Smarty の障害履歴

1. 2026年9月26日 15:51 UTCmonitoring

   15:23 UTCでは、サービスが断続的に利用できなくなったことを報告しました。 サービスは完全に復元され、すべてのシステムは正常に動作しています。 根本的な原因を調査し、密接に監視し続けます.

2. 2026年9月26日 16:49 UTCresolved

   事件が解決しました。 根本原因を発見するために、より徹底した調査を実施しております.

3. 2026年9月28日 19:03 UTCpostmortem

   **郵便番号** 2026年9月26日、15:28から15:39 UTCへのリクエストは、当社のAPIへのリクエストはスラブ的に失敗しました。 リクエストの大部分は、数分間直して拒否されました。 15:30 UTCの部分的な容量を短く回復させる地域がいくつかあります。 何が起こったのか: ロードバランサがディスクスペースから実行されるに依存する内部システム内のサーバーが、ピアノードに正しく失敗しなかった。 そのシステムが応答しなくなったとき、地域全体のさまざまな負荷バランサーが自動的に再起動し始めました。 弊社エンジニアは、影響を受けたシステムを15:37 UTCで健康なサーバーに移行し、サービスが15:39 UTCによって完全に復元されました。 私たちが何をしているのか: ディスク容量を増加させ、影響を受けるシステムにログ保持を変更しました。これにより、この方法で再びスペースを外すことはできません。 また、システムが利用できなくなったときにロードバランサーがどのように動作するかも変更していますので、シャットダウンの代わりにトラフィックをサービングし、影響を受ける前に問題が発生したことを警告しています.

公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。

1. 2026年9月10日 20:14 UTCinvestigating

   現在、ログインの問題点を調査し、すぐに解決したいと願っています。 製品の API は、影響を受けず、完全に操作できます.

2. 2026年9月10日 20:18 UTCinvestigating

   今後もこの問題について調査を続けてまいります.

3. 2026年9月10日 22:37 UTCresolved

   問題は解決しました。 影響を受けた唯一のサービスは、アカウント管理ポータルでした。 このインシデントは、当社のAPI(アドレス認証、オートコンプリート、ジオコーディングなど)への生産トラフィックに影響を与えませんでした

公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。

1. 2026年8月19日 0:49 UTCinvestigating

   US Street [Address] API の 503 エラーは、いくつかのリクエストに影響します。 現在調査中です.

2. 2026年8月19日 21:13 UTCresolved

   この事件は解決しました.

公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。

1. 2026年7月21日 22:30 UTCidentified

   19:00 UTC 以降は、US Street アドレス API から 503 応答コードを返すリクエストの割合が小さくなります。 現在進行中ですが、完成したら更新はこのページに掲載されます.

2. 2026年7月21日 22:33 UTCidentified

   この問題の修正には引き続き取り組んでいます。

3. 2026年7月21日 22:56 UTCmonitoring

   修正が実装され、艦隊に転がります。 結果を監視しています.

4. 2026年7月21日 23:10 UTCmonitoring

   ロールアウトが完了します。 今後も監視を続けてまいります.

5. 2026年7月22日 0:34 UTCresolved

   この事件は解決しました.

公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。

1. 2026年6月3日 20:17 UTCresolved

   SUMMARY We are rotating the Let's Encrypt intermediate certificates used to issue the TLS certificates that secure our services. Our certificates will continue to chain to the same trusted root — ISRG Root X1 — but through Let's Encrypt's new "Generation Y" intermediate hierarchy. For the vast majority of customers, no action is required. If your systems validate our certificates against the public root store — the default for virtually all browsers, operating systems, and HTTP client libraries — this change is completely transparent. The only customers who may be affected are those who pin a specific Let's Encrypt intermediate certificate. WHY WE'RE MAKING THIS CHANGE The intermediate certificates currently in our chain are approaching the end of their lifecycle, with the existing intermediate path expiring in approximately nine months. Rotating well ahead of that deadline guarantees uninterrupted certificate issuance and renewal with no disruption to your integrations. THE CHAIN OF TRUST A TLS certificate is never validated on its own. It is verified through a chain that links the connection back to a root certificate your device already trusts. Today, our certificates chain like this: Your connection → Smarty leaf certificate → Let's Encrypt intermediate → ISRG Root X1 After this update, they will chain like this: Your connection → Smarty leaf certificate → Let's Encrypt Generation Y intermediate (YR / YE) → ISRG Root YR / YE → ISRG Root X1 (via cross-sign) The destination is unchanged. Both the old and new paths terminate at ISRG Root X1, the RSA root that ships in every current major trust store. Let's Encrypt cross-signed its new Generation Y roots with the existing X1 and X2 roots specifically so that anything already trusting X1 continues to work without modification. The path is longer; the anchor of trust is identical.

1. 2026年4月24日 17:39 UTCresolved

   At 00:00 UTC on April 17, A scheduled certificate renewal updated the CA chain served by api.smartystreets.com. The change was made without advance notice to integrators, and the new chain is anchored by Sectigo roots (USERTrust ECC Certification Authority and USERTrust RSA Certification Authority) that are not present in some older trust stores. Clients on current operating systems, browsers, and runtimes continue to work without change. Connections may fail for systems that: - Use a custom or pinned TLS trust bundle that does not include USERTrust ECC Certification Authority. - Run Java 8 installations predating update 51 (mid-2015) or earlier Java versions — these do not ship USERTrust ECC Certification Authority in the default cacerts keystore. - Run other environments with outdated trust stores, including older Android devices, legacy embedded and IoT hardware, and air-gapped systems. To restore connectivity, affected systems should either update to a current runtime or add the Sectigo roots (USERTrust ECC Certification Authority and USERTrust RSA Certification Authority) to their trust store. Please reach out to support for assistance.

1. 2026年3月16日 22:35 UTCresolved

   Around 22:00 UTC the US [Address] Autocomplete Pro API service in one of our datacenters went offline due to a misconfiguration. The problem was quickly identified and rectified. All other datacenters were unaffected.

1. 2026年3月6日 17:59 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an increase in 503 Service Unavailable errors. We will provide an update as soon as more information is available.

2. 2026年3月6日 21:16 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been identified and we are currently monitoring overall system health.

3. 2026年3月10日 15:58 UTCresolved

   The issue has been resolved. A small number of nodes experienced large memory consumption which resulted in a few 503 errors being returned. This has been resolved and measures have been put in place to mitigate this in the future. Additional alerts and monitors have also been put in place.

1. 2026年2月18日 0:40 UTCresolved

   Around 19:15 UTC an incorrect configuration was deploy to our US Extract API service. The problem was quickly detected and reverted.

1. 2025年11月27日 0:32 UTCmonitoring

   We've identified an issue affecting one of our redundant facilities. As a precaution, it has been taken out of active rotation while we investigate.

2. 2025年12月1日 17:07 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 2025年10月30日 22:36 UTCmonitoring

   During a routine data deployment, we noticed a brief spike in 5xx error responses. Systems have since stabilized, and we're investigating the root cause to confirm the issue is fully resolved and to prevent similar behavior in future deployments.

2. 2025年11月4日 15:35 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 2025年7月18日 16:25 UTCresolved

   We have become aware that Google services have been exhibiting some intermittent failures. As a result, anyone using "Login with Google" to access their account dashboard on our website may also experience a failure to login. When Google is able to resolve the issues they are having, the login will continue to work as normal. In the meantime, if you have created a username and password, you should be able to use those to login.

1. 2025年5月15日 14:32 UTCresolved

   We discovered that the "API Keys" page in our Account dashboard web site was not able to retrieve the lists of keys from the backend service. This has now been fixed.

1. 2025年3月18日 22:11 UTCresolved

   Around 19:10 UTC, increased traffic exposed resource limitations caused by a previously implemented algorithm update, leading to issues on several servers hosting some of our services (US Street API, US Extract API) in one of our data centers due to insufficient RAM. To ensure stability and service reliability, the affected servers have been decommissioned and replaced with upgraded hardware.

1. 2025年2月26日 20:31 UTCresolved

   The US Enrichment API intermittently returned HTTP 500 codes in a single data center on 2025 February 26 around 17:00 UTC. The issue has been resolved as of 17:35 UTC.

1. 2025年2月7日 21:15 UTCresolved

   Around 18:00 UTC, one of our facilities experienced a network routing issue that lasted for about 30 minutes. The facility was removed from DNS rotation until the network issue had been resolved. If you have not yet read through our "Technical Requirements" and "Best Practices" documentation, this could be a good opportunity to become familiar with those important and helpful documents. - https://www.smarty.com/docs/cloud/requirements#retry - https://www.smarty.com/docs/cloud/best-practices

1. 2025年1月10日 21:12 UTCresolved

   From 01/08 12pm UTC to 01/09 9am UTC some requests to the US Street [Address] API instances experienced an intermittent issue with certain malformed addresses that caused some requests to not get a response, returning HTTP 503 errors to those requests. This affected a small number of requests and the error has since been resolved.

1. 2024年12月30日 22:32 UTCresolved

   During a regular upgrade of our control plane, several controller nodes became unresponsive. This resulted in various routing issues which were manifest by intermittent HTTP 503 errors visible in the HTTP response to some callers. Our monitoring systems alerted our Operations Engineering Team of the anomaly and, as a result, the affected cluster, located in our US Central region (Chicago), was immediately removed from production rotation. The affected cluster has been restored to full health by provisioning new cloud resources using our IaC (infrastructure as code) systems. Following this, the cluster was confirmed to be was healthy via our automated monitoring and was subsequently re-introduced into active rotation.

1. 2024年12月20日 16:11 UTCresolved

   On 2024 December 19, around 22-24:00 UTC, some users may have received the HTTP 299 code in response to requests from one of our loadbalancers. The reason for this response has been identified and remediated. We would like to take this opportunity to remind our users to familiarize themselves with our best practices. https://www.smarty.com/docs/cloud/best-practices

1. 2024年12月9日 19:45 UTCresolved

   Around 15:00 (3pm) UTC on 2024 November 28, a single IP address at one of our datacenters experienced a routing issue that caused some requests to be "null routed", which may have resulted in some clients experiencing 500 level errors during that time. This issue persisted until 17:00 (5pm) UTC on 2024 November 28, at which time our upstream provider resolved the issue. Our recommendation to clients to mitigate an issue such as this in the future is to maintain a pool of active TCP connections to the server nodes and to only send traffic over active, healthy TCP connections. Then a background "thread" (or programmatic equivalent) could attempt to connect to the suspect IPv4 address. Once that connection has determined to be healthy, regular traffic can be resumed over that TCP connection.