57 Pubnub incidents · 2023年3月 — official updates, affected components, duration and resolution details.
ユーザーは、フランクフルトのポイント・オブ・プレゼンスで履歴読者と高いエラーが発生することがあります。 改善に取り組んでおり、進捗状況を追って更新します。 お客様が影響を受け、議論したいと考えている場合は、[email protected] までご連絡下さい
修正を実装し、結果を監視しています。 こんなことに気づいたら、[email protected] へご連絡ください.
この事件は解決しました。 影響を受けた方は、[email protected]までお問い合わせください.
公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。
ユーザーは、Presence API でエラーやレイテンシ率が上昇している可能性があります。 改善に取り組んでおり、進捗状況を追って更新します。 お客様が影響を受け、議論したいと考えている場合は、[email protected] までご連絡下さい
この問題の修正が実施され、結果の監視を行っています。 こんなことに気づいたら、[email protected] へご連絡ください.
今後の問題がないか引き続き監視しています。
このインシデントは解決され、postmortemでフォローアップします。 ご不明な点がございましたら、[email protected]までお問い合わせ下さい.
公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。
ユーザーは、フランクフルトおよびボンベイのポイント・オブ・プレゼンスから高いエラーとレイテンシ率を経験することができます。 改善に取り組んでおり、進捗状況を追って更新します。 影響を受けると、[email protected] にご連絡ください.
問題が特定され、修正が実装されています.
修正を実装し、結果を監視しています。 この問題に影響を受けた場合や、まだ影響を受けていると感じた場合は、[email protected] までお問い合わせください.
この事件は解決しました。 影響を受けた方は、[email protected]までお問い合わせください.
##**Problem 記述、影響および決断** 10月22日、約14:45から16:13 UTCまで、フランクフルト\(FRA\)とムンバイ\(BOM\)のポイントのユーザーは、プレッスAPI呼び出しでエラー率とレイテンシが上昇している可能性があります。 その他のPubNubサービスは影響を受けません。 問題は、フランクフルトのプレゼンスサービスにソフトウェアアップデート中に始まりました。 新しいバージョンは以前のバージョンと互換性がなかったため、同時に実行されていました。 これにより、地域内のプレゼンスサーバーが繰り返し再起動し、健康なサーバーが返されたエラーに達していないリクエストが発生した。 私たちのチームは、原因として更新を識別し、それをロールバックしました。 約16:13 UTCで通常のサービスに戻りました。 ##**Mitigation Steps and recommend 今後の予防措置** このアップデートが再びリリースされる前に、不適合性を修正しています。 また、すべての Presence リリースの前に、古いバージョンと新しいバージョンのサイドで実行するテストを追加し、一度に 1 つの可用性ゾーンを更新し、ロールバックの手順を改善することで、互換性のないバージョンを一緒に実行しません.
公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。
セキュリティ証明書の更新のエラーは、一部のクライアントが接続の問題が発生する可能性があります。 調査を行い、詳細を調べて更新します.
今後もこの問題について調査を続けてまいります.
私たちは、問題を特定し、是正に十分である。 問題が発生した場合は、[email protected]までお問い合わせ下さい.
この問題の修正を完了しました。 影響はマイナーでした: エンドユーザのみが問題を報告しましたが、追加の影響を監視しています。 レポートに関連した問題がある場合は、[email protected]までご連絡下さい.
本件に関する追加報告はありません。 影響を受けた方は、[email protected]までお問い合わせください。 後期が続く.
##**Problem 記述、影響および決断** 10月21日の19:26 UTCから10月22日に約0204 UTCまで、PubNubエンドポイントは、当社の証明書の権限が取り消されたTLS証明書を提供しました。 証明書の取消を確認するクライアントは、そのウィンドウの間に影響を受けるエンドポイントに接続できませんでした。 当社の認証当局は、公表された証明書ポリシーに一致しなかったポリシー情報を含む発行された約400,000の証明書が発行されたことを発見しました。 証明書は妥協していませんが、業界規則は、そのような証明書を返済して置換する必要があります。 PubNubの証明書は、\*.pubnub.com、\*.pubnub.net、\*.pndsn.com、\*.pubnubapi.comの証明書は10月21日に再発されました。 交換証明書は、取消が効くまで、すべてのエンドポイントにデプロイされませんでした。 証明書の取消が確認されていないクライアントは影響を受けず、デフォルトのSDKの起源への接続もあった[ps.pndsn.com](http://ps.pndsn.com)。 お客様には、エンドユーザー様からお知らせいただきました。 10月22日(水)に、全地域に置換証明書を配備し、10月22日(水)に約2,04 UTCに完成しました。 ホスト名と証明書の有効期限 \(2027\) は変更されません。 ##**Mitigation Steps and recommend 今後の予防措置** 弊社が提供する証明書が再発された場合、当社の業務チームに警告する監視を追加します。 また、発行後速やかに商品化に展開し、証明書の更新が全ての地域に迅速に対応できるように、証明書交換プロセスも変更しています.
公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。
2026年10月9日、17:32 UTCにて、世界基準で5XXXのエラーレートとレイテンシが上昇しました。 問題は18:18 UTCによって解決され、サービスは正常なレベルに戻ってきました。 数に限りがございます。 根本原因分析は、今後数日間で公開されます。 誠に有難うございます。 影響を受け、議論したいと感じた場合は、[email protected]までご連絡ください.
##**Problem 記述、影響および決断** 2026年10月9日、17:30～18:20 UTCの間は、お客様のサブセットの購読エンドポイントに影響する HTTP 5xx のエラーが上昇したと見なしました。 購読リクエストが失敗し、メッセージのサブセットが遅延したり、リアルタイムで配信されていない場合があります。 メッセージが失われず、メッセージの永続性が有効になったお客様は、履歴から影響を受けたメッセージを取得できます。 インシデントは、想定された限界が設定されていない開発キーセットに対して、大量の負荷テストからトラフィックの予期しない増加によって引き起こされる。 得られた負荷は、問題を引き起こしたいくつかの共有インフラで一時的にメモリを排出しました。 過負荷を発生させるキーセットにレート制限を適用することにより、影響を受けるインフラを安定化しました。 18:20 UTCによって通常に戻されたサービス。 ##**Mitigation Steps and recommend 今後の予防措置** 影響を受けたキーセットの可用性を維持しながら、予期しないトラフィックと復元サービスを含む一時的な公開率制限を適用しました。 同様のインシデントを防ぐため、PubNubは、同じインフラストラクチャを共有する他のトラフィックに影響を与える可能性がある前に、保護策が正しく検出され、自動的に異常に負荷を制限するために、追加のチェックを追加します。 また、加入者のメモリおよび自動スケーリング変更の運用手順を更新し、事故緩和時に容量の調整が有効であることを確認します.
公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。
12:15 UTCと同様に、米国の東PoPのユーザーは、現在、そのサービスへの呼び出しに表示されないメッセージを引き起こしている公開および購読サービスの問題を経験しています。 メッセージが正しく返されないにもかかわらず、サービスからエラーが返されない。 課題を調査しています.
13:55 UTCの時点で、米国東PoPで公開およびサブスクリプションサービスに影響を与える問題が緩和されました。 総合的な監視は正常に戻り、見逃されたメッセージが検出されませんでした。 現時点では、監視障害に関連したと考えられています。 さらなる調査が進んでおり、サービスが密接に監視され続けています.
過去30分間の問題を抱えず、事故が解決しました。 根本原因解析ですぐにフォローアップします。 このインシデントに関連したインパクトを経験した方は、[email protected] にて、パブNubサポートにご連絡ください.
##**Problem 記述、影響および決断** 8月25日(火)、2026日(火)、12:10 UTCでは、内部監視は、1つの領域の1つの可用性ゾーン内のメッセージの非常に小さなサブセットであるという問題に警告しました\(米国東プレゼンスポイント)は、その同じ領域の加入者にすぐに配信されていないかもしれません。 すべてのメッセージは、通常、PubNub Persistenceサービス内で永続していたため、メッセージデータは失われませんでした。** 他の地域やAZへのトラフィックが影響されず、他のPubNubサービスは影響を受けませんでした。 顧客が影響を報告しませんでした。 ##**ルート原因** 計画された内部負荷テスト中に、サービスから内部ルーティングサーバーのグループが削除されました。 構成の欠陥により、ネットワークアドレスは完全に退職されず、公開レイヤーによってキャッシュされたままでした。 これは、ほとんどの部分に問題はありません。 しかし、同じプロトコルとポートで正常に応答した非関連な内部コンポーネントに1つのアドレスが再割り当てされました。 その応答が正常に現れたため、パブリッシングレイヤーはエラーを受けず、そのアドレスに送信されたメッセージは誤ってルーティングされた。 影響を受けたサーバーのロールリスタートは、13:25 UTC で古いアドレスをクリアしました。 ##**Mitigation Steps and recommend 今後の予防措置** * 影響を受けたサーバーが特定されたら、処理済みのルーティングアドレスをクリアするためにロールリスタートが実行されました。 * 根本原因を確認した調査に続いて、外出された内部ルーティングアドレスが正しく退職され、8月25日、22時22分に全世界の公開サーバーに展開されました.
公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。
From 13:55 to 14:15 UTC, users globally may have experienced errors with failure on Publish, and published messages may not have been received by subscribers. We also experienced errors and failures with PubNub Functions, and delays with Events & Actions during the period. Services have returned to normal and we are actively monitoring. A root cause analysis will be published in the coming days. If you believe you were impacted and would like to speak with us, please report impact to [email protected].
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** At approximately **13:55 UTC on Aug 14, 2026**, we observed elevated publish errors and message replication failures in our publish/subscribe service, which also caused latency in other PubNub services globally. Customers may have experienced increased publish error rates, delayed or missed message delivery, delayed message persistence, and increased latency for Functions and Events & Actions workflows. The root cause of the incident was an unusually large concentration of global publish traffic that was not limited by our throttling layers. That traffic created resource pressure in the publish and replication layers, increased load on storage systems, and caused downstream processing delays in dependent services. We mitigated the issue by adjusting targeted traffic controls, increasing capacity for affected publish and replication components, and isolating the high-volume traffic pattern to reduce broader platform impact. The issue was resolved at approximately **14:15 UTC on Aug 14, 2026**. This issue occurred because of an issue with our automated controls specific to this exceptional traffic pattern. As a result, the increased load affected multiple services before a mitigation could be fully applied. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, we have isolated the identified high-volume traffic pattern onto dedicated infrastructure and also increased baseline capacity for the affected components across our PoPs. We are also further strengthening our traffic detection and management processes for this exceptional load pattern so it will be identified and contained earlier without cascading impact across dependent services.
Starting at 17:00 UTC on June 10, a subset of publishes originating from the North America POP failed to replicate to subscribers globally. PubNub Technical Staff is investigating, and more information will be posted as it becomes available.
The PubNub Technical Staff identified that failures are limited to publishes from US-East and has identified, have applied a fix, and are now monitoring the results. If you are experiencing issues that you believe to be related to this incident, please report the details to PubNub Support ([email protected]).
Services have returned to normal. A root cause analysis will be published in the coming days. If you believe you were impacted and would like to speak with us, please report impact to [email protected].
## Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution At 19:50 UTC on June 10, 2026, we observed a small fraction of publishes originating from US-EAST-1 failing to replicate to subscribers globally. We removed the degraded publisher pod from service and the issue was resolved at 21:21 UTC on June 10, 2026. The root cause of the incident was triggered by a single process that fell into a degraded state where it continued receiving inbound traffic and passing health checks, but traffic sent outbound from the process was failing at an abnormally high rate. Our automated health check/recovery system did not auto-detect and replace the degraded process because its health check API reported itself as healthy. ## Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, we are improving the data within our health check APIs to return more complete performance metrics over a rolling time window. We are enhancing the issue detection logic to detect more patterns that infer process failure, even if the process itself is reporting as healthy.
From 13:20 to 13:48 UTC, users globally may have experienced errors with failure on Publish, and published messages may not have been received by subscribers. We also experienced errors and failures with PubNub Functions, and delays with Events & Actions during the period. Services have returned to normal and we are actively monitoring. A root cause analysis will be published in the coming days. If you believe you were impacted and would like to speak with us, please report impact to [email protected].
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** At approximately **13:20 UTC on June 9, 2026**, we observed elevated publish errors and message replication failures in our publish/subscribe service, which also caused latency in other PubNub services globally. Customers may have experienced increased publish error rates, delayed or missed message delivery, delayed message persistence, and increased latency for Functions and Events & Actions workflows. The root cause of the incident was an unusually large concentration of global publish traffic that was not limited by our throttling layers. That traffic created resource pressure in the publish and replication layers, increased load on storage systems, and caused downstream processing delays in dependent services. We mitigated the issue by adjusting targeted traffic controls, increasing capacity for affected publish and replication components, and isolating the high-volume traffic pattern to reduce broader platform impact. The issue was resolved at approximately **13:48 UTC on June 9, 2026**. This issue occurred because we did not have sufficient automated controls and isolation processes in place to protect shared infrastructure from this type of exceptional traffic pattern. As a result, the increased load affected multiple services before mitigation could be fully applied. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, we have isolated the identified high-volume traffic pattern onto dedicated infrastructure and also increased baseline capacity for the affected components across our PoPs. We are also further strengthening our traffic detection and management processes for exceptional load patterns so they can be identified and contained earlier without cascading impact across dependent services.
As of 19:27 UTC, we are investigating reports of connectivity issues affecting a subset of subscriptions across several global regions. While the majority of the PubNub network is operating normally, users on the affected segment may experience: - Connection delays and increased latency. - Intermittent errors when subscribing to channels. Our engineering team has identified the cause and is actively working to restore stability. We will provide updates as soon as more information is available.
The incident has been resolved. If you believe you were impacted by the incident and wish to discuss it with our team, please contact us by email at [email protected]
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** On March 24, 2026, at 19:27 UTC, one network shard experienced intermittent connectivity affecting a subset of customers. The affected users may have experienced elevated latency and temporary error responses related to their subscription requests. The instability was caused by an atypical surge in message volume within a shared processing environment that had improperly configured resource limits. This led to high resource utilization and triggered automated system restarts. PubNub Engineering resolved the issue by implementing the proper limits after expanding infrastructure capacity to accommodate the increased load. Service was fully stabilized once the environment was tuned to the new traffic profile. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** **Infrastructure Tuning:** Adjusted automated scaling parameters to provide greater headroom for rapid traffic fluctuations. **Enhanced Traffic Management:** Deployed refined monitoring heuristics to better isolate and manage high-volume traffic patterns without impacting shared resources. **Dynamic Resource Allocation:** Accelerating the rollout of enhanced vertical scaling technology to allow individual processing nodes to adapt more fluidly to demand spikes. **Operational Coordination:** Strengthening internal protocols for high-capacity events to ensure large-scale traffic shifts are proactively transitioned to dedicated environments.
Starting at 12:13AM GMT, we began seeing delays in published messages being written to history storage. Users may be unable to access recently stored messages through History API calls. The messages will eventually be published. Our engineers are actively working to address the issue and we will provide updates here. If you feel your service has been impacted and you would like to discuss, please email [email protected].
A fix has been applied and we are monitoring the results. Published messages waiting on queue to be written to history have now been successfully written. We will continue to monitor for the next 15 minutes.
The incident has been resolved. Published messages continue to be written to history storage normally. No messages were lost during the incident. If you believe you were impacted by the incident and wish to discuss it with our team, please contact us by email at [email protected]
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** On January 1, 2026 at 00:00 UTC, we observed elevated latency in our History service across multiple regions. Customers may have experienced delays in message persistence and history availability during this period. The issue was caused by a mismatch in newly created persistence tables. Specifically, required columns for message metadata were missing from the new tables, resulting in failed write operations and backed-up queues. This created downstream pressure on our storage systems, leading to higher latency in history processing. We mitigated the issue by manually applying the correct updates across all affected persistence spaces. After the updates were applied, message processing returned to normal and queue latency cleared. This issue occurred because we did not have proper controls in place to ensure schema consistency for newly generated monthly persistence tables. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To resolve the issue, we manually applied the required schema updates globally. In the coming days, we will update our change management processes to ensure schema changes are correctly applied to all future monthly tables. We are also auditing our schema tracking and automating validation to prevent inconsistencies across environments. These improvements will ensure that future table generation includes all necessary columns and reduce the risk of similar issues impacting History service performance.
Increased errors (5XX) observed On Nov. 20, 2025 between 16:36 UTC and 16:48 UTC, publish and replication errors (5xx) were observed in North American and Asia Pacific regions, and immediately resolved. Please contact [email protected] if you believe you were impacted by the issue and would like to discuss it with our team.
**Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** Starting at 16:46 UTC on Nov. 20, 2025, we noticed a small number of errors with the publish API in the North American and Asia Pacific regions. The system automatically recovered with all functionality fully restored by 16:50 UTC on Nov. 20, 2025.
Beginning at 12:40 UTC, we observed increased latency and errors in our US-West region for multiple services. PubNub Technical Staff is currently investigating, and more updates will follow once available.
We are continuing to investigate this issue.
Apologies, but we are continuing to investigate this issue.
We are still working with our infrastructure provider to mitigate the effects of the ongoing issues. We have been monitoring and handling traffic to minimize disruptions. While points of presence in the US may see slightly higher latencies, we are stable. Please reach out to PubNub support to report issues.
We are still stable, but seeing minor issues. We are still working with our infrastructure provider to address the remaining issues. Please reach out to PubNub support with any issues.
PubNub remains stable and fully operational. Our infrastructure provider is continuing to apply mitigation steps to restore normal health across their network and related services. We are closely monitoring the situation and coordinating with them to ensure continued stability. Please reach out to PubNub Support if you experience any service issues.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
PubNub continues to remains stable, with only minor issues being observed. Our infrastructure provider is making progress in restoring their services, with early signs of recovery in several regions. We continue to work closely with them as they complete mitigations across the remaining areas. Please reach out to PubNub Support if you experience any impact.
PubNub remains stable, with only minor issues being observed. Our infrastructure provider is making progress in restoring their services, with early signs of recovery in several regions. We continue to work closely with them as they complete mitigations across the remaining areas. Please reach out to PubNub Support if you experience any impact.
Our status is the same: stable, and working with our infrastructure provider to restore services to their normal state. Our normal policy is to update every 30 minutes, but we will stop issuing this status; we will update this page when a change to the status occurs. As always, reach out to PubNub support with any issues.
PubNub remains stable, and our infrastructure provider continues to make steady progress in restoring services. System performance and reliability are improving, and functionality across affected components is returning to normal levels. We continue to monitor closely and will share additional updates as recovery progresses. We will provide another update when there are any changes in status which we expect within the hour. Please contact PubNub Support if you experience any impact.
PubNub remains stable, and our infrastructure provider has restored normal service capacity. Systems are now operating at pre-event levels, and most dependent services are performing as expected. We continue to monitor closely and will share further updates as needed. Please contact PubNub Support if you experience any impact.
This incident has been fully resolved. Our infrastructure provider has restored normal operations, and all systems are functioning as expected. Service performance and reliability have returned to pre-event levels. PubNub continues to monitor systems closely to ensure ongoing stability and we will provide an RCA in in the next couple of day. Thank you for your patience and understanding throughout this event. If you experience any further issues, please reach out to PubNub Support.
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** On October 20th, 2025 at 07:06 UTC, our monitoring systems alerted us to elevated error levels across multiple PubNub services in the IAD region \(US-East\). Some customers may have experienced increased error rates and latency, as well as intermittent issues with Presence service availability across IAD \(US-East\), SJC \(US-West\), and HND \(AP-Northeast\). We quickly determined the issue was caused by a broader infrastructure outage affecting our cloud provider \(AWS\) in the IAD region. We initiated regional failover procedures and re-routed new connections to alternate regions. However, due to undefined steps in some of our failover processes and delays accessing some tools due to the provider issue, existing connections for some services remained degraded for longer than expected. To restore full service, we manually reset established connections, re-routed Presence traffic to Frankfurt \(EU-Central\), and brought on additional infrastructure in other regions to absorb traffic. Errors were mitigated by 09:20 UTC. Later in the day, additional regional load in US-West triggered a new wave of service degradation. We responded by isolating the US-East region again and scaling up balancer capacity in US-West. PubNub services were stabilized by 13:20 UTC, and remained in a monitoring state while our infrastructure provider worked to fully resolve the underlying issue. By 22:35 UTC, our provider reported full restoration of service. After validating stability in US-East, we completed rebalancing traffic by 23:48 UTC, and declared the incident resolved. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** While this incident was caused by an external infrastructure outage, we’ve identified several opportunities to strengthen our internal readiness and response procedures. We are consolidating and centralizing our regional failover procedures to ensure they are immediately accessible and complete for all production services. Any gaps in our process documentation for newer services will be addressed to ensure readiness before they are fully adopted into production. Additionally, we are reviewing and resolving issues with internal tooling, including inventory and DNS resolution problems, which made mitigation more difficult during the incident. These improvements will ensure faster and more consistent responses to future infrastructure-level disruptions, and reduce potential impact on customer traffic across regions.
At approximately 07:02 UTC, PubNub services began experiencing elevated latencies and server errors in the US-West and US-East regions. PubNub Technical Staff is currently investigating, and more updates will follow once available.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
With no further issues observed for the past 30 minutes, the incident has been resolved. We will follow up soon with a root cause analysis. If you believe you experienced an impact related to this incident, please report it to PubNub Support at [email protected].
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** On October 20th, 2025 at 07:06 UTC, our monitoring systems alerted us to elevated error levels across multiple PubNub services in the IAD region \(US-East\). Some customers may have experienced increased error rates and latency, as well as intermittent issues with Presence service availability across IAD \(US-East\), SJC \(US-West\), and HND \(AP-Northeast\). We quickly determined the issue was caused by a broader infrastructure outage affecting our cloud provider \(AWS\) in the IAD region. We initiated regional failover procedures and re-routed new connections to alternate regions. However, due to undefined steps in some of our failover processes and delays accessing some tools due to the provider issue, existing connections for some services remained degraded for longer than expected. To restore full service, we manually reset established connections, re-routed Presence traffic to Frankfurt \(EU-Central\), and brought on additional infrastructure in other regions to absorb traffic. Errors were mitigated by 09:20 UTC. Later in the day, additional regional load in US-West triggered a new wave of service degradation. We responded by isolating the US-East region again and scaling up balancer capacity in US-West. PubNub services were stabilized by 13:20 UTC, and remained in a monitoring state while our infrastructure provider worked to fully resolve the underlying issue. By 22:35 UTC, our provider reported full restoration of service. After validating stability in US-East, we completed rebalancing traffic by 23:48 UTC, and declared the incident resolved. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** While this incident was caused by an external infrastructure outage, we’ve identified several opportunities to strengthen our internal readiness and response procedures. We are consolidating and centralizing our regional failover procedures to ensure they are immediately accessible and complete for all production services. Any gaps in our process documentation for newer services will be addressed to ensure readiness before they are fully adopted into production. Additionally, we are reviewing and resolving issues with internal tooling, including inventory and DNS resolution problems, which made mitigation more difficult during the incident. These improvements will ensure faster and more consistent responses to future infrastructure-level disruptions, and reduce potential impact on customer traffic across regions.
We are currently investigating an incident that could lead to some missed messages by subscribers in the IAD region. All messages are being received and persisted, and can be retrieved from the Storage service. This incident started around 22:07 UTC (03:07 PDT) on 16th Oct 2025. We suspect a moderate impact. Please report any impact related to this incident to [email protected] with any details that you can provide.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
There have been no further issues for the past 45 minutes. We are resolving this issue, and we will follow up with a post-mortem soon.
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** On October 17, 2025 at 04:51 UTC, some customers may have experienced elevated latency and error rates with the Pub/Sub service in the IAD region \(US-East\). Our engineering teams began immediate investigation and identified a spike in errors related to a recent update to the Pub/Sub service. We began formal incident response and initiated rollback of the service deployment shortly thereafter. The issue was fully resolved by 06:50 UTC, and rollback across all regions was completed by 08:00 UTC. The issue occurred because a misconfiguration in the release caused incorrect behavior in the channel cleanup logic. Additionally, our alerting configuration did not include coverage for the synthetic test failures that would have surfaced this issue sooner, delaying detection. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, our engineering teams have written a simpler and more reliable replacement for the faulty logic. That code is currently undergoing rigorous testing before being reintroduced in a future release. We are also addressing the lack of proper alerting that contributed to a delayed response. Synthetic tests have been reviewed, and appropriate alerting will be implemented to ensure similar regressions are detected earlier. In parallel, we are updating our development and testing processes to catch such issues before code reaches production. Lastly, we are conducting a refresher training on our incident response process to ensure faster execution and coordination in the future.
At about 08:40 UTC, the Event & Action publish operation began to experience elevated error rates. Our Technical Staff is actively investigating, and more information will be posted as it becomes available. If you are experiencing issues that you believe are related to this incident, please report the details to PubNub Support ([email protected]).
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
With no further issues observed, the incident has been resolved. We will follow up soon with a root cause analysis. If you believe you experienced an impact related to this incident, please report it to PubNub Support at [email protected].
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** At 08:40 UTC on October 6, 2025, we observed elevated error rates in the Events & Actions service in our EU-Central \(FRA\) region, which led to delays in processing publish-triggered events. Some customers may have experienced slower-than-expected execution of their event workflows during this time. We identified a malformed payload that was causing backend consumers to fail when attempting to process the queue. We deployed an updated build with improved parsing logic, which cleared the blockage and restored normal service. The issue was fully resolved by 11:00 UTC on October 6, 2025. This issue occurred because our event processing service did not correctly handle a malformed message format, which caused the processing queue to stall. Additionally, the alerting system in place was not configured to detect this failure mode promptly, delaying our response. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To reduce the risk of similar delays in the future, we are refining our alert thresholds and naming conventions to improve early detection and clarity during response. We are also reviewing validation logic to ensure malformed messages are consistently isolated before reaching backend queues.
We experienced increased latencies and error rates in our Tokyo, San Jose, and Virginia points-of-presence from 18:14 - 18:17 UTC. A fix was deployed and we are monitoring the situation.
The issues affected the Presence service from 18:14 - 18:17 UTC. We will follow up with a post-mortem soon. We apologize for the impact this may have had on your service. Please reach out to us by contacting PubNub Support ([email protected]) if you wish to discuss the impact on your service.
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** At 18:14 UTC on September 7, 2025 we observed increased error rates and latency for our Presence service in our San Jose, Virginia, and Tokyo regions. We increased capacity in those regions and the issue was resolved at 18:17 UTC. This issue was a recurrence of the issue [experienced on September 2, 2025](https://status.pubnub.com/incidents/1n8xk6w5y9lk), where a bug in one of our APIs allowed a request to execute an operation that exceeded assumed limits in extreme cases, causing out-of-memory conditions for the Presence service. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** In the previous instance of this issue, we placed restrictions on the API in question; those changes were not restrictive enough, which allowed for this recurrence. We have corrected that oversight, as well as increased memory capacities in this area of our system as an additional safeguard.
At about 11:09, the Presence began to experience elevated latencies and error rates. PubNub Technical Staff is investigating and more information will be posted as it becomes available. If you are experiencing issues that you believe to be related to this incident, please report the details to PubNub Support ([email protected]).
The issues affected the Presence service from 18:08 to 18:16 UTC. We will follow up with a post-mortem soon. We apologize for the impact this may have had on your service. Please reach out to us by contacting PubNub Support ([email protected]) if you wish to discuss the impact on your service.
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** At 18:09 UTC on September 2, 2025 we observed increased error rates and latency for our Presence service in our San Jose, Virginia, and Tokyo regions. We increased capacity in those regions and the issue was resolved at 18:16 UTC. This issue occurred because a bug in one of our APIs allowed a request to execute an operation that exceeded assumed limits in extreme cases. In this case, a large number of such requests were executed that resulted in out-of-memory conditions for the Presence service. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future we have enforced the intended limit on the API in question. We have also added additional testing and monitoring in this area.
We have detected elevated error levels with the Presence service in multiple regions. Our Engineers are actively working to mitigate the issues and return service to normal levels. We will provide updates here. If you believe you have been impacted by the issue, please report impact to [email protected].
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented. We will provide updates here as progress is made.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
With no further issues observed, the incident has been resolved. We will follow up soon with a root cause analysis. If you believe you experienced an impact related to this incident, please report it to PubNub Support at [email protected].
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** On August 1, 2025 at 22:15 UTC, we observed elevated 5xx errors across the Presence service in multiple regions. Customers may have experienced intermittent failures when attempting to receive or update presence messages. We identified a subset of channels exhibiting highly concentrated activity patterns and applied a targeted configuration change to rebalance traffic across the cluster. The issue was resolved by 23:15 UTC on August 1, 2025. This issue occurred because our infrastructure lacked proactive safeguards to evenly distribute presence traffic across nodes in scenarios where a small number of channels receive a disproportionately high number of presence updates. This resulted in resource saturation on some nodes without triggering early mitigation. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** To prevent a similar issue from occurring in the future, we have applied a sharding configuration to affected channel patterns, which redistributes load more evenly across infrastructure components. This approach reduces the risk of overload caused by concentrated traffic. In the coming days we will be: * Reviewing long-term suitability of the sharding configuration applied during this incident. * Investigating automation options for dynamically applying sharding logic based on real-time usage patterns. * Enhancing internal tooling and monitoring to better detect and respond to load imbalance scenarios before they cause service degradation.
Between 15:33-15:59 UTC we observed elevated levels of latency and errors with our presence service in our FRA region. The issue has been resolved and remains stable. We apologize for the impact this may have had on your service. Please reach out to us by contacting PubNub Support ([email protected]) if you wish to discuss the impact on your service.
### **Problem Description, Impact, and Resolution** At 14:43 UTC on July 22, 2025, we observed elevated latency and service degradation in our Presence system in the FRA region, impacting customers' ability to receive timely presence events. We implemented changes in our infrastructure to mitigate the pressure on the system, and the incident ended at 15:06 UTC on July 22, 2025. Unfortunately, before we were able to conclusively determine and address the root cause, the issue re-occurred from 15:33 to 15:59 UTC on July 24, 2025. The failures started with an out-of-memory condition in some Presence service nodes. The root cause of the memory condition was a caching system—operated by a third-party vendor—that we rely heavily on for this service began responding slowly at first, and later timing out. While nodes that run into critical issues are generally taken out of service and replaced automatically, this issue began affecting our system faster than new capacity could be brought online to mitigate the incident. Furthermore, a bug in a downstream internal system caused it to also experience failures under the pressure due to a misconfiguration in how it retried failed requests caused by the Presence system’s issues. On the 22nd, we took manual action to break the retry cycle, scale capacity, and allow the Presence service to recover. On the 24th, we identified and addressed the root cause at the caching layer. ### **Mitigation Steps and Recommended Future Preventative Measures** In the short term, we have scaled the capacity of the Presence system and we implemented changes in the affected caching layer to mitigate the issue of the vendor-provided cache system. Longer term, we are working with the vendor to fix their underlying issue, while also exploring alternatives. We also changed the retry configuration to prevent this kind of retry storm from happening again. We implemented monitoring and alerts for this failure mode, to allow us to more quickly identify this kind of issue.
