Okta の障害履歴

1. 2026年9月3日 10:42 UTCresolved

   エンジニアリングチームは、OP1のエラー500の問題を調査し続けています。 その際、システム内の断続的な問題が発生することがあります。 今後30分以内に更新を予定しております。追加情報が必要な場合は、速やかに更新いたします.

2. 2026年9月3日 11:02 UTCresolved

   エンジニアリングチームは、OP1のエラー500の問題を調査し続けています。 その際、システム内の断続的な問題が発生することがあります。 今後30分以内に更新を予定しております。追加情報が必要な場合は、速やかに更新いたします.

3. 2026年9月3日 11:34 UTCresolved

   エンジニアリングチームは、OP1のエラー500の問題を調査し続けています。 その際、システム内の断続的な問題が発生することがあります。 今後30分以内に更新を予定しております。追加情報が必要な場合は、速やかに更新いたします.

4. 2026年9月3日 12:00 UTCresolved

   エンジニアリングチームは、OP1のエラー500の問題を調査し続けています。 その際、システム内の断続的な問題が発生することがあります。 今後30分以内に更新を予定しております。追加情報が必要な場合は、速やかに更新いたします.

5. 2026年9月3日 12:30 UTCresolved

   エンジニアリングチームは、OP1のエラー500の問題を調査し続けています。 その際、システム内の断続的な問題が発生することがあります。 今後30分以内に更新を予定しております。追加情報が必要な場合は、速やかに更新いたします.

6. 2026年9月3日 13:03 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineeringは、問題を軽減するために必要な行動を取ることができ、現在、安定性を監視しています。 取られた行動に関する問題および特異の原因は、トラストページに掲載されます.

7. 2026年9月3日 14:09 UTCresolved

   延長期間の監視後、問題が再発されていないことを確認しました。 根本原因分析(RCA)を5営業日以内に掲載します。 皆様のお越しをお待ちしております.

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1. 2026年8月14日 15:23 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering is investigating and has determined that the incident is currently impacting email delivery to a subset of customers. During this time, customers may experience email delivery deferrals. We'll provide an update in 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

2. 2026年8月14日 15:39 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering has determined that certain third-party providers were failing to receive emails from Okta. Our monitoring shows delivery rates are recovering to normal conditions and will continue to monitor until full resolution. Our next update will be in 30 minutes or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. 2026年8月14日 16:50 UTCresolved

   Our monitoring indicates that email deferrals to the impacted third-party email service have returned to the expected baseline. Additional information will be available within 5 Business days.

4. 2026年8月21日 16:04 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Okta detected an increase in customer support tickets regarding email delivery issues. Customers using custom email domains routed through Proofpoint experienced email delivery deferrals. During this period, affected end users were unable to receive system-generated emails, including One-Time Passwords (OTPs), account activation emails, password reset emails, factor enrollment emails, and other automated notifications. Root Cause Summary: Third-party provider Proofpoint experienced a service disruption, causing issues with email deliverability. When Okta services attempted to send emails to recipient domains whose MX records pointed to Proofpoint's infrastructure, the delivery attempts failed due to connection errors, resulting in deferred delivery. Okta's email sending infrastructure operated normally throughout the event. Remediation Steps: Okta Engineering monitored service telemetry and confirmed that email delivery returned to normal pre-incident baselines once Proofpoint restored stability to its infrastructure. Preventive Actions: Okta is defining automated alerting thresholds for email-bound and deferral rates to decrease detection time and updating runbooks to allow faster diagnosis of downstream provider disruptions. Timing: Incident start: August 14, 2026, at 5:00 AM PDT Incident resolved: August 14, 2026, at 10:04 AM PDT. Duration (# of minutes): 304 minutes Based on details provided by https://www.proofpoint.com/us/support-services

1. 2026年7月24日 13:55 UTCresolved

   安定性と監視の期間が経つと、サービスの問題が完全に解決されたことを確認できるようになりました。 5営業日以内に追加根本原因情報を公開いたします.

2. 2026年8月1日 3:28 UTCresolved

   お客様にご迷惑をおかけいたしますが、何卒ご了承くださいますようお願い申し上げます。 Oktaでは、信頼と透明性が最優先事項です。 以下は、この事件に関する事実です。 当社は、今後の発生を防止するために、サービスの改善を実施することに努めます。 検出と影響 7月 24, 2026, 約3:55 PM PDTで, OK7, OK12, OK14, OP3のオクタ観測サービス劣化. AD/LDAP の委任認証と OAuth トークンエンドポイント クライアントを AWS の us-west-2 領域内に配置して使用して、特に影響を受けた顧客。 イベントを通して、ユーザーはリソース、認証障害、エージェント接続タイムアウト、レイテンシー、OAuthトークンリクエストにアクセスするエラーに遭遇しました。 根本原因の概要 影響を受けた領域のクラウドサービスプロバイダ内のエラーから発生した根本原因。 修正手順 クラウドサービスプロバイダは、接続を回復させ、オクタサービスは、約4:10 PM PDTによって安定化され、当社のチームは4:19 AM PDTでベースライン操作の完全なリターンを確認しました。 予防的行動 Okta は、将来の発生を防ぐため、いくつかの取り組みを積極的に見直し、実行しています。 これらの対策は、地域内の拡張問題の場合には、当社のインシデント対応プロセスを監査および改善し、このインシデントに基づくモニタリングおよびアラートの拒否を含みます。 総持続時間 合計持続時間(分): 15 分 開始時間: 3:55 AM PDT 終了時間: 4:10 AM PDT 期間(分): 15

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1. 2026年7月22日 15:14 UTCresolved

   定期メンテナンスは現在進行中ですが、オクタエンジニアリングチームは積極的に取り組んでおります。 この拡張画面では、オクタワークフローにログインする際にエラーが発生することがあります。 弊社チームがこの業務を迅速・安全に完遂できるよう努めて参りますので、ご理解くださいますようお願い申し上げます。   これは、組織にどのように影響するかを理解し、推奨回避策を見るために、当社の詳細なサポート記事: https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/okta-workflows-cell-migration-expected-behaviors-and-workarounds?language=en US を確認してください。 詳細については、30分以内に更新をいたします.

2. 2026年7月22日 15:49 UTCresolved

   移行が安全かつ正常に完了していることを確認するため、メンテナンス活動はまだ進行中です。   引き続き30分以上の更新情報を公開します。 その間、回避策や期待される行動に関する最新のガイダンスについては、下記のサポート記事を参照してください。 https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/okta-workflows-cell-migration-expected-behaviors-and-workarounds?language=en US

3. 2026年7月22日 16:19 UTCresolved

   移行後の安定的なシステム性能を維持しています。 当社のエンジニアリングチームは、すべてのサービスを監視し、積極的に取り組んでいます。 コアワークフローが回復し、顧客は継続的な改善が見られます。 次回のアップデートは30分前以降に順次更新いたします.

4. 2026年7月22日 16:59 UTCresolved

   安定性と監視の期間が経つと、サービスの問題が完全に解決されたことを確認できるようになりました。 5営業日以内に追加根本原因情報を公開いたします.

5. 2026年7月29日 23:34 UTCresolved

   お客様にご迷惑をおかけいたしますが、何卒ご了承くださいますようお願い申し上げます。 Oktaでは、信頼と透明性が最優先事項です。 以下は、この事件に関する事実です。 当社は、今後の発生を防止するために、サービスの改善を実施することに努めます。 このメンテナンスは、元々の通信ウィンドウを越え、その拡張期間のステータスの更新が、お客様にタイムリーに通知されなかったことを認識しています。 申し訳ありません、このコンテンツはただ今 アメリカ英語 のみです。 2026年7月22日、北米地域(FL1セル)のオクタワークフローの5:15で、米国のセル1、2、3、4、6、7、および11のワークフローユーザーが影響を受ける問題が発生しました。 この間に、ワークフローの実行が失敗したり、早期終了したり、ワークフローコンソールをロードするエラーが発生しました。 また、一部のアプリ接続は機能を停止し、ユーザーが手動で再認証して機能を復元するように要求します。 根本原因の概要 計画されたシステムアップグレード中に発生した問題。 サードパーティベンダーのソフトウェアの不具合により、アップグレードが予想よりも大幅に長持ちする可能性が高まりました。 新しいデータストアシステムに移行する一方で、システムコンポーネント間の通信障害は、サービスが期待されるウィンドウ内の正常な状態に戻りないようにしました。 この期間中、ワークフローコンソールは、データストアが利用できなくなったとき、うまく劣化しませんでした。代わりに、ユーザーに直接エラーを直面しました。 また、障害時にクレデンシャルがリフレッシュできないアプリの接続は、失敗した状態で残され、自動的に更新されなかったため、アップグレードが完了した後にエラーが続いたため、影響を受けた接続が再承認されるまでです。 修正手順 サードパーティのベンダーは、8:34 AM PDTで安定化クラスターを確認しました。 安定化後、オクタエンジニアリングは、影響を受けたサービスを回復し、階段構成キャッシュをクリアします。 この期間中にOAuthトークンリフレッシュエラーを経験したお客様は、アプリの接続を手動で再承認する必要があります。 フル機能が9:33 AM PDTによって復元されました。 それでも影響を受けた場合: 手動でワークフローコンソールで影響を受けた接続資格を再認証する (KB: Okta ワークフロー: セルの移行 期待される行動と回避)。 ウィンドウ中に失敗したワークフローの実行は、通常のプロセスを使用して再実行することができます。影響を受ける実行を識別する助けが必要な場合は、 Okta サポートにお問い合わせください。 予防行動 同様の事故を未然に防ぐために、オクタは以下の手順を実施しました。 サードパーティのベンダーが確認された欠陥の修正をデプロイし、続行する安全であることを確認するまで、さらにすべてのデータストアエンジンの移行にフリート・ホールドを強化しました。 また、インフラストラクチャが一時的に利用できなくなったときに、ワークフローコンソールを高速化し、自動的に回復するために更新され、ユーザーが生システムエラーではなく再接続状態を確認できるようにしています。 並行して、直接自動監視機能を追加し、クラスター・コンバージェンス障害の警告機能を追加し、メンテナンスウィンドウの高速な検出を保証します。 最後に、よりタイムリーなステータスページや進捗/完了の更新など、長期にわたるメンテナンス中に連絡方法を改善しています。 ワークフローの信頼性やロードマップに関する質問については、オクタアカウントチームがお手伝いします。 総所要時間合計時間(分):258分(4時間18分) 開始時間:5:15 AM PDT終了時間:9:33 AM PDT持続時間(分):258分

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1. 2026年7月13日 21:23 UTCresolved

   当社のエンジニアリングチームは、インパクトのあるプレビュー環境に潜在的な修正を適用し、回復のためのシステムを積極的に監視しています。 新規情報が公開されると、30分以内に別のアップデートが提供されます。 誠に申し訳ございません.

2. 2026年7月13日 21:39 UTCresolved

   当社のエンジニアリングチームは、修正を適用しており、OP2プレビュー環境へのサービス復元を観察しています。 システムを監視し、30分以内に別の更新を行います.

3. 2026年7月13日 21:53 UTCresolved

   OP2のプレビュー環境が完全に安定化されていることを確認し、以前の問題は完全に解決されます。 5営業日以内に追加根本原因情報を公開いたします.

4. 2026年7月21日 1:57 UTCresolved

   お客様にご迷惑をおかけいたしますが、何卒ご了承くださいますようお願い申し上げます。 オクタでは、信頼と透明性が最優先事項です。 以下は、この事件に関する事実です。 当社は、この事故の発生を防止するために、本サービスの改善を実施することを約束します。 検出と影響: 7月13日、2026で1:01 PM PT、オクタ内部監視は、EMEAプレビューセル環境でエラーを上昇させました。 この期間中、EMEA プレビュー セル環境のすべての顧客は、認証障害とサービスの遅延が発生し、影響を受けました。 管理者とエンドユーザは、「内部サーバーのエラー」メッセージやその他のエラーが発生し、サインインまたはアクセスしようとすると、 Okta サービスにアクセスできます。 ルート原因サマリー: スケジュールされたサービスアップグレード中にインシデントがトリガーされました。 EMEA プレビューセルクラスタが誤ったバージョンの重要なインフラストラクチャルーティングコンポーネントを誤って受信するミスコンフィグを引き起こしました。 このアップデートは、外部の健全なインフラコンポーネント間の通信を防止する内部ネットワークルーティングを解除しました。 リクエストがコアアプリケーションに届かないため、広範囲にわたるサービスエラーや認証障害が発生しました。 修正手順: Okta のエンジニアリングチームは、問題を特定し、ルーティング設定の以前の安定したバージョンをすぐにデプロイし始めました。 ロールバックの後、エンジニアは、内部接続を復元するために、影響を受けるサービス(ゲートウェイやプロキシを含む)を体系的に再起動しました。 これらの行為は問題に首尾よく対処し、顧客の影響は十分に2:20 PM PTによって軽減されました。 予防的行動:当社の運用プロセスを精錬し、サービスの安定性を高めています。 これにより、自動検出と監視機能を改善し、潜在的な問題をより効果的に特定し、対処するのに役立ちます。 総所要時間(分):79分(1時間19分) 開始時間:1:01 PM PT終了時間:2:20 PM PT

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1. 2026年7月7日 20:50 UTCresolved

   Okta エンジニアリングは、Okta ワークフローに影響を及ぼす問題を特定し、現在是正措置を講じています。 Okta Workflows コンソール、API エンドポイント、およびインバウンド Webhook で 500 個のエラーやタイムアウトを見ることができます。 今後30分以内に更新を予定しております。追加情報が必要な場合は、速やかに更新いたします.

2. 2026年7月7日 21:03 UTCresolved

   Okta ワークフローの問題は解決しました。 ワークフローはすべて正常に処理されます。 根本原因分析(RCA)を5営業日以内に掲載します。 ご迷惑をおかけいたしますが、何卒ご了承くださいますようお願い申し上げます.

3. 2026年7月15日 15:22 UTCresolved

   お客様にご迷惑をおかけいたしますが、何卒ご了承くださいますようお願い申し上げます。 Oktaでは、信頼と透明性が最優先事項です。 以下は、この事件に関する事実です。 当社は、この事故の発生を防止するために、本サービスの改善を実施することを約束します。 検出と影響: 7 月 7 日、2026 日、1:01 PM PDT で、 Okta の内部監視および顧客レポートは、北米の Okta セル OK14 でワークフローにアクセスするユーザーとの問題にチームを警告しました。 この期間中、FL14の顧客は、管理者ポータルからワークフローに移動したり、SSOを介してワークフローコンソールにログインしようとすると、HTTP 500、503、または504ゲートウェイタイムアウトエラーが発生することがあります。 既存のセッションは、断続的にエラーが出ている可能性があります。 スケジュールされたワークフローとオンデマンドワークフロー、インラインホック、Webhooks は、エラーやタイムアウトが発生する可能性があります。 さらに、機内での実行経験のあるタイムアウト。 Root Causeサマリー:この事件は、リリース2027.07.07.0の計画的な展開中にFL14セルに発生しました。 展開プロセスの過程で、スキーマの更新を実行するためのサービスポッドが早期終了しました。 この初期の終了は、予期しない、長時間のデータベース接続につながり、最終的にはセルのプライマリデータベースへの接続排気を引き起こしました。 修正ステップ: アラートと顧客のレポートを受信すると、チームは12:44 PM PDTで診断を開始しました。 1:30 PM PDT では、スキーマの更新を実行しているサービスPodを分離して削除します。 これにより、データベースの接続が1:45 PM PDTのフルサービスのクリア、復元を可能にします。 予防的行動:将来の発生を防止するために、オクタは、インフラストラクチャの安定性を強化し、モニタリング機能を強化することを約束します。 現在、当社の展開プロセスおよびアラートシステムに対する戦略的改善を実施し、当社のサービス全体でより迅速な検出、応答およびより大きなレジリエンスを保証します。 総所要時間:67分

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1. 2026年6月26日 15:22 UTCresolved

   Our Engineering team has identified the issue, and we will continue monitoring the issue. We will provide another update within the next 15 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

2. 2026年6月29日 23:50 UTCresolved

3. 2026年6月30日 15:01 UTCresolved

   The Root Cause Analysis (RCA) details previously posted in this update were published in error and belonged to a separate incident that occurred on June 22nd (I-10858). We sincerely apologize for any confusion this may have caused. Our formal RCA process for this OK11 custom domains incident (I-10874) is still actively underway. We remain committed to transparency and will provide an accurate, dedicated RCA for this disruption within 5 business days (expected late July 6, 2026). Thank you for your patience.

4. 2026年7月6日 22:01 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 26th at 7:43 AM (PT), Okta was alerted to customer reports of connection issues and authentication failures when accessing custom domains. The incident was isolated to OK11 and normal connectivity was restored at 7:53 AM (PT). Root Cause Summary: Okta Engineering identified that the root cause of the issue originated during a custom domain traffic migration in OK11 on June 25th at 10:47 AM (PT), the new routing infrastructure became resource-constrained under increased traffic volume the next day. This resulted in TCP connection resets and errors sent to clients attempting to access custom domains. Remediation Steps: Once the source of the issue was identified, Okta engineering immediately mitigated the issue by reverting custom domain traffic back to the previous infrastructure, restoring normal connectivity within minutes. Preventative Actions: To prevent future incidents, the routing infrastructure was scaled to prevent recurrence. Okta will work to implement enhanced monitoring and alerting, as well as updated auto-scaling policies to ensure routing infrastructure maintains adequate capacity during traffic fluctuations and future infrastructure improvements. Duration (# of minutes): Total Duration (Minutes): 53 minutes Actual Time: 7:00 AM - 7:53 AM PT

1. 2026年6月22日 22:02 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team has taken steps to mitigate the issue. We have observed that the errors have been reduced and is continuing to subside. We are monitoring the situation closely and will provide further updates in 15-30 minutes as we move toward full mitigation.

2. 2026年6月22日 22:33 UTCresolved

   Internal monitoring confirmed that the EU1 environment has fully recovered and is operating normally. A full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be made available within 5 business days. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.

3. 2026年6月30日 14:43 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 22nd, 2026, at 2:08 PM PDT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team to errors in the EU environment. During this period, administrators and end users may have experienced intermittent 500 Internal Server Error and 429 Rate Limit responses when attempting to access Okta services. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by an unexpected scaling down of the application cluster during scheduled maintenance of the environment. This change accidentally overwrote the custom capacity settings for several of our applications. This caused the system to automatically revert to its lowest default capacity, drastically reducing the amount of user traffic it could handle simultaneously. As a result, the remaining servers were immediately overwhelmed by the normal volume of user requests, leading to system slowdowns, errors, and "too many requests" blockages for our customers in the impacted cell. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering team identified the root cause issue at 2:44 PM PDT. The team mitigated the issue by scaling up resource capacity, completely stabilizing service health back to normal levels by 2:48 PM PDT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: - Strengthen guardrails by improving our validation tools and multi-environment review processes to automatically detect and flag unexpected server capacity changes before they're applied. - Accelerate system monitoring by implementing enhanced monitoring thresholds to instantly detect and report infrastructure capacity drops before they can impact end users. - Optimize failover protocols by auditing critical alert paths for maximum reliability while establishing a clear, structured communication plan for when automated backup systems are triggered. These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again. Duration (# of minutes):40 minutes

1. 2026年6月2日 11:21 UTCresolved

   Engineering is still investigating the issue, recent actions that were taken show errors subsiding.

2. 2026年6月2日 11:40 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team has observed that the errors have been reduced. We are monitoring the situation closely and will provide further updates as we move toward full mitigation.

3. 2026年6月2日 12:07 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering has confirmed that the issue has been resolved. An RCA will be provided in five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

4. 2026年6月10日 2:19 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 2nd, 2026, at 2:36 AM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team to elevated errors in the OK9 environment. During this period, administrators and end users may have experienced intermittent 500 Internal Server errors when trying to access Okta services. Additionally, Admins may have encountered error messages when fetching certain records. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by a misconfiguration introduced during a scheduled maintenance of the environment. This maintenance introduced an error that caused connectivity issues within specific infrastructure components. Only a small percentage of the infrastructure was affected during this period. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering team identified and isolated impacted infrastructure at 4:01AM PT. These actions successfully addressed the issue, and normal operations were restored by 4:17 AM PT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: Incident response processes, procedures, and investigation tools to more rapidly diagnose similar issues in the future. Risk evaluation processes to include expanding error types and adding additional appropriate corresponding alerts and monitoring associated with vulnerability updates. These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again and, in cases like these, allow Okta to respond faster when possible. Duration (# of minutes): 100

1. 2026年5月1日 0:28 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team has successfully resolved the service instability that was causing system timeouts. Okta engineering has confirmed that errors have subsided, and we have transitioned into a monitoring phase to ensure continued stability. We sincerely appreciate your patience while our team worked to identify and resolve the issue.

2. 2026年5月1日 1:01 UTCresolved

   Internal monitoring confirmed that the OP1 environment has fully recovered and is operating normally. A full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be made available within 5 days. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.

3. 2026年5月8日 2:51 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On April 30th, 2026, at 10:57 AM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team of login issues for users accessing Okta Preview Cell 1. During this period, customers may have received 500 errors for query timeouts and were unable to log in. Root Cause Summary: The incident stemmed from a database query change. The updated query intermittently exceeded its timeout limit across several login endpoints. Consequently, users experienced 500 errors and were unable to log in. Remediation Steps: Upon receiving the alerts, Okta Engineering immediately launched an investigation. By 1:02 PM PT, the team took initial mitigation steps to resolve the issue, however these steps did not resolve the issue. The incident response team continued to triage and diagnose the issue and identified the root cause related to the updated database query change at 4:50 PM PT. The team reverted the new query behavior at 5:00 PM PT in Preview Cell 1, and full service functionality was restored by 5:05 PM PT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: -Reviewing incident response processes and investigation tools to more rapidly diagnose similar issues in the future -Risk evaluation processes associated with query updates -Alerts and monitors associated with the database proxy These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again and, in cases like these, allow Okta to respond faster when possible. Duration (# of minutes): 375

1. 2026年4月29日 22:42 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Customers using the third-party service Kolide began reporting that attempts to sign in to their orgs redirected to an unrelated tenant and received an HTTP 400 error with the message “Login Failed - 400: Bad Request Error Code: GENERAL_NONSUCCESS” Root Cause Summary: Kolide has confirmed for Okta that an incident occurred with their Device Trust SAML authentication system, resulting in some users being redirected to an incorrect service provider after completing authentication. This resulted in users receiving a 400 error. Kolide reported that users were unable to access their intended application, any unauthorized applications, or any unauthorized environments. Remediation Steps: Okta Support advised customers that they could temporarily disable their Kolide integrations to allow their users to successfully access their services. Timing: Kolide reports: Incident start: April 22, 2026, at 8:24 AM PDT Incident resolved: April 22, 2026, at 8:30 AM PDT Duration (# of minutes): 6 Minutes

1. 2026年4月13日 20:33 UTCresolved

   Okta has identified the issue impacting Access Request job processing and Engineering Teams are working to restore the service. We are rolling out the fix for this issue in 30 minutes and will provide another update once the fix is rolled out.

2. 2026年4月13日 20:59 UTCresolved

   Okta has identified the root cause of the issue affecting Access Request job processing as of 1:00 PM PT. A resolution was implemented at 1:45 PM PT, and the service is now fully operational for new submissions. The engineering team is currently working to restore and process any requests submitted during the disruption period. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. 2026年4月13日 21:29 UTCresolved

   While new Access Request job processing has been restored, Okta is also working to resolve the issue affecting in-flight Access Request job requests processed during the disruption period.  The fix for this issue is expected to be implemented around 5:00pm PT.  Okta will provide another update at 5:00pm PT or sooner if one becomes available.

4. 2026年4月14日 0:25 UTCresolved

   The issue with in-flight Access Request job requests processed during the disruption period has also been resolved. All Access Request jobs are now processing normally. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

5. 2026年4月21日 23:16 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this kind. Detection and Impact: On April 13, 2026, at 11:51 AM PST, an incident was reported where Okta Identity Governance (OIG) access requests stalled in the "In Progress" state indefinitely across all environments. The system accepted initial submissions and first-level approvals, but failed to trigger subsequent automated tasks like assigning users to apps/groups or running delegated workflows. . Root Cause Summary: During a recent update deployment, new tasks inadvertently moved to a 'LOCKED' status without implementing the necessary logic to transition them back to 'OPEN.' This caused the tasks to become permanently hidden, preventing the automated execution of the action associated with them. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering teams promptly responded, initiating immediate detection and diagnosis. Corrective measures, including a code fix deployed to all cells, were implemented to prevent any new access requests from becoming stuck. A remediation migration successfully transitioned most affected requests to a fixed state. Normal functionality was fully restored by April 13, 2026, at 5:18 PM PST, following the completion of a final migration to unblock remaining requests.On April 14, 2026, Okta took further steps to resolve in-flight requests that were stuck, moving them to a final, terminal state. Preventative Actions: Okta is taking several steps to prevent this issue from recurring. These include enhanced testing, deployment of safeguards, and improvements to our monitoring and alerting systems. Duration (# of minutes): 434

1. 2026年3月24日 23:32 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Okta internal monitoring alerted our engineering team to disruptions to the Okta status page and the commercial support portal. Okta Engineering identified a service disruption with our third-party provider and confirmed the impact. During the disruption, customer admins were unable to access the Okta Support Center (support.okta.com) to log support cases or view the primary status page (status.okta.com). Root Cause Summary: Okta's third-party provider, responsible for hosting the Okta Support Center and status page, experienced a service disruption. The third-party provider identified a version mismatch between their application and database layers as the technical trigger. This mismatch resulted in internal server errors and login failures, rendering the Okta Support Center and status page inaccessible for a portion of their disruption. Remediation Steps: Okta teams posted an admin banner within the Okta Admin Console to provide visibility into the disruption and offer a phone number for customers who needed to log support cases manually while the Okta Support Center was unavailable. Services were fully restored after the third-party provider successfully deployed a fix-forward release to the impacted infrastructure, which restored login access. Preventive Actions: As part of Okta's commitment to operational resilience, we have optimized our vendor engagement matrix to accelerate incident mitigation and downstream coordination. We are also conducting an expanded audit of external dependencies to formalize alternative response procedures within our disaster recovery plans. Simultaneously, Engineering has enhanced real-time monitoring and alerting for service endpoints, enabling faster detection and resolution. Timing: Incident start: March 16, 2026, at 08:58 PM PDT Incident resolved: March 16, 2026, at 11:34 PM PDT Duration (# of minutes): 156 minutes

1. 2026年3月13日 18:48 UTCresolved

   At around 11:20AM PT, Okta Engineering has confirmed that the issue has been resolved in both cells, EU1 and OK1. An RCA will be provided in five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

2. 2026年3月20日 20:35 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this kind. Detection and Impact On March 13, 2026, at 10:49 AM PT, Okta detected a service degradation that prevented some customers on the OK1 and EU1 cells from performing directory operations, viewing or searching for users, groups, and devices in the Okta Admin Console. Customers may have experienced "Invalid search query" messages or 5xx errors. This issue also affected several API endpoints related to users, groups, and devices, which may have impacted customer integrations relying on this functionality. End-user authentication was not impacted. Root Cause Summary The root cause of this incident was a planned configuration change that exposed a bug in the underlying service, resulting in system errors and disrupting both directory-based APIs. Remediation Steps Upon detection, Okta's engineering teams initiated incident response procedures. Once the problematic configuration change was identified as the source of the errors, it was immediately reverted. After the reversion was applied and verified, full functionality was restored to all impacted customers. Preventative Actions Okta is taking steps to prevent future occurrences of this kind, including enhancing our testing processes, hardening and improving our configuration rollout strategy, and upgrading our monitoring and alerting systems for enhanced detection. Start Time: 03/13/2026 10:17 AM PT End Time: 03/13/2026 11:21 AM PT Duration (# of minutes): 64

1. 2026年2月4日 12:37 UTCresolved

   Okta has implemented a fix for the LDAP issue affecting the OK9 environment. We are observing signs of service recovery and confirmed improvements from customers. We will continue to monitor the situation closely to ensure full resolution. We are monitoring the situation closely and will provide further updates within the next 30 minutes.

2. 2026年2月4日 12:50 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved. Internal monitoring and customer reports confirm that the LDAPi system in OK9 has fully recovered and is operating normally. We will continue to closely monitor the service to ensure stability. A full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be made available within 5 days. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.

3. 2026年2月11日 18:45 UTCresolved

   On February 4th, 2026, at 3:33 AM PT, Okta received customer reports of authentication failures within the OK9 (EMEA) cell. Customers attempting to access LDAP interface services encountered certificate validation errors related to hostname mismatches, preventing successful authentication. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by a misconfiguration introduced during a scheduled update of our LDAP interface to a new configuration source on February 4th 2:24 AM PT. This update inadvertently applied an incorrect SSL certificate profile to the LDAP interface within the OK9 environment. This misconfiguration caused certificate validity errors, resulting in connection issues when attempting to use LDAP services. Remediation Steps: Once the source of the issue was identified, Okta engineering team rolled back changes at 4:07 AM PT. These actions successfully addressed the issue and restored normal operations by 4:26 AM PT. Preventative Actions: To prevent future incidents, Okta has updated synthetic tests and enhanced monitoring. Teams also plan to add new tooling to improve changes to the LDAP service certificates. In addition, we are reviewing our internal processes and procedures, refining our automated rollback processes to further reduce the customer impact time for similar issues in the future. Duration (# of minutes): Total Duration (Minutes): 122 minutes Actual Time: 02:24 AM PT - 04:26 AM PT

1. 2026年1月28日 19:24 UTCresolved

   We are seeing significant and steady system stability as our third-party provider recovery continues in the EU-West-1 region. We will continue monitoring the service to ensure a full recovery. We will provide another update in 60 minutes or as soon as more information becomes available.

2. 2026年1月28日 19:36 UTCresolved

   The third-party provider has confirmed that the issue has been resolved. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within five business days.

3. 2026年2月5日 1:26 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On January 29th, 2026, at 8:28 AM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team of intermittent connectivity issues accessing Okta Cell 9 (EMEA). During this period, customers may have experienced intermittent errors establishing network connections and latency when trying to access Okta services. Clients configured to retry failed connections likely saw successful connectivity on secondary attempts. Root Cause Summary: The incident stemmed from a failure of a component that manages configuration changes to the networking infrastructure with our Cloud Service Provider (CSP) in the region hosting Okta Cell 9. Remediation Steps: Immediately upon receiving the alerts, Okta Engineering began investigating several isolated spikes but determined that cell health was stable. At 9:35 AM PT, Okta Engineering received more alerts and immediately initiated incident response procedures. At 9:51 AM PT, Okta Engineering began working with the CSP to diagnose the issue. At 10:13 AM PT, the latency began to stabilize. At 11:22 AM PT, the issue was resolved. Preventative Actions: To prevent similar incidents from recurring, Okta Engineering is improving our monitoring, working with our CSP to enhance their monitoring, and reviewing incident response processes associated with this event. Duration (# of minutes): 186

4. 2026年2月11日 18:40 UTCresolved

1. 2026年1月22日 21:46 UTCresolved

   We are continuing to monitor the third-party email service provider's progress toward a resolution. At this time, we have not received an estimated time for recovery (ETR). If you are attempting to sign in and have configured alternative MFA factors (such as Okta Verify, SMS, or Security Keys/Biometrics), we recommend using those options to avoid delays associated with email delivery. Our engineering teams remain on standby to verify service restoration the moment it begins. We will continue to provide updates as soon as the impacted provider shares new information.

2. 2026年1月22日 23:24 UTCresolved

   We're continuing to track the ongoing service disruption with the third-party email provider. We appreciate your patience while we await the provider's resolution of the root cause. We'll post our next update in 90 minutes or as soon as we have a significant change in status.

3. 2026年1月23日 0:46 UTCresolved

   The third-party email provider has identified the root cause as a service infrastructure issue within the North America region. They are currently implementing load-balancing configurations to stabilize the environment. While recovery is underway, users may continue to experience intermittent delays or failures in receiving emails. We are monitoring the provider's progress and will provide another update as they move toward full resolution.

4. 2026年1月23日 3:55 UTCresolved

   The third-party provider continues to see improvements across their impacted North American infrastructure. While our internal systems remain healthy, our team is on standby to validate the restoration of all external dependencies. We will provide a final update once the provider confirms that their services have fully returned to normal operations.

5. 2026年1月23日 6:46 UTCresolved

   The third-party provider has confirmed that a fix has been successfully deployed. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within ten business days. We sincerely apologize for the impact this had on you and your users.

6. 2026年1月30日 22:34 UTCresolved

   Following is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service Timing: Incident start: January 22, 2026, at 10:55 AM PST Incident resolved: January 22, 202,6 at 7:50 PM PST Detection: The issue was initially identified through customer reports that they were not receiving expected email notifications. Okta Engineering confirmed the service disruption after internal monitoring indicated a high volume of deferred email delivery attempts to specific third-party domains. Impact: Customers across all Okta cells with email addresses hosted by Microsoft Exchange Online may have experienced intermittent delays or failures in receiving automated email notifications, such as Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) codes and enrollment links. Okta services remained healthy and attempted to resend deferred messages. Root Cause: Microsoft reports that it experienced a service issue within its North American data centers during a planned maintenance activity. As a result, emails sent from Okta to the affected provider resulted in “soft bounce” errors, indicating that the provider's servers were temporarily unable to accept the messages. Remediation Steps: To mitigate the impact on users attempting to sign in, Okta recommended using alternative MFA factors, such as Okta Verify, security keys, or SMS, to bypass delays associated with email delivery. Okta Engineering continuously monitored the third-party provider's recovery efforts and validated that mail delivery returned to baseline levels once the provider stabilized their environment.

1. 2026年1月20日 16:04 UTCresolved

   We've identified that the service interruption is due to an issue with a third-party provider. We are actively working with the provider to ensure a swift resolution and are closely monitoring progress. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

2. 2026年1月20日 16:35 UTCresolved

   We are continuing to monitor progress with our third-party provider. The provider is currently implementing mitigation steps, and we are seeing signs of recovery. Several customers have already confirmed that service has been restored on their end. We are working to ensure this resolution is consistent across all accounts. We will provide the next updates within 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. 2026年1月20日 17:10 UTCresolved

   Our third-party provider is continuing their recovery efforts. While we are no longer seeing active errors, we remain in a period of close monitoring as they work toward a final resolution. We recognize that some users may still experience residual effects; our Support teams are working with them to resolve these errors. Our next update will be in 60 minutes or sooner if additional information becomes available.

4. 2026年1月20日 17:21 UTCresolved

   Our third-party provider has confirmed that a fix has been successfully deployed. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within ten business days. We sincerely apologize for the impact this had on you and your users.

5. 2026年1月26日 18:31 UTCresolved

   Following is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. Timing: Incident start: January 19, 2026, at 10:10 AM PST Incident resolved: January 20, 2026, at 11:49 AM PST Detection: Okta teams were notified via customer cases and an increase in Google Workspace import errors. Impact: Any customers performing Google Workspace imports during the incident window may have encountered an error stating “UserImportJob: Failed to download users. Json field=primaryEmail does not exist for object=[...]” Root Cause: Google Workspaces, a third-party provider, confirmed that a faulty code change introduced caused certain fields, such as primary email addresses, to be missing in API call results. As a result, Okta imports from Google Workspace could not complete, leading to import failures. Google provides additional details for this disruption: https://www.google.com/appsstatus/dashboard/incidents/9q5n4sfDnxYzHj8FxEua Remediation Steps: Okta teams soon identified that a provider-side disruption was the cause of the incident and opened a formal support case to track the resolution. The third-party provider resolved the incident by rolling back a faulty code change and restoring the missing metadata. Recovery occurred in stages, with some customers successfully remediated before others. Okta teams monitored the recovery in real-time and confirmed successful import signals across multiple impacted customers before standing down.

1. 2026年1月3日 1:52 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this kind. Detection and Impact: On December 26, 2025, at 3:27 AM PST, Okta engineering was alerted to increased errors in US Cell 6. During this time, US Cell 6 experienced errors, connection timeouts, and slow responses while attempting to access resources. Admins would have seen a banner on the admin portal stating that the cell was in read-only mode. Root Cause Summary: Okta has determined that the issue was caused by an outage with our cloud service provider. All instances fully recovered by 5:43 AM PT. Remediation Steps: Upon detection, Okta's engineering teams immediately began diagnosing the issue and worked with our cloud service provider to resolve the issue. In addition, the Incident response teams continued to review and analyze the incident, applying additional measures to improve service availability for end-user authentications. Preventative Actions: Okta is taking steps to prevent a recurrence of this issue. We are making improvements to our monitoring and response procedures to more quickly diagnose and recover from this kind of failure in the future. Total Duration: 2 hours and 16 minutes Start Time: December 26, 2025, 03:27 AM PT End Time: December 26, 2025, 05:43 AM PT

1. 2025年12月14日 16:40 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team is continuing to work with our third-party vendor and addressing this issue with urgency related to the custom domain email delivery issues.

2. 2025年12月14日 16:42 UTCresolved

   The next update will be posted in the next 60 minutes.

3. 2025年12月14日 17:50 UTCresolved

   Our Engineering team is continuing to work with the third-party provider on mitigation actions to help resolve this outstanding issue. We are treating the issue with the utmost urgency to restore our services as soon as possible. The next update will be provided within the next 60 minutes or sooner, if additional information becomes available.

4. 2025年12月14日 18:48 UTCresolved

   We have identified a potential root cause of this issue, and are currently investigating next steps towards resolution. We will provide the next update in 60 minutes, unless new information becomes available.

5. 2025年12月14日 19:39 UTCresolved

   This issue has been successfully resolved as of 11:07AM PDT. All services have been restored. If you continue to see issues, please update your support case for assistance. Additional root cause information will be available within 5 Business days.

6. 2025年12月23日 14:49 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar future occurrences. Detection and Impact: On December 14, 2025, at 3:01 a.m. PST, Okta detected an issue that prevented email delivery for customers using custom email domains. This affected end-users' ability to receive emails for Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), password resets, registration activation, account lockout notifications, and other notification emails, such as rate-limit notifications for administrators. Root Cause Summary: Okta has determined that the issue was caused by an unintended configuration change on our Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs). This change incorrectly routed emails from custom domains without proper DMARC sender authentication. As a result, email service providers rejected the emails, causing the delivery failures. Remediation Steps: Upon detection, Okta's engineering teams immediately began diagnosing the delivery failures. After identifying the incorrect routing, we updated the configuration to ensure emails were sent through the appropriate authenticated channels. Normal email functionality was fully restored after the updated configuration was applied. Preventative Actions: Okta is taking several steps to prevent a recurrence of this issue. We are enhancing our monitoring and alerting for email services and improving our configuration management tools to add further safeguards. Duration (# of minutes):1140