Jira Work Management の障害履歴

1. 2026年9月1日 9:12 UTCinvestigating

   Jira Work アイテムの移行に影響を与える問題を認識しています。 問題の移行を試みるときに、失敗したユーザーはエラーが発生する可能性があります。 私たちのチームは、根本的な原因を積極的に調査しています。 資料更新がある場合、60分以降に次の更新を行います.

2. 2026年9月1日 10:11 UTCmonitoring

   Jira Work アイテムの移行に影響を及ぼす問題の根本原因を特定し、修正を加えました。 現在、復旧の兆候が見られ、引き続き監視を続けていきます。 次の1時間、または材料の更新がある場合、次のアップデートを提供します.

3. 2026年9月1日 11:44 UTCresolved

   9 月 1 日 2026, 間に 04:22 UTC へ 10:59 UTC, 一部の Jira のユーザーは、経験豊富なサービス混乱を経験することができます. 問題は解決され、サービスはすべての顧客のために普通作動しています.

公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。

1. 2026年8月7日 1:33 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation affecting JIRA and JSM. Affected users may experience errors viewing issues and boards. We will share updates here as more information is available.

2. 2026年8月7日 1:39 UTCmonitoring

   The performance degradation of JIRA has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

3. 2026年8月7日 1:46 UTCresolved

   On August 7, 2026, JIRA, JWM, and JSM users may have experienced performance degradation when viewing issues and boards. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026年6月1日 8:06 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating cases of partial-outage for Jira-software in the EU Region. We will provide more details within the next hour.

2. 2026年6月1日 8:06 UTCidentified

   We have identified an issue causing degraded performance for Jira Software, Jira Work Management, and Jira Service Management in the EU region. affected users may experience 5XX errors when accessing issues, boards, and navigation. Our engineering team is actively working on a resolution. We will provide an update within the next hour.

3. 2026年6月1日 9:07 UTCmonitoring

   We have implemented a fix for the issue causing degraded performance for Jira Software and Jira Service Management in the EU region. The impact has been mitigated, and we are actively monitoring the stability.

4. 2026年6月1日 13:23 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved. The issue causing degraded performance for Jira Software and Jira Service Management in the EU region has been fully mitigated. We have deployed a fix to prevent recurrence. If you continue to experience issues, please contact Atlassian Support. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

5. 2026年6月12日 6:49 UTCpostmortem

   **SUMMARY** On June 01, 2026, between 06:54 and 08:28 UTC, Atlassian customers using Jira, Jira Service Management, and Jira Work Management were unable to view issues, boards, and backlogs, and experienced errors when performing transitions, adding comments, and navigating the product. The event was triggered by caching infrastructure autoscaling failure. The issue only impacted customers hosted in Europe. The incident was detected within 8 minutes by our automated monitoring system and mitigated by progressively scaling the caching clusters manually. The total time to resolution was 1 hour and 34 minutes due to the progressive recovery. **IMPACT** The incident caused service disruption for customers hosted in the Europe region who were unable to access core experiences across Jira Software, Jira Service Management, and Jira Work Management. **ROOT CAUSE** The root cause of the incident was a capacity constraint on our caching infrastructure in one availability zone of our EU Central cloud region. As morning traffic increased, our caching clusters attempted to scale out automatically. However, the cloud infrastructure was unable to provision additional nodes in that availability zone due to insufficient underlying capacity. Our caching infrastructure is designed to scale across multiple availability zones to ensure balanced and resilient capacity. On this occasion, a capacity constraint in one availability zone prevented the scaling operation from completing as expected. With the caching layer unable to grow to meet demand, the clusters began to experience network and/or CPU saturation and could not handle all incoming requests within the expected timeout window. Since a single user request to Jira typically involves multiple cache calls, timeouts compound rapidly. As more threads became blocked waiting on timed-out or slow cache operations, the application nodes reached its busy thread limit and began shedding load. While additional application nodes were added, these also experienced the same thread limit saturation due to the saturation of the cache layer resulting in widespread 503 service unavailable errors for customers. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. In addition to existing safeguards and monitoring, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: - **Increased minimum caching cluster size**: We have increased the minimum number of nodes in all affected caching clusters in the EU Central region. This ensures sufficient capacity headroom to handle peak traffic without relying on autoscaling, reducing the risk of a similar failure occurring. - **Change autoscaling behaviour**: We are working on improvements to our autoscaling behaviour to fall back to other availability zones when capacity is unavailable in a single zone. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年5月14日 5:11 UTCidentified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

2. 2026年5月14日 5:24 UTCidentified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

3. 2026年5月14日 5:34 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

4. 2026年5月14日 5:43 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

5. 2026年5月14日 6:40 UTCmonitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

6. 2026年5月14日 6:41 UTCmonitoring

   We are approaching full system recovery at this time, and are performing final confirmations that services are restored.

7. 2026年5月14日 6:48 UTCresolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

8. 2026年5月19日 19:08 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 2026年5月8日 1:31 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 2026年5月8日 4:10 UTCidentified

   We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

3. 2026年5月8日 4:10 UTCidentified

   Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

4. 2026年5月8日 4:10 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

5. 2026年5月8日 5:53 UTCmonitoring

   The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

6. 2026年5月8日 8:03 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

7. 2026年5月8日 11:12 UTCmonitoring

   Our services are now fully operational. We continue to replay any events that were missed during the incident, and are making good progress. We will provide a further update once replays are complete. If you experience any ongoing issues, please contact our support team. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

8. 2026年5月8日 19:45 UTCresolved

   On May 8, 2026, some customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

9. 2026年5月20日 6:51 UTCpostmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support.

1. 2026年5月6日 3:18 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating reports of users unable to log time while on business board. Our engineering teams are actively investigating and working to resolve the issue. We will provide more updates in next 1 hour.

2. 2026年5月6日 4:16 UTCidentified

   Our engineering teams have identified the cause and are in process of deploying a fix. We will share further updates in next 3 hours, or sooner if we have any meaningful developments to report.

3. 2026年5月6日 6:39 UTCresolved

   The issue causing Jira users inability to log time on business board has been resolved. A fix was deployed to address the problem and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026年5月2日 0:55 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an incident affecting Jira Software (viewBoard, viewIssue, createIssue). Our team is working to identify the cause and restore service to normal levels. We will provide the next update within 60 minutes.

2. 2026年5月2日 1:38 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting the issue viewing experience in Jira. This is also impacting the accessibility of support tickets. We will share updates here as more information becomes available.

3. 2026年5月2日 2:00 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting the Work Item viewing experience in Jira. This is also impacting the accessibility of support tickets. We will share updates here as more information becomes available.

4. 2026年5月2日 2:48 UTCresolved

   The Jira Work Item View experience has been restored to normal service. Our teams are continuing to investigate the root cause affecting this issue. We will provide more details once we identify the root cause

5. 2026年5月14日 19:44 UTCpostmortem

   ### SUMMARY ### Between May 1, 2026 at 23:34 UTC and May 2, 2026 at 02:53 UTC Atlassian customers using Jira and Jira Service Management (JSM) across all Cloud tenants received an error page when attempting to open a work item due to a schema incompatibility, and editing work item fields was degraded for both products. Navigating to and interacting with boards were degraded for Jira specifically. On Jira mobile, users were unable to view work items and work item search was degraded. This was caused by a deployment of a schema configuration change that had only been validated against some production environments. The issue also affected Atlassian's customer support operations and temporarily impacted Atlassian’s ability to respond to incoming support requests. Customers were able to raise tickets as usual. Atlassian’s automated monitoring systems detected the issue on May 1, 2026 at 23:41 UTC, and engineering teams promptly began investigating. The issue was reported on Statuspage on May 2, 2026 at 00:55 UTC. The issue was resolved after 3 hours and 19 minutes on May 2, 2026 at 02:53 UTC when the previous version of the schema configuration was successfully redeployed to all regions. ### IMPACT ### - **Duration**: 3 hours 19 minutes (May 1, 2026 at 23:34 UTC – May 2, 2026 at 02:53 UTC) - **Affected regions**: All regions. - **Affected products**: Jira, JSM, Jira Mobile - **Customer experience**: - Users were unable to view work items using the work item view; consequently updating and creating work items from the work item view was affected. - Editing work items was degraded. - Boards did not show under Spaces in the Jira navigation. - Certain board interactions were affected. - Other areas of Jira not dependent on the broken schema configuration continued to operate normally. ### ### ROOT CAUSE ### The root cause was a deployment sequencing issue. A schema configuration change was deployed to the API gateway layer before the corresponding application-level change had been deployed across all production environments. This created a mismatch between the schema expected by the gateway and the schema served by the application servers. ### ### MITIGATIONS ### The engineering team identified the problematic schema change and initiated a rollback of the deployment. A deployment blocker was put in place to prevent further changes while the rollback was executed. The previous version of the schema configuration was redeployed, and service was restored across all regions. ### ### REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN & NEXT STEPS ### We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: - We are adding automated pre-deployment checks to verify that schema configurations are compatible across all production environments before changes are deployed. - We will streamline our incident communication processes, incident response training and tooling to reduce the time between incident detection and customer notification. - We are working to improve resilience of critical customer-facing support services to ensure SLA continuity during outages. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 2026年4月14日 12:12 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a partial service disruption affecting Rovo, specifically for customers using automation rules that invoke Rovo agents. Some customers may find that these automations are not completing as expected. We'll share updates here as more information becomes available.

2. 2026年4月14日 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified that this incident also affects automation rules in Confluence that use Rovo agents. We are investigating and will provide updates as we learn more.

3. 2026年4月14日 14:11 UTCidentified

   We have identified the issue, and our teams are working to resolve it and restore normal operations as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as they become available.

4. 2026年4月14日 15:46 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

5. 2026年4月14日 16:11 UTCresolved

   On April 14, 2026, affected users may have experienced some service disruption with automation rules that use Rovo agents. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026年4月13日 7:29 UTCmonitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 2026年4月13日 8:33 UTCmonitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 2026年4月13日 10:17 UTCresolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 2026年4月21日 2:34 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026年3月10日 0:06 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of customers experiencing delays with their automations within Jira, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Jira Product Discovery and Confluence. Our team is investigating with urgency and we will provide an update within one hour.

2. 2026年3月10日 0:15 UTCidentified

   Our team has now identified the cause of this issue relating to delayed automation events and has put a hotfix in place to help restore automation performance. We will continue to monitor performance as the backlog of issues is now being processed.

3. 2026年3月10日 0:51 UTCmonitoring

   The performance degradation of automations has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. 2026年3月10日 0:59 UTCresolved

   On 9 March UTC, Automation users in the APAC region may have experienced performance degradation within Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Confluence. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2025年12月27日 4:42 UTCmonitoring

   We have taken steps to mitigate the issue and are seeing recovery in the affected services. Our teams will continue to closely monitor the situation and are actively working to confirm that all services are fully restored. We will provide further updates as we make additional progress.

2. 2025年12月27日 5:20 UTCresolved

   We have successfully mitigated the incident and all affected services are now fully operational. Our teams have verified that normal functionality has been restored across all areas. Thank you for your patience and understanding while we worked to resolve this issue.

3. 2026年1月30日 4:10 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On **December 27, 2025**, between **02:48 UTC and 05:20 UTC**, some Atlassian cloud customers experienced failures in sending and receiving emails and mobile notifications. Core Jira and Confluence functionality remained available. The issue was triggered when **TLS certificates used by Atlassian’s monitoring infrastructure expired**, causing parts of our metrics pipeline to stop accepting traffic. Services responsible for email and mobile notifications had a critical path dependency on monitoring path leading to service disruptions. All impacted services were fully restored by **05:20 UTC**, around **2.5 hours** after customer impact began. ### IMPACT During the impact window, customers experienced: * **Outbound product email failures** \(notifications and other product emails did not send\). * **Identity and account flow failures** where emails were required \(e.g. sign‑ups, password resets, one‑time‑password / step‑up challenges\). * **Jira and Confluence mobile push notifications** * **Customer site activations and some admin policy changes** failing and requiring later reprocessing. ### ROOT CAUSE The incident was caused by: 1. **Expired TLS certificates** on domains used by our monitoring and metrics infrastructure caused by **misconfigured DNS authorization record** which prevented automatic renewal. 2. **Tight coupling of services to metrics publishing**, which caused them to fail when monitoring endpoints became unavailable, instead of degrading gracefully. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS We recognize that outages like this have a direct impact on customers’ ability to receive important notifications, complete account tasks, and operate their sites. We are prioritizing the following actions to improve our existing testing, monitoring and certificate management processes: * **Hardening monitoring and certificate infrastructure** * We are refining DNS and certificate configuration across our monitoring domains and strengthening proactive checks to detect and address failed renewals and certificate issues well before expiry. * We are also improving alerting on our monitoring and metrics pipeline. * **Decoupling monitoring from critical customer flows** We are updating services such as outbound email, identity, mobile push, provisioning, and admin policy changes so they no longer depend on metrics publishing to operate. If monitoring becomes unavailable, these services will continue to run and degrade gracefully by dropping or buffering metrics instead of failing customer operations. We apologize to customers impacted during this incident. We are implementing the improvements above to help ensure that similar issues are avoided. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2025年12月15日 16:26 UTCidentified

   We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation affecting Admin Hub, Atlassian Analytics, Confluence Cloud, Focus, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, and Rovo. We'll share updates here as more information is available.

2. 2025年12月15日 16:47 UTCidentified

   We have identified the cause of the issue, and our teams are diligently working on mitigations. We're currently seeing signs of improvements. We'll continue to share additional updates here in 60 minutes or as more information becomes available.

3. 2025年12月15日 17:47 UTCidentified

   Our teams are continuing to implement mitigations. Error rates have decreased across all products and we are seeing improvements. We will continue to provide updates here in 60 minutes or as more information becomes available.

4. 2025年12月15日 19:02 UTCresolved

   On December 15th, 2025, Admin Hub, Atlassian Analytics, Confluence Cloud, Ecosystem, Focus, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, and Rovo users in the prod-us-east region may have experienced performance degradations and errors on the web page and mobile apps. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2025年12月1日 17:24 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an incident affecting Jira Work Management, Jira, and Jira Service Management. We will provide updates via Statuspage shortly. The ability to view issues and boards is experiencing degraded performance for some users. Customers may notice a slowdown in accessing these functionalities.

2. 2025年12月1日 18:26 UTCinvestigating

   We are still investigating an issue with functionality that is mainly affected by Sandboxes and impacting some Jira Work Management, Jira Service Management, and Jira Cloud customers. We will provide more details within 2 hours.

3. 2025年12月1日 18:26 UTCresolved

   Impact Jira Software users experienced degraded performance affecting their ability to view issues and boards. Users may have encountered an error or slowdown during this time. Current Status The situation is currently mitigated due to actions taken on the affected systems, leading to a stabilization of services. Next Steps The team is actively monitoring the systems.

1. 2025年11月15日 21:36 UTCidentified

   We are currently experiencing issues due to timeouts when refreshing OAuth tokens from Microsoft. This has impacted authentication for some users. In the last 30 minutes, we have observed a reduction in timeout errors and signs of recovery. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused and appreciate your patience as we work towards a full resolution. We will continue to keep you updated on our progress.

2. 2025年11月15日 21:36 UTCmonitoring

   We were experiencing issues due to timeouts when refreshing OAuth tokens from Microsoft. This affected authentication for some users. After scaling our internal services, we have observed a reduction in timeout errors with reliability metrics returning to normal. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

3. 2025年11月17日 11:50 UTCresolved

   The issue has been resolved. All systems are healthy and fully operational, with no further problems observed in sending emails from Jira.

1. 2025年10月27日 16:33 UTCinvestigating

   Impact Jira Software users are experiencing service degradation in viewIssue and createIssue. This issue affects multiple regions, with noticeable impacts on user functionalities across these experiences. This is potentially affecting Jira Service Management and Jira Work Management. Next Steps - The team is investigating and further communications will be provided in 60 minutes.

2. 2025年10月27日 17:50 UTCresolved

   Between 15:09 UTC to 17:16 UTC, some customers experienced partial outage for Jira Work Management, Jira Service Management, and Jira viewIssue, createIssue and editIssue caused by a faulty code rollout. We have deployed a fix to mitigate the issue and have verified that the services have recovered. The root cause is still being investigated and will be provided in the post incident review. The conditions that cause the errors are being addressed and we're actively working on a permanent fix. The issue has been resolved and the services are operating normally.

1. 2025年10月20日 7:56 UTCinvestigating

   We have noticed that Atlassian Cloud services are impacted and our teams are actively investigating the same. We shall keep you informed of the progress every hour.

2. 2025年10月20日 8:24 UTCinvestigating

   Atlassian Cloud services are impacted and we are aware that our customers might not be able to create support tickets. Our teams are actively investigating the same. We shall keep you informed of the progress every hour.

3. 2025年10月20日 9:24 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing an outage due to some issue at the end of our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to get this resolved or mitigated as quickly as possible. ETA of the same is not know at the moment. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

4. 2025年10月20日 9:58 UTCidentified

   We understand that our public cloud provider has identified the cause of the issue. We are starting to see some recovery and is working towards mitigation. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

5. 2025年10月20日 11:06 UTCidentified

   We continue to work with our public cloud provider towards mitigating the issue at the earliest. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

6. 2025年10月20日 12:06 UTCidentified

   Atlassian team is actively engaged and continues to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue at the earliest. We are starting to see partial operations succeed. We appreciate your patience. We shall continue to share updates every hour, if not sooner.

7. 2025年10月20日 13:58 UTCidentified

   Our public cloud provider is working to mitigate this issue quickly. We are seeing some early positive indicators and are continuing to monitor. We appreciate your patience and will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner.

8. 2025年10月20日 14:03 UTCidentified

   We understand your pain and mitigating or fixing this issue is of utmost importance. Our public cloud provider is actively working to mitigate this issue on priority. We have been seeing partial operational success. We appreciate your patience and will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner.

9. 2025年10月20日 16:35 UTCidentified

   Update - Thank you for your continued patience. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority. Our public cloud provider is still actively working to mitigate this issue with urgency and while we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will be providing hourly updates on this issue.

10. 2025年10月20日 17:27 UTCidentified

    Update - We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority. Our public cloud provider is actively working to mitigate this issue with urgency. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner as new information becomes available.

11. 2025年10月20日 17:43 UTCidentified

    We are currently aware of an ongoing incident impacting Atlassian Cloud services due to an outage with our public cloud provider, AWS. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority and we are closely monitoring the health of AWS services. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation. We will continue to provide updates every hour or sooner as new information becomes available.

12. 2025年10月20日 18:38 UTCmonitoring

    There have been no changes since our last update. We will provide our next updated by 9:00PM UTC or sooner as new information becomes available. We are currently aware of an ongoing incident impacting Atlassian Cloud services due to an outage with our public cloud provider, AWS. We understand the impact this issue is having on your operations and want to assure you that resolving this matter is our highest priority and we are closely monitoring the health of AWS services. While we do not have a definitive ETA at this time, we remain committed to full resolution and deeply appreciate your patience as we work through this situation.

13. 2025年10月20日 21:26 UTCmonitoring

    Monitoring - We've started seeing continued product experience improvement. While we still have a backlog of event processing, we are seeing improvements in systems operational capabilities across all products. We estimate a significant improvement with the next few hours and will continue to monitor the health of AWS services and the effects on Atlassian customers. We appreciate your continued patience and remain committed to full resolution as we work through this situation. We will post our next update in two hours.

14. 2025年10月20日 22:58 UTCmonitoring

    Our teams are continuing to monitor the recovery of systems across Atlassian products. This update is to inform that the Atlassian Support portal is fully operational at this time for customers that wish to contact support.

15. 2025年10月21日 0:03 UTCmonitoring

    Our team is now seeing recovery across all impacted Atlassian products. We are continuing to monitor for individual products that may still be processing backlogged items now that services are restored. The Atlassian Support portal is currently still displaying a message directing customers to our temporary support channel. Please note that our support portal is currently fully functional for those attempting to raise requests. We are continuing to look into this alert to remove this message. We will provide further update on our recovery status in one hour.

16. 2025年10月21日 1:07 UTCmonitoring

    We continue to see recovery progressing across all impacted products as backlogged items continue to be processed. The Atlassian Support portal is currently displaying a message directing customers to our temporary support channel. Please note that our support portal is currently fully functional for those attempting to raise requests. We are continuing to look into this alert to remove this message. We will provide further update on our recovery status in two hours.

17. 2025年10月21日 3:24 UTCmonitoring

    The issue relating to the Atlassian Support portal displaying a message to customers to use our temporary support channel has now been resolved. The Atlassian Support portal is fully functional for any ongoing support issues. With regards to other Atlassian products, we continue to see recovery continuing across all impacted products and our teams are continuing to monitor as the recovery continues. We will provide further update on our recovery status within two hours.

18. 2025年10月21日 5:24 UTCresolved

    Our team is now able to see full recovery across the vast majority of Atlassian products. We are aware of some ongoing issues with specific components such as migrations and JSM virtual service agents, and our team is continuing to investigate with urgency. We apologise for the inconvenience that this incident has caused and we will provide further information when the Post Incident Investigation has been completed.

19. 2025年10月24日 17:52 UTCpostmortem

    ### Postmortem publish date: Nov 19th, 2025 ### Summary All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. Customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 04:05. The service disruptions were triggered due to an [AWS DynamoDB outage](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=1%3A50%20PM.-,DynamoDB,-Between%2011%3A48) and further affected by subsequent failures in [AWS EC2](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) and [AWS Network Load Balancer](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/#:~:text=service%20disruption%20event.-,Amazon%20EC2,-Between%2011%3A48) within the us-east-1 region. The incident started at Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and was detected within six minutes by our automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore all core services by Oct 21, 2025 04:05. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues was completed on Oct 22, 2025. We recognize the critical role our products play in your daily operations, and we offer our sincere apologies for any impact this incident had on your teams. We are taking immediate steps to enhance the reliability and performance of our services, so that you continue to receive the standard of service you have come to trust. ### IMPACT Before examining product-level impacts, it's helpful to understand Atlassian's service topology and internal dependencies. Products such as Jira and Confluence are deployed across multiple AWS regions. The data for each tenant is stored and processed exclusively within its designated host region. This design is intentional and represents the desired operational state, as it limits the impact of any regional outage strictly to tenants in-region, in this case us-east-1. While in-scope application data is pinned to the region selected by the customer, there are times when systems need to call other internal services that may be based in a different region. If a problem occurs in the main region where these services operate, systems are designed to automatically fail over to a backup region, usually within three minutes. However, if unexpected issues arise during this failover, it can take longer to restore services. In rare cases, this could affect customers in more than one region. It’s important to note that all in-scope application data for supported products is pinned according to a customer’s chosen region. **Jira** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 20:00, customers with tenants hosted in the us-east-1 region experienced increased error rates when accessing core entities such as Issues, Boards, and Backlogs. This disruption was caused by AWS's inability to allocate AWS EC2 instances and elevated errors in AWS Network Load Balancer \(NLB\). During this window, users may also have observed intermittent timeouts, slow page loads, and failures when performing operations like creating or updating issues, loading board views, and executing workflow transitions. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced elevated failure rates when attempting to load Jira pages. This disruption was caused by the regional frontend service entering an unhealthy state during this specific time interval. Normally, the frontend service connects to the primary AWS DynamoDB instance located in the us-east-1 to retrieve the most recent configuration data necessary for proper operation. Additionally, the service is designed with a fallback mechanism that references static configuration data in the event that the primary database becomes inaccessible. Unfortunately, a latent bug existed in the local fallback path. When the frontend service nodes restarted, they were unable to load critical operational configuration data from primary or fallback sources, leading to the observed failures experienced by customers. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 06:30, customers experienced significant delays and missing Jira in-app notifications across all regions. The notification ingestion service, which is hosted exclusively in us-east-1, exhibited an increased failure rate when processing notification messages due to AWS EC2 and NLB issues. This issue resulted in notifications being delayed - and in some cases, not delivered at all - to users worldwide. **Jira Service Management \(JSM\)** JSM was impacted similarly to Jira above, with the same timeframes and for the same reasons. Between Oct 20, 2025 08:36 and Oct 20, 2025 09:23, customers across all regions experienced significantly elevated failure rates when attempting to load JSM pages. This affected all JSM experiences including the Help Centre, Portal, Queues, Work Items, Operations, and Alerts. **Confluence** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 21, 2025 02:45, customers using Confluence in the us-east-1 region experienced elevated failure rates when performing common operations such as editing pages or adding comments. The primary cause of this service degradation was the system's inability to auto-scale due to AWS EC2 issues to manage peak traffic load effectively. Though the AWS outage ended at Oct 20, 21:09, a subset of customers continued to experience failures as some Confluence web server nodes across multiple clusters remained in an unhealthy state. This was ultimately mitigated by recycling the affected nodes. To protect our systems while AWS recovered, we made a deliberate decision to enable node termination protection. This action successfully preserved our server capacity but, as a trade-off, it extended the time required for a full recovery once AWS services were restored. **Automation** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 23:59, automation customers whose rules are processed in us-east-1 experienced delays of up to 23 hours in rule execution. During this window, some events triggering rule executions were processed out of order because they arrived later during backlog processing. This caused potential inconsistencies in workflow executions, as rules were run in the order events were received, not when the action causing the event occurred. Additionally, some rule actions failed because they depend on first-party and third-party systems, which were also affected by the AWS outage. Customers can see most of these failures in their audit logs; however, a few updates were not logged due to the nature of the outage. By Oct 21, 2025 5:30, the backlog of rule runs in us-east-1 was cleared. Although most of these delayed rules were successfully handled, there were some additional replays of events to ensure completeness. Our investigation confirmed that a few events may never have triggered their associated rules due to the outage. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:55 and Oct 20, 2025 11:20, all non-us-east-1 regional automation services experienced delays of up to 4 hours in rule execution. This was caused by an upstream service that was unable to deliver events as expected. The delivery service encountered a failure due to a cross-region dependency call to a service hosted in the us-east-1 region. Because of this dependency issue, the delivery service was unable to successfully deliver events throughout this time frame, resulting in customer-defined rules not being executed in a timely manner. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:33, Bitbucket experienced intermittent unavailability across core services. During this period, users faced increased error rates and latency when signing in, navigating repositories, and performing essential actions such as creating, updating, or approving pull requests. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage that impacted downstream services. Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 22:46, numerous Bitbucket Pipeline steps failed to start, stalled mid-execution, or experienced significant queueing delays. Impact varied, with partial recoveries followed by degradation as downstream components re-synchronized. The primary cause was an AWS DynamoDB outage, compounded by instability in AWS EC2 instance availability and AWS Network Load Balancers. Furthermore, Bitbucket Pipelines continued to experience a low but persistent rate of step timeouts and scheduling errors due to AWS bare-metal capacity shortages in select availability zones. Atlassian coordinated with AWS to provision additional bare-metal hosts and addressed a significant backlog of pending pods, successfully restoring services by 01:30 on Oct 21, 2025. **Trello** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 15:25, users of Trello experienced widespread service degradation and intermittent failures due to upstream AWS issues affecting multiple components, including AWS DynamoDB and subsequent AWS EC2 capacity constraints. During this period, customers reported elevated error rates when loading boards, opening cards, adding comments or attachments. **Login** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, a small subset of users experienced failures when attempting to initiate new login sessions using SAML tokens. This resulted in an inability for those users to access Atlassian products during that time period. However, users who already had valid active sessions were not affected by this issue and continued to have uninterrupted access. The issue impacted all regions globally because regional identity services relied on a write replica located in the us-east-1 region to synchronize profile data. When the primary region became unavailable, the failover to a secondary database in another region failed, which delayed recovery. This failover defect has since been addressed. **Statuspage** Between Oct 20, 2025 06:48 and Oct 20, 2025 09:30, Statuspage customers who were not already logged in to the management portal were unable to log in to create or update incident statuses. This impact was restricted only to users who were not already logged in at the time. The root cause was the same as described in the Login section above, and it was resolved by the same remediation steps. ### REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN & NEXT STEPS We have completed the following critical actions designed to help prevent cross-region impact from similar issues: * Resolved the code defect in the fallback option to ensure that Jira Frontend Services in other regions remain unaffected during a region-wide outage. * Fixed the issue that prevented timely failover of the identity service which impacted new login sessions. * Resolved the code defect so that delivery services in unaffected regions remain operational during region-wide outages. Additionally, we are prioritizing the following improvement actions: * Implement mitigation strategies to strengthen resilience against region-wide outages in the notification ingestion service. Although disruptions to our cloud services are sometimes unavoidable during outages of the underlying cloud provider, we continuously evaluate and improve test coverage to strengthen resilience of our cloud services against these issues. We recognize the critical importance of our products to your daily operations and overall productivity, and we extend our sincere apologies for any disruptions this incident may have caused your teams. If you were impacted and require additional details for internal post-incident reviews, please reach out to your Atlassian support representative with affected timeframes and tenant identifiers so we can correlate logs and provide guidance. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2025年10月15日 13:43 UTCinvestigating

   UI based Customer interactions are currently degraded and our team is actively investigating the same. We shall keep you informed of the progress in next 2 hours.

2. 2025年10月15日 14:34 UTCinvestigating

   Atlassian team is actively investigating the issue with UI based Customer interactions. Existing automation rules continue to run without any issue. Accessing automation rules and creating new automation rules could lead to intermittent failures. We shall keep you informed of the progress in next 2 hours, if not sooner.

3. 2025年10月15日 15:26 UTCmonitoring

   We have recovered from a issue which saw degraded Automation experience. Impact Some Customers using Jira, Confluence, and Jira Service Management were not able to create or update Automation rules, and some Automation rules which triggered webhooks might have been throttled and require re-running. Current Status The incident has been mitigated and we continue to investigate the cause of this incident Next Steps We are continuing to monitor the service, and will provide further updates in the next two hours

4. 2025年10月15日 16:16 UTCresolved

   Between 14:00 UTC to 16:00 UTC, we experienced automation rule functionality degradation for Confluence, Jira Work Management, Jira Service Management, and Jira. Impact Some customers using Jira, Confluence, and Jira Service Management were not able to create or update Automation rules, and some Automation rules which triggered webhooks might have been throttled and require re-running. Approximately 50 percent of Automation API calls were affected in the us-east-1 region with customers receiving 429 status codes. Current Status The incident has been mitigated by increasing the API Gateway rate limit service quota and disabling the internal service that was causing high traffic volume. Next Steps We are conducting a root cause analysis of the internal service. A post incident review will be conducted.

1. 2025年9月22日 5:38 UTCidentified

   Our team is continuing to monitor Jira and Confluence products following the earlier issues relating to an erroneous certificate change. We are assessing all impacted products to ensure that services are fully restored and we will provide further update within the hour.

2. 2025年9月22日 5:59 UTCidentified

   Our team is performing an investigation into all Atlassian products and services to understand the full impact of the prior certificate changes that caused this incident. While many services are restored we are continuing to monitor for additional impacted service issues that customers may be experiencing.

3. 2025年9月22日 6:55 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has investigated and enabled configuration changes which should be restoring services across all impacted products starting at 06:17AM UTC. We are monitoring for recovery across all products and services at this time, and will provide further update when available.

4. 2025年9月22日 7:17 UTCresolved

   A configuration change to our CDN configuration for the atlassian.net domain resulted in customer traffic temporarily being dropped. This was immediately identified by our monitoring systems and rolled back. A public PIR with full details will be issued as a follow up.

5. 2025年10月1日 6:21 UTCpostmortem

   ### **SUMMARY** On September 22, 2025, between 04:38 and 04:48 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced connection errors preventing access to their [atlassian.net](http://atlassian.net/) sites. Some customers observed intermittent errors as services gradually recovered until 06:17 UTC. The event was triggered by a faulty configuration change to our Content Delivery Network \(CDN\). The change included an invalid hostname which prevented customers from successfully connecting to [atlassian.net](http://atlassian.net/) domains. The incident was detected within 1 minute by our monitoring systems and mitigated by rolling back the change, which put Atlassian systems into a known good state. The acute impact was resolved in 10 minutes and all lingering errors resolved in 1 hour 38 minutes. ### **IMPACT** The acute impact occurred on September 22, 2025, between 04:38 UTC and 04:48 UTC to Confluence, Compass and Jira, including Jira Service Management. The incident caused service disruption to customers when they attempted to load those products in their browser or interact with APIs. Between 04:48 UTC and 06:17 UTC some customers continued to observe intermittent errors as services gradually recovered. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The issue was caused by a change to the hostname configuration of our Content Delivery Network \(CDN\). As a result, the products mentioned could not receive connections, and the users received TLS handshake errors, followed by HTTP 503 and 403 errors. More specifically a new CDN configuration contained a resource name which conflicted with the existing customer-serving CDN resource, and was able to be deployed, overwriting it. The root cause of the incident was the failure in the detection of the bug by our pre-deployment validations and tests. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that you rely on our products for your daily operations and productivity, and we sincerely apologize for any impact this disruption has had on you, your team or your organisation. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to help avoid repeating this type of incident: * Improved pre-deployment change controls and testing. * Improved validation of target configurations before deployment to ensure customer-serving CDN resources cannot their hostnames changed. * Sharding of our CDN configuration to enable progressive changes. We sincerely appreciate your understanding and patience as we improve our processes to provide a better customer experience. Thank you, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2025年9月9日 10:23 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating cases of degraded performance for Confluence and Jira Cloud customers using Microsoft Edge. We will provide more details as they emerge.

2. 2025年9月9日 11:40 UTCidentified

   Important Update on Attachment Issues with Edge 140 and Atlassian Products We've identified an issue affecting images, media, and Whiteboards in Confluence and Jira for users who have upgraded to Microsoft Edge version 140.0.3485.54 with Strict tracking prevention enabled. These settings can block media (images and videos) content from loading, uploading, or opening. The issue is triggered by Edge's Strict tracking prevention incorrectly classifying Atlassian as advertising, impacting functionality. Recommended Workarounds: - Switch your tracking prevention settings from 'Strict' to the 'Balanced (Recommended)' mode in Edge. - Alternatively, add an 'Exception' for the URL you use to access Atlassian products. - Use a different browser, such as Chrome, Firefox, or Safari. This issue only affects Microsoft Edge. Other browsers are not affected by this issue. Thank you for your patience as we work through this issue. We'll provide updates as they become available.

3. 2025年9月10日 0:55 UTCidentified

   Our team is aware that the incorrect classification of Atlassian sites as advertising has been resolved, however these changes will take some time to propagate out to users since we are waiting for Edge from Microsoft to incorporate the changes. We are continuing to monitor the situation and will provide further update when we are able to confirm that the issue is resolved.

4. 2025年9月10日 18:35 UTCidentified

   We continue to work on resolving the Microsoft Edge 140 tracking prevention issue for Confluence, Jira Work Management, Jira Service Management, Jira, Jira Align, and Jira Product Discovery. We have identified the root cause and are working on solutions for each product. We will provide the next update within three hours.

5. 2025年9月10日 20:34 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified the root cause of the Microsoft Edge 140 tracking prevention issue and have mitigated the problem and we continue monitoring closely. The issue has been mitigated however it will not be considered resolved until Microsoft issues an updated version of the Edge browser scheduled for September 18th. This will be the last update until the issue is resolved.

6. 2025年9月15日 6:40 UTCresolved

   An update has been released by Microsoft to resolve this issue for users of the Edge browser. To verify that you are running the required version of Edge, you can navigate to edge://components/ in the address bar, click the 'Check for update' button for the 'Trust Protections List', ensuring that you are on version 1.0.0.31 or higher to ensure you are running the version that contains the fixed release. All Edge browsers should otherwise receive this update within 10 hours without user intervention.

1. 2025年8月7日 22:25 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of the fact that customers are facing issues with using Forge app created custom fields. The issue is that the the data selected or typed in the field is cleared when the focus is lost. However, even though the data looks like it is no longer present, the system has still stored it. Therefore, as a workaround, users can ignore the fact that the data is no longer visible and Click Issue create anyway. We are actively looking into the root cause to remediate this issue promptly.

2. 2025年8月7日 23:57 UTCidentified

   We continue to work on resolving the functionality impacted for Forge custom fields on Jira Work Management and Jira. We have identified the root cause and expect recovery shortly.

3. 2025年8月8日 5:08 UTCidentified

   Our intended resolution for the issue impacting Forge custom fields on Jira Work Management and Jira is taking longer than expected. Our team is continuing to work on this issue with urgency and we will provide an update as soon as possible.

4. 2025年8月8日 9:16 UTCidentified

   Our team continues to work on restoring full functionality. The fix is currently being deployed across all regions. Some users can already start noticing improvements. The next update will be provided as soon as the issue is fully resolved.

5. 2025年8月8日 12:18 UTCresolved

   Between 02:00 am UTC and 11:57 am UTC, we experienced issues with custom fields created by the Forge app for Jira Work Management and Jira. The issue has been resolved, and the service is now operating normally.