Tink の障害履歴

1. 2026年7月16日 8:17 UTCinvestigating

   現在、いくつかのTink製品に影響を及ぼす問題について調査しています。 影響を受けた製品の完全なリストについては、詳細を参照してください.

2. 2026年7月16日 8:42 UTCidentified

   問題は特定され、現在解決に取り組んでいます.

3. 2026年7月16日 8:55 UTCidentified

   この問題の修正には引き続き取り組んでいます。

4. 2026年7月16日 9:11 UTCmonitoring

   現在、サービスが復旧しており、状況を積極的に監視しています.

5. 2026年7月20日 12:47 UTCresolved

   この問題は解決しました。 大変申し訳ございません.

6. 2026年7月22日 13:26 UTCpostmortem

   ## 紹介 7月16日 09:54と10:56 CEST Tink は、Tink Console、Tink Link、Payment Initiation Services、アカウント情報サービス、および選択したリスク製品に影響を及ぼす技術的な問題を経験しました。 インシデントの期間中、エンドユーザは認証、同意、アカウント情報、支払い開始のプロセスを開始または完了する問題を経験し、Tink ConsoleにログインしてTinkプラットフォームとの統合を管理することができませんでした。 ## ルート原因分析 徹底した調査の後、Tink のクラウドプロバイダーが提供する外部インフラの依存性が、顧客に直面したトラフィックの誤動作をルーティングし、Tink Link ベースのユーザー ジャーニーの中断や、Tink Console へのアクセスの一時的な不当性が一部の顧客向けに向上しました。 ## 修正 問題が特定されたら、Tink は、代替構成を介して影響を受けたトラフィックをルーティングし、影響を受けたサービスを正常な操作に復元しました。 ##フォローアップアクション 今後同様の問題を防ぐため、以下の取り組みを実施します。 1. 重要な外部インフラの依存性を監視し、警告を改善します。 2. 同様の故障を回避するための回復手順を文書化し、検証します。 3. より速い同一インフラ関連の問題の特定および処理のための付加的な訓練を実行して下さい.

公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。

1. 2026年7月7日 13:39 UTCinvestigating

   現在、いくつかのTink製品に影響を及ぼす問題について調査しています。 影響を受けた製品の完全なリストについては、詳細を参照してください.

2. 2026年7月7日 13:54 UTCmonitoring

   現在、サービスが復旧しており、状況を積極的に監視しています.

3. 2026年7月8日 13:37 UTCresolved

   この問題は解決しました。 大変申し訳ございません.

4. 2026年7月9日 14:31 UTCpostmortem

   **導入** 2026-07-07 で 15:26 と 15:51 CEST, Tink は、お客様の API の可用性に影響を与える技術的な問題を経験しました. インシデント中、エンドユーザーは、影響を受けるTinkサービスにアクセスした問題を経験しました。 **ルート原因分析** 徹底した調査の後、一時的な API の可用性の問題が特定され、正常に対処されたイベント。 **是正** 問題が特定されたら、Tink はサービスの可用性を回復し、同様のイベントに対するレジリエンスを改善するための追加の保護策を実装しました。 **フォローアップアクション** 今後同様の問題を防ぐため、以下の取り組みを実施します。 1. 関連する生産環境に保護制御を強化します。 2. 監視および応答手順を改善し、高影響の可用性イベント。 3. 類似事故の影響を減らすためにサービスのレジリエンスを見直し、高めて下さい.

公式のインシデント更新を自動翻訳しています。

1. 2026年6月22日 15:13 UTCresolved

   Between June 20th, 02:00 CEST and June 22nd, 13:40 CET Tink has experienced degraded performance with webhooks. We have pinpointed the root cause of the issue and resolved it. We are sorry any issues this may have caused.

1. 2026年6月16日 10:15 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and we are currently working on a solution.

2. 2026年6月16日 11:32 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 2026年6月2日 9:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with Payment Initiation.

2. 2026年6月2日 10:25 UTCmonitoring

   Service is currently recovering and we are actively monitoring the situation.

3. 2026年6月3日 8:31 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 2026年6月1日 0:35 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and we are currently working on a solution.

2. 2026年6月1日 4:53 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 2026年5月28日 16:47 UTCidentified

   We have identified and are currently investigating an issue with our provider which is affecting inbound Faster Payments Service (FPS), which may result in delays.

2. 2026年5月28日 18:02 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 2026年5月21日 21:52 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with payments in German market.

2. 2026年5月21日 22:47 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 2026年5月19日 9:53 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified and are currently investigating an issue with our provider which is affecting both outbound and inbound SEPA payments, which may result in delays.

2. 2026年5月21日 13:29 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to monitor an issue affecting both outbound and inbound SEPA payments. While some payments are processing, we cannot yet confirm full service restoration. We are actively investigating and will provide a further update as soon as possible. We apologise for the inconvenience.

3. 2026年5月22日 7:39 UTCresolved

   We can confirm that the previously identified issue affecting inbound and outbound SEPA payments has now been resolved. Payments are processing as expected. We apologise for the inconvenience caused and thank you for your patience.

1. 2026年5月11日 13:32 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with the account exclusion functionality, as accounts are not being excluded as intended. Further updates will be provided as soon as possible.

2. 2026年5月11日 14:19 UTCresolved

   The issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 2026年3月25日 9:15 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with Bulk Payments in Sweden.

2. 2026年3月25日 10:04 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 2026年3月19日 21:16 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently looking into an issue with Nordea bulk payments. The initiation for the SE market has been failing for about 3 hours.

2. 2026年3月20日 8:12 UTCresolved

   The issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 2026年3月5日 9:48 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with Payment initiations across multiple markets.

2. 2026年3月5日 10:19 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

3. 2026年3月10日 11:34 UTCpostmortem

   **Introduction**  On 5 March, between 10:31 CET and 10:59 CET, Tink experienced a technical issue that impacted the Payment Initiation service across multiple markets. The issue was detected immediately, and mitigation actions were taken promptly to limit the impact. During the incident window, some end users experienced difficulties when initiating payments.  **Root Cause Analysis**  Following a thorough investigation, it was determined that a recently introduced change contained a defect that caused unexpected request failures within the Payment Initiation service. This resulted in a temporary disruption to payment initiation flows in the affected markets.  **Remediation**  As soon as the issue was identified, the affected deployment was immediately rolled back. This action mitigated the impact and restored normal service functionality.  **Follow-up actions**  To reduce the risk of similar incidents in the future, Tink is taking the following actions:  1. **Extend test coverage for payment initiation scenarios** Further strengthen the pre-deployment validation for payment flows by expanding our end-to-end test coverage for payment flows.

1. 2026年3月3日 13:03 UTCresolved

   We experienced a technical issue between 2 March 11:30 CET and 3 March 13:42 CET that caused degraded performance of Transactions and Risk reporting. During this time, some users may have experienced empty reports or missing data when viewing or downloading Transactions and Risk reports. Performance has since returned to normal. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 2026年2月3日 15:53 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue with Analytics in Tink Console.

2. 2026年2月4日 8:09 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 2026年2月3日 10:42 UTCresolved

   We experienced a technical issue between 10:43 CET and 11:18 CET that caused a degraded performance of the Payment product. During this time some users in the FI and DE markets may have experienced issues with initiating payments. Performance has since returned to normal. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 2026年2月2日 17:15 UTCinvestigating

   We’re currently experiencing a major outage impacting Payments since 17:48 CET. Our team is investigating the issue, and we’ll share updates here as soon as possible.

2. 2026年2月2日 18:17 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved as of 19:01 CET. We apologize for the inconvenience.

3. 2026年2月5日 14:21 UTCpostmortem

   # Introduction  On 2 February 2026, between 17:48 and 19:01 CET, Tink experienced a technical issue that affected the availability of all Payments products across all markets. During this period of the incident, end‑users were unable to successfully initiate one‑time or bulk payments.  # Root Cause Analysis  Following a detailed investigation, it was determined that the incident was caused by an availability issue affecting a critical database table. As this table is a required dependency for multiple service flows, all flows relying on it were unable to function during the incident.   # Remediation  Once the issue was identified, a new copy of the database table was created to minimize the total duration of unavailability of our PIS \(Payment Initiation Service\) and restore normal service.  # Follow-up actions  To prevent similar issues in the future, Tink will be implementing the following actions:  1. Review alerting and improve monitoring of database table parameters

1. 2026年1月21日 9:33 UTCinvestigating

   We’re currently experiencing degraded performance affecting multiple products since 10:01 CET. Some users may encounter issues with availability.

2. 2026年1月21日 9:47 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved. We apologize for the inconvenience.

1. 2025年12月8日 10:14 UTCresolved

   We experienced Temporary outage on data enrichment service between 10.20 and 10:40 CET This resulted in increased of Http 503 responses. Performance has since returned to normal. We apologise for the inconvenience.

1. 2025年11月24日 14:29 UTCresolved

   We experienced a technical issue between 15:06 CET and 15:24 CET. During this time users had issues with availability of Tink products. Status has since returned to normal. We apologise for the inconvenience.

2. 2025年11月26日 15:50 UTCpostmortem

   # Introduction On 24th November between 15:06 and 15:30 CET Tink experienced a technical issue which impacted all products in all European markets. During the time of the incident, end-users were experiencing issues with initiating payments, fetching transactions, performing account and balance checks, generating risk reports. # Root Cause Analysis After a thorough investigation, it was found that the issue was caused by an attempt to resume a failed backup job on our main production database. Initiating a command to verify data integrity caused a lock on the database. # Remediation Once the issue was identified, the process which was causing the lock was terminated. # Follow-up actions To prevent similar issues in the future, Tink will be implementing the following actions: 1. We are strengthening our internal processes so that any resource-intensive commands meant to be run on production databases should go through internal review with full risk assessment and run on replicas and/or non-production environments first