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66 Split incidents · April 2026 — official updates, affected components, duration and resolution details.
Actualmente estamos investigando esta cuestión.
Se ha aplicado una solución y estamos monitoreando los resultados.
Este incidente ha sido resuelto.
Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.
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Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.
Actualmente estamos investigando un problema en el grupo Prod3 donde los componentes de la plataforma Harness están cargando más despacio de lo esperado.
Actualmente estamos investigando esta cuestión.
Se ha aplicado una solución y estamos monitoreando los resultados.
Este incidente ha sido resuelto.
## Summary Entre el 7 de julio y el 8 de julio de 2026, las cuentas de clientes hospedadas en nuestro entorno Prod 3 experimentaron una lentitud intermitente y fallas al cargar oleoductos y resolver plantillas. La causa subyacente fue un aumento agudo y sostenido del tráfico interno de búsqueda de características de nuestro servicio de procesamiento de plantillas a nuestro servicio de backend de la plataforma central. La cuestión se presentó en dos días separados. En el día 1 \(Julio 7\), nuestro equipo restauró el servicio a través de las atenuaciones del nivel de infraestructura, reiniciando los servicios afectados y añadiendo capacidad. Debido a que esa causa subyacente todavía estaba presente, el mismo modo de fallo recurrió el Día 2 \(Julio 8\). La investigación más profunda del día 2 identificó la bandera y el camino de código específico responsable, y la ingeniería envió una solución para que el control de la bandera se sirve ahora de caché local. Esta solución se desplegó en todos los grupos de producción y resolvió plenamente la cuestión; no se ha recurrido desde entonces Estamos auditando todas las demás banderas de la plataforma para la misma brecha de caché, y estamos implementando procesos y monitoreando mejoras descritas en la sección de Medidas Preventivas a continuación para capturar esta clase de tema antes y reducir el riesgo de recurrencia. ## Impacto *Síntomas* Oleoductos de carga intermitentes; validación y resolución de plantillas lentas o fallidas; errores de conectividad intermitente/timeout entre los servicios de plataforma. ** Impacto funcional:** Las ejecuciones de tuberías y operaciones de estudio de oleoductos que dependen de la resolución de plantilla se retrasaron o fallaron durante las ventanas activas descritas en el cronograma anterior. Algunas ejecuciones requieren reingreso manual ## Root cause Nuestro servicio de backend central no pudo mantenerse al día con la tasa de llegada de la solicitud debido a una búsqueda sostenida y sin trabas de características que conduce un volumen grande y creciente de tráfico interno después de una liberación reciente. Mitigation * Mitigación inmediata \(Día 1 y Día 2\): eliminar la instancia de backend saturada\(s\) del servicio y la capacidad agregada para aliviar el cuello de botella agudo. * Fijación permanente \(Día 2\): actualizó el servicio de procesamiento de plantillas para que la comprobación de características responsables lea de caché local en lugar de llamar al servicio de backend en cada búsqueda, eliminando el exceso de tráfico interno en su fuente. * La fijación se desplegó en todos los grupos de producción y se verificó mediante un retorno a volúmenes de tráfico interno normales y tiempos de respuesta. ## Preventive Measures ' Next Steps * Auditoría de caché de alta frecuencia: Estamos revisando todas las banderas de características utilizadas en las rutas de código de alta frecuencia en toda la plataforma para identificar y cerrar cualquier laguna de caché similar antes de que puedan causar una repetición de este problema. * Validación de la liberación: Estamos fortaleciendo las pruebas de carga pre-release para nuevas trayectorias de código ligadas a características para que las regresiones de llamada-volumen de este tipo sean capturadas antes de alcanzar la producción. * Alerta de capacidad: Estamos añadiendo alertas proactivas sobre la saturación de solicitud de backend para que esta clase de cuello de botella se vea atrapada y mitigada automáticamente, antes de que afecte los tiempos de respuesta orientados al cliente.
Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.
Actualmente estamos investigando un problema en la UE1 donde los usuarios están teniendo problemas utilizando el módulo IACM.
Hemos implementado una solución a nuestro lado que ha resuelto esta cuestión. Seguimos vigilando esta cuestión.
Este incidente ha sido resuelto.
Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.
Actualmente estamos investigando un problema en el grupo Prod3 donde los componentes del oleoducto están cargando más despacio de lo esperado.
Una solución se ha implementado en uno de nuestros microservicios responsables de tratar plantillas de oleoductos que han resuelto el problema. Seguimos vigilando la cuestión.
Este incidente ha sido resuelto.
## Summary Entre el 7 de julio y el 8 de julio de 2026, las cuentas de clientes hospedadas en nuestro entorno Prod 3 experimentaron una lentitud intermitente y fallas al cargar oleoductos y resolver plantillas. La causa subyacente fue un aumento agudo y sostenido del tráfico interno de búsqueda de características de nuestro servicio de procesamiento de plantillas a nuestro servicio de backend de la plataforma central. La cuestión se presentó en dos días separados. En el día 1 \(Julio 7\), nuestro equipo restauró el servicio a través de las atenuaciones del nivel de infraestructura, reiniciando los servicios afectados y añadiendo capacidad. Debido a que esa causa subyacente todavía estaba presente, el mismo modo de fallo recurrió el Día 2 \(Julio 8\). La investigación más profunda del día 2 identificó la bandera y el camino de código específico responsable, y la ingeniería envió una solución para que el control de la bandera se sirve ahora de caché local. Esta solución se desplegó en todos los grupos de producción y resolvió plenamente la cuestión; no se ha recurrido desde entonces Estamos auditando todas las demás banderas de la plataforma para la misma brecha de caché, y estamos implementando procesos y monitoreando mejoras descritas en la sección de Medidas Preventivas a continuación para capturar esta clase de tema antes y reducir el riesgo de recurrencia. ## Impacto *Síntomas* Oleoductos de carga intermitentes; validación y resolución de plantillas lentas o fallidas; errores de conectividad intermitente/timeout entre los servicios de plataforma. ** Impacto funcional:** Las ejecuciones de tuberías y operaciones de estudio de oleoductos que dependen de la resolución de plantilla se retrasaron o fallaron durante las ventanas activas descritas en el cronograma anterior. Algunas ejecuciones requieren reingreso manual ## Root cause Nuestro servicio de backend central no pudo mantenerse al día con la tasa de llegada de la solicitud debido a una búsqueda sostenida y sin trabas de características que conduce un volumen grande y creciente de tráfico interno después de una liberación reciente. Mitigation * Mitigación inmediata \(Día 1 y Día 2\): eliminar la instancia de backend saturada\(s\) del servicio y la capacidad agregada para aliviar el cuello de botella agudo. * Fijación permanente \(Día 2\): actualizó el servicio de procesamiento de plantillas para que la comprobación de características responsables lea de caché local en lugar de llamar al servicio de backend en cada búsqueda, eliminando el exceso de tráfico interno en su fuente. * La fijación se desplegó en todos los grupos de producción y se verificó mediante un retorno a volúmenes de tráfico interno normales y tiempos de respuesta. ## Preventive Measures ' Next Steps * Auditoría de caché de alta frecuencia: Estamos revisando todas las banderas de características utilizadas en las rutas de código de alta frecuencia en toda la plataforma para identificar y cerrar cualquier laguna de caché similar antes de que puedan causar una repetición de este problema. * Validación de la liberación: Estamos fortaleciendo las pruebas de carga pre-release para nuevas trayectorias de código ligadas a características para que las regresiones de llamada-volumen de este tipo sean capturadas antes de alcanzar la producción. * Alerta de capacidad: Estamos añadiendo alertas proactivas sobre la saturación de solicitud de backend para que esta clase de cuello de botella se vea atrapada y mitigada automáticamente, antes de que afecte los tiempos de respuesta orientados al cliente.
Traducido automáticamente desde la actualización oficial del incidente.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
We are seeing the backlogged items worked through and continuing to monitor results.
We are continuing to monitor results while the backlog is worked through.
This incident has been resolved.
**Incident Summary** Harness FME \(Feature Management & Experimentation\) faced substantial delays in scheduled impressions data exports on Jul 2, 2026. This issue stemmed from performance degradation within Tinybird's infrastructure, affecting query execution crucial to our export pipeline. **Root Cause** The core issue was a temporary **performance degradation on the provider's infrastructure**. This directly impacted the metadata retrieval endpoint, which failed to return job IDs intermittently. Consequently, completed export jobs underwent repeated retries, leading to a backlog in the export queue. **Impact** * The export backlog accumulated, peaking at more than 6 hours behind the planned schedule. * No data loss was detected during the incident. **Mitigation** 1. **Adjusted Temporal workflows:** Extended timeouts from ~30 to ~50 minutes and increased polling attempts from ~180 to ~300. 2. **Expanded resource capacity.** 3. **Traffic redirection:** Systematically shifted export workloads over to an optimized in-house cluster. 4. **Manual intervention:** Terminated stalling workflows stuck in retry loops from failed metadata lookups. **Next Steps** Complete the migration of all remaining export jobs to the internal analytics cluster \(In progress\).
Testing Maintenance
Scheduled maintenance is currently in progress. We will provide updates as necessary.
The scheduled maintenance has been completed.
Dev Statuspage incident - Testing
We are currently investigating this issue.
Harness is investigating an issue affecting our Prod 4 environments. Our log-services are affected and harness is currently working on restoring function. This can affect our CI, Chaos, IACM modules.
We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
### **Summary** During a planned security improvement to rotate service authentication secrets in the Prod 4 environment, an incorrect secret value was inadvertently applied to a subset of internal services. This resulted in authentication failures between platform components, impacting CI initialization, delegate task creation, and log streaming for certain pipeline executions. The issue was resolved by rolling back the token configuration to the previous known-good version and validating service recovery. ### **Impact** **Affected environment:** Prod 4 **Customer-visible impact:** * CI builds failed during initialization with errors such as: * _“Could not fetch token from log service”_ * _“token in request not authorized for receiving tokens”_ \(HTTP 400\) * CD and IaCM pipeline stages continued to execute but did not stream logs. * Some Shell Script steps failed during execution. * Delegate tasks could not be created or assigned for some pipeline executions. No customer data was lost or corrupted. ### **Root Cause** As part of a planned security initiative, authentication secrets used for communication between internal platform services were rotated in the Prod 4 environment. During the rotation process, an incorrect secret value was inadvertently configured for one of the services. Instead of applying the newly generated secret in the expected format, a default/incorrect value was introduced. This created a mismatch between services that authenticate using the shared token, causing authentication requests to be rejected with HTTP 400 errors. The authentication failures prevented CI components from obtaining log service tokens, disrupted delegate task creation, and prevented log streaming for affected pipeline executions. ### **Resolution** Engineering responded by: * Reverting the token configuration to the previous known-good secret. * Restoring consistent authentication across affected services. * Validating recovery through CI pipeline execution tests. * Verifying CD and IaCM pipeline execution and log streaming. * Executing a comprehensive validation suite to confirm platform functionality before closing the incident. ### **Follow-up Actions** To reduce the likelihood of similar incidents in the future, Harness will: * Implement additional pre-rotation and post-rotation validation checks to verify that the correct secret values and formats are applied before changes are activated. * Introduce automated verification of authentication between dependent services immediately following secret rotations. * Strengthen operational safeguards and deployment validation for security credential rotation procedures to detect configuration mismatches before they can impact customer workloads.
Testing CD outage
We are continuing to investigate this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently experiencing intermittent login issues with the Traceable cluster due to an issue with our login provider. We are actively working with the provider to resolve the issue. This incident does not impact data ingestion, and all ingestion pipelines continue to function normally. We will provide updates as we have more information.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
Issue has been fixed and we are closely monitoring
We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.
This incident has been resolved.
## **Summary** _Between **06:50 UTC and 07:20 UTC on June 26, 2026**, customers experienced intermittent login failures while accessing Traceable environments across multiple US clusters. The incident was traced to an issue with the external authentication provider \(Auth0\), where elevated socket timeouts caused increased login latency and authentication request failures. Login functionality gradually recovered as the upstream issue stabilized, and the incident was resolved after successful login validation across multiple impacted clusters._ ## **Root Cause** _The root cause was an issue with the external authentication provider \(Auth0\), which experienced elevated socket timeouts while processing authentication requests. These upstream timeouts increased login latency and caused intermittent authentication failures across multiple US-region clusters. Since authentication requests depended on the external provider, affected login attempts failed despite Traceable platform services remaining healthy. The incident was resolved once the upstream authentication service recovered and login requests consistently completed successfully._ ## **Impact** _Starting at approximately 06:50 UTC, customers experienced intermittent login failures when accessing Traceable environments across multiple US clusters. The issue affected user authentication, preventing some users from accessing the platform while underlying application services remained operational. Login functionality progressively recovered during the incident, and normal authentication was restored by 07:20 UTC._ ## **Remediation** _The engineering team worked with the external authentication provider while continuously monitoring authentication health across affected clusters. Login functionality was validated through platform metrics and manual verification across representative environments. After confirming consistent authentication success across impacted clusters, the incident was declared resolved._ ## **Action Items** _To prevent such issues going forward, Harness will,_ _Increase authentication resilience: Evaluate improvements to authentication request handling, including timeout tuning, retry strategies where appropriate, and graceful degradation for transient upstream failures._
We’ll be performing a backend infrastructure upgrade to improve reliability and compliance. During this maintenance window, Harness platform may experience brief, intermittent interruptions. We appreciate your understanding and are working to minimize any impact.
Maintenance will begin as scheduled in 60 minutes.
Harness login is failing. We are investigating the problem.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.
This incident has been resolved.
### **Summary** During a planned security improvement to rotate service authentication secrets in the EU1 environment, an out of sequence secret value was inadvertently applied to a subset of internal services. This resulted in authentication failures between platform components, causing login failures. The issue was resolved by rolling back the token configuration to the previous known-good version and validating service recovery. ### **Impact** **Affected environment:** EU1 **Customer-visible impact: Login Failures** No customer data was lost or corrupted. ### **Root Cause** As part of a planned security initiative, authentication secrets used for communication between internal platform services were rotated in the EU1 . During the rotation process, an secret value was inadvertently misconfigured for one of the services. There was a newer format of secret and had to be applied in a certain order. This created a mismatch between services that authenticate using the shared token, causing authentication requests to be rejected with HTTP 400 errors. The authentication failures prevented CI components from obtaining log service tokens, disrupted delegate task creation, and prevented log streaming for affected pipeline executions. ### **Resolution** Engineering responded by: * Reverting the token configuration to the previous known-good secret. * Restoring consistent authentication across affected services. ### **Follow-up Actions** To reduce the likelihood of similar incidents in the future, Harness will: * Implement additional pre-rotation and post-rotation validation checks to verify that the correct secret values and formats are applied before changes are activated. * Introduce automated verification of authentication between dependent services immediately following secret rotations. * Strengthen operational safeguards and deployment validation for security credential rotation procedures to detect configuration mismatches before they can impact customer workloads.
We have identified an issue affecting a small subset of accounts in the EU1 region. As a result, data ingestion for impacted integrations may have stopped.
FME will be undergoing scheduled critical maintenance during this window. No downtime is expected, and all services are anticipated to remain available. As part of this maintenance, updates or modifications to Large Segments will be temporarily unavailable until the activity is completed.
We will be undergoing scheduled maintenance during this time.
Maintenance will begin as scheduled in 60 minutes.
Scheduled maintenance is currently in progress. We will provide updates as necessary.
The scheduled maintenance has been completed.
We’ll be performing a backend infrastructure upgrade to improve reliability and compliance. During this maintenance window, Harness platform may experience brief, intermittent interruptions. We appreciate your understanding and are working to minimize any impact.
Maintenance will begin as scheduled in 60 minutes.
Scheduled maintenance is currently in progress. We will provide updates as necessary.
The scheduled maintenance has been completed.
Testing Dev in QA
We are currently investigating this issue.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
IDP Systems' communication was interrupted due to an update. Harness is rolling back changes. Impacted environments - prod0, prod1, prod2
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
# **Customer RCA: Executive Summary** On June 17, 2026, between 9:30 PM and 10:15 PM IST, customers in certain production environments experienced failures when accessing IDP \(Internal Developer Portal\) workflows. The issue was caused by a configuration mismatch in service authentication settings. ## **Impact** * **Affected Service:** IDP workflows * **Duration:** Approximately 45 minutes \(9:30 PM - 10:15 PM IST\) * **Customer Impact:** Users were unable to load IDP workflows during this period. * **Data Loss:** None * **Security Impact:** None ## **Root Cause** During a planned service deployment, a configuration mismatch occurred in the authentication settings used for internal service-to-service communication. Specifically, the authentication credentials configured in the newly deployed service did not match the credentials expected by existing services in prod environments. This mismatch caused authentication failures when services attempted to communicate with each other, resulting in workflow loading failures for customers. ## **Mitigation** The issue was resolved by reverting the configuration change to restore the previous working authentication settings. The engineering team was proactively monitoring logs immediately after deployment and identified error patterns several minutes before the first customer report. ## **Action Items/Next Steps** 1. **Enhanced Pre-Deployment Validation:** Automated validation checks will be introduced to verify that all required configurations, secrets, and service dependencies are correctly provisioned and consistent across services before any production deployment. 2. **Improved Deployment Procedures:** Updated deployment checklists with explicit verification of service authentication settings across services before rollout.
We are investigating an issue affecting artifact downloads from Maven Central following recent rate-limiting changes implemented by Sonatype. Sonatype has recently implemented rate limits and builds downloading artifacts from central sonatype https://central.sonatype.org/faq/429-contact-support/. Customers downloading artifacts would be impacted. We are actively engaging with Sonatype to mitigate the issue here.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
Maven Central is rate-limiting requests originating from our us-central1 NAT egress IP. Other regions (us-west1, us-east5) are not affected. The Maven/Sonatype team has been engaged and is actively working on lifting the rate limit for our IP range.
We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.
This incident has been resolved.
## Summary On June 17, 2026, a subset of Harness Hosted CI customers experienced intermittent build failures when downloading Java/Gradle dependencies from Maven Central. Affected builds failed with `429 Too Many Requests` errors and could not proceed until the issue was resolved. The incident was not caused by a Harness code change or platform defect. It was triggered by a policy change implemented by Sonatype \(the operator of Maven Central\) that tightened IP-based rate limits for unauthenticated access. Because Harness Hosted CI routes builds through shared network egress infrastructure, the aggregate outbound traffic from multiple customers sharing a common IP address exceeded the new, lower thresholds — causing all builds behind that IP to be temporarily blocked. This was an industry-wide change. Other CI/CD platforms experienced identical incidents in the weeks prior to Harness being affected. ## Root Cause **Primary cause:** Sonatype tightened IP-based rate limiting policies on Maven Central \([repo1.maven.org](http://repo1.maven.org) and [repo.maven.apache.org](http://repo.maven.apache.org)\). Harness Hosted CI uses shared network egress infrastructure where multiple customer build environments route outbound traffic through common IP addresses. When the aggregate Maven Central request volume from all customers behind a given IP exceeded Sonatype's revised threshold, that IP was hard-blocked for approximately 30 minutes, causing all builds attempting to download Maven dependencies to fail with `429` errors. ## Mitigation **Immediate actions taken during the incident:** 1. **Regional redistribution:** For customers experiencing active failures, builds were routed to infrastructure regions whose outbound IPs had not yet hit the rate limit threshold, providing immediate relief for those customers. 2. **Sonatype engagement and IP whitelisting:** The Harness team contacted Sonatype support and provided the full list of Harness Hosted CI outbound IP addresses for whitelisting. Sonatype applied a "warning" rate-limit policy in place of hard blockingeliminating the `429` errors across all affected regions. Post-mitigation validation confirmed zero throttling across all tested IPs. ## Next Steps The following actions are in progress or planned to prevent recurrence and reduce exposure to similar incidents: **Near-term \(in progress\):** * Harness is in the process of establishing a commercial agreement with Sonatype for elevated rate limits on Maven Central and advance notification of future policy changes. * Harness is engaging other major dependency registries — including Docker Hub, npm, GitHub Packages, and the Gradle Plugin Portal — to proactively whitelist Harness egress IPs before similar incidents can occur. * We are publishing documentation on best practices for managing external dependency access in Hosted CI, including guidance on dependency proxies, mirrors, and caching strategies. * Harness plans to implement caching infrastructure for common dependencies at the platform level \(using Harness Artifact Registry\), which will significantly reduce direct Maven Central request volume and provide resilience against future external rate-limit changes. * We are enhancing our alerting alerting for `429` error patterns from external registries so that future rate-limit incidents are detected internally before customers are impacted. ## What This Means for You **To reduce future exposure**, we recommend: * **Enable Cache Intelligence** in Harness CI to cache dependency artifacts between builds, reducing how often Maven Central is contacted. * **Use Harness Save/Restore Cache steps** to persist your local dependency cache across pipeline runs. If you have questions or need help implementing any of these recommendations, please contact your Customer Success Manager or reach out to Harness Support.
We will be undergoing scheduled maintenance during this time.