 May 2026, some users were facing errors when attempting to view Calendars in Confluence. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and this incident has been fully restored.

1. 2026年5月26日 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where some custom extensions may fail to load when editing Confluence Cloud pages. Affected users may see 'Error loading the extension!' messages or notice that certain macros are missing from the editor's extension selection menu. Viewing published pages is not affected. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 2026年5月26日 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating an issue affecting the editing macros in Confluence Cloud editor. Our team is working to identify the root cause. We will provide an update within approximately one hour.

3. 2026年5月26日 13:55 UTCresolved

   Between 08:30 UTC and 13:51 UTC on 26 May 2026, some users were unable to load or edit certain macros in the Confluence Cloud page editor. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and macro functionality has been fully restored.

1. 2026年5月14日 4:54 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue with multiple Atlassian products that is impacting a large number of Confluence and Jira Cloud customers. We are continuing to investigate and will add further details about additional impact as our investigation continues. We will provide more details within the next hour or sooner if further information becomes available

2. 2026年5月14日 5:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware that the current issues with accessing Atlassian products are impacting additional products. We have now expanded the impact of the incident to cover the known impacted products at this time. We will provide further update within one hour or sooner as information is available.

3. 2026年5月14日 5:11 UTCidentified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

4. 2026年5月14日 5:24 UTCidentified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

5. 2026年5月14日 5:34 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

6. 2026年5月14日 5:43 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

7. 2026年5月14日 6:40 UTCmonitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

8. 2026年5月14日 6:41 UTCmonitoring

   We are approaching full system recovery at this time, and are performing final confirmations that services are restored.

9. 2026年5月14日 6:48 UTCresolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

10. 2026年5月19日 19:04 UTCpostmortem

    ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 2026年5月8日 1:31 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 2026年5月8日 4:10 UTCidentified

   We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

3. 2026年5月8日 4:10 UTCidentified

   Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

4. 2026年5月8日 4:10 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

5. 2026年5月8日 5:53 UTCmonitoring

   The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

6. 2026年5月8日 8:03 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

7. 2026年5月8日 11:12 UTCmonitoring

   Our services are now fully operational. We continue to replay any events that were missed during the incident, and are making good progress. We will provide a further update once replays are complete. If you experience any ongoing issues, please contact our support team. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

8. 2026年5月8日 19:45 UTCresolved

   On May 8, 2026, some customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

9. 2026年5月20日 6:55 UTCpostmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support.

1. 2026年4月14日 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a partial service disruption affecting Rovo, specifically for customers using automation rules that invoke Rovo agents. Some customers may find that these automations are not completing as expected. We'll share updates here as more information becomes available.

2. 2026年4月14日 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified that this incident also affects automation rules in Confluence that use Rovo agents. We are investigating and will provide updates as we learn more.

3. 2026年4月14日 14:11 UTCidentified

   We have identified the issue, and our teams are working to resolve it and restore normal operations as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as they become available.

4. 2026年4月14日 15:46 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

5. 2026年4月14日 16:11 UTCresolved

   On April 14, 2026, affected users may have experienced some service disruption with automation rules that use Rovo agents. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026年4月13日 7:29 UTCmonitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 2026年4月13日 8:33 UTCmonitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 2026年4月13日 10:17 UTCresolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 2026年4月21日 2:33 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年4月8日 6:01 UTCinvestigating

   The impact of this incident is now understood to also be impacting search in Jira and Confluence, as well as additional downstream impacts to Rovo Chat, User Management, Administration and Guard. Our team is continuing to investigate with urgency and we will provide further update within 1 hour.

2. 2026年4月8日 6:25 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is aware that users are currently experiencing errors while attempting to search in Confluence and Jira. Our team is investigating with urgency and will be providing an update within 1 hour.

3. 2026年4月8日 7:40 UTCidentified

   Confluence and Jira search reliability is improving, and we expect full recovery shortly; we will continue to closely monitor the services to ensure they remain stable.

4. 2026年4月8日 8:33 UTCidentified

   We have restored core search functionality and services are operating again, but some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour while new data continues to be indexed. We are actively working to complete reindexing and will update this page as performance fully recovers.

5. 2026年4月8日 9:03 UTCidentified

   We are also aware of impact as a result of these search failures to Customer Service Management, Asset Reports, Jira Service Management and dashboards within Focus. Our team have identified the potential root cause of the issue and our teams are working with urgency on a resolution. We will provide further update within 1 hour.

6. 2026年4月8日 9:03 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally. Some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour, while new data continues to be indexed. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

7. 2026年4月8日 11:43 UTCresolved

   The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

8. 2026年4月17日 16:24 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. A configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high‑density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers. The root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC. ### **IMPACT** During the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period. Impacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context. **Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions. **Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue. **Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC. **Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC. **Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC. ### **ROOT CAUSE** Atlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. An infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \(CPU & Memory\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products. The change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst‑affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: * **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types** Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly. * **Strengthen automated pre‑deploy validation for resource changes** Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads. * **Improve post‑deploy verification and alerting** Enhance monitoring and post‑deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod‑IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out. * **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits** Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts. * **Enhance recovery automation** Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年3月12日 13:38 UTCinvestigating

   Confluence Cloud users may experience errors when accessing certain Marketplace macros. Affected customers are seeing the message Error rendering macro 'static-macro': Page loading failed. Our team is actively investigating this issue. We will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner.

2. 2026年3月12日 13:38 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the cause of this issue, and a fix is currently being deployed. We are monitoring the deployment, and we will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner if needed.

3. 2026年3月13日 0:26 UTCresolved

   On March 12, 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026年3月10日 0:15 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of customers experiencing delays with their automations within Jira, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Jira Product Discovery and Confluence. Our team is investigating with urgency and we will provide an update within one hour.

2. 2026年3月10日 0:15 UTCidentified

   Our team has now identified the cause of this issue relating to delayed automation events and has put a hotfix in place to help restore automation performance. We will continue to monitor performance as the backlog of issues is now being processed.

3. 2026年3月10日 0:51 UTCmonitoring

   The performance degradation of automations has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. 2026年3月10日 0:59 UTCresolved

   On 9 March UTC, Automation users in the APAC region may have experienced performance degradation within Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Confluence. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026年2月20日 4:14 UTCidentified

   Customers using Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours as we continue our investigation.

2. 2026年2月20日 12:26 UTCidentified

   We understand that customers using Customer Service Management, Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours or sooner based on significant progress.

3. 2026年2月20日 12:26 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved and all services are functional.