Historia awarii Asana

1. 2 września 2026 18:08 UTCinvestigating

   Obecnie badamy tę kwestię.

2. 2 września 2026 18:13 UTCinvestigating

   Nadal badamy tę kwestię.

3. 2 września 2026 18:14 UTCinvestigating

   Rollback wydaje się mieć całkowicie rozwiązane błędy. Monitorujemy dokładnie, ale użytkownicy powinni mieć dostęp do Asany.

4. 2 września 2026 18:14 UTCmonitoring

   Wprowadzono rozwiązanie i monitorujemy wyniki.

5. 2 września 2026 18:49 UTCresolved

   Ten incydent został rozwiązany.

6. 4 września 2026 19:52 UTCpostmortem

   Incydent: Wewnętrzny system odpowiedzialny za automatyczne skalowanie pojemności serwera backend w jednym z naszych klastrów obliczeniowych przestał zastępować pojemność, która została przerwana podczas rutynowej konserwacji. Spowodowało to stopniowe zmniejszenie dostępnej przepustowości w ciągu kilku godzin. Kolejne uruchomienie zostało uruchomione z niewystarczającą przepustowością, co spowodowało, że wszystkie nowe wnioski dotyczące niepowodzenia obliczeń tego klastra. Aby złagodzić ten wpływ, powróciliśmy do poprzedniego przeglądu wydania, który nadal miał wystarczające możliwości. Impact: Przez około 30 minut klienci, których ruch był obsługiwany przez ten klaster obliczeń widział pełne przestoje; inni klienci nie zostały naruszone. Nie utracono danych klientów. Dalsze działania: Dodaliśmy dodatkowy monitoring w celu wykrycia tego rodzaju awarii skalowania pojemności znacznie wcześniej oraz dodaliśmy zabezpieczenia zapobiegające przemieszczaniu ruchu, zanim zostanie potwierdzona wystarczająca sprawność. _ Nasza metryka uwzględnia średnią ważoną czasu przestoju doświadczonego przez użytkowników w każdym centrum danych. Liczba minut przestoju odzwierciedla tę średnią ważoną. _

Automatyczne tłumaczenie oficjalnej aktualizacji incydentu.

1. 31 sierpnia 2026 15:14 UTCinvestigating

   Prowadzimy śledztwo w sprawie ostrzeżeń o powolnych błędach wydajności i aplikacji.

2. 31 sierpnia 2026 15:55 UTCinvestigating

   Kontynuujemy badanie tej kwestii; odwróciliśmy ostatnie zmiany i pracujemy nad zidentyfikowaniem źródła błędów.

3. 31 sierpnia 2026 16:24 UTCinvestigating

   Dokonaliśmy zmian konfiguracji i widzimy częściową regenerację, ale nadal widzimy pewne podwyższone błędy.

4. 31 sierpnia 2026 16:47 UTCmonitoring

   Zastosowaliśmy opatrunek.

5. 31 sierpnia 2026 17:18 UTCresolved

   Objawy ze strony użytkownika ustąpiły. Będziemy nadal monitorować i traktować priorytetowo retrospektywę, aby zrozumieć i zapobiec podobnym incydentom w przyszłości.

6. 2 września 2026 21:29 UTCpostmortem

   Pracowaliśmy nad dodaniem warstwy buforowej do naszego rurociągu aktualizacji, dostrojeniem go ostrożnie i stopniowym toczeniem. W środę, 26 sierpnia włączyliśmy go do większości przypadków użycia, i początkowo dobrze się sprawdził. W poniedziałek, 31 sierpnia, połączenie niepowiązanych zmian w infrastrukturze i ruch szczytowy pchnął cache poza swoje ograniczenia skalowania. Po przekroczeniu tego progu, cache stało się bezużyteczne, a wiele kapsuł obsługujących ruch odczytu dla aplikacji Asana nie mógł już służyć. Złagodziliśmy ten incydent cofając system, aby użyć poprzedniej, niebuforowanej ścieżki kodu. Zwrot był udany, ale ożywienie zajęło więcej czasu, niż się spodziewaliśmy w tej klasie problemów. Trwa pełniejsza analiza. Będziemy kontynuować działania związane z podstawowymi przyczynami, działaniami i ulepszeniami, w tym z tym, dlaczego ożywienie trwało tak długo, jak trwało. Byliśmy całkowicie w dół dla około 25% naszych użytkowników, na 2 godziny, 15 minut.

Automatyczne tłumaczenie oficjalnej aktualizacji incydentu.

1. 6 sierpnia 2026 17:24 UTCresolved

   From 2026-08-04 15:25 UTC until 2026-08-06 03:51 UTC, Asana failed to send some events to registered webhooks and to return them in the event streams API. Apps which rely on this should refetch the underlying data from the Asana API. Existing webhooks and event streams will continue to function, but events from the incident window will not be sent. Most events with type `task` and action `changed` were dropped during this period. Other events are not affected. The root cause of the incident was traced to a code change which unintentionally dropped change events for most fields on the task type, and the change was reverted.

1. 7 lipca 2026 18:49 UTCidentified

   Widzimy błędy dla części (około 10%) użytkowników w USA dla webapp Asana. Zidentyfikowaliśmy przyczynę i pracujemy nad określeniem rozwiązania.

2. 7 lipca 2026 19:12 UTCmonitoring

   Wprowadziliśmy środki łagodzące i monitorujemy, aby zapewnić ożywienie gospodarcze.

3. 7 lipca 2026 19:21 UTCmonitoring

   Nadal monitorujemy wszelkie dalsze problemy.

4. 7 lipca 2026 19:24 UTCresolved

   Ten incydent został rozwiązany.

5. 8 lipca 2026 21:28 UTCpostmortem

   * * Incydent * * Zmiana konfiguracji nieumyślnie usunęła krytyczny zasób wymagany przez jedną z naszych usług. Podczas gdy istniejąca infrastruktura nadal normalnie funkcjonowała, nowo skalowana infrastruktura nie mogła stać się gotowa. Wraz ze wzrostem natężenia ruchu w godzinach porannych pojawiała się coraz większa luka między wnioskami przychodzącymi a zdolnością naszego systemu do ich obsługi, co doprowadziło do degradacji usług. Rozwiązaliśmy problem ręcznie przywracając brakujące zasoby i poprawiając zmianę konfiguracji, która spowodowała jego usunięcie. Uzasadnienie * * Uderzenie * *: Przez około 1,5 godziny podzbiory klientów doświadczyły całkowitego wyczerpania aplikacji internetowych i aplikacji na pulpicie. W tym czasie dotknięci użytkownicy nie byli w stanie uzyskać dostępu do Asana. Nie utracono danych klientów. Uzasadnienie * * Moving forward * *: Wprowadzamy dodatkowe zabezpieczenia w procesie zarządzania konfiguracją, aby zapobiec przypadkowemu usuwaniu krytycznych zasobów. Ulepszamy również nasze systemy monitorowania w celu wcześniejszego wykrycia degradacji, zanim wpłynie to na dostęp klientów. Uzasadnienie Nasza metryka uwzględnia średnią ważoną czasu przestoju, jakiego doświadczają użytkownicy w każdym centrum danych. Liczba minut przestoju odzwierciedla tę średnią ważoną.

Automatyczne tłumaczenie oficjalnej aktualizacji incydentu.

1. 29 kwietnia 2026 23:19 UTCresolved

   Between April 21st and April 23rd, many rules triggered by date time triggers did not run. New rule triggers ran normally starting April 23rd, and the delayed triggers were processed by April 27th.

2. 30 kwietnia 2026 00:43 UTCpostmortem

   Starting on **April 20th, 2026 at 10:00 AM PDT**, a combination of scaled-up background action jobs in the EU and a recent change to how date time trigger volume is managed overloaded the system that processes resource intensive background action jobs. This caused multi-hour delays in email and inbox notifications in the EU and prevented date time triggers from executing in all regions. Engineers were first alerted on **April 21st** by our monitoring systems, but did not recognize the full scope of the incident until **April 23rd**. On April 23rd, the change to manage date time trigger volume was reverted and the problematic background action jobs were isolated. All delayed notifications were sent by **April 24th, 11:30 AM PDT**, and all delayed date time triggers were executed by **April 27th, 4:00 AM PDT**.

1. 29 kwietnia 2026 23:09 UTCresolved

   Between April 20th and April 24th, 60% of email and inbox notifications were delayed by at least one hour in EU. Notifications were delayed up to 3 days. Other resource intensive background actions were also impacted at a lesser rate.

2. 30 kwietnia 2026 00:34 UTCpostmortem

   Starting on **April 20th, 2026 at 10:00 AM PDT**, a combination of scaled-up background action jobs in the EU and a recent change to how date time trigger volume is managed overloaded the system that processes resource intensive background action jobs. This caused multi-hour delays in email and inbox notifications in the EU and prevented date time triggers from executing in all regions. Engineers were first alerted on **April 21st** by our monitoring systems, but did not recognize the full scope of the incident until **April 23rd**. On April 23rd, the change to manage date time trigger volume was reverted and the problematic background action jobs were isolated. All delayed notifications were sent by **April 24th, 11:30 AM PDT**, and all delayed date time triggers were executed by **April 27th, 4:00 AM PDT**.

1. 26 marca 2026 15:03 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports that some users are unable to load Asana, especially in and around New York/the East Coast of the US, and have observed intermittent errors. We are investigating this, and will provide an update within an hour.

2. 26 marca 2026 15:50 UTCmonitoring

   We believe that this was related to http3, and have disabled http3 for the affected CloudFront distribution. We believe Asana should now load after a hard refresh.

3. 26 marca 2026 18:34 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 1 marca 2026 20:31 UTCinvestigating

   Asana remains accessible to customers in the ME region, but we are seeing backends impacted by an AWS ME outage. If that isn't resolved soon, we expect to see some performance degradation and possible outages of the Asana application. This is only for the ME region; other regions are unaffected.

2. 1 marca 2026 21:03 UTCinvestigating

   We no longer see impact on our servers. We're monitoring, as the AWS incident has not resolved.

3. 2 marca 2026 09:02 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

4. 2 marca 2026 09:05 UTCinvestigating

   We are seeing major impact in the ME region making Asana services unavailable to users whose data is stored in that region. We have taken steps to avoid additional loss of EC2 resources, but are continuing to see high error rates. This cause is AWS incidents affecting the infrastructure (az1 and az3) in the Middle East region: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

5. 2 marca 2026 10:27 UTCinvestigating

   We are still seeing major impact in the ME region making Asana services unavailable to users whose data is stored in that region. We are continuing to monitor the situation. The cause is AWS incidents affecting the infrastructure in the Middle East region: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

6. 2 marca 2026 12:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are still seeing major impact in the ME region making Asana services unavailable to users whose data is stored in that region. We are continuing to monitor the situation. The cause is widespread AWS incidents affecting the infrastructure in the Middle East region: https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status

7. 13 marca 2026 18:44 UTCmonitoring

   A small number of users were affected by the AWS outage in UAE (me-central-1); following AWS's recommendations, we have moved processing to other regions, and believe there is no user impact.

8. 15 marca 2026 05:58 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 5 lutego 2026 23:49 UTCmonitoring

   Our primary monitoring is observing an outage for our API and mobile services, but secondary monitoring indicates that API and mobile traffic is operating as usual. Our engineers are reviewing our primary monitoring and will provide updates on the situation.

2. 5 lutego 2026 23:58 UTCresolved

   Our engineers have rolled back recent changes to our primary monitoring systems, and our API and mobile systems are fully operational.

1. 26 stycznia 2026 03:01 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an elevated rate of API errors as well as delays reflecting changes for the App in EU.

2. 26 stycznia 2026 03:19 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified certain expensive workloads and reduced background processing to mitigate this. We see recovery in user facing services and are investigating the expensive workloads; user traffic is now working normally.

3. 26 stycznia 2026 03:20 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

4. 26 stycznia 2026 03:29 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 22 stycznia 2026 17:48 UTCinvestigating

   We're investigating an outage, it looks like no one is able to reach the Asana webapp.

2. 22 stycznia 2026 17:51 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 22 stycznia 2026 17:59 UTCinvestigating

   We've identified the cause and have rolled back. Based on our monitoring, we should be recovered for some users.

4. 22 stycznia 2026 18:04 UTCinvestigating

   Error rates have dropped significantly, to about 2%. It's possible some users continue to see errors, but we expect most users to be able to use Asana.

5. 22 stycznia 2026 18:38 UTCinvestigating

   Our error rates are back to normal baseline, and we don't expect an immediate recurrence. We'll create a post-mortem in the next few days with more details, including what happened and how we plan to prevent this going forward.

6. 22 stycznia 2026 19:00 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

7. 27 stycznia 2026 07:53 UTCpostmortem

   Incident: On 2026-01-22 the Asana App and all associated services had a service disruption due to dependency on a shared database used for storing metadata. This was triggered by a code path which caused overload for that database, followed by request queuing, timeouts, and errors. Impact: From 17:33 - 17:57 UTC the Asana App and all associated services were unavailable. There was a further 14 minutes of partial downtime from 18:45 - 18:59 UTC affecting 10-20% of users, also triggered by dependency on this shared database. Moving forward: We immediately rolled back our application code and added resources for this database. Going forward we will continue to reduce dependency on this shared database for common paths to reduce risk, and monitor for unexpected resource usage. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

1. 6 stycznia 2026 14:17 UTCresolved

   On January 6th, 2026 at UTC 12:00, we experienced an approximately 50-minute service disruption affecting customers in non-US regions. During this time, some requests may have failed or timed out. What Happened: During routine maintenance, we upgraded a core infrastructure component. While the upgrade itself completed as expected, some services did not successfully reconnect to the updated infrastructure. This led to temporary communication issues and degraded service in the affected regions. We apologize for the inconvenience and want to assure you that we are taking steps to help prevent similar issues in the future.

1. 5 stycznia 2026 21:17 UTCinvestigating

   Users are currently unable to begin new sessions in the Asana web app. Our engineers are working to investigate and mitigate this issue as soon as possible. Existing web sessions are unaffected, along with mobile and API traffic.

2. 5 stycznia 2026 21:29 UTCmonitoring

   Our engineers have identified and reverted the change preventing users from starting new Asana web app sessions. We're monitoring the situation to ensure recovery. The Asana web app is operational, and other services (mobile, API) are unaffected.

3. 5 stycznia 2026 21:50 UTCresolved

   Thank you for your patience. Service is fully restored, and the Asana web app is back to normal functionality.

1. 24 listopada 2025 20:28 UTCresolved

   Resolved - We have fully resolved an incident related to a product permissions bug that briefly impacted some of our customers between November 18 and November 19. This issue was contained entirely within customer domains and did not expose any data externally.

1. 18 listopada 2025 22:14 UTCresolved

   Asana's MCP server experienced partial unavailability for three hours due to an upstream provider outage. No data loss or security issues occurred during this outage. This resulted in an increased rate of errors from 3:20 - 5:00 AM PT and some failed requests from 5:04 - 6:26 AM PT. The service fully recovered after the upstream provider resolved the issue.

2. 21 listopada 2025 00:29 UTCpostmortem

   Incident: [Cloudflare experienced an outage](https://blog.cloudflare.com/18-november-2025-outage/) that impacted the Workers KV service, a storage infrastructure service our MCP server relies on. This resulted in increased error rates and failed requests for a portion of our MCP traffic over the span of 3 hours. ‌ Impact:  Approximately 100 users making requests to the MCP server received error responses or were unable to reach the server from 2025-11-18 11:20 UTC through 14:20 UTC. ‌ Moving forward: We are investing in our MCP Server to improve its resilience to KV store outages, and are investigating ways to reduce the overall impact of Cloudflare outages. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

1. 7 listopada 2025 21:22 UTCidentified

   We're currently experiencing a high volume of crashes for the Asana app. We've identified the cause and are actively working to resolve the issue. Thank you for your patience!

2. 7 listopada 2025 21:24 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

3. 7 listopada 2025 21:39 UTCidentified

   The root cause has been addressed, and some sessions are starting to see recovery. We are taking action to speed up recovery across all regions.

4. 7 listopada 2025 21:56 UTCmonitoring

   Functionality to the Asana webapp is now restored. We are still experiencing errors in the API, and are working to resolve them.

5. 7 listopada 2025 22:03 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

6. 7 listopada 2025 22:08 UTCresolved

   The incident is now resolved.

7. 12 listopada 2025 17:15 UTCpostmortem

   We had approximately 1 hour of full downtime, where the Asana application was unavailable for most of our users. There was no data loss or security vulnerability. ‌ A routine configuration change affected the Asana application globally. While refactoring the configuration consumption, we missed an unintended side effect, causing the app to fail loading in all regions. We reverted the change and restarted servers for full recovery.

1. 31 października 2025 16:17 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating the issue.

2. 31 października 2025 16:28 UTCidentified

   We’re currently experiencing increased system load. Our team has identified the source and is actively working to mitigate the impact. Thank you for your patience.

3. 31 października 2025 17:05 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified the source of load and addressed it, and are monitoring recovery.

4. 31 października 2025 17:18 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved. During the incident, users in EU experienced slow application performance, and automations, webhooks, and background actions were delayed.

1. 20 października 2025 14:28 UTCidentified

   We are currently investigating an issue which affects about 10% of our users, this is a continuation of the AWS outage that happened earlier today

2. 20 października 2025 15:07 UTCidentified

   We are still working on fixing the issue, this is affecting most of our users

3. 20 października 2025 16:55 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work on resolving the issue impacting access to Asana. This outage is related to the ongoing AWS service disruption, which is affecting many applications and customers globally (https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status). Our team is closely monitoring AWS recovery efforts and will restore full functionality as soon as possible.

4. 20 października 2025 18:43 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work on restoring access to Asana. This outage is related to the ongoing AWS service disruption, which is affecting many applications and customers globally (https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status). Our engineers are actively deploying mitigation strategies to restore Asana functionality and reduce our reliance on affected services. We're observing some recovery in foundational infrastructure, and are working towards restoring core app functionality.

5. 20 października 2025 19:54 UTCmonitoring

   Asana is functional again. We’ve begun re-enabling API traffic and are gradually allowing traffic from all clients. Most functionality is coming back online, though some users may still experience intermittent errors or slower performance while systems stabilise.

6. 20 października 2025 20:34 UTCresolved

   Asana is now fully operational, and all services are performing normally. API traffic and client access have been fully restored, and we’re no longer seeing elevated error rates or latency. This incident was related to an earlier AWS service disruption. We’ll continue to monitor performance closely, but Asana is back to normal.

7. 23 października 2025 16:07 UTCpostmortem

   **Incident:** AWS infrastructure had [an outage affecting core services](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/), which our application depends on, in the Virginia \(us-east-1\) region. The initial impact to our services is covered by [https://status.asana.com/incidents/zfdtyvckl5k2](https://status.asana.com/incidents/zfdtyvckl5k2); this covers the second major impact to our services. **Impact:** Starting at 2025-10-20 14:58 UTC, our application was down for approximately 10% of our users. By 15:08 UTC the application was completely down for all users We saw some improvement in internal error rates around 17:06 UTC resulting in intermittent availability. We did not see full infrastructure recovery until approximately 19:50 UTC and our traffic fully recovered by 20:29 UTC. This affected all regions because we store some global state and shared application configuration in the Virginia region. **Moving forward:** We are working on ways to reduce the impact of single region outages, including for this region, to limit the impact and improve options for recovery. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

1. 20 października 2025 07:10 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue which affects all services.

2. 20 października 2025 07:15 UTCinvestigating

   AWS is investigating errors in Virginia, per https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status . We are continuing to investigate and will provide an update in 15 minutes.

3. 20 października 2025 07:30 UTCinvestigating

   We are still seeing full downtime, and are continuing investigation.

4. 20 października 2025 07:43 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue from our side, and waiting for an update from AWS.

5. 20 października 2025 07:59 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

6. 20 października 2025 08:19 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to work on this issue. AWS DynamoDB is disrupted, and this impacts our production services.

7. 20 października 2025 08:32 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to work on this issue, and will update once we have an ETA for resolution. Also see https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status for status on resolution for infrastructure issues.

8. 20 października 2025 09:18 UTCinvestigating

   We are working to prepare our systems to recover once AWS resolves DynamoDB issues in us-east-1.

9. 20 października 2025 09:32 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented, and we are monitoring recovery.

10. 20 października 2025 10:08 UTCmonitoring

    The root cause has been fixed, and we are monitoring recovery; we still see somehow degraded performance in the US region, and are adjusting configuration to address this.

11. 20 października 2025 10:23 UTCresolved

    This incident has been resolved; error rates and latency have gone down and we've caught up on existing traffic. We will publish a postmortem here within 72 hours.

12. 23 października 2025 16:05 UTCpostmortem

    **Incident:** AWS infrastructure had [an outage affecting core services](https://aws.amazon.com/message/101925/), which our application depends on, in the Virginia \(us-east-1\) region. After partial recovery within AWS, we made configuration changes and saw recovery for our traffic. We continued to observe while AWS worked through the incident on their side. The remaining impact on Asana's side is covered in [https://status.asana.com/incidents/lvtt14d4d80g](https://status.asana.com/incidents/lvtt14d4d80g) . **Impact:** We saw global downtime from 2025-10-20 06:52 UTC through 09:27 UTC, 2 hours and 35 minutes. This affected all regions because we store some global state and shared application configuration in the Virginia region. **Moving forward:** We are working on ways to reduce the impact of single region outages, including for this region, to limit the impact and improve options for recovery. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

1. 13 października 2025 20:56 UTCresolved

   From 15:44 - 16:33 UTC, Asana users may have seen stale data in the web app. In some cases, users may have experienced crashes and failed API requests.