Historial de interrupciones de Asana

1. September 2, 2026 at 6:08 PM UTCinvestigating

   Actualmente estamos investigando esta cuestión.

2. September 2, 2026 at 6:13 PM UTCinvestigating

   Seguimos investigando esta cuestión.

3. September 2, 2026 at 6:14 PM UTCinvestigating

   El rollback parece tener errores completamente resueltos. Estamos monitoreando de cerca, pero los usuarios deben poder acceder de nuevo a Asana.

4. September 2, 2026 at 6:14 PM UTCmonitoring

   Se ha aplicado una solución y estamos monitoreando los resultados.

5. September 2, 2026 at 6:49 PM UTCresolved

   Este incidente ha sido resuelto.

6. September 4, 2026 at 7:52 PM UTCpostmortem

   Incident: Un sistema interno responsable de escalar automáticamente la capacidad del servidor backend en uno de nuestros clústeres de computación dejó de sustituir la capacidad que se había ciclado durante el mantenimiento rutinario. Esto causó una reducción gradual de la capacidad disponible durante varias horas. Un despliegue posterior se activó con insuficiente capacidad, lo que hizo fracasar todas las nuevas solicitudes de ese grupo de cálculo. Para mitigar el impacto, revertimos a una revisión de la versión anterior, que todavía tenía suficiente capacidad. Impacto: Durante aproximadamente 30 minutos, los clientes cuyo tráfico fue manejado por este grupo de computación vieron tiempo de inactividad completo; otros clientes no fueron afectados. No se perdieron datos de clientes. Avances: Hemos añadido una vigilancia adicional para detectar este tipo de fallos de aumento de la capacidad mucho antes, y hemos añadido salvaguardias para evitar que los despliegues desplacen el tráfico antes de que se confirme suficiente capacidad saludable. Nuestra métrica considera un promedio ponderado de tiempo de trabajo experimentado por los usuarios en cada centro de datos. El número de minutos de tiempo de inactividad mostrado refleja este promedio ponderado.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. August 31, 2026 at 3:14 PM UTCinvestigating

   Estamos investigando alertas para errores de rendimiento lento y aplicación.

2. August 31, 2026 at 3:55 PM UTCinvestigating

   Continuamos investigando la cuestión; hemos revertido cambios recientes y estamos trabajando para identificar la fuente de los errores.

3. August 31, 2026 at 4:24 PM UTCinvestigating

   Hemos hecho cambios de configuración y vemos recuperación parcial, pero seguimos viendo algunos errores elevados.

4. August 31, 2026 at 4:47 PM UTCmonitoring

   Hemos aplicado una solución están viendo signos de recuperación.

5. August 31, 2026 at 5:18 PM UTCresolved

   Los síntomas de cara al usuario se han recuperado. Seguiremos monitoreando y priorizaremos una retrospectiva para comprender e impedir incidentes similares en el futuro.

6. September 2, 2026 at 9:29 PM UTCpostmortem

   Hemos estado trabajando para añadir una capa de caché a nuestro oleoducto de actualización, afinarlo cuidadosamente y rodarlo gradualmente. El miércoles 26 de agosto lo habilitamos para la mayoría de los casos de uso, y inicialmente funcionó bien. El lunes 31 de agosto, una combinación de cambios de infraestructura no relacionados y tráfico máximo empujó a la caché más allá de sus límites de escalada. Una vez cruzado ese umbral, el caché se hizo inutilizable, y muchas cápsulas que sirven tráfico de lectura para la aplicación Asana ya no podían servirlo. Mitigamos el incidente revertiendo el sistema para utilizar la ruta de código anterior y no programada. El revertido fue exitoso, pero la recuperación tomó más tiempo de lo que esperamos para esta clase de tema. Está en marcha un análisis más completo. Seguiremos con causas profundas, elementos de acción y mejoras, incluyendo por qué la recuperación tomó tanto tiempo como lo hizo. Estábamos completamente abajo por alrededor del 25% de nuestros usuarios, durante 2 horas, 15 minutos.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. August 6, 2026 at 5:24 PM UTCresolved

   From 2026-08-04 15:25 UTC until 2026-08-06 03:51 UTC, Asana failed to send some events to registered webhooks and to return them in the event streams API. Apps which rely on this should refetch the underlying data from the Asana API. Existing webhooks and event streams will continue to function, but events from the incident window will not be sent. Most events with type `task` and action `changed` were dropped during this period. Other events are not affected. The root cause of the incident was traced to a code change which unintentionally dropped change events for most fields on the task type, and the change was reverted.

1. July 7, 2026 at 6:49 PM UTCidentified

   Estamos viendo errores por parte (alrededor del 10%) de usuarios en EE.UU. para la webapp Asana. Hemos identificado la causa raíz y estamos trabajando en identificar una resolución.

2. July 7, 2026 at 7:12 PM UTCmonitoring

   Hemos aplicado una mitigación y estamos monitoreando para asegurar la recuperación.

3. July 7, 2026 at 7:21 PM UTCmonitoring

   Continuamos monitoreando cualquier otro problema.

4. July 7, 2026 at 7:24 PM UTCresolved

   Este incidente ha sido resuelto.

5. July 8, 2026 at 9:28 PM UTCpostmortem

   **Incidente**: Un cambio de configuración removió involuntariamente un recurso crítico requerido por uno de nuestros servicios. Si bien la infraestructura existente sigue funcionando normalmente, la infraestructura de nueva escala no puede estar lista. A medida que aumentaba el tráfico de la mañana, había una brecha creciente entre las solicitudes recibidas y la capacidad de nuestro sistema para manejarlas, lo que dio lugar a la degradación de los servicios. Resolvimos la cuestión restableciendo manualmente el recurso perdido y corrigiendo el cambio de configuración que causó su eliminación. **Impact**: Durante aproximadamente 1,5 horas, un subconjunto de clientes experimentó una salida completa de nuestra aplicación web y aplicaciones de escritorio. Durante este tiempo, los usuarios afectados no pudieron acceder a Asana. No se perdieron datos de clientes. **Moving forward**: Estamos implementando salvaguardias adicionales en nuestro proceso de gestión de configuración para evitar que los recursos críticos sean eliminados involuntariamente. También estamos mejorando nuestros sistemas de monitoreo para detectar la degradación antes, antes de que impacte el acceso al cliente. Nuestra métrica considera un promedio ponderado de tiempo de trabajo experimentado por los usuarios en cada centro de datos. El número de minutos de tiempo de inactividad mostrado refleja este promedio ponderado.

Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.

1. April 29, 2026 at 11:19 PM UTCresolved

   Between April 21st and April 23rd, many rules triggered by date time triggers did not run. New rule triggers ran normally starting April 23rd, and the delayed triggers were processed by April 27th.

2. April 30, 2026 at 12:43 AM UTCpostmortem

   Starting on **April 20th, 2026 at 10:00 AM PDT**, a combination of scaled-up background action jobs in the EU and a recent change to how date time trigger volume is managed overloaded the system that processes resource intensive background action jobs. This caused multi-hour delays in email and inbox notifications in the EU and prevented date time triggers from executing in all regions. Engineers were first alerted on **April 21st** by our monitoring systems, but did not recognize the full scope of the incident until **April 23rd**. On April 23rd, the change to manage date time trigger volume was reverted and the problematic background action jobs were isolated. All delayed notifications were sent by **April 24th, 11:30 AM PDT**, and all delayed date time triggers were executed by **April 27th, 4:00 AM PDT**.

1. April 29, 2026 at 11:09 PM UTCresolved

   Between April 20th and April 24th, 60% of email and inbox notifications were delayed by at least one hour in EU. Notifications were delayed up to 3 days. Other resource intensive background actions were also impacted at a lesser rate.

2. April 30, 2026 at 12:34 AM UTCpostmortem

   Starting on **April 20th, 2026 at 10:00 AM PDT**, a combination of scaled-up background action jobs in the EU and a recent change to how date time trigger volume is managed overloaded the system that processes resource intensive background action jobs. This caused multi-hour delays in email and inbox notifications in the EU and prevented date time triggers from executing in all regions. Engineers were first alerted on **April 21st** by our monitoring systems, but did not recognize the full scope of the incident until **April 23rd**. On April 23rd, the change to manage date time trigger volume was reverted and the problematic background action jobs were isolated. All delayed notifications were sent by **April 24th, 11:30 AM PDT**, and all delayed date time triggers were executed by **April 27th, 4:00 AM PDT**.

1. March 26, 2026 at 3:03 PM UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports that some users are unable to load Asana, especially in and around New York/the East Coast of the US, and have observed intermittent errors. We are investigating this, and will provide an update within an hour.

2. March 26, 2026 at 3:50 PM UTCmonitoring

   We believe that this was related to http3, and have disabled http3 for the affected CloudFront distribution. We believe Asana should now load after a hard refresh.

3. March 26, 2026 at 6:34 PM UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. March 1, 2026 at 8:31 PM UTCinvestigating

   Asana remains accessible to customers in the ME region, but we are seeing backends impacted by an AWS ME outage. If that isn't resolved soon, we expect to see some performance degradation and possible outages of the Asana application. This is only for the ME region; other regions are unaffected.

2. March 1, 2026 at 9:03 PM UTCinvestigating

   We no longer see impact on our servers. We're monitoring, as the AWS incident has not resolved.

3. March 2, 2026 at 9:02 AM UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

4. March 2, 2026 at 9:05 AM UTCinvestigating

   We are seeing major impact in the ME region making Asana services unavailable to users whose data is stored in that region. We have taken steps to avoid additional loss of EC2 resources, but are continuing to see high error rates. This cause is AWS incidents affecting the infrastructure (az1 and az3) in the Middle East region: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

5. March 2, 2026 at 10:27 AM UTCinvestigating

   We are still seeing major impact in the ME region making Asana services unavailable to users whose data is stored in that region. We are continuing to monitor the situation. The cause is AWS incidents affecting the infrastructure in the Middle East region: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

6. March 2, 2026 at 12:03 PM UTCinvestigating

   We are still seeing major impact in the ME region making Asana services unavailable to users whose data is stored in that region. We are continuing to monitor the situation. The cause is widespread AWS incidents affecting the infrastructure in the Middle East region: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

7. March 13, 2026 at 6:44 PM UTCmonitoring

   A small number of users were affected by the AWS outage in UAE (me-central-1); following AWS's recommendations, we have moved processing to other regions, and believe there is no user impact.

8. March 15, 2026 at 5:58 AM UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. February 5, 2026 at 11:49 PM UTCmonitoring

   Our primary monitoring is observing an outage for our API and mobile services, but secondary monitoring indicates that API and mobile traffic is operating as usual. Our engineers are reviewing our primary monitoring and will provide updates on the situation.

2. February 5, 2026 at 11:58 PM UTCresolved

   Our engineers have rolled back recent changes to our primary monitoring systems, and our API and mobile systems are fully operational.

1. January 26, 2026 at 3:01 AM UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an elevated rate of API errors as well as delays reflecting changes for the App in EU.

2. January 26, 2026 at 3:19 AM UTCmonitoring

   We have identified certain expensive workloads and reduced background processing to mitigate this. We see recovery in user facing services and are investigating the expensive workloads; user traffic is now working normally.

3. January 26, 2026 at 3:20 AM UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

4. January 26, 2026 at 3:29 AM UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. January 22, 2026 at 5:48 PM UTCinvestigating

   We're investigating an outage, it looks like no one is able to reach the Asana webapp.

2. January 22, 2026 at 5:51 PM UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. January 22, 2026 at 5:59 PM UTCinvestigating

   We've identified the cause and have rolled back. Based on our monitoring, we should be recovered for some users.

4. January 22, 2026 at 6:04 PM UTCinvestigating

   Error rates have dropped significantly, to about 2%. It's possible some users continue to see errors, but we expect most users to be able to use Asana.

5. January 22, 2026 at 6:38 PM UTCinvestigating

   Our error rates are back to normal baseline, and we don't expect an immediate recurrence. We'll create a post-mortem in the next few days with more details, including what happened and how we plan to prevent this going forward.

6. January 22, 2026 at 7:00 PM UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

7. January 27, 2026 at 7:53 AM UTCpostmortem

   Incident: On 2026-01-22 the Asana App and all associated services had a service disruption due to dependency on a shared database used for storing metadata. This was triggered by a code path which caused overload for that database, followed by request queuing, timeouts, and errors. Impact: From 17:33 - 17:57 UTC the Asana App and all associated services were unavailable. There was a further 14 minutes of partial downtime from 18:45 - 18:59 UTC affecting 10-20% of users, also triggered by dependency on this shared database. Moving forward: We immediately rolled back our application code and added resources for this database. Going forward we will continue to reduce dependency on this shared database for common paths to reduce risk, and monitor for unexpected resource usage. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

1. January 6, 2026 at 2:17 PM UTCresolved

   On January 6th, 2026 at UTC 12:00, we experienced an approximately 50-minute service disruption affecting customers in non-US regions. During this time, some requests may have failed or timed out. What Happened: During routine maintenance, we upgraded a core infrastructure component. While the upgrade itself completed as expected, some services did not successfully reconnect to the updated infrastructure. This led to temporary communication issues and degraded service in the affected regions. We apologize for the inconvenience and want to assure you that we are taking steps to help prevent similar issues in the future.

1. January 5, 2026 at 9:17 PM UTCinvestigating

   Users are currently unable to begin new sessions in the Asana web app. Our engineers are working to investigate and mitigate this issue as soon as possible. Existing web sessions are unaffected, along with mobile and API traffic.

2. January 5, 2026 at 9:29 PM UTCmonitoring

   Our engineers have identified and reverted the change preventing users from starting new Asana web app sessions. We're monitoring the situation to ensure recovery. The Asana web app is operational, and other services (mobile, API) are unaffected.

3. January 5, 2026 at 9:50 PM UTCresolved

   Thank you for your patience. Service is fully restored, and the Asana web app is back to normal functionality.

1. November 24, 2025 at 8:28 PM UTCresolved

   Resolved - We have fully resolved an incident related to a product permissions bug that briefly impacted some of our customers between November 18 and November 19. This issue was contained entirely within customer domains and did not expose any data externally.

1. November 18, 2025 at 10:14 PM UTCresolved

   Asana's MCP server experienced partial unavailability for three hours due to an upstream provider outage. No data loss or security issues occurred during this outage. This resulted in an increased rate of errors from 3:20 - 5:00 AM PT and some failed requests from 5:04 - 6:26 AM PT. The service fully recovered after the upstream provider resolved the issue.

2. November 21, 2025 at 12:29 AM UTCpostmortem

   Incident: [Cloudflare experienced an outage](https://blog.cloudflare.com/18-november-2025-outage/) that impacted the Workers KV service, a storage infrastructure service our MCP server relies on. This resulted in increased error rates and failed requests for a portion of our MCP traffic over the span of 3 hours. ‌ Impact:  Approximately 100 users making requests to the MCP server received error responses or were unable to reach the server from 2025-11-18 11:20 UTC through 14:20 UTC. ‌ Moving forward: We are investing in our MCP Server to improve its resilience to KV store outages, and are investigating ways to reduce the overall impact of Cloudflare outages. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

1. November 7, 2025 at 9:22 PM UTCidentified

   We're currently experiencing a high volume of crashes for the Asana app. We've identified the cause and are actively working to resolve the issue. Thank you for your patience!

2. November 7, 2025 at 9:24 PM UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

3. November 7, 2025 at 9:39 PM UTCidentified

   The root cause has been addressed, and some sessions are starting to see recovery. We are taking action to speed up recovery across all regions.

4. November 7, 2025 at 9:56 PM UTCmonitoring

   Functionality to the Asana webapp is now restored. We are still experiencing errors in the API, and are working to resolve them.

5. November 7, 2025 at 10:03 PM UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

6. November 7, 2025 at 10:08 PM UTCresolved

   The incident is now resolved.

7. November 12, 2025 at 5:15 PM UTCpostmortem

   We had approximately 1 hour of full downtime, where the Asana application was unavailable for most of our users. There was no data loss or security vulnerability. ‌ A routine configuration change affected the Asana application globally. While refactoring the configuration consumption, we missed an unintended side effect, causing the app to fail loading in all regions. We reverted the change and restarted servers for full recovery.

1. October 31, 2025 at 4:17 PM UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating the issue.

2. October 31, 2025 at 4:28 PM UTCidentified

   We’re currently experiencing increased system load. Our team has identified the source and is actively working to mitigate the impact. Thank you for your patience.

3. October 31, 2025 at 5:05 PM UTCmonitoring

   We have identified the source of load and addressed it, and are monitoring recovery.

4. October 31, 2025 at 5:18 PM UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved. During the incident, users in EU experienced slow application performance, and automations, webhooks, and background actions were delayed.

1. October 20, 2025 at 2:28 PM UTCidentified

   We are currently investigating an issue which affects about 10% of our users, this is a continuation of the AWS outage that happened earlier today

2. October 20, 2025 at 3:07 PM UTCidentified

   We are still working on fixing the issue, this is affecting most of our users

3. October 20, 2025 at 4:55 PM UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work on resolving the issue impacting access to Asana. This outage is related to the ongoing AWS service disruption, which is affecting many applications and customers globally (https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status). Our team is closely monitoring AWS recovery efforts and will restore full functionality as soon as possible.

4. October 20, 2025 at 6:43 PM UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work on restoring access to Asana. This outage is related to the ongoing AWS service disruption, which is affecting many applications and customers globally (https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status). Our engineers are actively deploying mitigation strategies to restore Asana functionality and reduce our reliance on affected services. We're observing some recovery in foundational infrastructure, and are working towards restoring core app functionality.

5. October 20, 2025 at 7:54 PM UTCmonitoring

   Asana is functional again. We’ve begun re-enabling API traffic and are gradually allowing traffic from all clients. Most functionality is coming back online, though some users may still experience intermittent errors or slower performance while systems stabilise.

6. October 20, 2025 at 8:34 PM UTCresolved

   Asana is now fully operational, and all services are performing normally. API traffic and client access have been fully restored, and we’re no longer seeing elevated error rates or latency. This incident was related to an earlier AWS service disruption. We’ll continue to monitor performance closely, but Asana is back to normal.

7. October 23, 2025 at 4:07 PM UTCpostmortem

   **Incident:** AWS infrastructure had [an outage affecting core services](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/), which our application depends on, in the Virginia \(us-east-1\) region. The initial impact to our services is covered by [https://status.asana.com/incidents/zfdtyvckl5k2](https://status.asana.com/incidents/zfdtyvckl5k2); this covers the second major impact to our services. **Impact:** Starting at 2025-10-20 14:58 UTC, our application was down for approximately 10% of our users. By 15:08 UTC the application was completely down for all users We saw some improvement in internal error rates around 17:06 UTC resulting in intermittent availability. We did not see full infrastructure recovery until approximately 19:50 UTC and our traffic fully recovered by 20:29 UTC. This affected all regions because we store some global state and shared application configuration in the Virginia region. **Moving forward:** We are working on ways to reduce the impact of single region outages, including for this region, to limit the impact and improve options for recovery. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

1. October 20, 2025 at 7:10 AM UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue which affects all services.

2. October 20, 2025 at 7:15 AM UTCinvestigating

   AWS is investigating errors in Virginia, per https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status . We are continuing to investigate and will provide an update in 15 minutes.

3. October 20, 2025 at 7:30 AM UTCinvestigating

   We are still seeing full downtime, and are continuing investigation.

4. October 20, 2025 at 7:43 AM UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue from our side, and waiting for an update from AWS.

5. October 20, 2025 at 7:59 AM UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

6. October 20, 2025 at 8:19 AM UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to work on this issue. AWS DynamoDB is disrupted, and this impacts our production services.

7. October 20, 2025 at 8:32 AM UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to work on this issue, and will update once we have an ETA for resolution. Also see https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status for status on resolution for infrastructure issues.

8. October 20, 2025 at 9:18 AM UTCinvestigating

   We are working to prepare our systems to recover once AWS resolves DynamoDB issues in us-east-1.

9. October 20, 2025 at 9:32 AM UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented, and we are monitoring recovery.

10. October 20, 2025 at 10:08 AM UTCmonitoring

    The root cause has been fixed, and we are monitoring recovery; we still see somehow degraded performance in the US region, and are adjusting configuration to address this.

11. October 20, 2025 at 10:23 AM UTCresolved

    This incident has been resolved; error rates and latency have gone down and we've caught up on existing traffic. We will publish a postmortem here within 72 hours.

12. October 23, 2025 at 4:05 PM UTCpostmortem

    **Incident:** AWS infrastructure had [an outage affecting core services](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/), which our application depends on, in the Virginia \(us-east-1\) region. After partial recovery within AWS, we made configuration changes and saw recovery for our traffic. We continued to observe while AWS worked through the incident on their side. The remaining impact on Asana's side is covered in [https://status.asana.com/incidents/lvtt14d4d80g](https://status.asana.com/incidents/lvtt14d4d80g) . **Impact:** We saw global downtime from 2025-10-20 06:52 UTC through 09:27 UTC, 2 hours and 35 minutes. This affected all regions because we store some global state and shared application configuration in the Virginia region. **Moving forward:** We are working on ways to reduce the impact of single region outages, including for this region, to limit the impact and improve options for recovery. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

1. October 13, 2025 at 8:56 PM UTCresolved

   From 15:44 - 16:33 UTC, Asana users may have seen stale data in the web app. In some cases, users may have experienced crashes and failed API requests.