Anaplan Status

Thank you for your patience as we continue to investigate this issue. Currently, we do not yet have a time to resolution. We will continue to provide updates every 30 minutes as we work to resolve this issue as quickly as possible.

We have confirmed that the issue is now resolved. We deeply apologize for any impact this issue may have caused. We appreciate your patience and partnership as we worked through this issue. We will follow up within 7 business days with a detailed root cause analysis (RCA) that will be shared on our Status Page. If you have any question or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact us at Anaplan Support.

**June 8–12, 2026 Platform Disruptions** On June 8, 2026, at 11:05 UTC, our monitoring detected a brief drop in incoming traffic across the Anaplan platform, with automated monitoring checks failing across all affected regions \(us1: Data Center - US East, us2: Data Center - US West, eu1: Data Center - Netherlands, eu2: Data Center - Germany, eu4: Cloud - Europe, us5: Cloud - US East, us7: Cloud - US, and ap1: Cloud - Japan\). Over the four days, a series of related disruptions affected the same regions. Customers experienced intermittent difficulties logging in, opening models, and running integrations. The platform was fully stabilized on June 11, 2026, at 18:12 UTC. These disruptions are linked to our previously communicated infrastructure modernization program. On the weekend of June 6, we migrated our control plane, the part of the platform that directs how traffic is routed between services. This was the most complex of the planned migration weekends, and it was completed successfully, as had the two previous migration weekends. The issues described in this report emerged in the days following that migration. This report covers the seven linked incidents that occurred between June 8 and June 11, 2026. **Root cause** As part of our infrastructure modernization program, on the weekend of June 6, we completed a successful migration of our control plane. In the days that followed, we observed two discrete network-hardware issues that interacted to drive these disruptions. _Issue 1: Media Access Control \(MAC\) flapping \(June 8–9\)_ Every device on a network has a MAC address, a unique hardware identifier that network switches use to route traffic to the correct destination. In our environment, the MAC addresses involved are virtual — assigned to logical network gateways rather than to fixed physical hardware — which allows them to legitimately move between hosts as part of normal operation. MAC flapping occurs when a switch sees the same MAC address appearing on two different physical ports in rapid succession, forcing it repeatedly to update its routing tables. This briefly slows or interrupts traffic. For customers, this surfaced as a brief, self-recovering instability. Short bursts of load and intermittent errors appeared and cleared on their own within minutes. The trigger for this behavior was the specific way live production traffic interacted with the new post-migration network. To resolve the issue, we scaled capacity, engaged our vendor, and deployed configuration changes to contain the impact. _Issue 2: network card driver defect \(June 10–11\)_ Once the first set of mitigations were in place, we identified a second issue: A defect in the network card driver, which is the software that controls how a network card sends and receives data. The defect affected fewer than 0.005% of the cards in our estate. Those cards failed randomly and unpredictably, dropping traffic while still appearing healthy to our monitoring systems. This is known as a "gray failure" condition, because the affected components don’t flag themselves as broken. The cards sat in the part of the network that routes traffic between the regions impacted. This resulted in failures that cascaded across the platform and drove disruptions on June 10 and June 11. The defect hadn't been observed in previous migrations or in any other environment, and there were no indicators in pre-deployment testing. The gray failure pattern was also what initially masked the defect as a load issue, until further investigation pointed us to the driver itself. We engaged our vendor, who confirmed the defect. Working closely with them, we rapidly prepared, tested, and deployed the patch to the affected hosts on the evening of June 11, UTC. After that, the platform stabilized. **Recovery** From the first occurrence on June 8 through to permanent resolution on June 11, our engineering team led a continuous, round-the-clock response, working closely with our vendor to identify, diagnose, and resolve the underlying defect. We deployed configuration mitigations, repeatedly rerouted traffic between hosts and across alternative network paths, and scaled out capacity to restore service to customers as quickly as possible while the underlying defect was being addressed. The seven linked incidents and their impact windows were: * **June 8, 2026, 11:00–11:20 UTC** — A short network disruption from the initial MAC flapping event caused intermittent login failures and slow page loads. For most customers, this appeared as a brief 6-minute blip and recovered automatically. Some basic authentication users experienced a longer impact and needed to start a new browser session, with full recovery by 11:20 UTC. * **June 9, 2026, 11:05–11:29 UTC** — A recurrence of the same MAC flapping condition caused a similar brief disruption. Again, most customers experienced only a short blip of around 6 minutes, with basic authentication users seeing a longer impact. We applied scaling changes to address the issue. * **June 10, 2026, 11:02–12:40 UTC** — Customers across all affected regions experienced a loss of access to the platform for approximately 98 minutes. We worked with the vendor and applied configuration changes to address the issue. * **June 10–11, 2026, 23:06–00:04 UTC** — A disruption of approximately 58 minutes, caused when the network card defect affected the backup host that traffic had been moved to. We restored connectivity by moving traffic onto an alternative network path. * **June 11, 2026, 03:43–05:20 UTC** — A disruption of approximately 97 minutes, as the next backup host was affected by the same defect. We restored connectivity by moving traffic onto an alternative network path. * **June 11, 2026, 11:10–13:02 UTC** — A further recurrence of the network traffic surge caused customers to experience slow or failed access to the platform. We restored service by applying an underlying configuration change. * **June 11, 2026, 17:04–17:48 UTC** — A final disruption of approximately 44 minutes during which we moved traffic to a host running the updated network card driver. The platform was fully stabilized at 18:12 UTC on June 11, 2026, once traffic was successfully moved to a host running the updated network card driver. We then applied the same update to a second host for resilience. Monitoring continued through to midday Friday before the incident was closed. CloudWorks™ experienced a backlog of queued jobs during and immediately after each disruption. Our engineering team scaled out CloudWorks capacity to accelerate processing, and the backlog was fully cleared shortly after each recovery. **Corrective and preventative actions** The control plane migration that preceded these disruptions was a one-time, foundational piece of work. The actions below reflect the learnings we are carrying forward from the event to further strengthen the platform. 1. The updated network card driver has been rolled out across all hosts matching the affected hardware profile, in every region. This removes the underlying defect from our infrastructure, even though it hasn't been observed in any other region. 2. The conditions that allowed MAC flapping to surface as customer-visible instability have been addressed at multiple layers. Configuration changes have been deployed in the affected regions. The underlying network configuration has been standardized across the wider production estate, and we have tuned the network behavior that triggered the initial event. 3. During the incident, our engineering team deployed dedicated alerting in real time for the specific network conditions causing the disruptions, enabling faster detection and intervention throughout the response. We are continuing to strengthen proactive monitoring and early-warning detection across post-release windows, so that emerging anomalies are surfaced and investigated before they escalate into customer-visible disruptions. 4. The remaining infrastructure update that supports the network card fix is being completed across our other environments. This brings the full benefit of the fix to every part of our infrastructure. **What's next** One final migration weekend is scheduled for June 20, 2026. After this, the migration phase of the infrastructure modernization program is complete. **Closing** We apologize for the impact this issue has had on your operations. We're committed to the improvements outlined above to prevent similar disruptions. If you have questions or concerns, please contact [Support](https://support.anaplan.com/).

**June 8–12, 2026 Platform Disruptions** On June 8, 2026, at 11:05 UTC, our monitoring detected a brief drop in incoming traffic across the Anaplan platform, with automated monitoring checks failing across all affected regions \(us1: Data Center - US East, us2: Data Center - US West, eu1: Data Center - Netherlands, eu2: Data Center - Germany, eu4: Cloud - Europe, us5: Cloud - US East, us7: Cloud - US, and ap1: Cloud - Japan\). Over the four days, a series of related disruptions affected the same regions. Customers experienced intermittent difficulties logging in, opening models, and running integrations. The platform was fully stabilized on June 11, 2026, at 18:12 UTC. These disruptions are linked to our previously communicated infrastructure modernization program. On the weekend of June 6, we migrated our control plane, the part of the platform that directs how traffic is routed between services. This was the most complex of the planned migration weekends, and it was completed successfully, as had the two previous migration weekends. The issues described in this report emerged in the days following that migration. This report covers the seven linked incidents that occurred between June 8 and June 11, 2026. **Root cause** As part of our infrastructure modernization program, on the weekend of June 6, we completed a successful migration of our control plane. In the days that followed, we observed two discrete network-hardware issues that interacted to drive these disruptions. _Issue 1: Media Access Control \(MAC\) flapping \(June 8–9\)_ Every device on a network has a MAC address, a unique hardware identifier that network switches use to route traffic to the correct destination. In our environment, the MAC addresses involved are virtual — assigned to logical network gateways rather than to fixed physical hardware — which allows them to legitimately move between hosts as part of normal operation. MAC flapping occurs when a switch sees the same MAC address appearing on two different physical ports in rapid succession, forcing it repeatedly to update its routing tables. This briefly slows or interrupts traffic. For customers, this surfaced as a brief, self-recovering instability. Short bursts of load and intermittent errors appeared and cleared on their own within minutes. The trigger for this behavior was the specific way live production traffic interacted with the new post-migration network. To resolve the issue, we scaled capacity, engaged our vendor, and deployed configuration changes to contain the impact. _Issue 2: network card driver defect \(June 10–11\)_ Once the first set of mitigations were in place, we identified a second issue: A defect in the network card driver, which is the software that controls how a network card sends and receives data. The defect affected fewer than 0.005% of the cards in our estate. Those cards failed randomly and unpredictably, dropping traffic while still appearing healthy to our monitoring systems. This is known as a "gray failure" condition, because the affected components don’t flag themselves as broken. The cards sat in the part of the network that routes traffic between the regions impacted. This resulted in failures that cascaded across the platform and drove disruptions on June 10 and June 11. The defect hadn't been observed in previous migrations or in any other environment, and there were no indicators in pre-deployment testing. The gray failure pattern was also what initially masked the defect as a load issue, until further investigation pointed us to the driver itself. We engaged our vendor, who confirmed the defect. Working closely with them, we rapidly prepared, tested, and deployed the patch to the affected hosts on the evening of June 11, UTC. After that, the platform stabilized. **Recovery** From the first occurrence on June 8 through to permanent resolution on June 11, our engineering team led a continuous, round-the-clock response, working closely with our vendor to identify, diagnose, and resolve the underlying defect. We deployed configuration mitigations, repeatedly rerouted traffic between hosts and across alternative network paths, and scaled out capacity to restore service to customers as quickly as possible while the underlying defect was being addressed. The seven linked incidents and their impact windows were: * **June 8, 2026, 11:00–11:20 UTC** — A short network disruption from the initial MAC flapping event caused intermittent login failures and slow page loads. For most customers, this appeared as a brief 6-minute blip and recovered automatically. Some basic authentication users experienced a longer impact and needed to start a new browser session, with full recovery by 11:20 UTC. * **June 9, 2026, 11:05–11:29 UTC** — A recurrence of the same MAC flapping condition caused a similar brief disruption. Again, most customers experienced only a short blip of around 6 minutes, with basic authentication users seeing a longer impact. We applied scaling changes to address the issue. * **June 10, 2026, 11:02–12:40 UTC** — Customers across all affected regions experienced a loss of access to the platform for approximately 98 minutes. We worked with the vendor and applied configuration changes to address the issue. * **June 10–11, 2026, 23:06–00:04 UTC** — A disruption of approximately 58 minutes, caused when the network card defect affected the backup host that traffic had been moved to. We restored connectivity by moving traffic onto an alternative network path. * **June 11, 2026, 03:43–05:20 UTC** — A disruption of approximately 97 minutes, as the next backup host was affected by the same defect. We restored connectivity by moving traffic onto an alternative network path. * **June 11, 2026, 11:10–13:02 UTC** — A further recurrence of the network traffic surge caused customers to experience slow or failed access to the platform. We restored service by applying an underlying configuration change. * **June 11, 2026, 17:04–17:48 UTC** — A final disruption of approximately 44 minutes during which we moved traffic to a host running the updated network card driver. The platform was fully stabilized at 18:12 UTC on June 11, 2026, once traffic was successfully moved to a host running the updated network card driver. We then applied the same update to a second host for resilience. Monitoring continued through to midday Friday before the incident was closed. CloudWorks™ experienced a backlog of queued jobs during and immediately after each disruption. Our engineering team scaled out CloudWorks capacity to accelerate processing, and the backlog was fully cleared shortly after each recovery. **Corrective and preventative actions** The control plane migration that preceded these disruptions was a one-time, foundational piece of work. The actions below reflect the learnings we are carrying forward from the event to further strengthen the platform. 1. The updated network card driver has been rolled out across all hosts matching the affected hardware profile, in every region. This removes the underlying defect from our infrastructure, even though it hasn't been observed in any other region. 2. The conditions that allowed MAC flapping to surface as customer-visible instability have been addressed at multiple layers. Configuration changes have been deployed in the affected regions. The underlying network configuration has been standardized across the wider production estate, and we have tuned the network behavior that triggered the initial event. 3. During the incident, our engineering team deployed dedicated alerting in real time for the specific network conditions causing the disruptions, enabling faster detection and intervention throughout the response. We are continuing to strengthen proactive monitoring and early-warning detection across post-release windows, so that emerging anomalies are surfaced and investigated before they escalate into customer-visible disruptions. 4. The remaining infrastructure update that supports the network card fix is being completed across our other environments. This brings the full benefit of the fix to every part of our infrastructure. **What's next** One final migration weekend is scheduled for June 20, 2026. After this, the migration phase of the infrastructure modernization program is complete. **Closing** We apologize for the impact this issue has had on your operations. We're committed to the improvements outlined above to prevent similar disruptions. If you have questions or concerns, please contact [Support](https://support.anaplan.com/).

**June 8–12, 2026 Platform Disruptions** On June 8, 2026, at 11:05 UTC, our monitoring detected a brief drop in incoming traffic across the Anaplan platform, with automated monitoring checks failing across all affected regions \(us1: Data Center - US East, us2: Data Center - US West, eu1: Data Center - Netherlands, eu2: Data Center - Germany, eu4: Cloud - Europe, us5: Cloud - US East, us7: Cloud - US, and ap1: Cloud - Japan\). Over the four days, a series of related disruptions affected the same regions. Customers experienced intermittent difficulties logging in, opening models, and running integrations. The platform was fully stabilized on June 11, 2026, at 18:12 UTC. These disruptions are linked to our previously communicated infrastructure modernization program. On the weekend of June 6, we migrated our control plane, the part of the platform that directs how traffic is routed between services. This was the most complex of the planned migration weekends, and it was completed successfully, as had the two previous migration weekends. The issues described in this report emerged in the days following that migration. This report covers the seven linked incidents that occurred between June 8 and June 11, 2026. **Root cause** As part of our infrastructure modernization program, on the weekend of June 6, we completed a successful migration of our control plane. In the days that followed, we observed two discrete network-hardware issues that interacted to drive these disruptions. _Issue 1: Media Access Control \(MAC\) flapping \(June 8–9\)_ Every device on a network has a MAC address, a unique hardware identifier that network switches use to route traffic to the correct destination. In our environment, the MAC addresses involved are virtual — assigned to logical network gateways rather than to fixed physical hardware — which allows them to legitimately move between hosts as part of normal operation. MAC flapping occurs when a switch sees the same MAC address appearing on two different physical ports in rapid succession, forcing it repeatedly to update its routing tables. This briefly slows or interrupts traffic. For customers, this surfaced as a brief, self-recovering instability. Short bursts of load and intermittent errors appeared and cleared on their own within minutes. The trigger for this behavior was the specific way live production traffic interacted with the new post-migration network. To resolve the issue, we scaled capacity, engaged our vendor, and deployed configuration changes to contain the impact. _Issue 2: network card driver defect \(June 10–11\)_ Once the first set of mitigations were in place, we identified a second issue: A defect in the network card driver, which is the software that controls how a network card sends and receives data. The defect affected fewer than 0.005% of the cards in our estate. Those cards failed randomly and unpredictably, dropping traffic while still appearing healthy to our monitoring systems. This is known as a "gray failure" condition, because the affected components don’t flag themselves as broken. The cards sat in the part of the network that routes traffic between the regions impacted. This resulted in failures that cascaded across the platform and drove disruptions on June 10 and June 11. The defect hadn't been observed in previous migrations or in any other environment, and there were no indicators in pre-deployment testing. The gray failure pattern was also what initially masked the defect as a load issue, until further investigation pointed us to the driver itself. We engaged our vendor, who confirmed the defect. Working closely with them, we rapidly prepared, tested, and deployed the patch to the affected hosts on the evening of June 11, UTC. After that, the platform stabilized. **Recovery** From the first occurrence on June 8 through to permanent resolution on June 11, our engineering team led a continuous, round-the-clock response, working closely with our vendor to identify, diagnose, and resolve the underlying defect. We deployed configuration mitigations, repeatedly rerouted traffic between hosts and across alternative network paths, and scaled out capacity to restore service to customers as quickly as possible while the underlying defect was being addressed. The seven linked incidents and their impact windows were: * **June 8, 2026, 11:00–11:20 UTC** — A short network disruption from the initial MAC flapping event caused intermittent login failures and slow page loads. For most customers, this appeared as a brief 6-minute blip and recovered automatically. Some basic authentication users experienced a longer impact and needed to start a new browser session, with full recovery by 11:20 UTC. * **June 9, 2026, 11:05–11:29 UTC** — A recurrence of the same MAC flapping condition caused a similar brief disruption. Again, most customers experienced only a short blip of around 6 minutes, with basic authentication users seeing a longer impact. We applied scaling changes to address the issue. * **June 10, 2026, 11:02–12:40 UTC** — Customers across all affected regions experienced a loss of access to the platform for approximately 98 minutes. We worked with the vendor and applied configuration changes to address the issue. * **June 10–11, 2026, 23:06–00:04 UTC** — A disruption of approximately 58 minutes, caused when the network card defect affected the backup host that traffic had been moved to. We restored connectivity by moving traffic onto an alternative network path. * **June 11, 2026, 03:43–05:20 UTC** — A disruption of approximately 97 minutes, as the next backup host was affected by the same defect. We restored connectivity by moving traffic onto an alternative network path. * **June 11, 2026, 11:10–13:02 UTC** — A further recurrence of the network traffic surge caused customers to experience slow or failed access to the platform. We restored service by applying an underlying configuration change. * **June 11, 2026, 17:04–17:48 UTC** — A final disruption of approximately 44 minutes during which we moved traffic to a host running the updated network card driver. The platform was fully stabilized at 18:12 UTC on June 11, 2026, once traffic was successfully moved to a host running the updated network card driver. We then applied the same update to a second host for resilience. Monitoring continued through to midday Friday before the incident was closed. CloudWorks™ experienced a backlog of queued jobs during and immediately after each disruption. Our engineering team scaled out CloudWorks capacity to accelerate processing, and the backlog was fully cleared shortly after each recovery. **Corrective and preventative actions** The control plane migration that preceded these disruptions was a one-time, foundational piece of work. The actions below reflect the learnings we are carrying forward from the event to further strengthen the platform. 1. The updated network card driver has been rolled out across all hosts matching the affected hardware profile, in every region. This removes the underlying defect from our infrastructure, even though it hasn't been observed in any other region. 2. The conditions that allowed MAC flapping to surface as customer-visible instability have been addressed at multiple layers. Configuration changes have been deployed in the affected regions. The underlying network configuration has been standardized across the wider production estate, and we have tuned the network behavior that triggered the initial event. 3. During the incident, our engineering team deployed dedicated alerting in real time for the specific network conditions causing the disruptions, enabling faster detection and intervention throughout the response. We are continuing to strengthen proactive monitoring and early-warning detection across post-release windows, so that emerging anomalies are surfaced and investigated before they escalate into customer-visible disruptions. 4. The remaining infrastructure update that supports the network card fix is being completed across our other environments. This brings the full benefit of the fix to every part of our infrastructure. **What's next** One final migration weekend is scheduled for June 20, 2026. After this, the migration phase of the infrastructure modernization program is complete. **Closing** We apologize for the impact this issue has had on your operations. We're committed to the improvements outlined above to prevent similar disruptions. If you have questions or concerns, please contact [Support](https://support.anaplan.com/).

**June 8–12, 2026 Platform Disruptions** On June 8, 2026, at 11:05 UTC, our monitoring detected a brief drop in incoming traffic across the Anaplan platform, with automated monitoring checks failing across all affected regions \(us1: Data Center - US East, us2: Data Center - US West, eu1: Data Center - Netherlands, eu2: Data Center - Germany, eu4: Cloud - Europe, us5: Cloud - US East, us7: Cloud - US, and ap1: Cloud - Japan\). Over the four days, a series of related disruptions affected the same regions. Customers experienced intermittent difficulties logging in, opening models, and running integrations. The platform was fully stabilized on June 11, 2026, at 18:12 UTC. These disruptions are linked to our previously communicated infrastructure modernization program. On the weekend of June 6, we migrated our control plane, the part of the platform that directs how traffic is routed between services. This was the most complex of the planned migration weekends, and it was completed successfully, as had the two previous migration weekends. The issues described in this report emerged in the days following that migration. This report covers the seven linked incidents that occurred between June 8 and June 11, 2026. **Root cause** As part of our infrastructure modernization program, on the weekend of June 6, we completed a successful migration of our control plane. In the days that followed, we observed two discrete network-hardware issues that interacted to drive these disruptions. _Issue 1: Media Access Control \(MAC\) flapping \(June 8–9\)_ Every device on a network has a MAC address, a unique hardware identifier that network switches use to route traffic to the correct destination. In our environment, the MAC addresses involved are virtual — assigned to logical network gateways rather than to fixed physical hardware — which allows them to legitimately move between hosts as part of normal operation. MAC flapping occurs when a switch sees the same MAC address appearing on two different physical ports in rapid succession, forcing it repeatedly to update its routing tables. This briefly slows or interrupts traffic. For customers, this surfaced as a brief, self-recovering instability. Short bursts of load and intermittent errors appeared and cleared on their own within minutes. The trigger for this behavior was the specific way live production traffic interacted with the new post-migration network. To resolve the issue, we scaled capacity, engaged our vendor, and deployed configuration changes to contain the impact. _Issue 2: network card driver defect \(June 10–11\)_ Once the first set of mitigations were in place, we identified a second issue: A defect in the network card driver, which is the software that controls how a network card sends and receives data. The defect affected fewer than 0.005% of the cards in our estate. Those cards failed randomly and unpredictably, dropping traffic while still appearing healthy to our monitoring systems. This is known as a "gray failure" condition, because the affected components don’t flag themselves as broken. The cards sat in the part of the network that routes traffic between the regions impacted. This resulted in failures that cascaded across the platform and drove disruptions on June 10 and June 11. The defect hadn't been observed in previous migrations or in any other environment, and there were no indicators in pre-deployment testing. The gray failure pattern was also what initially masked the defect as a load issue, until further investigation pointed us to the driver itself. We engaged our vendor, who confirmed the defect. Working closely with them, we rapidly prepared, tested, and deployed the patch to the affected hosts on the evening of June 11, UTC. After that, the platform stabilized. **Recovery** From the first occurrence on June 8 through to permanent resolution on June 11, our engineering team led a continuous, round-the-clock response, working closely with our vendor to identify, diagnose, and resolve the underlying defect. We deployed configuration mitigations, repeatedly rerouted traffic between hosts and across alternative network paths, and scaled out capacity to restore service to customers as quickly as possible while the underlying defect was being addressed. The seven linked incidents and their impact windows were: * **June 8, 2026, 11:00–11:20 UTC** — A short network disruption from the initial MAC flapping event caused intermittent login failures and slow page loads. For most customers, this appeared as a brief 6-minute blip and recovered automatically. Some basic authentication users experienced a longer impact and needed to start a new browser session, with full recovery by 11:20 UTC. * **June 9, 2026, 11:05–11:29 UTC** — A recurrence of the same MAC flapping condition caused a similar brief disruption. Again, most customers experienced only a short blip of around 6 minutes, with basic authentication users seeing a longer impact. We applied scaling changes to address the issue. * **June 10, 2026, 11:02–12:40 UTC** — Customers across all affected regions experienced a loss of access to the platform for approximately 98 minutes. We worked with the vendor and applied configuration changes to address the issue. * **June 10–11, 2026, 23:06–00:04 UTC** — A disruption of approximately 58 minutes, caused when the network card defect affected the backup host that traffic had been moved to. We restored connectivity by moving traffic onto an alternative network path. * **June 11, 2026, 03:43–05:20 UTC** — A disruption of approximately 97 minutes, as the next backup host was affected by the same defect. We restored connectivity by moving traffic onto an alternative network path. * **June 11, 2026, 11:10–13:02 UTC** — A further recurrence of the network traffic surge caused customers to experience slow or failed access to the platform. We restored service by applying an underlying configuration change. * **June 11, 2026, 17:04–17:48 UTC** — A final disruption of approximately 44 minutes during which we moved traffic to a host running the updated network card driver. The platform was fully stabilized at 18:12 UTC on June 11, 2026, once traffic was successfully moved to a host running the updated network card driver. We then applied the same update to a second host for resilience. Monitoring continued through to midday Friday before the incident was closed. CloudWorks™ experienced a backlog of queued jobs during and immediately after each disruption. Our engineering team scaled out CloudWorks capacity to accelerate processing, and the backlog was fully cleared shortly after each recovery. **Corrective and preventative actions** The control plane migration that preceded these disruptions was a one-time, foundational piece of work. The actions below reflect the learnings we are carrying forward from the event to further strengthen the platform. 1. The updated network card driver has been rolled out across all hosts matching the affected hardware profile, in every region. This removes the underlying defect from our infrastructure, even though it hasn't been observed in any other region. 2. The conditions that allowed MAC flapping to surface as customer-visible instability have been addressed at multiple layers. Configuration changes have been deployed in the affected regions. The underlying network configuration has been standardized across the wider production estate, and we have tuned the network behavior that triggered the initial event. 3. During the incident, our engineering team deployed dedicated alerting in real time for the specific network conditions causing the disruptions, enabling faster detection and intervention throughout the response. We are continuing to strengthen proactive monitoring and early-warning detection across post-release windows, so that emerging anomalies are surfaced and investigated before they escalate into customer-visible disruptions. 4. The remaining infrastructure update that supports the network card fix is being completed across our other environments. This brings the full benefit of the fix to every part of our infrastructure. **What's next** One final migration weekend is scheduled for June 20, 2026. After this, the migration phase of the infrastructure modernization program is complete. **Closing** We apologize for the impact this issue has had on your operations. We're committed to the improvements outlined above to prevent similar disruptions. If you have questions or concerns, please contact [Support](https://support.anaplan.com/).

**Introduction**   On June 10, 2026, at 09:48 UTC, customers in us1: Data Center - US East experienced slight delays in the processing and successful completion of CloudWorks™ integrations.   **Root cause**  During routine database patching on June 10, all regions completed without issue except for the us1: Data Center - US East region, where CloudWorks encountered an unexpected loss of database connectivity. This caused deadlocks within the scheduler service.  Our investigation determined that one remote connection had been dropped while a second remained active, resulting in connection conflicts and errors. The issue was remediated by performing a rolling restart of the scheduler service and clearing the database rules.  **Recovery**  Upon identifying the issue, our engineering team acted quickly to initiate a rolling restart of the scheduler service across the affected region. To fully resolve the connection conflict and errors, the team cleared the internal routing and caching rules associated with the database gateway. Following this action, the database connection errors ceased immediately, and manual validation confirmed that integration scheduling had been fully restored. The issue was completely resolved by 10:42 UTC.  **Corrective and preventative actions**  We are implementing the following actions to prevent recurrence and improve service reliability:  * We are developing enhanced system alerts to immediately detect database connectivity issues and abnormal error volumes.  * We are working to replicate the scenario in non-production environments to strengthen CloudWorks' ability to recover from database disconnections.   * We are currently reviewing the errors encountered, along with the relevant system settings, to determine whether any changes can be implemented to better handle this type of issue in the future.  * We are reviewing and optimizing the capacity and sizing of our integration services across all regions to ensure they are robust and resilient.  * We are establishing more detailed incident response runbooks and centralizing triage procedures to accelerate resolution of similar issues.   * We are strengthening our platform observability and system telemetry to improve our diagnostic capabilities and detect connection issues more rapidly.  We apologize for any impact this issue may have had on your business operations.` `We are continuously strengthening our systems and procedures to ensure we avoid future disruptions to your business and users.  If you have further questions or concerns, please visit our [Support website](https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.anaplan.com%2F). We appreciate your patience during this incident and value the trust you place in Anaplan.

**June 8–12, 2026 Platform Disruptions** On June 8, 2026, at 11:05 UTC, our monitoring detected a brief drop in incoming traffic across the Anaplan platform, with automated monitoring checks failing across all affected regions \(us1: Data Center - US East, us2: Data Center - US West, eu1: Data Center - Netherlands, eu2: Data Center - Germany, eu4: Cloud - Europe, us5: Cloud - US East, us7: Cloud - US, and ap1: Cloud - Japan\). Over the four days, a series of related disruptions affected the same regions. Customers experienced intermittent difficulties logging in, opening models, and running integrations. The platform was fully stabilized on June 11, 2026, at 18:12 UTC. These disruptions are linked to our previously communicated infrastructure modernization program. On the weekend of June 6, we migrated our control plane, the part of the platform that directs how traffic is routed between services. This was the most complex of the planned migration weekends, and it was completed successfully, as had the two previous migration weekends. The issues described in this report emerged in the days following that migration. This report covers the seven linked incidents that occurred between June 8 and June 11, 2026. **Root cause** As part of our infrastructure modernization program, on the weekend of June 6, we completed a successful migration of our control plane. In the days that followed, we observed two discrete network-hardware issues that interacted to drive these disruptions. _Issue 1: Media Access Control \(MAC\) flapping \(June 8–9\)_ Every device on a network has a MAC address, a unique hardware identifier that network switches use to route traffic to the correct destination. In our environment, the MAC addresses involved are virtual — assigned to logical network gateways rather than to fixed physical hardware — which allows them to legitimately move between hosts as part of normal operation. MAC flapping occurs when a switch sees the same MAC address appearing on two different physical ports in rapid succession, forcing it repeatedly to update its routing tables. This briefly slows or interrupts traffic. For customers, this surfaced as a brief, self-recovering instability. Short bursts of load and intermittent errors appeared and cleared on their own within minutes. The trigger for this behavior was the specific way live production traffic interacted with the new post-migration network. To resolve the issue, we scaled capacity, engaged our vendor, and deployed configuration changes to contain the impact. _Issue 2: network card driver defect \(June 10–11\)_ Once the first set of mitigations were in place, we identified a second issue: A defect in the network card driver, which is the software that controls how a network card sends and receives data. The defect affected fewer than 0.005% of the cards in our estate. Those cards failed randomly and unpredictably, dropping traffic while still appearing healthy to our monitoring systems. This is known as a "gray failure" condition, because the affected components don’t flag themselves as broken. The cards sat in the part of the network that routes traffic between the regions impacted. This resulted in failures that cascaded across the platform and drove disruptions on June 10 and June 11. The defect hadn't been observed in previous migrations or in any other environment, and there were no indicators in pre-deployment testing. The gray failure pattern was also what initially masked the defect as a load issue, until further investigation pointed us to the driver itself. We engaged our vendor, who confirmed the defect. Working closely with them, we rapidly prepared, tested, and deployed the patch to the affected hosts on the evening of June 11, UTC. After that, the platform stabilized. **Recovery** From the first occurrence on June 8 through to permanent resolution on June 11, our engineering team led a continuous, round-the-clock response, working closely with our vendor to identify, diagnose, and resolve the underlying defect. We deployed configuration mitigations, repeatedly rerouted traffic between hosts and across alternative network paths, and scaled out capacity to restore service to customers as quickly as possible while the underlying defect was being addressed. The seven linked incidents and their impact windows were: * **June 8, 2026, 11:00–11:20 UTC** — A short network disruption from the initial MAC flapping event caused intermittent login failures and slow page loads. For most customers, this appeared as a brief 6-minute blip and recovered automatically. Some basic authentication users experienced a longer impact and needed to start a new browser session, with full recovery by 11:20 UTC. * **June 9, 2026, 11:05–11:29 UTC** — A recurrence of the same MAC flapping condition caused a similar brief disruption. Again, most customers experienced only a short blip of around 6 minutes, with basic authentication users seeing a longer impact. We applied scaling changes to address the issue. * **June 10, 2026, 11:02–12:40 UTC** — Customers across all affected regions experienced a loss of access to the platform for approximately 98 minutes. We worked with the vendor and applied configuration changes to address the issue. * **June 10–11, 2026, 23:06–00:04 UTC** — A disruption of approximately 58 minutes, caused when the network card defect affected the backup host that traffic had been moved to. We restored connectivity by moving traffic onto an alternative network path. * **June 11, 2026, 03:43–05:20 UTC** — A disruption of approximately 97 minutes, as the next backup host was affected by the same defect. We restored connectivity by moving traffic onto an alternative network path. * **June 11, 2026, 11:10–13:02 UTC** — A further recurrence of the network traffic surge caused customers to experience slow or failed access to the platform. We restored service by applying an underlying configuration change. * **June 11, 2026, 17:04–17:48 UTC** — A final disruption of approximately 44 minutes during which we moved traffic to a host running the updated network card driver. The platform was fully stabilized at 18:12 UTC on June 11, 2026, once traffic was successfully moved to a host running the updated network card driver. We then applied the same update to a second host for resilience. Monitoring continued through to midday Friday before the incident was closed. CloudWorks™ experienced a backlog of queued jobs during and immediately after each disruption. Our engineering team scaled out CloudWorks capacity to accelerate processing, and the backlog was fully cleared shortly after each recovery. **Corrective and preventative actions** The control plane migration that preceded these disruptions was a one-time, foundational piece of work. The actions below reflect the learnings we are carrying forward from the event to further strengthen the platform. 1. The updated network card driver has been rolled out across all hosts matching the affected hardware profile, in every region. This removes the underlying defect from our infrastructure, even though it hasn't been observed in any other region. 2. The conditions that allowed MAC flapping to surface as customer-visible instability have been addressed at multiple layers. Configuration changes have been deployed in the affected regions. The underlying network configuration has been standardized across the wider production estate, and we have tuned the network behavior that triggered the initial event. 3. During the incident, our engineering team deployed dedicated alerting in real time for the specific network conditions causing the disruptions, enabling faster detection and intervention throughout the response. We are continuing to strengthen proactive monitoring and early-warning detection across post-release windows, so that emerging anomalies are surfaced and investigated before they escalate into customer-visible disruptions. 4. The remaining infrastructure update that supports the network card fix is being completed across our other environments. This brings the full benefit of the fix to every part of our infrastructure. **What's next** One final migration weekend is scheduled for June 20, 2026. After this, the migration phase of the infrastructure modernization program is complete. **Closing** We apologize for the impact this issue has had on your operations. We're committed to the improvements outlined above to prevent similar disruptions. If you have questions or concerns, please contact [Support](https://support.anaplan.com/).

**Introduction**  On June 8, 2026, at 13:14 UTC, customers in our ap1: Cloud - Japan, eu1: Data Center - Netherlands, eu2: Data Center - Germany, us2: Data Center - US West, us5: Cloud - US East, us7: Cloud - US, and eu4: Cloud - Europe regions experienced delays and difficulties accessing the CloudWorks™ user interface. During this period, users experienced slow UI access and a temporary inability to create new integrations or run certain scheduled jobs. Existing workflows were unaffected, although some experienced minor delays in completion.  **Root cause**  The root cause of this incident was an incorrect configuration setting where certain backend components did not automatically pick up updated hostname configurations following a scheduled system migration. Consequently, these components continued to attempt connections using the outdated configuration, leading to connection failures. This prevented users from accessing the user interface and successfully initiating new integration runs. The issue was resolved by reloading the updated configuration on the affected services.  **Recovery**  Our engineering team identified the issue and took immediate action. We initiated a rolling restart of the job management service across the affected regions, which restored user interface access. To fully resolve the connection errors, the engineering team performed a comprehensive restart of all related service components in every affected region, forcing them to load the updated database configurations. Following these restarts, database connection errors immediately ceased, and manual validation confirmed that both user-interface access and integration scheduling were fully restored and functioning normally. By 15:52 UTC, the issue was fully resolved.  **Corrective and preventative actions**  We are implementing the following actions to prevent recurrence and improve service reliability:  * We are developing enhanced system alerts to immediately detect database connectivity issues and abnormal error volumes.  * We are reviewing and optimizing the capacity and sizing of our integration services across all regions to ensure they are robust and resilient.  * We are establishing more detailed incident response runbooks and centralizing triage procedures to accelerate resolution of similar configuration mismatches.  * We are strengthening our platform observability and system telemetry to improve our diagnostic capabilities and detect connection issues more rapidly.  * We are refining our strategy and APIs to proactively detect and manage delayed integration workflows.   We apologize for any impact this issue may have had on your business operations. We are continuously strengthening our systems and procedures to ensure we avoid future disruptions to your business and users.  If you have further questions or concerns, please visit our [Support website](https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fsupport.anaplan.com%2F). We appreciate your patience during this incident and value the trust you place in Anaplan.

**June 8–12, 2026 Platform Disruptions**  On June 8, 2026, at 11:05 UTC, our monitoring detected a brief drop in incoming traffic across the Anaplan platform, with automated monitoring checks failing across all affected regions \(us1: Data Center - US East, us2: Data Center - US West, eu1: Data Center - Netherlands, eu2: Data Center - Germany, eu4: Cloud - Europe, us5: Cloud - US East, us7: Cloud - US, and ap1: Cloud - Japan\). Over the four days, a series of related disruptions affected the same regions. Customers experienced intermittent difficulties logging in, opening models, and running integrations. The platform was fully stabilized on June 11, 2026, at 18:12 UTC.  These disruptions are linked to our previously communicated infrastructure modernization program. On the weekend of June 6, we migrated our control plane, the part of the platform that directs how traffic is routed between services. This was the most complex of the planned migration weekends, and it was completed successfully, as had the two previous migration weekends. The issues described in this report emerged in the days following that migration.  This report covers the seven linked incidents that occurred between June 8 and June 11, 2026.  **Root cause**  As part of our infrastructure modernization program, on the weekend of June 6, we completed a successful migration of our control plane. In the days that followed, we observed two discrete network-hardware issues that interacted to drive these disruptions.  _Issue 1: Media Access Control \(MAC\) flapping \(June 8–9\)_  Every device on a network has a MAC address, a unique hardware identifier that network switches use to route traffic to the correct destination. In our environment, the MAC addresses involved are virtual — assigned to logical network gateways rather than to fixed physical hardware — which allows them to legitimately move between hosts as part of normal operation. MAC flapping occurs when a switch sees the same MAC address appearing on two different physical ports in rapid succession, forcing it repeatedly to update its routing tables. This briefly slows or interrupts traffic. For customers, this surfaced as a brief, self-recovering instability. Short bursts of load and intermittent errors appeared and cleared on their own within minutes. The trigger for this behavior was the specific way live production traffic interacted with the new post-migration network. To resolve the issue, we scaled capacity, engaged our vendor, and deployed configuration changes to contain the impact.  _Issue 2: network card driver defect \(June 10–11\)_  Once the first set of mitigations were in place, we identified a second issue: A defect in the network card driver, which is the software that controls how a network card sends and receives data. The defect affected fewer than 0.005% of the cards in our estate. Those cards failed randomly and unpredictably, dropping traffic while still appearing healthy to our monitoring systems. This is known as a "gray failure" condition, because the affected components don’t flag themselves as broken. The cards sat in the part of the network that routes traffic between the regions impacted. This resulted in failures that cascaded across the platform and drove disruptions on June 10 and June 11.  The defect hadn't been observed in previous migrations or in any other environment, and there were no indicators in pre-deployment testing. The gray failure pattern was also what initially masked the defect as a load issue, until further investigation pointed us to the driver itself.  We engaged our vendor, who confirmed the defect. Working closely with them, we rapidly prepared, tested, and deployed the patch to the affected hosts on the evening of June 11, UTC. After that, the platform stabilized.  **Recovery**  From the first occurrence on June 8 through to permanent resolution on June 11, our engineering team led a continuous, round-the-clock response, working closely with our vendor to identify, diagnose, and resolve the underlying defect. We deployed configuration mitigations, repeatedly rerouted traffic between hosts and across alternative network paths, and scaled out capacity to restore service to customers as quickly as possible while the underlying defect was being addressed. The seven linked incidents and their impact windows were:  * **June 8, 2026, 11:00–11:20 UTC** — A short network disruption from the initial MAC flapping event caused intermittent login failures and slow page loads. For most customers, this appeared as a brief 6-minute blip and recovered automatically. Some basic authentication users experienced a longer impact and needed to start a new browser session, with full recovery by 11:20 UTC.  * **June 9, 2026, 11:05–11:29 UTC** — A recurrence of the same MAC flapping condition caused a similar brief disruption. Again, most customers experienced only a short blip of around 6 minutes, with basic authentication users seeing a longer impact. We applied scaling changes to address the issue.  * **June 10, 2026, 11:02–12:40 UTC** — Customers across all affected regions experienced a loss of access to the platform for approximately 98 minutes. We worked with the vendor and applied configuration changes to address the issue.  * **June 10–11, 2026, 23:06–00:04 UTC** — A disruption of approximately 58 minutes, caused when the network card defect affected the backup host that traffic had been moved to. We restored connectivity by moving traffic onto an alternative network path.  * **June 11, 2026, 03:43–05:20 UTC** — A disruption of approximately 97 minutes, as the next backup host was affected by the same defect. We restored connectivity by moving traffic onto an alternative network path.  * **June 11, 2026, 11:10–13:02 UTC** — A further recurrence of the network traffic surge caused customers to experience slow or failed access to the platform. We restored service by applying an underlying configuration change.  * **June 11, 2026, 17:04–17:48 UTC** — A final disruption of approximately 44 minutes during which we moved traffic to a host running the updated network card driver.  The platform was fully stabilized at 18:12 UTC on June 11, 2026, once traffic was successfully moved to a host running the updated network card driver. We then applied the same update to a second host for resilience. Monitoring continued through to midday Friday before the incident was closed.  CloudWorks™ experienced a backlog of queued jobs during and immediately after each disruption. Our engineering team scaled out CloudWorks capacity to accelerate processing, and the backlog was fully cleared shortly after each recovery.  **Corrective and preventative actions**  The control plane migration that preceded these disruptions was a one-time, foundational piece of work. The actions below reflect the learnings we are carrying forward from the event to further strengthen the platform.  1. The updated network card driver has been rolled out across all hosts matching the affected hardware profile, in every region. This removes the underlying defect from our infrastructure, even though it hasn't been observed in any other region.  2. The conditions that allowed MAC flapping to surface as customer-visible instability have been addressed at multiple layers. Configuration changes have been deployed in the affected regions. The underlying network configuration has been standardized across the wider production estate, and we have tuned the network behavior that triggered the initial event.  3. During the incident, our engineering team deployed dedicated alerting in real time for the specific network conditions causing the disruptions, enabling faster detection and intervention throughout the response. We are continuing to strengthen proactive monitoring and early-warning detection across post-release windows, so that emerging anomalies are surfaced and investigated before they escalate into customer-visible disruptions.  4. The remaining infrastructure update that supports the network card fix is being completed across our other environments. This brings the full benefit of the fix to every part of our infrastructure.  **What's next**  One final migration weekend is scheduled for June 20, 2026. After this, the migration phase of the infrastructure modernization program is complete.  **Closing**  We apologize for the impact this issue has had on your operations. We're committed to the improvements outlined above to prevent similar disruptions. If you have questions or concerns, please contact [Support](https://support.anaplan.com/).

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.

The Anaplan platform maintenance scheduled for Saturday, April 18, 2026, at 15:00 UTC has been cancelled. The platform will remain available with no service interruptions.

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.

The scheduled maintenance has been completed.