Okta 장애 기록

1. 2026년 9월 3일 AM 10:42 UTCresolved

   엔지니어링 팀은 OP1의 오류 500 문제점을 조사하고 있습니다. 이 시간 동안, 사용자는 우리의 체계 내의 간헐적인 문제점을 경험할지도 모릅니다. 다음 30 분 이내에 또 다른 업데이트를 제공하거나 추가 정보가 유효하면 곧 업데이트됩니다.

2. 2026년 9월 3일 AM 11:02 UTCresolved

   엔지니어링 팀은 OP1의 오류 500 문제점을 조사하고 있습니다. 이 시간 동안, 사용자는 우리의 체계 내의 간헐적인 문제점을 경험할지도 모릅니다. 다음 30 분 이내에 또 다른 업데이트를 제공하거나 추가 정보가 유효하면 곧 업데이트됩니다.

3. 2026년 9월 3일 AM 11:34 UTCresolved

   엔지니어링 팀은 OP1의 오류 500 문제점을 조사하고 있습니다. 이 시간 동안, 사용자는 우리의 체계 내의 간헐적인 문제점을 경험할지도 모릅니다. 다음 30 분 이내에 또 다른 업데이트를 제공하거나 추가 정보가 유효하면 곧 업데이트됩니다.

4. 2026년 9월 3일 PM 12:00 UTCresolved

   엔지니어링 팀은 OP1의 오류 500 문제점을 조사하고 있습니다. 이 시간 동안, 사용자는 우리의 체계 내의 간헐적인 문제점을 경험할지도 모릅니다. 다음 30 분 이내에 또 다른 업데이트를 제공하거나 추가 정보가 유효하면 곧 업데이트됩니다.

5. 2026년 9월 3일 PM 12:30 UTCresolved

   엔지니어링 팀은 OP1의 오류 500 문제점을 조사하고 있습니다. 이 시간 동안, 사용자는 우리의 체계 내의 간헐적인 문제점을 경험할지도 모릅니다. 다음 30 분 이내에 또 다른 업데이트를 제공하거나 추가 정보가 유효하면 곧 업데이트됩니다.

6. 2026년 9월 3일 PM 1:03 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering은 문제점을 완화하기 위해 필요한 조치를 취할 수 있었고 현재 안정성을 모니터링합니다. 문제의 원인과 행동에 대한 특정은 신뢰할 페이지에 게시됩니다.

7. 2026년 9월 3일 PM 2:09 UTCresolved

   장시간 기간 동안 감시 후에, 우리는 문제점이 reoccurred지 않다는 것을 확인했습니다. 루트 원인 분석 (RCA)는 5 영업일 이내에 여기에 게시됩니다. 우리는 진심으로 당신에게 영향을 미치는 영향에 대해 사과하고 사용자.

공식 인시던트 업데이트를 자동 번역했습니다.

1. 2026년 8월 14일 PM 3:23 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering is investigating and has determined that the incident is currently impacting email delivery to a subset of customers. During this time, customers may experience email delivery deferrals. We'll provide an update in 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

2. 2026년 8월 14일 PM 3:39 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering has determined that certain third-party providers were failing to receive emails from Okta. Our monitoring shows delivery rates are recovering to normal conditions and will continue to monitor until full resolution. Our next update will be in 30 minutes or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. 2026년 8월 14일 PM 4:50 UTCresolved

   Our monitoring indicates that email deferrals to the impacted third-party email service have returned to the expected baseline. Additional information will be available within 5 Business days.

4. 2026년 8월 21일 PM 4:04 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Okta detected an increase in customer support tickets regarding email delivery issues. Customers using custom email domains routed through Proofpoint experienced email delivery deferrals. During this period, affected end users were unable to receive system-generated emails, including One-Time Passwords (OTPs), account activation emails, password reset emails, factor enrollment emails, and other automated notifications. Root Cause Summary: Third-party provider Proofpoint experienced a service disruption, causing issues with email deliverability. When Okta services attempted to send emails to recipient domains whose MX records pointed to Proofpoint's infrastructure, the delivery attempts failed due to connection errors, resulting in deferred delivery. Okta's email sending infrastructure operated normally throughout the event. Remediation Steps: Okta Engineering monitored service telemetry and confirmed that email delivery returned to normal pre-incident baselines once Proofpoint restored stability to its infrastructure. Preventive Actions: Okta is defining automated alerting thresholds for email-bound and deferral rates to decrease detection time and updating runbooks to allow faster diagnosis of downstream provider disruptions. Timing: Incident start: August 14, 2026, at 5:00 AM PDT Incident resolved: August 14, 2026, at 10:04 AM PDT. Duration (# of minutes): 304 minutes Based on details provided by https://www.proofpoint.com/us/support-services

1. 2026년 7월 24일 PM 1:55 UTCresolved

   안정성과 감시의 기간 후에, 우리는 지금 서비스 문제점이 완전히 해결되었는지 확인해서 좋습니다. 추가 루트 원인 정보는 5 영업일 이내에 사용할 수 있습니다.

2. 2026년 8월 1일 AM 3:28 UTCresolved

   우리는 진심으로이 사건에 영향을 미치는 영향에 대해 사과합니다. Okta에서 신뢰와 투명성은 우리의 최고 우선 순위입니다. 아래 개요는이 사건에 관한 사실입니다. 우리는 미래 발생을 방지하기 위해 우리의 서비스에 개선을 시행하기 위해 최선을 다하고 있습니다. 감지 및 영향 7 월 24, 2026, 약 3 : 55 AM PDT, Okta는 OK7, OK12, OK14 및 OP3에 대한 서비스 평가를 관찰했습니다. AD/LDAP delegated 인증 및 OAuth 토큰 엔드포인트 클라이언트를 사용하는 사건은 AWS us-west-2 지역에 위치해 있습니다. 이벤트를 통해 사용자는 리소스, 인증 실패, 에이전트 연결 타임 아웃, 대기 시간 및 OAuth 토큰 요청에 액세스하는 오류가 발생했습니다. Root Cause 요약 루트 원인은 영향을받는 지역에 대한 클라우드 서비스 제공 업체의 오류에서 유래. 치료 단계 클라우드 서비스 제공 업체는 연결성을 회복하고, Okta 서비스는 약 4:10 AM PDT에 의해 안정화, 우리의 팀은 4:19 AM PDT에서 기본 작업을 완료 반환을 확인. 예방 조치 Okta는 미래의 발생을 방지하기 위해 여러 이니셔티브를 적극적으로 검토하고 실행합니다. 이러한 조치는 다음과 같습니다 : 지역 내에서 확장 된 문제의 경우 우리의 사건 응답 프로세스를 감사하고 개선하고,이 사건을 기반으로 모니터링 및 경고를 거부. 총 지속 시간 총 지속 시간 (분): 15 분 시작 시간: 3:55 AM PDT 종료 시간: 4:10 AM PDT 지속 시간 (# 분): 15

공식 인시던트 업데이트를 자동 번역했습니다.

1. 2026년 7월 22일 PM 3:14 UTCresolved

   현재 진행 중인 유지보수가 진행되고 있으며, Okta 엔지니어링 팀은 적극적으로 참여하고 있습니다. 이 확장된 창 도중, 고객은 Okta Workflows에 로그인할 때 오류를 경험할 수 있습니다. 우리는 우리의 팀으로 당신의 patience를 빨리 완료하고 가능한 한 안전하게 이 가동을 완료하기 위하여 일합니다. · 이 조직에 영향을 미치는지 이해하기 위해 권장되는 운동을 볼 수 있습니다. 자세한 지원 문서를 검토하십시오.  https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/okta-workflows-cell-migration-expected-behaviors-and-workarounds?language=en US . 우리는 30 분, 또는 더 빨리, 더 많은 정보를 사용할 수 있기 때문에 더 많은 업데이트를 제공 할 것입니다.

2. 2026년 7월 22일 PM 3:49 UTCresolved

   유지 보수 활동은 여전히 계속됩니다. 우리는 마이그레이션이 안전하고 성공적으로 완료되도록합니다.   우리는 30 분 또는 더 빨리 업데이트를 계속 공유 할 것입니다. 한편, 아래 지원 기사를 참조하시기 바랍니다. 아래에서 최신 지침에 대한 workarounds 및 예상 행동: https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/okta-workflows-cell-migration-expected-behaviors-and-workarounds?language=en US

3. 2026년 7월 22일 PM 4:19 UTCresolved

   우리는 이제 마이그레이션 활동에 따라 안정적인 시스템 성능을 관찰하고 있습니다. 우리의 엔지니어링 팀은 모든 서비스를 모니터링에 적극적으로 참여합니다. 핵심 워크플로우가 복구되고, 고객은 지속적인 개선을 볼 수 있습니다. 우리는 30 분에 우리의 다음 업데이트를 제공 할 것입니다, 또는 더 빨리 새로운 정보를 사용할 수 있다면.

4. 2026년 7월 22일 PM 4:59 UTCresolved

   안정성과 감시의 기간 후에, 우리는 지금 서비스 문제점이 완전히 해결되었는지 확인해서 좋습니다. 추가 루트 원인 정보는 5 영업일 이내에 사용할 수 있습니다.

5. 2026년 7월 29일 PM 11:34 UTCresolved

   우리는 진심으로이 사건에 영향을 미치는 영향에 대해 사과합니다. Okta에서 신뢰와 투명성은 우리의 최고 우선 순위입니다. 아래 개요는이 사건에 관한 사실입니다. 우리는 미래 발생을 방지하기 위해 우리의 서비스에 개선을 시행하기 위해 최선을 다하고 있습니다. 이 유지 보수는 원래 소통 창을 넘어 우리의 상태 업데이트가 적시에 통보되지 않았다는 것을 인식합니다. 우리는 이것을 위해 사과합니다; 그것의 개량은 우리의 예방적인 행동의 밑에 부분입니다. 감지 및 영향 7 월 22, 2026, 5 : 15 AM PDT, 우리의 북미 지역에서 Okta 워크 플로우 (FL1 셀) 미국 셀 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 및 11의 전역 사용자에 영향을 미치는 워크 플로우에 영향을 미치는 문제. 이 시간 동안, 일부 작업 흐름 실행 실패 또는 조기 종료, 사용자가 작업 흐름 콘솔을로드 오류 발생. 또한 일부 앱 연결은 기능을 복원하기 위해 수동으로 reauthenticate를 필요로하는 작업을 중단했습니다. Root Cause 요약 계획된 시스템 업그레이드 중 문제가 발생했습니다. 제3자 공급업체의 소프트웨어에 대한 결함은 예상보다 크게 더 오래 실행되도록 업그레이드를 발생했습니다. 새로운 datastore 시스템에 마이그레이션하는 동안, 시스템 구성 요소 간의 통신 실패는 예상 창 내에서 정상 상태에 돌려서 서비스를 방지했습니다. 이 기간 동안 Workflows Console은 아래 데이터 저장소가 사용할 수 없을 때 우아하게 해소하지 않았습니다. 대신 사용자가 직접 표면 오류가 발생했습니다. 또한, 부정 행위가 실패한 상태에 남아있을 때 상쾌하지 않을 수 있는 app 연결은, 어떤 과실이 완료된 후에 계속되는 왜 몇몇 과실이, 영향 받은 연결이 허가된 때까지. 치료 단계 제3자 공급업체는 8:34 AM PDT에서 안정화된 클러스터를 확인했습니다. 안정화 후, Okta Engineering은 스테이플 구성 캐시에 영향을 미치는 서비스를 복구했습니다. OAuth 토큰을 경험한 모든 고객은 이 기간 동안 오류가 수동으로 모든 앱 연결을 재사용해야합니다. 전체 기능은 9:33 AM PDT에 의해 복원되었습니다. 여전히 영향을 받으면: 수동으로 Workflows 콘솔에서 영향을받는 연결 자격 증명을 재 승인 (KB를 참조 : Okta Workflows : Cell Migration 기대 Behaviors 및 Workarounds). 창에서 실패한 작업 흐름 실행은 정상적인 프로세스를 사용하여 재 실행 될 수 있습니다. 영향을받는 실행을 식별하는 데 도움이되는 경우 Okta 지원에 문의하십시오. 예방 활동 사건에서 유사한 사건을 방지하기 위해, Okta는 뒤에 오는 단계를 가지고 갔습니다. 우리는 우리의 제3자 납품업자가 확인한 결함을 위한 고침을 배치할 때까지 모든 datastore engine migrations에 함대 넓은 파악을 실행하고 그것을 진행하는 안전 확인합니다. 우리는 또한 Workflows Console을 업데이트하여 인프라가 일시적으로 사용할 수 없을 때 자동으로 복구하고, 사용자가 원하는 시스템 오류보다 재연결 상태를 확인합니다. 병렬에서는, 우리는 정비 창 도중 더 빠른 탐지를 지키기 위하여 cluster-convergence 실패를 위해 직접 자동화된 감시 그리고 경고를 추가하고 있습니다. 마지막으로, 우리는 더 많은 시간 상태 페이지 및 진행/completion 업데이트를 포함하여 긴 유지 보수 중에 통신하는 방법을 개선하고 있습니다. Workflows 신뢰성 또는 Roadmap에 대한 질문은 Okta 계정 팀이 도움이 될 수 있습니다. 총 지속 시간 총 지속 시간 (분): 258 분 (4 시간 및 18 분) 시작 시간: 5:15 AM PDT 종료 시간: 9:33 AM PDT 지속 시간 (# 분): 258 분

공식 인시던트 업데이트를 자동 번역했습니다.

1. 2026년 7월 13일 PM 9:23 UTCresolved

   우리의 공학 팀은 충격적인 시사 환경에 잠재적인 고침을 적용하고 회복을 위한 체계를 적극적으로 감시하고 있습니다. 우리는 30 분 안에 또 다른 업데이트를 제공 할 것입니다, 또는 더 빨리 새로운 정보를 사용할 수 있다면. 우리는 진심으로 어떤 불편을 위해 사과합니다.

2. 2026년 7월 13일 PM 9:39 UTCresolved

   우리의 엔지니어링 팀은 수정을 적용했으며, OP2 미리보기 환경에 서비스 복원을 관찰하고 있습니다. 우리는 체계에 바싹 감시하고 30 분 안에 다른 갱신을 제공할 것입니다.

3. 2026년 7월 13일 PM 9:53 UTCresolved

   OP2 미리보기 환경이 완전히 안정화되었는지 확인했으며 이전 문제는 완전히 해결되었습니다. 추가 루트 원인 정보는 5 영업일 이내에 사용할 수 있습니다.

4. 2026년 7월 21일 AM 1:57 UTCresolved

   우리는 진심으로이 사건에 영향을 미치는 영향에 대해 사과합니다. Okta에서 신뢰와 투명성은 우리의 최고 우선 순위입니다. 아래 개요는이 사건에 관한 사실입니다. 우리는 이 사건의 미래 발생을 방지하기 위해 서비스의 개선을 시행하기 위해 최선을 다하고 있습니다. 탐지 및 영향 : 7 월 13, 2026에서 1:01 PM PT, Okta 내부 모니터링은 EMEA Preview Cell 환경에서 오류를 높일 수 있도록 우리의 팀을 경고했습니다. 이 기간 동안 EMEA Preview Cell 환경의 모든 고객은 영향을 받았으며 인증 실패 및 서비스 감속을 경험했습니다. Administrators 및 최종 사용자는 Okta 서비스에 로그인하거나 액세스 할 때 "Internal Server Error" 메시지 및 기타 오류가 발생할 수 있습니다. Root Cause Summary : 사건은 예정된 서비스 업그레이드 중 트리거되었습니다. 잘못된 구성은 EMEA Preview Cell 클러스터를 inadvertently가 중요한 인프라 라우팅 구성 요소의 잘못된 버전을 수신하기 위해 발생했습니다. 이 업데이트는 내부 네트워킹 라우팅을 손상, 이는 다른 건강한 인프라 구성 요소 간의 통신을 방지. 요청은 핵심 애플리케이션에 도달 할 수 없기 때문에 광범위한 서비스 오류 및 인증 실패로 인해 발생합니다. 구제 단계 : Okta의 엔지니어링 팀은 문제를 확인하고 즉시 이전을 배포하기 시작, 라우팅 구성의 안정적인 버전. 롤백에 따라 엔지니어는 내부 연결성을 복원하기 위해 영향을받는 서비스를 재시작했습니다. 이 작업은 성공적으로 문제를 해결하고 고객 영향은 2:20 PM PT에 의해 완전히 mitigated. 예방적인 행동: 우리는 서비스 안정성을 강화하기 위하여 우리의 가동 과정을 정제하고 있습니다. 자동 감지 및 모니터링 기능을 개선하기 위해 지속적인 작업이 포함되어있어 잠재적 인 문제를 더 효과적으로 식별하고 해결하는 데 도움이됩니다. 총 시간 (분): 79 분 (1 시간 19 분) 시작 시간: 1:01 PM PT 종료 시간: 2:20 PM PT

공식 인시던트 업데이트를 자동 번역했습니다.

1. 2026년 7월 7일 PM 8:50 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering은 Okta Workflows에 영향을 미치는 이슈를 식별하고 현재 중급 단계가 있습니다. 고객은 Okta Workflows 콘솔, API 엔드포인트 및 인바운드 webhooks에서 500 오류 또는 타임아웃을 볼 수 있습니다. 다음 30 분 이내에 또 다른 업데이트를 제공하거나 추가 정보가 유효하면 곧 업데이트됩니다.

2. 2026년 7월 7일 PM 9:03 UTCresolved

   Okta Workflows의 문제점은 해결되었습니다. 모든 작업 흐름은 일반적으로 처리됩니다. 루트 원인 분석 (RCA)는 5 영업일 이내에 여기에 게시됩니다. 우리는이 발생 할 수있는 불편에 대해 사과합니다.

3. 2026년 7월 15일 PM 3:22 UTCresolved

   우리는 진심으로이 사건에 대한 사과를드립니다, 귀하의 비즈니스 또는 고객. Okta에서 신뢰와 투명성은 우리의 최고 우선 순위입니다. 아래 개요는이 사건에 관한 사실입니다. 우리는 이 사건의 미래 발생을 방지하기 위해 서비스의 개선을 시행하기 위해 최선을 다하고 있습니다. 탐지 및 영향 : 7 월 7 일, 2026, 1 : 1 PM PDT, Okta 내부 모니터링 및 고객 보고서는 북미의 Okta 셀 OK14에 Workflows에 액세스하는 사용자와 문제로 우리의 팀을 경고했습니다. 이 기간 동안, FL14의 고객은 관리 포털에서 워크 플로우에 항해 할 때 HTTP 500, 503 또는 504 게이트웨이 타임 아웃 오류를 경험하거나 SSO를 통해 워크 플로우 콘솔에 로그인하려고 할 수 있습니다. 기존 세션은 실수로 발생될 수 있습니다. 일정 및 주문형 워크플로우, 인라인 후크 및 webhooks는 오류와 타임아웃을 경험할 수 있습니다. 또한, in-flight는 경험있는 운동을 실행합니다. 루트 원인 요약: 이 사건은 계획된 배포 중에 발생 2027.07.0 에 FL14 세포. 배포 프로세스의 과정에서, schema 업데이트를 실행하는 서비스 pod 책임은 조기에 종료되었습니다. 이 초기 종료는 예상치 못한, 긴 라이브 데이터베이스 연결, 이는 궁극적으로 세포의 기본 데이터베이스에 연결 배기를 발생. 구제 단계 : 경고 및 고객 보고서를 수신하면 팀은 12 : 44 PM PDT에서 진단을 시작했습니다. PM 1:30에 의해 PDT, 그들은 격리 및 서비스 팟 수행 스키마 업데이트를 제거. 1:45 PM PDT로 전체 서비스를 정리하는 데이터베이스 연결을 허용했습니다. 예방 조치 : 미래 발생을 방지하기 위해 Okta는 인프라 안정성을 강화하고 모니터링 기능을 강화하기 위해 최선을 다하고 있습니다. 우리는 현재 우리의 배포 프로세스 및 경고 시스템에 전략적 개선을 구현하여 빠른 감지, 응답 및 더 큰 탄력을 보장합니다. 총 소요시간: 67분

공식 인시던트 업데이트를 자동 번역했습니다.

1. 2026년 6월 26일 PM 3:22 UTCresolved

   Our Engineering team has identified the issue, and we will continue monitoring the issue. We will provide another update within the next 15 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

2. 2026년 6월 29일 PM 11:50 UTCresolved

3. 2026년 6월 30일 PM 3:01 UTCresolved

   The Root Cause Analysis (RCA) details previously posted in this update were published in error and belonged to a separate incident that occurred on June 22nd (I-10858). We sincerely apologize for any confusion this may have caused. Our formal RCA process for this OK11 custom domains incident (I-10874) is still actively underway. We remain committed to transparency and will provide an accurate, dedicated RCA for this disruption within 5 business days (expected late July 6, 2026). Thank you for your patience.

4. 2026년 7월 6일 PM 10:01 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 26th at 7:43 AM (PT), Okta was alerted to customer reports of connection issues and authentication failures when accessing custom domains. The incident was isolated to OK11 and normal connectivity was restored at 7:53 AM (PT). Root Cause Summary: Okta Engineering identified that the root cause of the issue originated during a custom domain traffic migration in OK11 on June 25th at 10:47 AM (PT), the new routing infrastructure became resource-constrained under increased traffic volume the next day. This resulted in TCP connection resets and errors sent to clients attempting to access custom domains. Remediation Steps: Once the source of the issue was identified, Okta engineering immediately mitigated the issue by reverting custom domain traffic back to the previous infrastructure, restoring normal connectivity within minutes. Preventative Actions: To prevent future incidents, the routing infrastructure was scaled to prevent recurrence. Okta will work to implement enhanced monitoring and alerting, as well as updated auto-scaling policies to ensure routing infrastructure maintains adequate capacity during traffic fluctuations and future infrastructure improvements. Duration (# of minutes): Total Duration (Minutes): 53 minutes Actual Time: 7:00 AM - 7:53 AM PT

1. 2026년 6월 22일 PM 10:02 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team has taken steps to mitigate the issue. We have observed that the errors have been reduced and is continuing to subside. We are monitoring the situation closely and will provide further updates in 15-30 minutes as we move toward full mitigation.

2. 2026년 6월 22일 PM 10:33 UTCresolved

   Internal monitoring confirmed that the EU1 environment has fully recovered and is operating normally. A full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be made available within 5 business days. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.

3. 2026년 6월 30일 PM 2:43 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 22nd, 2026, at 2:08 PM PDT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team to errors in the EU environment. During this period, administrators and end users may have experienced intermittent 500 Internal Server Error and 429 Rate Limit responses when attempting to access Okta services. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by an unexpected scaling down of the application cluster during scheduled maintenance of the environment. This change accidentally overwrote the custom capacity settings for several of our applications. This caused the system to automatically revert to its lowest default capacity, drastically reducing the amount of user traffic it could handle simultaneously. As a result, the remaining servers were immediately overwhelmed by the normal volume of user requests, leading to system slowdowns, errors, and "too many requests" blockages for our customers in the impacted cell. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering team identified the root cause issue at 2:44 PM PDT. The team mitigated the issue by scaling up resource capacity, completely stabilizing service health back to normal levels by 2:48 PM PDT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: - Strengthen guardrails by improving our validation tools and multi-environment review processes to automatically detect and flag unexpected server capacity changes before they're applied. - Accelerate system monitoring by implementing enhanced monitoring thresholds to instantly detect and report infrastructure capacity drops before they can impact end users. - Optimize failover protocols by auditing critical alert paths for maximum reliability while establishing a clear, structured communication plan for when automated backup systems are triggered. These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again. Duration (# of minutes):40 minutes

1. 2026년 6월 2일 AM 11:21 UTCresolved

   Engineering is still investigating the issue, recent actions that were taken show errors subsiding.

2. 2026년 6월 2일 AM 11:40 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team has observed that the errors have been reduced. We are monitoring the situation closely and will provide further updates as we move toward full mitigation.

3. 2026년 6월 2일 PM 12:07 UTCresolved

   Okta Engineering has confirmed that the issue has been resolved. An RCA will be provided in five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

4. 2026년 6월 10일 AM 2:19 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On June 2nd, 2026, at 2:36 AM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team to elevated errors in the OK9 environment. During this period, administrators and end users may have experienced intermittent 500 Internal Server errors when trying to access Okta services. Additionally, Admins may have encountered error messages when fetching certain records. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by a misconfiguration introduced during a scheduled maintenance of the environment. This maintenance introduced an error that caused connectivity issues within specific infrastructure components. Only a small percentage of the infrastructure was affected during this period. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering team identified and isolated impacted infrastructure at 4:01AM PT. These actions successfully addressed the issue, and normal operations were restored by 4:17 AM PT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: Incident response processes, procedures, and investigation tools to more rapidly diagnose similar issues in the future. Risk evaluation processes to include expanding error types and adding additional appropriate corresponding alerts and monitoring associated with vulnerability updates. These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again and, in cases like these, allow Okta to respond faster when possible. Duration (# of minutes): 100

1. 2026년 5월 1일 AM 12:28 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team has successfully resolved the service instability that was causing system timeouts. Okta engineering has confirmed that errors have subsided, and we have transitioned into a monitoring phase to ensure continued stability. We sincerely appreciate your patience while our team worked to identify and resolve the issue.

2. 2026년 5월 1일 AM 1:01 UTCresolved

   Internal monitoring confirmed that the OP1 environment has fully recovered and is operating normally. A full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be made available within 5 days. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.

3. 2026년 5월 8일 AM 2:51 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On April 30th, 2026, at 10:57 AM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team of login issues for users accessing Okta Preview Cell 1. During this period, customers may have received 500 errors for query timeouts and were unable to log in. Root Cause Summary: The incident stemmed from a database query change. The updated query intermittently exceeded its timeout limit across several login endpoints. Consequently, users experienced 500 errors and were unable to log in. Remediation Steps: Upon receiving the alerts, Okta Engineering immediately launched an investigation. By 1:02 PM PT, the team took initial mitigation steps to resolve the issue, however these steps did not resolve the issue. The incident response team continued to triage and diagnose the issue and identified the root cause related to the updated database query change at 4:50 PM PT. The team reverted the new query behavior at 5:00 PM PT in Preview Cell 1, and full service functionality was restored by 5:05 PM PT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta is currently reviewing the following: -Reviewing incident response processes and investigation tools to more rapidly diagnose similar issues in the future -Risk evaluation processes associated with query updates -Alerts and monitors associated with the database proxy These learnings work to prevent similar incidents from happening again and, in cases like these, allow Okta to respond faster when possible. Duration (# of minutes): 375

1. 2026년 4월 29일 PM 10:42 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Customers using the third-party service Kolide began reporting that attempts to sign in to their orgs redirected to an unrelated tenant and received an HTTP 400 error with the message “Login Failed - 400: Bad Request Error Code: GENERAL_NONSUCCESS” Root Cause Summary: Kolide has confirmed for Okta that an incident occurred with their Device Trust SAML authentication system, resulting in some users being redirected to an incorrect service provider after completing authentication. This resulted in users receiving a 400 error. Kolide reported that users were unable to access their intended application, any unauthorized applications, or any unauthorized environments. Remediation Steps: Okta Support advised customers that they could temporarily disable their Kolide integrations to allow their users to successfully access their services. Timing: Kolide reports: Incident start: April 22, 2026, at 8:24 AM PDT Incident resolved: April 22, 2026, at 8:30 AM PDT Duration (# of minutes): 6 Minutes

1. 2026년 4월 13일 PM 8:33 UTCresolved

   Okta has identified the issue impacting Access Request job processing and Engineering Teams are working to restore the service. We are rolling out the fix for this issue in 30 minutes and will provide another update once the fix is rolled out.

2. 2026년 4월 13일 PM 8:59 UTCresolved

   Okta has identified the root cause of the issue affecting Access Request job processing as of 1:00 PM PT. A resolution was implemented at 1:45 PM PT, and the service is now fully operational for new submissions. The engineering team is currently working to restore and process any requests submitted during the disruption period. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. 2026년 4월 13일 PM 9:29 UTCresolved

   While new Access Request job processing has been restored, Okta is also working to resolve the issue affecting in-flight Access Request job requests processed during the disruption period.  The fix for this issue is expected to be implemented around 5:00pm PT.  Okta will provide another update at 5:00pm PT or sooner if one becomes available.

4. 2026년 4월 14일 AM 12:25 UTCresolved

   The issue with in-flight Access Request job requests processed during the disruption period has also been resolved. All Access Request jobs are now processing normally. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

5. 2026년 4월 21일 PM 11:16 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this kind. Detection and Impact: On April 13, 2026, at 11:51 AM PST, an incident was reported where Okta Identity Governance (OIG) access requests stalled in the "In Progress" state indefinitely across all environments. The system accepted initial submissions and first-level approvals, but failed to trigger subsequent automated tasks like assigning users to apps/groups or running delegated workflows. . Root Cause Summary: During a recent update deployment, new tasks inadvertently moved to a 'LOCKED' status without implementing the necessary logic to transition them back to 'OPEN.' This caused the tasks to become permanently hidden, preventing the automated execution of the action associated with them. Remediation Steps: Okta's engineering teams promptly responded, initiating immediate detection and diagnosis. Corrective measures, including a code fix deployed to all cells, were implemented to prevent any new access requests from becoming stuck. A remediation migration successfully transitioned most affected requests to a fixed state. Normal functionality was fully restored by April 13, 2026, at 5:18 PM PST, following the completion of a final migration to unblock remaining requests.On April 14, 2026, Okta took further steps to resolve in-flight requests that were stuck, moving them to a final, terminal state. Preventative Actions: Okta is taking several steps to prevent this issue from recurring. These include enhanced testing, deployment of safeguards, and improvements to our monitoring and alerting systems. Duration (# of minutes): 434

1. 2026년 3월 24일 PM 11:32 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact: Okta internal monitoring alerted our engineering team to disruptions to the Okta status page and the commercial support portal. Okta Engineering identified a service disruption with our third-party provider and confirmed the impact. During the disruption, customer admins were unable to access the Okta Support Center (support.okta.com) to log support cases or view the primary status page (status.okta.com). Root Cause Summary: Okta's third-party provider, responsible for hosting the Okta Support Center and status page, experienced a service disruption. The third-party provider identified a version mismatch between their application and database layers as the technical trigger. This mismatch resulted in internal server errors and login failures, rendering the Okta Support Center and status page inaccessible for a portion of their disruption. Remediation Steps: Okta teams posted an admin banner within the Okta Admin Console to provide visibility into the disruption and offer a phone number for customers who needed to log support cases manually while the Okta Support Center was unavailable. Services were fully restored after the third-party provider successfully deployed a fix-forward release to the impacted infrastructure, which restored login access. Preventive Actions: As part of Okta's commitment to operational resilience, we have optimized our vendor engagement matrix to accelerate incident mitigation and downstream coordination. We are also conducting an expanded audit of external dependencies to formalize alternative response procedures within our disaster recovery plans. Simultaneously, Engineering has enhanced real-time monitoring and alerting for service endpoints, enabling faster detection and resolution. Timing: Incident start: March 16, 2026, at 08:58 PM PDT Incident resolved: March 16, 2026, at 11:34 PM PDT Duration (# of minutes): 156 minutes

1. 2026년 3월 13일 PM 6:48 UTCresolved

   At around 11:20AM PT, Okta Engineering has confirmed that the issue has been resolved in both cells, EU1 and OK1. An RCA will be provided in five business days. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.

2. 2026년 3월 20일 PM 8:35 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this kind. Detection and Impact On March 13, 2026, at 10:49 AM PT, Okta detected a service degradation that prevented some customers on the OK1 and EU1 cells from performing directory operations, viewing or searching for users, groups, and devices in the Okta Admin Console. Customers may have experienced "Invalid search query" messages or 5xx errors. This issue also affected several API endpoints related to users, groups, and devices, which may have impacted customer integrations relying on this functionality. End-user authentication was not impacted. Root Cause Summary The root cause of this incident was a planned configuration change that exposed a bug in the underlying service, resulting in system errors and disrupting both directory-based APIs. Remediation Steps Upon detection, Okta's engineering teams initiated incident response procedures. Once the problematic configuration change was identified as the source of the errors, it was immediately reverted. After the reversion was applied and verified, full functionality was restored to all impacted customers. Preventative Actions Okta is taking steps to prevent future occurrences of this kind, including enhancing our testing processes, hardening and improving our configuration rollout strategy, and upgrading our monitoring and alerting systems for enhanced detection. Start Time: 03/13/2026 10:17 AM PT End Time: 03/13/2026 11:21 AM PT Duration (# of minutes): 64

1. 2026년 2월 4일 PM 12:37 UTCresolved

   Okta has implemented a fix for the LDAP issue affecting the OK9 environment. We are observing signs of service recovery and confirmed improvements from customers. We will continue to monitor the situation closely to ensure full resolution. We are monitoring the situation closely and will provide further updates within the next 30 minutes.

2. 2026년 2월 4일 PM 12:50 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved. Internal monitoring and customer reports confirm that the LDAPi system in OK9 has fully recovered and is operating normally. We will continue to closely monitor the service to ensure stability. A full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be made available within 5 days. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.

3. 2026년 2월 11일 PM 6:45 UTCresolved

   On February 4th, 2026, at 3:33 AM PT, Okta received customer reports of authentication failures within the OK9 (EMEA) cell. Customers attempting to access LDAP interface services encountered certificate validation errors related to hostname mismatches, preventing successful authentication. Root Cause Summary: The incident was triggered by a misconfiguration introduced during a scheduled update of our LDAP interface to a new configuration source on February 4th 2:24 AM PT. This update inadvertently applied an incorrect SSL certificate profile to the LDAP interface within the OK9 environment. This misconfiguration caused certificate validity errors, resulting in connection issues when attempting to use LDAP services. Remediation Steps: Once the source of the issue was identified, Okta engineering team rolled back changes at 4:07 AM PT. These actions successfully addressed the issue and restored normal operations by 4:26 AM PT. Preventative Actions: To prevent future incidents, Okta has updated synthetic tests and enhanced monitoring. Teams also plan to add new tooling to improve changes to the LDAP service certificates. In addition, we are reviewing our internal processes and procedures, refining our automated rollback processes to further reduce the customer impact time for similar issues in the future. Duration (# of minutes): Total Duration (Minutes): 122 minutes Actual Time: 02:24 AM PT - 04:26 AM PT

1. 2026년 1월 28일 PM 7:24 UTCresolved

   We are seeing significant and steady system stability as our third-party provider recovery continues in the EU-West-1 region. We will continue monitoring the service to ensure a full recovery. We will provide another update in 60 minutes or as soon as more information becomes available.

2. 2026년 1월 28일 PM 7:36 UTCresolved

   The third-party provider has confirmed that the issue has been resolved. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within five business days.

3. 2026년 2월 5일 AM 1:26 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On January 29th, 2026, at 8:28 AM PT, Okta internal monitoring alerted our team of intermittent connectivity issues accessing Okta Cell 9 (EMEA). During this period, customers may have experienced intermittent errors establishing network connections and latency when trying to access Okta services. Clients configured to retry failed connections likely saw successful connectivity on secondary attempts. Root Cause Summary: The incident stemmed from a failure of a component that manages configuration changes to the networking infrastructure with our Cloud Service Provider (CSP) in the region hosting Okta Cell 9. Remediation Steps: Immediately upon receiving the alerts, Okta Engineering began investigating several isolated spikes but determined that cell health was stable. At 9:35 AM PT, Okta Engineering received more alerts and immediately initiated incident response procedures. At 9:51 AM PT, Okta Engineering began working with the CSP to diagnose the issue. At 10:13 AM PT, the latency began to stabilize. At 11:22 AM PT, the issue was resolved. Preventative Actions: To prevent similar incidents from recurring, Okta Engineering is improving our monitoring, working with our CSP to enhance their monitoring, and reviewing incident response processes associated with this event. Duration (# of minutes): 186

4. 2026년 2월 11일 PM 6:40 UTCresolved

1. 2026년 1월 22일 PM 9:46 UTCresolved

   We are continuing to monitor the third-party email service provider's progress toward a resolution. At this time, we have not received an estimated time for recovery (ETR). If you are attempting to sign in and have configured alternative MFA factors (such as Okta Verify, SMS, or Security Keys/Biometrics), we recommend using those options to avoid delays associated with email delivery. Our engineering teams remain on standby to verify service restoration the moment it begins. We will continue to provide updates as soon as the impacted provider shares new information.

2. 2026년 1월 22일 PM 11:24 UTCresolved

   We're continuing to track the ongoing service disruption with the third-party email provider. We appreciate your patience while we await the provider's resolution of the root cause. We'll post our next update in 90 minutes or as soon as we have a significant change in status.

3. 2026년 1월 23일 AM 12:46 UTCresolved

   The third-party email provider has identified the root cause as a service infrastructure issue within the North America region. They are currently implementing load-balancing configurations to stabilize the environment. While recovery is underway, users may continue to experience intermittent delays or failures in receiving emails. We are monitoring the provider's progress and will provide another update as they move toward full resolution.

4. 2026년 1월 23일 AM 3:55 UTCresolved

   The third-party provider continues to see improvements across their impacted North American infrastructure. While our internal systems remain healthy, our team is on standby to validate the restoration of all external dependencies. We will provide a final update once the provider confirms that their services have fully returned to normal operations.

5. 2026년 1월 23일 AM 6:46 UTCresolved

   The third-party provider has confirmed that a fix has been successfully deployed. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within ten business days. We sincerely apologize for the impact this had on you and your users.

6. 2026년 1월 30일 PM 10:34 UTCresolved

   Following is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service Timing: Incident start: January 22, 2026, at 10:55 AM PST Incident resolved: January 22, 202,6 at 7:50 PM PST Detection: The issue was initially identified through customer reports that they were not receiving expected email notifications. Okta Engineering confirmed the service disruption after internal monitoring indicated a high volume of deferred email delivery attempts to specific third-party domains. Impact: Customers across all Okta cells with email addresses hosted by Microsoft Exchange Online may have experienced intermittent delays or failures in receiving automated email notifications, such as Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) codes and enrollment links. Okta services remained healthy and attempted to resend deferred messages. Root Cause: Microsoft reports that it experienced a service issue within its North American data centers during a planned maintenance activity. As a result, emails sent from Okta to the affected provider resulted in “soft bounce” errors, indicating that the provider's servers were temporarily unable to accept the messages. Remediation Steps: To mitigate the impact on users attempting to sign in, Okta recommended using alternative MFA factors, such as Okta Verify, security keys, or SMS, to bypass delays associated with email delivery. Okta Engineering continuously monitored the third-party provider's recovery efforts and validated that mail delivery returned to baseline levels once the provider stabilized their environment.

1. 2026년 1월 20일 PM 4:04 UTCresolved

   We've identified that the service interruption is due to an issue with a third-party provider. We are actively working with the provider to ensure a swift resolution and are closely monitoring progress. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

2. 2026년 1월 20일 PM 4:35 UTCresolved

   We are continuing to monitor progress with our third-party provider. The provider is currently implementing mitigation steps, and we are seeing signs of recovery. Several customers have already confirmed that service has been restored on their end. We are working to ensure this resolution is consistent across all accounts. We will provide the next updates within 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

3. 2026년 1월 20일 PM 5:10 UTCresolved

   Our third-party provider is continuing their recovery efforts. While we are no longer seeing active errors, we remain in a period of close monitoring as they work toward a final resolution. We recognize that some users may still experience residual effects; our Support teams are working with them to resolve these errors. Our next update will be in 60 minutes or sooner if additional information becomes available.

4. 2026년 1월 20일 PM 5:21 UTCresolved

   Our third-party provider has confirmed that a fix has been successfully deployed. A root cause analysis (RCA) will be posted here within ten business days. We sincerely apologize for the impact this had on you and your users.

5. 2026년 1월 26일 PM 6:31 UTCresolved

   Following is the RCA summary for a recent incident where a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that impacted the Okta service. Timing: Incident start: January 19, 2026, at 10:10 AM PST Incident resolved: January 20, 2026, at 11:49 AM PST Detection: Okta teams were notified via customer cases and an increase in Google Workspace import errors. Impact: Any customers performing Google Workspace imports during the incident window may have encountered an error stating “UserImportJob: Failed to download users. Json field=primaryEmail does not exist for object=[...]” Root Cause: Google Workspaces, a third-party provider, confirmed that a faulty code change introduced caused certain fields, such as primary email addresses, to be missing in API call results. As a result, Okta imports from Google Workspace could not complete, leading to import failures. Google provides additional details for this disruption: https://www.google.com/appsstatus/dashboard/incidents/9q5n4sfDnxYzHj8FxEua Remediation Steps: Okta teams soon identified that a provider-side disruption was the cause of the incident and opened a formal support case to track the resolution. The third-party provider resolved the incident by rolling back a faulty code change and restoring the missing metadata. Recovery occurred in stages, with some customers successfully remediated before others. Okta teams monitored the recovery in real-time and confirmed successful import signals across multiple impacted customers before standing down.

1. 2026년 1월 3일 AM 1:52 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this kind. Detection and Impact: On December 26, 2025, at 3:27 AM PST, Okta engineering was alerted to increased errors in US Cell 6. During this time, US Cell 6 experienced errors, connection timeouts, and slow responses while attempting to access resources. Admins would have seen a banner on the admin portal stating that the cell was in read-only mode. Root Cause Summary: Okta has determined that the issue was caused by an outage with our cloud service provider. All instances fully recovered by 5:43 AM PT. Remediation Steps: Upon detection, Okta's engineering teams immediately began diagnosing the issue and worked with our cloud service provider to resolve the issue. In addition, the Incident response teams continued to review and analyze the incident, applying additional measures to improve service availability for end-user authentications. Preventative Actions: Okta is taking steps to prevent a recurrence of this issue. We are making improvements to our monitoring and response procedures to more quickly diagnose and recover from this kind of failure in the future. Total Duration: 2 hours and 16 minutes Start Time: December 26, 2025, 03:27 AM PT End Time: December 26, 2025, 05:43 AM PT

1. 2025년 12월 14일 PM 4:40 UTCresolved

   The Okta Engineering team is continuing to work with our third-party vendor and addressing this issue with urgency related to the custom domain email delivery issues.

2. 2025년 12월 14일 PM 4:42 UTCresolved

   The next update will be posted in the next 60 minutes.

3. 2025년 12월 14일 PM 5:50 UTCresolved

   Our Engineering team is continuing to work with the third-party provider on mitigation actions to help resolve this outstanding issue. We are treating the issue with the utmost urgency to restore our services as soon as possible. The next update will be provided within the next 60 minutes or sooner, if additional information becomes available.

4. 2025년 12월 14일 PM 6:48 UTCresolved

   We have identified a potential root cause of this issue, and are currently investigating next steps towards resolution. We will provide the next update in 60 minutes, unless new information becomes available.

5. 2025년 12월 14일 PM 7:39 UTCresolved

   This issue has been successfully resolved as of 11:07AM PDT. All services have been restored. If you continue to see issues, please update your support case for assistance. Additional root cause information will be available within 5 Business days.

6. 2025년 12월 23일 PM 2:49 UTCresolved

   We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar future occurrences. Detection and Impact: On December 14, 2025, at 3:01 a.m. PST, Okta detected an issue that prevented email delivery for customers using custom email domains. This affected end-users' ability to receive emails for Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), password resets, registration activation, account lockout notifications, and other notification emails, such as rate-limit notifications for administrators. Root Cause Summary: Okta has determined that the issue was caused by an unintended configuration change on our Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs). This change incorrectly routed emails from custom domains without proper DMARC sender authentication. As a result, email service providers rejected the emails, causing the delivery failures. Remediation Steps: Upon detection, Okta's engineering teams immediately began diagnosing the delivery failures. After identifying the incorrect routing, we updated the configuration to ensure emails were sent through the appropriate authenticated channels. Normal email functionality was fully restored after the updated configuration was applied. Preventative Actions: Okta is taking several steps to prevent a recurrence of this issue. We are enhancing our monitoring and alerting for email services and improving our configuration management tools to add further safeguards. Duration (# of minutes):1140