Confluence 장애 기록

1. 2026년 8월 27일 AM 4:22 UTCinvestigating

   우리의 팀은이 문제를 확인했습니다 Jira 서비스 관리에 영향을 미치는. 가능한 한 빨리 업데이트하겠습니다.

2. 2026년 8월 27일 AM 4:25 UTCinvestigating

   Confluence, Jira Cloud 및 Jira Serivce Management 고객에 영향을 미치는 액세스 제품으로 문제를 조사하고 있습니다. 우리의 팀은 긴급하게 이 문제점을 투자하고 우리는 1 시간 안에 더 세부사항을 제공할 것입니다 또는 정보가 유효한 경우에 빨리.

3. 2026년 8월 27일 AM 4:33 UTCidentified

   우리의 팀은 Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management 및 Confluence에 영향을 미치는 문제에 대한 가능한 해결을 확인했습니다. 이것은 지금 충격을 입힌 지구에 구르고 우리는 1 시간 안에 새롭게 할 것입니다, 또는 더 많은 정보는 유효합니다.

4. 2026년 8월 27일 AM 4:51 UTCmonitoring

   Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management 및 Confluence를 로딩하는 문제에 대한 문제는 이제 복구되었습니다. 우리는 안정성을 확인하고 1 시간 이내에 업데이트를 제공하거나 더 많은 정보를 사용할 수 있도록 긴밀히 모니터링 할 것입니다.

5. 2026년 8월 27일 AM 5:16 UTCresolved

   에 27 8월 2026 UTC, Atlassian 제품은 Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management 및 Confluence는 혼란을 경험하고, 서비스가 영향을받는 사용자에게 사용할 수 없었습니다. 문제는 이제 해결되었습니다. 서비스는 일반적으로 모든 영향을받는 고객을 위해 운영됩니다. 이 사건에 대한 대중적인 postmortem는 사건의 우리의 가득 차있는 조사가 완료될 때 이 페이지에 유효합니다.

6. 2026년 9월 7일 AM 2:53 UTCpostmortem

   **월 ** 8 월 27, 2026, 사이 03:51 그리고 04:35 UTC, 서유럽과 동남 APAC 지역의 Atlassian 고객이 Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search 및 Talent를 포함한 Atlassian Cloud 제품을 도달할 수 없었다. 이 이벤트는 우리의 프록시 함대 중 하나의 라우팅 레이어로 결함 코드 변경에 의해 트리거되었습니다. 이 웹 사이트는 애플 리케이션에 전념. 우리는 정품 앱과 게임을 제공 할 목적으로이 사이트를 만들었습니다. 4AppsApk 최고의 안드로이드 애플 리케이션을위한 무료 APK 파일 다운로드 서비스입니다. 이 사건은 자동화된 감시 체계에 의해 1 분 안에 검출되고, 이전 윤곽 방출에 회전함으로써, 프록시 함대를 알려진 좋은 국가로 끼워넣었습니다. 프록시 함대가 복구 된 후, 일부 Jira 및 Confluence 고객 (위치의 무시)은 HTTP 503 오류를 받았습니다. 04:33 과 04:53 UTC 서버 함대는 트래픽의 영향력에 맞게 조정. **IMPACT ** 전반적인 충격은 2개의 분리된 기간으로 분할되었습니다: - 첫 번째, 27 8월 2026, 사이 03:51 고 04:35 아틀라스 분석 UTC, 나침반, 혼란, 초점, 가드, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo 검색, 그리고 재능. 사건은 Western Europe 및 Southeast APAC 지구에서 시작된 고객 교통에 대한 서비스 중단을 발생했습니다. HTTP 404 오류가 반환되었습니다. 원래 위치에 관계없이 고객 API 트래픽에 영향을 미치지 않았습니다. - 두 번째, 27 8 월 2026, 사이 04:33 그리고 04:53 UTC, 일부 Jira 및 오염 고객 HTTP 503 오류가 해결 된 후 HTTP 503 오류를받은 경우: ~32% ap-southeast-2, ~4% eu-west-1, ~2.5%의 요청에 대한 eu-west-2 및 ap-southeast-1, 그리고 <1%의 요청의 모든 나머지 지구. **ROOT 이용 ** 이벤트는 프록시 함대의 하나에 코드 변경에 의해 트리거되었습니다. 그러나 수동 및 자동화 테스트에 의해 감지되지 않은 코드에 결함이있었습니다. 이 proxy tier의 열렬한 조회 기능의 misconfiguration에 주도, 이는 유효한 네트워크 경로가 없는 트래픽을 주도하는 HTTP 404 오류로 인해 서유럽과 동남아 APAC 지역의 이러한 프록시 함대를 통해 모든 고객 트래픽에 제공. 프록시 계층 영향 복구 후, 영향의 두 번째 기간은 Jira 및 Confluence 고객에 기인되었습니다. Jira 및 Confluence에 전달되는 트래픽의 감소로 인해 프록시 함대, Jira 및 Confluence 서비스 계층은 고객 트래픽을 제공하는 서버 수에 자동으로 확장되었습니다. 프록시 함대 기능을 복원 한 후, 트래픽의 큰 파도는 Jira 서비스 계층을 압수했습니다. 이는 자동으로 다시 확장 될 때까지 HTTP 503s의 높은 비율을 반환합니다. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN 및 다음 단계 ** 생산성에 영향을 미칩니다. 테스트 및 예방 프로세스의 수를 가지고 있지만, 이 특정 문제는 변화가 자동화 된 연속 배포 스위트 및 수동 테스트 스크립트에 의해 픽업되지 않은 가장자리 케이스의 매우 특정 종류와 관련되었기 때문에 식별되지 않았습니다. 이 유형의 사건을 반복하는 것을 돕는 뒤에 오는 개선 행동을 전진하고 있습니다: - **추가 더 안전한 배포:** 임팩트 프록시 계층의 구성을위한 배포 파이프라인은 레거시 시스템을 사용하고 올바르게 구성 된 적절한 느린 지역 롤아웃 기능을하지 않았다. 우리는 이미 정확한 safeguards를 추가하고, 우리는 기본적으로 우리의 안전 통제를 포함하는 우리의 회사 표준 배치 파이프라인에 이것을 이동하고 있습니다. 우리는 또한 새로운 표준 파이프라인 배포 서비스에 모든 것을 검증하는 모든 네트워킹 서비스를 감사하고 있습니다. - ** 서비스 함대 사기 정책 : ** Jira 및 Confluence 서비스 함대에 대한 자동 스케일링 구성이 너무 공격적으로 스케일로 구성되었습니다. 우리는 완전히 복잡한 Jira 및 Confluence 자동 스케일링 정책을 검토하고 업데이트하여이가 다시 발생하지 않도록합니다. 우리는이 사건에 영향을 미치는 고객에게 사과합니다. 우리는 플랫폼의 성능과 가용성을 개선하기 위해 즉각적인 조치를 취합니다. 감사합니다, Atlassian 고객 지원

공식 인시던트 업데이트를 자동 번역했습니다.

1. 2026년 8월 25일 AM 8:42 UTCinvestigating

   Jira, JSM 및 Confluence의 이메일, 모바일 및 슬랙 알림에 대한 향상된 대기 시간 결과로 성능 향상의 보고서를 적극적으로 조사하고 있습니다. 우리의 팀은 문제 및 더 많은 정보를 다음 1 시간 이내에 공유됩니다.

2. 2026년 8월 25일 AM 9:44 UTCinvestigating

   우리의 팀은 충격적인 지역을 확인하고 문제점을 완화하기 위하여 적극적으로 일하고 있습니다. 우리는 우리가 공유하는 중요한 진전이 있는 경우에 시간, 또는 더 빨리 제안할 것입니다.

3. 2026년 8월 25일 AM 10:49 UTCinvestigating

   우리의 팀은 충격적인 지구의 하나에 있는 문제점을 완화하는 몇몇 정확한 측정을 가지고 가고 몇몇 개선을 관찰하고 있습니다. 우리는 상황을 모니터링하고 사건이 완전히 복구 될 때까지 필요한 조치를 취할 것입니다. 우리는 다음 2 시간 이내에 더 많은 업데이트를 제공 할 것입니다, 또는 우리가 공유하는 중요한 진전이 있다면 더 빨리.

4. 2026년 8월 25일 PM 1:01 UTCmonitoring

   우리의 팀은 문제점을 완화하고 약간 개선을 관찰하는 것을 계속합니다. 우리는 상황을 모니터링하고 사건이 완전히 복구 될 때까지 필요한 조치를 취할 것입니다. 우리는 다음 2 시간 이내에 더 많은 업데이트를 제공 할 것입니다, 또는 우리가 공유하는 중요한 진전이 있다면 더 빨리.

5. 2026년 8월 25일 PM 2:33 UTCresolved

   25th 8월 2026일, 일부 사용자는 이메일, 모바일 및 슬랙 알림에서 향상된 대기 시간을 경험할 수 있습니다. 문제는 이제 해결되었습니다, 그리고 서비스는 모든 고객을 위해 일반적으로 운영됩니다.

공식 인시던트 업데이트를 자동 번역했습니다.

1. 2026년 8월 24일 PM 7:22 UTCinvestigating

   JIRA, JSM 및 Confluence의 이메일, 모바일 및 Slack 알림에 대한 향상된 대기 시간으로 인한 성능 평가 보고서를 적극적으로 조사하고 있습니다. 우리는 더 많은 정보로 업데이트를 공유 할 것입니다.

2. 2026년 8월 24일 PM 8:25 UTCinvestigating

   JIRA, JSM 및 Confluence의 이메일, 모바일 및 Slack 알림에 영향을 미치는 증가 된 대기 시간을 조사하기 위해 우리의 팀은 세 가지 영향을 미쳤습니다.

3. 2026년 8월 24일 PM 9:30 UTCidentified

   우리는 문제의 가능성이 원인을 식별하고, 우리의 팀은 크게 완화에 노력하고 있습니다. 수정된 사용자는 JIRA, JSM 및 Confluence에 대한 이메일, 모바일 및 Slack 알림에서 지연 시간을 늘릴 수 있습니다. 우리는 더 많은 정보로 추가 업데이트를 계속 공유 할 것입니다.

4. 2026년 8월 24일 PM 11:15 UTCresolved

   8월 24일, 2026일, 일부 JIRA, JSM 및 Confluence 사용자는 이메일, 모바일 및 슬랙 알림의 증가 지연으로 인한 성능 향상을 경험할 수 있습니다. 이 문제는 새로 만들어진 알림을 위해 해결되고, 서비스는 일반적으로 작동합니다. 처리되는 이전 알림이 있을 수 있으며, 다음 몇 시간 내에 완료될 것으로 예상됩니다.

공식 인시던트 업데이트를 자동 번역했습니다.

1. 2026년 8월 21일 AM 7:16 UTCidentified

   우리는 Confluence의 Marketplace App Macros에 영향을 미치는 문제의 뿌리 원인을 발견했습니다. 사용자는 매크로를 올바르게 렌더링하지 않고 오류를 표시할 수 있습니다. 우리의 엔지니어링 팀은 뿌리 원인과 치료가 진행 중임을 확인했습니다. 우리는 다음 60 분에서 더 많은 업데이트를 제공합니다.

2. 2026년 8월 21일 AM 8:15 UTCidentified

   수정이 확인되었으며 현재 배포되고 있습니다. 사용자는 영향 받은 MarketPlace App - 매크로를 연결하여 올바른 렌더링을 시작할 수 있습니다. 수정이 완전히 전파되었습니다. 우리는 다음 2 시간 내에 더 많은 업데이트를 제공합니다.

3. 2026년 8월 21일 AM 10:10 UTCresolved

   에 21st 8월 2026, 사이 04:26 UTC 과 09:33 UTC, 일부 사용자는 Confluence에서 올바르게 렌더링하지 않는 매크로와 함께 문제가있을 수 있습니다. 문제는 이제 해결되고 서비스는 모든 고객을 위해 일반적으로 운영됩니다.

공식 인시던트 업데이트를 자동 번역했습니다.

1. 2026년 8월 12일 PM 8:11 UTCidentified

   Some Confluence Cloud users visiting public links saw a Something went wrong error page. The issue affected anonymous access paths for public links, and some related Confluence areas could also show the same error message.

2. 2026년 8월 12일 PM 10:13 UTCresolved

   On August 12, 2026 some Confluence users utilizing anonymous access via public links, may have experienced a 'Something went wrong' error message. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026년 7월 6일 AM 9:23 UTCinvestigating

   우리는 귀하의 서비스에 영향을 미치는 문제를 조사하고 있습니다. 우리는 적극적으로 원인을 확인하고 문제를 해결합니다. 우리는 1 시간 이내에 더 많은 업데이트를 제공 할 것입니다.

2. 2026년 7월 6일 AM 10:04 UTCmonitoring

   우리는 성공적으로 수정을 적용하고 복구를보고있다. 자동화 기능은 복원되고 일반적으로 앞으로 이동해야 합니다. 정전 기간 동안 제출된 데이터 처리 요청은 서비스 불균형으로 인해 완료되지 않았습니다. 우리는 상황을 모니터링하고 다음 시간 내에 전체 복구를 기대합니다. 우리는 다음 1 시간 또는 더 빨리에 추가 업데이트를 제공 할 것입니다.

3. 2026년 7월 6일 AM 11:46 UTCinvestigating

   우리는 여전히 EU-Region과 함께 사용자 연구, 사용자 의사 및 자산과 함께 일부 문제를보고 있습니다. 우리는 상황을 조사하고 다음 1 시간 또는 더 빨리 추가 업데이트를 제공 할 것입니다.

4. 2026년 7월 6일 PM 12:25 UTCmonitoring

   우리는 문제를 완화하고 복구를보고 수정을 적용했다. 우리는 상황을 모니터링하고 곧 완전히 복구해야합니다. 우리는 다음 1 시간 이전의 업데이트를 제공 할 수 있어야합니다.

5. 2026년 7월 6일 PM 1:04 UTCresolved

   에 7월 6th 2026, 사이 06:51 UTC 에 09:39 UTC 몇몇 사용자는 경험있는 문제 관련 자동화가 있을 수 있습니다, 그리고 사이 08:10 UTC 에 11:50 UTC 몇몇 사용자는 유럽 연합의 사용자 연구, 사용자 픽커 및 자산과 관련한 문제점을 경험할지도 모릅니다. 문제는 이제 해결되고 서비스는 일반적으로 모든 고객에게 작동합니다.

6. 2026년 7월 17일 PM 4:59 UTCpostmortem

   ## 요약 에 7월 6, 2026, 사이 06:51 과 20:17 UTC, Atlassian 고객 사용 클라우드 제품 유럽 (EU) 지역 경험 서비스 중단 자동화 규칙 실행에 영향을 미치는, 사용자 검색, 사용자 선택, 및 관련 워크플로우. 이 사건은 EU 지역에서 핵심 정체성 서비스 경험있는 데이터베이스 포화, 대기 시간 및 오류율을 증가 할 때 시작되었습니다. 응답자는 용량을 복원하기 위해 일했지만 비상 사태는 ID 엔드포인트에 액세스하여 자동화 규칙을 차단했습니다. 병렬에서, 높은 정체성 대기권은 다운스트림 사용자 검색 서비스에서 캐스케닝 실패에 기여하고, 사용자 검색 및 사용자 피커 경험을 여러 제품에 걸쳐 향상. Service는 추가 데이터베이스 읽기 용량이 추가 된 후 신속하게 복원되었습니다. 비상 블록이 제거되었으며 사용자 검색 서비스는 수동으로 확장되었습니다. ## 충격 사건은 7 월 6, 2026 사이 06:51 그리고 20:17 UTC에 EU 지구에 있는 다수 Atlassian 제품의 맞은편에 영향을 미쳤습니다. - **Core Identity Service degradation:** 상승된 간헐적인 접근은 EU 지구에 있는 제품의 맞은편에 관찰되었습니다. - ** 자동 규칙 실행 실패 : ** Jira, Jira 서비스 관리 및 EU 지역의 Jira 제품 Discovery에서 기본 사용자 (Automation for Jira)를 사용하여 자동화 규칙은 허가 오류로 실패했습니다. - ** 사용자 검색 및 사용자 선택 실패 : ** 사용자 검색 성공률은 EU 지역에서 크게 감소, 사용자 선택 기능으로 크게 제품을 통해 사용할 수 없습니다. ## 뿌리 원인 이 사건은 핵심 신원 서비스에 대한 캐시 수명을 줄인 최근 구성 변화에서 유래했습니다. 유럽 연합 (EU)의 일상 교통은 7 월 6, 2026에 올랐으므로 요청의 더 큰 공유가 캐시에서 제공되는 것보다 직접 백업 데이터베이스에 도달하기 시작했습니다. EU 데이터베이스는 증가 된 부하를 흡수하기 위해 충분한 지역 용량을 가지고하지 않았다, 및 데이터베이스 CPU는 포화에 도달, 높은 간헐적 인 액세스 거부 비율을 발생. 소송의 일부로서, 비상 차단은 포화 정체 서비스 데이터베이스에 부하를 줄이고 핵심 정체 서비스를 회복하기 위해 적용되었습니다. 이 inadvertently 막힌 자동화 규칙은 사전-execution permission checks를 통과하여 실패합니다. 장시간 내구는 가공 한계 throttling에 기인한 자동화 규칙 실패의 이차 파로 주로 때문이었습니다. 병렬에서, 지속된 degradation는 이 체크에 달려있는 제품의 주위에 증가한 대기권 및 간헐적인 실패를 일으키는 원인이 되고, 다운스트림 사용자 수색 서비스에 있는 캐스케이드 실패에 공헌했습니다. 결과적으로 사용자 검색 및 사용자 피커 경험은 EU 지역에서 사용되지 않았기 때문에 복구 서비스 및 사용자 검색 서비스는 용량을 복원하기 위해 확장되었습니다. ## Remedial Actions 계획 및 다음 단계 고객의 생산성에 영향을 미칩니다. Atlassian은 향후 유사한 사건을 방지하기 위해 다음과 같은 조치를 우선화합니다. - **높은 충격 비상 사태에 대 한 안전 보호:** 고객 관계 워크플로우가 추가 검토를 필요로 할 수 있도록 열심히 작업 툴링. - **Strengthen ID 인프라 용량 및 변경 안전:** 지역 데이터베이스 조정 및 용량 헤드룸을 검토하여 피크 트래픽 기간 동안 포화의 위험을 줄이고 구성 변경에 대한 평가 프로세스를 정제하므로 다운스트림로드 충격은 생산 롤아웃 전에 평가됩니다. - **Strengthen은 상류 등급의 캐스케이드 실패에 대한 탄력성 :** 감사 backpressure 취급, 회로 차단기 윤곽 및 서비스에서 자동적인 행동, 그래서 상류 degradation는 사용자 수색, 사용자 픽업 및 관련 경험의 맞은편에 더 넓은 제품 충격을 일으키는 원인이 되지 않습니다. - ** 자동화 규칙 실패를위한 Harden 재생 메커니즘 : ** 자동화 규칙의 탄력을 증가하여 종속 사건과 관련된 영향을 줄 수 있습니다. 우리는 중요한 믿을 수 있는 제품 작업 흐름이 우리의 고객을 위해 이고, 우리는 이 사건에 의해 충격을 주는 고객에게 apologize. 감사합니다, Atlassian 고객 지원

공식 인시던트 업데이트를 자동 번역했습니다.

1. 2026년 6월 16일 PM 1:46 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is investigating degraded performance affecting your service. We are actively working to identify the cause and resolve the issue. We will provide further updates within one hour.

2. 2026년 6월 16일 PM 2:28 UTCidentified

   We have identified the source of degraded performance affecting some Confluence Cloud users. A subset of users may experience errors or slowness when viewing or editing pages. Our team has initiated a remediation and is actively monitoring recovery. We will provide another update within one hour or once the issue is fully resolved.

3. 2026년 6월 16일 PM 2:53 UTCmonitoring

   We have been able to apply the fix to mitigate the issue and we are seeing recovery. We continue to monitor the situation and should be fully recovered soon. We should be able to provide more updates in the next one hour or earlier.

4. 2026년 6월 16일 PM 3:56 UTCresolved

   On June 16, 2026, Confluence Cloud users for some customers may have experienced performance degradation of view and edit page experiences. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 2026년 6월 23일 PM 6:25 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary ### On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT ### The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ### ROOT CAUSE ### 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ### We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. We have already deployed the following fix: - Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: - Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. - Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026년 6월 12일 AM 7:39 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing experiencing degraded performance in Confluence Cloud affecting view page and edit page functionality. Our teams are actively investigating and will be sharing more updates in next 1 hour or sooner.

2. 2026년 6월 12일 AM 8:45 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing degraded performance with view content, create and edit functionality on Confluence Cloud primarily in the EU region. Our teams are actively working to identify the root cause of the issue. We will share additional updates in next 2 hours or sooner as more information is available.

3. 2026년 6월 12일 AM 10:29 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause of this issue and implemented a fix. We are beginning to observe signs of recovery, with some affected users regaining access to view, create, and edit content on Confluence Cloud. We will provide a further update within one hour, or sooner if we confirm full recovery for all affected customers.

4. 2026년 6월 12일 AM 11:15 UTCresolved

   On June 12th 2026, between 07:04 to 11:06 UTC, some Confluence users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 2026년 6월 23일 PM 6:28 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ‌ ### ROOT CAUSE ‌ 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ‌ ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ‌ We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. ‌ We have already deployed the following fix: * Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: * Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. * Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ ‌ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026년 6월 10일 AM 6:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating reports of extended delays being experienced across tasks such as processing of Incoming Emails, Notifications relating to changes or creation of Work Items, in addition to delays in processing Scheduled Triggers from Marketplace apps. Our team is looking into this with urgency and we will provide further update within one hour as our investigation continues.

2. 2026년 6월 10일 AM 6:14 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause for this issue and has now deployed a fix that is rolling out across impacted products. At this time we are monitoring for the recovery of these events across Jira Service Management, Jira Cloud and Ecosystem app Scheduled Triggers. We will provide further update within one hour or when we have seen a full recovery of all task processing across these products.

3. 2026년 6월 10일 AM 6:14 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has now determined that performance has returned to expected levels for those impacted by this incident. Additional products that are now known to have been impacted by this incident are Confluence, Customer Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery. These products would have seen similar impact where email notifications or processing of events may have been delayed while this incident was underway. We are now monitoring for the full recovery of performance across all products and will update when we are confident this issue is fully resolved, or within one hour, whichever is sooner.

4. 2026년 6월 10일 AM 6:31 UTCresolved

   We are now confident that any of the tasks that were impacted by this incident and were delayed should now be operating as expected. We apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.

1. 2026년 5월 27일 AM 6:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where customers attempting to view Calendars receive an error message on Confluence Cloud pages. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 2026년 5월 27일 AM 7:06 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause and are in process of deploying a fix. We will share further updates in next 1 hours, or sooner if we have any meaningful developments to report.

3. 2026년 5월 27일 AM 7:48 UTCresolved

   Between 00:50 UTC and 07:30 UTC on 27 May 2026, some users were facing errors when attempting to view Calendars in Confluence. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and this incident has been fully restored.

1. 2026년 5월 26일 AM 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where some custom extensions may fail to load when editing Confluence Cloud pages. Affected users may see 'Error loading the extension!' messages or notice that certain macros are missing from the editor's extension selection menu. Viewing published pages is not affected. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 2026년 5월 26일 AM 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating an issue affecting the editing macros in Confluence Cloud editor. Our team is working to identify the root cause. We will provide an update within approximately one hour.

3. 2026년 5월 26일 PM 1:55 UTCresolved

   Between 08:30 UTC and 13:51 UTC on 26 May 2026, some users were unable to load or edit certain macros in the Confluence Cloud page editor. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and macro functionality has been fully restored.

1. 2026년 5월 14일 AM 4:54 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue with multiple Atlassian products that is impacting a large number of Confluence and Jira Cloud customers. We are continuing to investigate and will add further details about additional impact as our investigation continues. We will provide more details within the next hour or sooner if further information becomes available

2. 2026년 5월 14일 AM 5:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware that the current issues with accessing Atlassian products are impacting additional products. We have now expanded the impact of the incident to cover the known impacted products at this time. We will provide further update within one hour or sooner as information is available.

3. 2026년 5월 14일 AM 5:11 UTCidentified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

4. 2026년 5월 14일 AM 5:24 UTCidentified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

5. 2026년 5월 14일 AM 5:34 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

6. 2026년 5월 14일 AM 5:43 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

7. 2026년 5월 14일 AM 6:40 UTCmonitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

8. 2026년 5월 14일 AM 6:41 UTCmonitoring

   We are approaching full system recovery at this time, and are performing final confirmations that services are restored.

9. 2026년 5월 14일 AM 6:48 UTCresolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

10. 2026년 5월 19일 PM 7:04 UTCpostmortem

    ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 2026년 5월 8일 AM 1:31 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 2026년 5월 8일 AM 4:10 UTCidentified

   We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

3. 2026년 5월 8일 AM 4:10 UTCidentified

   Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

4. 2026년 5월 8일 AM 4:10 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

5. 2026년 5월 8일 AM 5:53 UTCmonitoring

   The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

6. 2026년 5월 8일 AM 8:03 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

7. 2026년 5월 8일 AM 11:12 UTCmonitoring

   Our services are now fully operational. We continue to replay any events that were missed during the incident, and are making good progress. We will provide a further update once replays are complete. If you experience any ongoing issues, please contact our support team. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

8. 2026년 5월 8일 PM 7:45 UTCresolved

   On May 8, 2026, some customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

9. 2026년 5월 20일 AM 6:55 UTCpostmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support.

1. 2026년 4월 14일 PM 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a partial service disruption affecting Rovo, specifically for customers using automation rules that invoke Rovo agents. Some customers may find that these automations are not completing as expected. We'll share updates here as more information becomes available.

2. 2026년 4월 14일 PM 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified that this incident also affects automation rules in Confluence that use Rovo agents. We are investigating and will provide updates as we learn more.

3. 2026년 4월 14일 PM 2:11 UTCidentified

   We have identified the issue, and our teams are working to resolve it and restore normal operations as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as they become available.

4. 2026년 4월 14일 PM 3:46 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

5. 2026년 4월 14일 PM 4:11 UTCresolved

   On April 14, 2026, affected users may have experienced some service disruption with automation rules that use Rovo agents. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026년 4월 13일 AM 7:29 UTCmonitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 2026년 4월 13일 AM 8:33 UTCmonitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 2026년 4월 13일 AM 10:17 UTCresolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 2026년 4월 21일 AM 2:33 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026년 4월 8일 AM 6:01 UTCinvestigating

   The impact of this incident is now understood to also be impacting search in Jira and Confluence, as well as additional downstream impacts to Rovo Chat, User Management, Administration and Guard. Our team is continuing to investigate with urgency and we will provide further update within 1 hour.

2. 2026년 4월 8일 AM 6:25 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is aware that users are currently experiencing errors while attempting to search in Confluence and Jira. Our team is investigating with urgency and will be providing an update within 1 hour.

3. 2026년 4월 8일 AM 7:40 UTCidentified

   Confluence and Jira search reliability is improving, and we expect full recovery shortly; we will continue to closely monitor the services to ensure they remain stable.

4. 2026년 4월 8일 AM 8:33 UTCidentified

   We have restored core search functionality and services are operating again, but some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour while new data continues to be indexed. We are actively working to complete reindexing and will update this page as performance fully recovers.

5. 2026년 4월 8일 AM 9:03 UTCidentified

   We are also aware of impact as a result of these search failures to Customer Service Management, Asset Reports, Jira Service Management and dashboards within Focus. Our team have identified the potential root cause of the issue and our teams are working with urgency on a resolution. We will provide further update within 1 hour.

6. 2026년 4월 8일 AM 9:03 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally. Some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour, while new data continues to be indexed. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

7. 2026년 4월 8일 AM 11:43 UTCresolved

   The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

8. 2026년 4월 17일 PM 4:24 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. A configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high‑density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers. The root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC. ### **IMPACT** During the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period. Impacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context. **Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions. **Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue. **Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC. **Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC. **Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC. ### **ROOT CAUSE** Atlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. An infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \(CPU & Memory\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products. The change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst‑affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: * **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types** Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly. * **Strengthen automated pre‑deploy validation for resource changes** Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads. * **Improve post‑deploy verification and alerting** Enhance monitoring and post‑deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod‑IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out. * **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits** Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts. * **Enhance recovery automation** Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 2026년 3월 12일 PM 1:38 UTCinvestigating

   Confluence Cloud users may experience errors when accessing certain Marketplace macros. Affected customers are seeing the message Error rendering macro 'static-macro': Page loading failed. Our team is actively investigating this issue. We will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner.

2. 2026년 3월 12일 PM 1:38 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the cause of this issue, and a fix is currently being deployed. We are monitoring the deployment, and we will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner if needed.

3. 2026년 3월 13일 AM 12:26 UTCresolved

   On March 12, 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026년 3월 10일 AM 12:15 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of customers experiencing delays with their automations within Jira, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Jira Product Discovery and Confluence. Our team is investigating with urgency and we will provide an update within one hour.

2. 2026년 3월 10일 AM 12:15 UTCidentified

   Our team has now identified the cause of this issue relating to delayed automation events and has put a hotfix in place to help restore automation performance. We will continue to monitor performance as the backlog of issues is now being processed.

3. 2026년 3월 10일 AM 12:51 UTCmonitoring

   The performance degradation of automations has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. 2026년 3월 10일 AM 12:59 UTCresolved

   On 9 March UTC, Automation users in the APAC region may have experienced performance degradation within Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Confluence. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 2026년 2월 20일 AM 4:14 UTCidentified

   Customers using Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours as we continue our investigation.

2. 2026년 2월 20일 PM 12:26 UTCidentified

   We understand that customers using Customer Service Management, Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours or sooner based on significant progress.

3. 2026년 2월 20일 PM 12:26 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved and all services are functional.

1. 2026년 2월 19일 PM 3:44 UTCmonitoring

   We have received and investigated reports of a partial service disruption affecting Confluence Cloud for some customers in AP South, APSE, APSE2, East, and Central. The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

2. 2026년 2월 19일 PM 5:47 UTCresolved

   On February 19 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption in AP South, APSE, APSE2, East, and Central regions. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.