Istoricul incidentelor Confluence

1. 1 octombrie 2026 la 02:55 UTCinvestigating

   Procesarea locurilor de muncă și programarea locurilor de muncă sunt degradate, ceea ce afectează lucrările programate și asincrone în mai multe produse, inclusiv Jira, Confluence și Bitbucket Cloud. Utilizatorii afectați pot vedea o execuție întârziată sau lipsă a locului de muncă, inclusiv procesarea întârziată a e-mailurilor și a programelor care nu funcționează conform așteptărilor.

2. 1 octombrie 2026 la 03:47 UTCidentified

   Echipele noastre au identificat cauza principală a acestui incident şi acum lucrează activ la atenuarea problemei. Vom furniza actualizări suplimentare într-o oră sau mai devreme dacă avem vreun progres semnificativ de împărtăşit.

3. 1 octombrie 2026 la 04:03 UTCidentified

   Echipele noastre au luat măsuri corective pentru a atenua această problemă și observă unele îmbunătățiri. Continuăm să monitorizăm situaţia şi vom lua măsurile necesare până când incidentul va fi recuperat complet.

4. 1 octombrie 2026 la 05:00 UTCidentified

   Echipele noastre continuă să lucreze la recuperare până când incidentul este complet rezolvat. Vom furniza noi actualizări dacă avem progrese semnificative de împărtăşit. Împreună cu impactul asupra lucrărilor programate și asincrone pe mai multe produse, am identificat, de asemenea, componenta SLA în Jira Service Management nu apare așa cum se așteaptă.

5. 1 octombrie 2026 la 07:01 UTCidentified

   Echipele noastre continuă să lucreze la recuperare până când incidentul este complet rezolvat. Vom furniza noi actualizări dacă avem progrese semnificative de împărtăşit. Există, de asemenea, un impact asupra noilor bilete de sprijin create în ceea ce privește componenta lipsă SLA, notificări care pot afecta timpii de răspuns și gestionarea backlog a unor bilete.

6. 1 octombrie 2026 la 07:51 UTCresolved

   La 01 octombrie 2026, între 01:00 UTC și 07:25 UTC, utilizatorii pot fi văzut lipsa execuției locului de muncă, inclusiv prelucrarea întârziată a e-mail-to-ticket și a programelor care nu funcționează conform așteptărilor. Am implementat acum o fix și servicii au fost restaurate la funcționarea normală pentru clienții afectați. Impactul pentru sprijinirea biletelor cu componenta SLA lipsă și notificările întârziate au confirmat, de asemenea, recuperarea. Notă: Pentru clienţii Bitbucket, dacă au existat conducte programate care nu au rulat în timpul ferestrei incidentului, puteţi aştepta următoarea execuţie programată sau declanşa manual.

7. 9 octombrie 2026 la 18:24 UTCpostmortem

   ### Rezumat La 1 octombrie 2026, între 01:00 și 07:25 UTC, procesarea și programarea de locuri de muncă degradate au afectat produsele Atlassian, inclusiv Bitbucket Cloud, Confluence, Aplicații Forge, Jira, și Jira Service Management în toate regiunile cloud comerciale. Acest lucru a cauzat sarcini de fundal întârziate sau omise, cum ar fi procesarea prin e-mail și conducte programate; utilizarea interactivă a produselor nu a fost afectată. Evenimentul a fost declanșat atunci când un volum neașteptat de sarcini programate a devenit datorate simultan, copleșind platforma noastră comună de planificare a locurilor de muncă. Monitorizarea automată a detectat incidentul în trei minute. Recuperarea a început în jur de 03:45 UTC pe măsură ce capacitatea de inginerie a crescut și platforma a funcționat prin backlog, cu rezoluția completă a ajuns în 6 ore și 25 minute. ### IMPACT Majoritatea sarcinilor programate au încetat să mai funcţioneze la ora 01:00 UTC şi au fost reluate de la ora 03:45 UTC. Cele mai multe lucrări întârziate au ajuns la ora 06:00 UTC, iar întârzierile rămase au fost eliminate până la ora 07:25 UTC. Pentru produsele afectate: - Recurgerea sarcinilor programate omise sau întârziate din cauza în timpul incidentului; rularile sarit nu au fost re-run automat, și sarcinile reluate la ora lor programată viitoare. - Cele mai multe sarcini programate o singură dată au întârziat; un număr mic nu poate fi rulat. - Regulile de automatizare, inclusiv regulile programate, au funcţionat normal, cu excepţia celor menţionate mai jos. Bitbucket Cloud Conducte programate datorate între 01:00 și aproximativ 03:50 UTC nu a rulat. Dacă o conductă programată nu a funcţionat în timpul incidentului, puteţi aştepta următoarea execuţie programată sau o puteţi declanşa manual. Alte conducte nu au fost afectate. Confluență Unele memento-uri de eveniment calendar datorate între 01:00 și aproximativ 03:45 UTC nu au fost trimise. Aplicații forjate Declanşatorii programaţi s-au oprit la ora 01:00 UTC şi s-au reluat de la ora 04:00 UTC; invocările omise nu au fost reluate. Obiective Începutul lunii de e-mail memento pentru a actualiza obiectivele ar putea fi întârziat. Jira și Jira Service Management Mesajele primite au rămas în cutiile poştale şi au fost procesate automat după recuperare. Notificările programate, cum ar fi abonamentele la filtre, au fost amânate. În unele proiecte de servicii, regulile de automatizare și notificările declanșate de SLA sau timpul în stare de funcționare a întârziat. Datele cronometrului SLA au rămas intacte. Suport atlassian Până la 07:25 UTC, problemele cu instrumentele noastre de sprijin ar fi încetinit unele dintre răspunsurile noastre. Pe baza anchetei noastre de până în prezent, nu am identificat nici o pierdere de elemente de lucru, pagini, depozite, sau e-mailuri primite. Cauza ROOT Platforma noastră comună de planificare a locurilor de muncă funcționează la scară mare în condiții normale. Unul dintre consumatorii platformei a programat un volum anormal de mare de sarcini care urmează să fie executate în acelaşi timp la 1 octombrie, ora 01:00 UTC. Această creştere de magnitudine a depăşit limitele noastre arhitecturale şi de scalare, creând un backlog de procesare între serviciile dependente. Ingineria a mărit manual capacitatea de a manevra sarcina anormală, permițând serviciului să proceseze backlog-ul și să revină la operațiunile normale. ### PLANUL ACŢIUNILOR REMEDIARE ŞI PASELE URMĂTOARE Ştim că munca întârziată şi ratată îţi afectează productivitatea. Prioritizăm aceste acţiuni pentru a contribui la reducerea riscului şi impactului unor incidente similare: - **Izolarea volumului de muncă:** Punerea în aplicare corecte de planificare balustrade astfel încât valurile de volum dintr-o singură sursă nu mor de foame sau întârziere sarcini în alte produse. - **Controlul de supratensiune:** Adăugaţi capacităţi operaţionale pentru a accelera rapid sau pentru a întrerupe volumul de muncă programat din surse specifice în timpul creşterilor neaşteptate ale traficului. - ** Îmbunătățește scalarea sistemului și recuperarea:** Îmbunătățește capacitatea platformei și optimizează procesele de scalare pentru a gestiona creșterea cererii extreme și pentru a recupera mai rapid. Ne cerem scuze clienților ale căror servicii au fost afectate în timpul acestui incident. Mulţumesc. Atlassian

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 27 august 2026 la 04:22 UTCinvestigating

   Echipele noastre au identificat această problemă afectează şi Jira Service Management. Vom actualiza cât mai curând posibil.

2. 27 august 2026 la 04:25 UTCinvestigating

   Investigăm o problemă cu accesarea produselor care afectează confluența, Jira Cloud și Jira Serivce Management. Echipa noastră investighează urgent această problemă și vom oferi detalii suplimentare în termen de o oră sau mai devreme dacă informațiile sunt disponibile.

3. 27 august 2026 la 04:33 UTCidentified

   Echipele noastre au identificat o posibilă soluţie pentru problemele care afectează Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management şi Confluence. Acest lucru este acum transmis regiunilor afectate și ne vom actualiza în termen de o oră, sau mai devreme dacă sunt disponibile informații suplimentare.

4. 27 august 2026 la 04:51 UTCmonitoring

   Problemele legate de încărcarea Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management și Confluența sunt acum în recuperare. Vom continua să monitorizeze îndeaproape pentru a confirma stabilitatea și de a oferi o actualizare în termen de o oră, sau mai devreme ca mai multe informații devine disponibile.

5. 27 august 2026 la 05:16 UTCresolved

   La 27 august 2026 UTC, produsele Atlassian inclusiv Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management și Confluence au suferit o perturbare, iar serviciile nu au fost disponibile pentru utilizatorii afectați. Problema a fost rezolvată acum, iar serviciul funcționează în mod normal pentru toți clienții afectați. O autopsie publică pentru acest incident va fi pusă la dispoziţie pe această pagină atunci când investigaţia noastră completă asupra incidentului a fost finalizată.

6. 7 septembrie 2026 la 02:53 UTCpostmortem

   ** SUMARY ** La 27 august 2026, între 03:51 și 04:35 UTC, clienții atlasși din Europa de Vest și din regiunile APAC de Sud-Est nu au putut ajunge la produsele Atlassian Cloud, inclusiv Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search și Talent. Evenimentul a fost declanşat de o schimbare de cod defectă în stratul de rutare al uneia dintre flotele noastre proxy. Acest lucru a dus la apariția unor erori HTTP 404 în traficul tuturor clienților prin intermediul acestor flote proxy din Europa de Vest și din regiunile APAC de Sud-Est. Incidentul a fost detectat în termen de 1 minut de către sistemele noastre de monitorizare automată, și atenuat prin rularea înapoi la eliberarea configurației anterioare, care a pus flota proxy într-o stare bună cunoscută. După recuperarea flotei proxy, unii clienți Jira și Confluence (indiferent de locație) au primit erori HTTP 503 între 04:33 și 04:53 UTC ca flote de server ajustate la afluxul de trafic. ** IMPACT ** Impactul global a fost împărțit în două perioade discrete: - În primul rând, la 27 august 2026, între 03:51 și 04:35 UTC pe Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search și Talent. Incidentul a cauzat întreruperea traficului de servicii către clienţi provenind din regiunile Europei de Vest şi de Sud-Est APAC, iar erorile HTTP 404 au revenit. Nu a existat niciun impact asupra traficului API al clientului, indiferent de locul de origine. - În al doilea rând, la 27 august 2026, între 04:33 și 04:53 UTC, unii clienți Jira și Confluence au primit erori HTTP 503 după ce erorile HTTP 404 au fost rezolvate: ~32% din cererile din ap-sud-est-2, ~4% din cererile din eu-vest-1, ~ 2,5% din cererile din noi-vest-2 și ap-sud-est-1, și <1% din cererile din toate regiunile globale rămase. **ROOT CAuse ** Evenimentul a fost declanșat de o schimbare de cod la una dintre flotele noastre proxy. Cu toate acestea, a existat un defect în codul aplicat care nu a fost detectat prin testare manuală și automată. Acest lucru a condus la o configuraţie greşită a funcţionalităţii de căutare a chiriaşului în nivelul proxy, ceea ce a condus la un trafic care nu are o cale de reţea validă, ceea ce a condus la utilizarea erorilor HTTP 404 pentru traficul tuturor clienţilor prin intermediul acestor flote proxy din Europa de Vest şi regiunile APAC de Sud-Est. După recuperarea impactului de nivel proxy, a fost cauzată o a doua perioadă de impact unor clienți Jira și Confluence. Din cauza reducerii traficului deservit Jira și Confluence de flota proxy, nivelurile Jira și Confluence de servicii au crescut automat în numărul de servere care servesc traficul clienților. Odată ce funcționalitatea flotei proxy a fost restabilită, valul de trafic a copleșit nivelul de servicii Jira, care a returnat o rată ridicată de HTTP 503s până când a crescut automat din nou. ** PLANUL ACŢIUNILOR REMEDIALE ŞI PASURILE URMĂTOARE ** Ştim că întreruperile afectează productivitatea. În timp ce avem un număr de procese de testare și prevenire în vigoare, această problemă specifică nu a fost identificată deoarece schimbarea a fost legată de un tip foarte specific de caz de margine, care nu a fost preluat de suitele noastre automatizate de implementare continuă și script-uri de testare manuale. Prioritizăm următoarele acțiuni de îmbunătățire pentru a evita repetarea acestui tip de incident: - ** Adăugarea altor măsuri de protecţie:** Conducta de implementare pentru configurarea nivelului de proxy afectat utiliza un sistem moștenit și nu dispunea de caracteristicile regionale lente corespunzătoare configurate corect. Am adăugat deja garanțiile corecte și mutăm acest lucru la conducta noastră standard de implementare care include toate controalele noastre de siguranță activate implicit. De asemenea, audităm toate serviciile de rețea pentru a valida faptul că acestea sunt toate pe noul serviciu standard de implementare a conductelor. - **Enhancing service flow scalating policys:** Configuraţia de scalare automată pentru flotele noastre de servicii Jira şi Confluence a fost configurată să urce prea agresiv. Revizuim și actualizăm în detaliu toate politicile complexe Jira și Confluence de scalare auto pentru a ne asigura că acest lucru nu are loc din nou. Ne cerem scuze clienților ale căror servicii au fost afectate în timpul acestui incident; luăm măsuri imediate pentru a îmbunătăți performanța și disponibilitatea platformei. Mulţumesc. Suport Clienţi Atlassian

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 25 august 2026 la 08:42 UTCinvestigating

   Investigăm în mod activ rapoarte privind degradarea performanţelor care au dus la creşterea latenţei pentru notificări prin e-mail, mobile şi lente pentru Jira, JSM şi Confluence. Echipele noastre investighează problema şi mai multe informaţii vor fi împărtăşite în următoarea oră.

2. 25 august 2026 la 09:44 UTCinvestigating

   Echipele noastre au identificat regiunile afectate și lucrează activ pentru a atenua această problemă. Vom furniza actualizări suplimentare într-o oră, sau mai devreme dacă avem progrese semnificative de împărtășit.

3. 25 august 2026 la 10:49 UTCinvestigating

   Echipele noastre au luat puține măsuri corective pentru a atenua problema într-una dintre regiunile afectate și observă unele îmbunătățiri. Continuăm să monitorizăm situaţia şi vom lua măsurile necesare până când incidentul va fi recuperat complet. Vom furniza actualizări suplimentare în următoarele două ore, sau mai devreme dacă avem progrese semnificative de împărtășit.

4. 25 august 2026 la 13:01 UTCmonitoring

   Echipele noastre continuă să atenueze problema și observă unele îmbunătățiri. Continuăm să monitorizăm situaţia şi vom lua măsurile necesare până când incidentul va fi recuperat complet. Vom furniza actualizări suplimentare în următoarele două ore, sau mai devreme dacă avem progrese semnificative de împărtășit.

5. 25 august 2026 la 14:33 UTCresolved

   Pe data de 25 august 2026, unii utilizatori s-ar putea să fi experimentat o creştere a latentităţii în notificarea prin e-mail, mobilă şi lejeră. Problema a fost rezolvată acum, iar serviciul funcționează în mod normal pentru toți clienții.

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 24 august 2026 la 19:22 UTCinvestigating

   Investigăm în mod activ rapoarte de degradare a performanţelor care au dus la o creştere a latenţei pentru e-mail, mobile şi notificări Slack pentru JIRA, JSM şi Confluenţă. Vom împărtăși actualizări aici, deoarece mai multe informații sunt disponibile.

2. 24 august 2026 la 20:25 UTCinvestigating

   Echipele noastre au identificat trei regiuni afectate și continuă să investigheze creșterea latenței care afectează emailul, mobilul și notificarea Slack pentru JIRA, JSM și Confluence.

3. 24 august 2026 la 21:30 UTCidentified

   Am identificat cauza probabilă a problemei, iar echipele noastre lucrează cu sârguinţă la o atenuare. Utilizatorii afectaţi pot experimenta o creştere a latenţei în e-mail, mobile şi Slack notificări pentru JIRA, JSM şi Confluenţă. Vom continua să partajăm actualizări suplimentare aici, deoarece sunt disponibile mai multe informații.

4. 24 august 2026 la 23:15 UTCresolved

   La 24 august 2026, unii utilizatori JIRA, JSM și Confluence s-ar putea să fi cunoscut o degradare a performanței, ceea ce a dus la creșterea latenței în notificările de e-mail, mobile și Slack. Problema a fost rezolvată pentru notificările nou create, iar serviciul funcționează în mod normal. Pot exista notificări mai vechi care sunt prelucrate şi ne aşteptăm ca acestea să fie finalizate în următoarele câteva ore.

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 21 august 2026 la 07:16 UTCidentified

   Am identificat cauza principală a unei probleme care afectează macro-urile Marketplace App în confluență. Utilizatorii pot experimenta macro-uri care nu redau corect sau afişează erori. Echipa noastră de ingineri a identificat cauza principală și remedierea este în curs de desfășurare. Vom furniza actualizări suplimentare în următoarele 60 de minute.

2. 21 august 2026 la 08:15 UTCidentified

   Un fix a fost identificat și este în curs de desfășurare. Utilizatorii ar trebui să înceapă să vadă impactul App Marketplace - Conectați macro-urile pentru a începe redarea corectă, odată ce fixa a fost complet propagată. Vom furniza actualizări suplimentare în următoarele 2 ore.

3. 21 august 2026 la 10:10 UTCresolved

   Pe 21 august 2026, între 04:26 UTC și 09:33 UTC, unii utilizatori s-ar putea să fi experimentat probleme cu macro-uri care nu redă corect în confluență. Problema a fost rezolvată acum, iar serviciul funcționează în mod normal pentru toți clienții.

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 12 august 2026 la 20:11 UTCidentified

   Some Confluence Cloud users visiting public links saw a Something went wrong error page. The issue affected anonymous access paths for public links, and some related Confluence areas could also show the same error message.

2. 12 august 2026 la 22:13 UTCresolved

   On August 12, 2026 some Confluence users utilizing anonymous access via public links, may have experienced a 'Something went wrong' error message. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 6 iulie 2026 la 09:23 UTCinvestigating

   Investigăm probleme care vă afectează serviciile. Ne străduim în mod activ să identificăm cauza și să rezolvăm problema. Vom furniza noi actualizări într-o oră.

2. 6 iulie 2026 la 10:04 UTCmonitoring

   Am aplicat cu succes fix și vedem recuperare. Capacitățile de automatizare sunt restaurate și ar trebui să funcționeze în mod normal mergând înainte. Cererile de prelucrare a datelor prezentate în timpul perioadei de întrerupere nu au fost completate din cauza indisponibilitatea serviciului. Continuăm să monitorizăm situaţia şi ne aşteptăm la o recuperare completă în următoarea oră. Vom furniza actualizări suplimentare în următoarea oră sau mai devreme.

3. 6 iulie 2026 la 11:46 UTCinvestigating

   Vedem în continuare unele probleme legate de căutarea utilizatorilor, utilizarea de utilizatori și active în întreaga regiune UE-Regiune. Vom continua să investigăm situația și vom oferi actualizări suplimentare în următoarea oră sau mai devreme.

4. 6 iulie 2026 la 12:25 UTCmonitoring

   Am aplicat fix pentru a atenua problema și vedem recuperare. Continuăm să monitorizăm situația și ar trebui să fim pe deplin recuperați în curând. Ar trebui să putem oferi mai multe actualizări în următoarea oră sau mai devreme.

5. 6 iulie 2026 la 13:04 UTCresolved

   La data de 6 iulie 2026, între 06:51 UTC - 09:39 UTC unii utilizatori ar fi putut avea probleme legate de automatizare, iar între 08:10 UTC - 11:50 UTC unii utilizatori ar fi putut avea probleme legate de căutarea utilizatorilor, utilizator-picker și active în UE-Regiunea. Problemele au fost rezolvate acum, iar serviciile funcționează în mod normal pentru toți clienții.

6. 17 iulie 2026 la 16:59 UTCpostmortem

   ## Rezumat La 6 iulie 2026, între 06:51 și 20:17 UTC, clienții atlasși care utilizează produse cloud în regiunile europene (UE) au suferit perturbări ale serviciilor care afectează executarea normelor de automatizare, căutarea utilizatorilor, culegerea utilizatorilor și fluxurile de lucru aferente. Incidentul a început atunci când un serviciu principal de identitate a experimentat saturarea bazei de date în regiunile UE, crescând ratele de latență și de eroare. În timp ce cei care au răspuns au lucrat pentru a restabili capacitatea, a fost aplicată o atenuare de urgență care a blocat normele de automatizare de la accesarea obiectivului de identitate. În paralel, latența de identitate ridicată a contribuit la un eșec în cascadă într-un serviciu de căutare a utilizatorilor din aval, la degradarea căutării utilizatorilor și la experiențele de culegători de utilizatori din mai multe produse. Serviciul a fost restaurat progresiv după adăugarea capacității suplimentare de citire a bazei de date, blocul de urgență a fost eliminat, iar serviciul de căutare a utilizatorilor a fost escaladat manual. ## Impact Incidentul a afectat clienții din mai multe produse atlassiene din regiunile UE la 6 iulie 2026 între 06:51 și 20:17 UTC. - **Degradarea serviciului de identitate:** ratele ridicate de acces intermitent refuzat au fost observate la toate produsele din regiunile UE. - **Eșecuri de execuție a normelor de automatizare:** reguli de automatizare folosind utilizatorul implicit (Automatizare pentru Jira) în Jira, Jira Service Management și Jira Product Discovery în regiunile UE au eșuat cu o eroare de permisiune. - **User search and user picker fails:** user search success rates scazut semnificativ in regiunile UE, cu capacitatea de cules a utilizatorului in mare parte indisponibil la toate produsele. ## Root Cause Incidentul provine dintr-o schimbare de configurare recentă care a redus durata de viață a cache-ului pentru un serviciu de identitate de bază. Pe măsură ce traficul din ziua de muncă a UE a crescut la 6 iulie 2026, o parte mai mare a cererilor au început să ajungă direct la baza de date de suport, în loc să fie servite de la cache. Bazele de date ale UE nu au avut suficientă capacitate regională pentru a absorbi creșterea sarcinii, iar CPU-ul din baza de date a ajuns la saturare, provocând rate ridicate de acces intermitent refuzat. Ca parte a atenuării, s-a aplicat un bloc de urgență pentru a reduce sarcina din baza de date a serviciului de identitate saturat și pentru a prioritiza restabilirea serviciului de identitate centrală. Acest lucru a împiedicat din greşeală regulile de automatizare să-şi treacă verificările înainte de execuţie, determinându-le să eşueze. Durata prelungită s-a datorat în primul rând unui val secundar de eşecuri ale regulilor de automatizare cauzate de limita de procesare. În paralel, degradarea susținută a cauzat latență sporită și eșecuri intermitente la nivelul produselor care depind de aceste verificări și au contribuit la o defecțiune în cascadă într-un serviciu de căutare în aval. Ca urmare, experienţele de căutare a utilizatorilor şi ale culegerii utilizatorilor au devenit în mare măsură indisponibile în regiunile UE până când serviciul de permisiuni a fost recuperat şi serviciul de căutare a utilizatorilor a fost extins pentru a restabili capacitatea. ## Plan de acțiuni corective și pașii următori Ştim că întreruperile afectează productivitatea clienţilor. Atlassian prioritizează următoarele acţiuni pentru prevenirea unor incidente similare în viitor: - **Îmbunătățește garanțiile pentru atenuarea situațiilor de urgență cu impact ridicat:** Utilizarea eficientă a instrumentelor operaționale astfel încât etapele de atenuare să poată dezactiva fluxurile de lucru orientate către clienți necesită o revizuire suplimentară. - ** Consolidarea capacității infrastructurii de identitate și a siguranței schimbării:** Revizuirea bazei de date regionale de dimensionare și capacitatea headroom pentru a reduce riscul de saturare în perioadele de trafic de vârf, și rafinarea procesului de evaluare pentru modificările configurației, astfel încât impactul sarcinii în aval este evaluat înainte de introducerea producției. - ** Consolidarea rezilienței împotriva defecțiunilor de cascadă din degradarea în amonte:** Audit de manipulare a presiunii spate, configurarea întrerupătorului de circuit, și autoscalare comportament în servicii, astfel încât degradarea în amonte nu provoacă un impact mai larg al produsului pe parcursul căutării utilizatorilor, culegator de utilizator, și experiențe conexe. - **Harden replay mecanisms for Automation rule fails:** Sporirea rezilienței normelor de automatizare pentru a reduce impactul asociat incidentelor care au loc în dependențe. Noi recunoaștem cât de critice fluxuri de produse fiabile sunt pentru clienții noștri, și ne cerem scuze clienților care au fost afectate de acest incident. Mulţumesc. Suport Clienţi Atlassian

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 16 iunie 2026 la 13:46 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is investigating degraded performance affecting your service. We are actively working to identify the cause and resolve the issue. We will provide further updates within one hour.

2. 16 iunie 2026 la 14:28 UTCidentified

   We have identified the source of degraded performance affecting some Confluence Cloud users. A subset of users may experience errors or slowness when viewing or editing pages. Our team has initiated a remediation and is actively monitoring recovery. We will provide another update within one hour or once the issue is fully resolved.

3. 16 iunie 2026 la 14:53 UTCmonitoring

   We have been able to apply the fix to mitigate the issue and we are seeing recovery. We continue to monitor the situation and should be fully recovered soon. We should be able to provide more updates in the next one hour or earlier.

4. 16 iunie 2026 la 15:56 UTCresolved

   On June 16, 2026, Confluence Cloud users for some customers may have experienced performance degradation of view and edit page experiences. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23 iunie 2026 la 18:25 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary ### On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT ### The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ### ROOT CAUSE ### 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ### We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. We have already deployed the following fix: - Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: - Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. - Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12 iunie 2026 la 07:39 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing experiencing degraded performance in Confluence Cloud affecting view page and edit page functionality. Our teams are actively investigating and will be sharing more updates in next 1 hour or sooner.

2. 12 iunie 2026 la 08:45 UTCinvestigating

   Users are experiencing degraded performance with view content, create and edit functionality on Confluence Cloud primarily in the EU region. Our teams are actively working to identify the root cause of the issue. We will share additional updates in next 2 hours or sooner as more information is available.

3. 12 iunie 2026 la 10:29 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause of this issue and implemented a fix. We are beginning to observe signs of recovery, with some affected users regaining access to view, create, and edit content on Confluence Cloud. We will provide a further update within one hour, or sooner if we confirm full recovery for all affected customers.

4. 12 iunie 2026 la 11:15 UTCresolved

   On June 12th 2026, between 07:04 to 11:06 UTC, some Confluence users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. 23 iunie 2026 la 18:28 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On Jun 12, 2026, between 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and on Jun 16, 2026, between 12:56 and 14:35 UTC, a subset of Atlassian customers using Confluence Cloud experienced errors and degraded performance when attempting to view or edit pages. The event was triggered when a database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. This caused idle connections to accumulate rather than be released — resulting in increased memory pressure and cascading errors for users. The incident was detected by our automated monitoring within 18 minutes and mitigated by scaling database resources and redeploying, which recycled the idle connections. A permanent fix has since been developed and deployed. ### IMPACT The overall impact was between Jun 12, 2026 07:04 and 12:10 UTC and Jun 16, 2026 12:56 and 14:35 UTC on Confluence Cloud. The June 12 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the EU region while the June 16 incident caused service disruption to a subset of customers in the US region. Impacted users experienced errors or degraded performance when attempting to view, edit, or access Confluence content and spaces. ‌ ### ROOT CAUSE ‌ 1. A database cluster within our infrastructure stopped responding to connection close requests. 2. Idle connections accumulated across clusters rather than being closed, creating a connection leak and increasing memory pressure on the database layer. 3. Hitting max connections on the cluster degraded query performance. 4. Users attempting to view or edit Confluence content experienced errors and slow load times as a result. ‌ ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS ‌ We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific design limitation in our connection cleanup process was not identified until it was triggered by an adverse infrastructure condition in production. ‌ We have already deployed the following fix: * Redesigned the database connection cleanup process to prevent unresponsive connections from impacting the closure of others. To minimize the impact of similar incidents in the future, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: * Monitoring and alerting for connection cleanup latency and failure rates, so that slowdowns in connection closure are detected early. * Enhanced safeguards on database connection creation to limit the blast radius of any future connection accumulation events. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. We are taking immediate steps to improve the resilience of our platform_._ ‌ Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 10 iunie 2026 la 06:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating reports of extended delays being experienced across tasks such as processing of Incoming Emails, Notifications relating to changes or creation of Work Items, in addition to delays in processing Scheduled Triggers from Marketplace apps. Our team is looking into this with urgency and we will provide further update within one hour as our investigation continues.

2. 10 iunie 2026 la 06:14 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause for this issue and has now deployed a fix that is rolling out across impacted products. At this time we are monitoring for the recovery of these events across Jira Service Management, Jira Cloud and Ecosystem app Scheduled Triggers. We will provide further update within one hour or when we have seen a full recovery of all task processing across these products.

3. 10 iunie 2026 la 06:14 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has now determined that performance has returned to expected levels for those impacted by this incident. Additional products that are now known to have been impacted by this incident are Confluence, Customer Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery. These products would have seen similar impact where email notifications or processing of events may have been delayed while this incident was underway. We are now monitoring for the full recovery of performance across all products and will update when we are confident this issue is fully resolved, or within one hour, whichever is sooner.

4. 10 iunie 2026 la 06:31 UTCresolved

   We are now confident that any of the tasks that were impacted by this incident and were delayed should now be operating as expected. We apologize for any inconvenience that this issue may have caused.

1. 27 mai 2026 la 06:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where customers attempting to view Calendars receive an error message on Confluence Cloud pages. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 27 mai 2026 la 07:06 UTCidentified

   Our teams have identified the root cause and are in process of deploying a fix. We will share further updates in next 1 hours, or sooner if we have any meaningful developments to report.

3. 27 mai 2026 la 07:48 UTCresolved

   Between 00:50 UTC and 07:30 UTC on 27 May 2026, some users were facing errors when attempting to view Calendars in Confluence. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and this incident has been fully restored.

1. 26 mai 2026 la 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where some custom extensions may fail to load when editing Confluence Cloud pages. Affected users may see 'Error loading the extension!' messages or notice that certain macros are missing from the editor's extension selection menu. Viewing published pages is not affected. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working toward a resolution. We will provide an update within an hour or as more information becomes available.

2. 26 mai 2026 la 11:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating an issue affecting the editing macros in Confluence Cloud editor. Our team is working to identify the root cause. We will provide an update within approximately one hour.

3. 26 mai 2026 la 13:55 UTCresolved

   Between 08:30 UTC and 13:51 UTC on 26 May 2026, some users were unable to load or edit certain macros in the Confluence Cloud page editor. Our engineering team identified and resolved the underlying issue, and macro functionality has been fully restored.

1. 14 mai 2026 la 04:54 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue with multiple Atlassian products that is impacting a large number of Confluence and Jira Cloud customers. We are continuing to investigate and will add further details about additional impact as our investigation continues. We will provide more details within the next hour or sooner if further information becomes available

2. 14 mai 2026 la 05:03 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware that the current issues with accessing Atlassian products are impacting additional products. We have now expanded the impact of the incident to cover the known impacted products at this time. We will provide further update within one hour or sooner as information is available.

3. 14 mai 2026 la 05:11 UTCidentified

   Further confirmations of impacted products have now been added to the incident. Our team is investigating the issue with urgency and we will provide further update as soon as it becomes available.

4. 14 mai 2026 la 05:24 UTCidentified

   It is likely if you are experiencing any issues relating to logging in or accessing Atlassian products at this time it is likely due to this ongoing incident. We are continuing to receive reports about expanded product impact resulting from this incident. While our team continues to investigate the issue with urgency, we will continue to provide further updates here with additional information. We will provide further update within one hour, or sooner as further information becomes available.

5. 14 mai 2026 la 05:34 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the root cause of this issue and is now actively working on mitigating the issue with accessing Atlassian products. At this time, Atlassian customers should also be able to once again raise support requests with our team. We will provide further update within an hour as we are able to progress mitigating this issue.

6. 14 mai 2026 la 05:43 UTCmonitoring

   Our team has implemented a mitigation for this issue and we are now seeing recovery across Atlassian products. We will continue to monitor this issue for any ongoing concerns, and provide further updates here within an hour as we are able to confirm a full recovery has taken place.

7. 14 mai 2026 la 06:40 UTCmonitoring

   We are now able to see recovery for all impacted products, and users should be able to access their products as expected. Our team is continuing to monitor all products and services to ensure there is no further impact, and we will provide further update when this has been validated and the incident is closed.

8. 14 mai 2026 la 06:41 UTCmonitoring

   We are approaching full system recovery at this time, and are performing final confirmations that services are restored.

9. 14 mai 2026 la 06:48 UTCresolved

   All products and services impacted by this incident should now be fully recovered, and this incident is resolved.

10. 19 mai 2026 la 19:04 UTCpostmortem

    ### Summary On May 14, 2026, between 04:30 and 05:26 UTC, Atlassian customers experienced widespread service disruption across multiple Atlassian Cloud products. The issue was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. The incident was detected within a minute by automated monitoring systems and mitigated in 56 minutes. ### **IMPACT** During the incident, customers attempting to access Atlassian Cloud products in the us-east region experienced authentication and permission failures and were unable to access services. Customers also experienced errors when accessing the support portal until Atlassian fell back to an alternate support method. This was caused by a core identity service in the us-east region becoming unavailable. Affected products included Atlassian Administration, Atlassian Analytics, Bitbucket, Compass, Confluence, Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management and Trello. Some users outside us-east may have been affected in certain scenarios. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The incident was caused by a race condition in our internal deployment orchestration platform during a routine rollback operation of a core identity service in the us-east region. This race condition resulted in insufficient capacity for the identity service in the affected region which started returning errors to dependent products. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: * **Refine deployment orchestration safeguards** * Harden our deployment platform to prevent similar race conditions or resulting capacity loss during a rollback operation. * Streamline mitigation steps when a service becomes unavailable in a region. * **Reduce cross-region impact** * Improve regional isolation and fallback handling so an issue affecting a single region is less likely to impact customers or product functionality in other regions. We recognise how critical reliable access to Atlassian products is for our customers' productivity, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

1. 8 mai 2026 la 01:31 UTCinvestigating

   We are experiencing issues with multiple Atlassian products. Our teams are investigating further and more updates including will be shared within 1 hour.

2. 8 mai 2026 la 04:10 UTCidentified

   We have identified that the root cause of the issue is related to an infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We are working closely with them to mitigate this issue. We will provide further updates when they become available.

3. 8 mai 2026 la 04:10 UTCidentified

   Our teams continue to work on mitigating the infrastructure outage from our public cloud provider. We will provide further updates when they are available.

4. 8 mai 2026 la 04:10 UTCidentified

   We are continuing to work with our public cloud provider to mitigate this issue. We are starting to see some recovery in regions outside of Eastern USA, however, users globally may still be experiencing issues with certain product features. These are listed at the bottom of each product page.

5. 8 mai 2026 la 05:53 UTCmonitoring

   The underlying issue in public infrastructure which affected asynchronous event processing has been mitigated and all the affected services are recovering. We are now working on clearing the backlog of queued events, which means some actions (such as notifications, automation triggers, and data syncs) may be in degraded state. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as the backlog is cleared.

6. 8 mai 2026 la 08:03 UTCmonitoring

   We continue to monitor the situation as services recover. We are currently in the process of clearing the backlog of queued events. We will provide a further update in approximately one hour.

7. 8 mai 2026 la 11:12 UTCmonitoring

   Our services are now fully operational. We continue to replay any events that were missed during the incident, and are making good progress. We will provide a further update once replays are complete. If you experience any ongoing issues, please contact our support team. We apologise for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

8. 8 mai 2026 la 19:45 UTCresolved

   On May 8, 2026, some customers utilizing Atlassian products experienced elevated error rates and degraded performance. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

9. 20 mai 2026 la 06:55 UTCpostmortem

   All dates and times below are in UTC unless stated otherwise. ### Summary On May 8, 2026 between 00:22 and 06:08, one of our hosting providers suffered a significant incident in a specific availability zone in prod-east which led to Atlassian customers experiencing degraded performance and delays of background operations and automation execution. The incident started on May 8, 2026 at 00:22 and was detected within 4 minutes by automated monitoring systems. Our teams worked to restore core access by 06:08. Final cleanup of backlogged processes and minor issues progressed in stages from there was completed iteratively by 19:15. ### **IMPACT** The primary infrastructure affected in this incident was the event processing pipeline in the prod-east region, which distributes events between Atlassian services and underpins background operations such as automation execution, search indexing, notifications, permission synchronisation. * Between 00:22 and 06:08, an infrastructure incident in our hosting provider triggered an ingestion failure in our event processing pipeline. * At 02:50, event ingestion was failed over to an unaffected availability zone, progressively restoring live event flows. * At 06:08, reliability for new ingestion in prod-east recovered to 100%. The remaining work was to drain the accumulated cross-region backlog of messages, which completed by 17:00. * By 18:48, Automation had processed their backlog of events that were created while processing **Automation** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with automation rules triggered by events originating from the prod-east region experienced a significant reduction in rule executions. During this window, event-triggered automation rules were not firing because the events that trigger them were not being delivered. Rule authoring, saving, and rules triggered manually, by schedules, or by webhooks were not affected. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of live events to Automation and allowing new event-triggered rules to begin executing normally. However, events generated during the impact window still needed to be replayed before delayed automations could be processed. Beginning at 08:28, upstream services replayed their queued events in a coordinated sequence, and all replayed events were processed by 18:48. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, a small number of rules reaching daily processing limits due to compressed replay, and time-sensitive rules not completing as expected if internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Jira and Jira Service Management** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruption to Jira and Jira Service Management event-driven features like automation, along with a short period of elevated errors during infrastructure failover. Core Jira experiences, including issue view, boards, and project navigation, remained available throughout the incident. Jira event delivery was affected by the primary impact, preventing downstream services from receiving issue lifecycle events. This affected automation rules triggered by Jira events, AI agent orchestration in Jira, notifications for issue updates and transitions, search indexing for newly created or modified issues, and event-driven integrations between Jira and other Atlassian products. At 02:50, the event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, restoring delivery of new events. All events generated during the impact window were retained in a recovery queue and required replaying. This began at 08:28 and completed at 12:00. During the replay window, customers may have experienced automation rules executing later than expected, delayed notifications arriving hours after the triggering action, temporary gaps in search results for content created or modified during the impact window, and AI agent workflows not completing as expected where internal timeout thresholds were exceeded. **Confluence** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced disruptions to event-driven services in Confluence. This resulted in delays to search indexing, notifications, automation rule execution, and permission synchronisation. The underlying event processing infrastructure failed over to an unaffected availability zone, after which live Confluence operations resumed normally. However, events generated during the impact window were queued for replay, and some background services remained delayed until that replay and related validation work completed. Between 10:14 and 17:00, a bulk replay of all the queued tenant replay tasks was completed to restore data consistency. During and immediately after the replay window, customers may have experienced search results not reflecting content created or modified during the outage, delayed or missing notifications for page and comment activity, automation rules firing later than expected, and brief delays in permission synchronisation for tenants relying on incremental identity sync. **Bitbucket and Pipelines** Between 00:22 and 06:08, customers using Bitbucket and Pipelines experienced failures and degraded functionality across event-driven workflows. Core Git operations, including push, pull, and clone, were not affected and continued to operate normally throughout the incident. Automatic pipeline triggers initiated by push or pull request events were unavailable during the impact window. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge-based triggers, workspace permission changes, and some workspace provisioning flows were also affected. Customers using merge queues were unable to merge pull requests, and some pipeline steps failed because queued work contributed to elevated concurrency limits. At approximately 03:57, Pipelines was reconfigured to consume events through an alternative path, restoring automatic pipeline triggering. Merge queues, custom merge checks, Forge triggers, and other affected workflows were progressively restored as the underlying event processing infrastructure recovered. All Bitbucket and Pipelines services were confirmed fully operational by 06:08. After recovery, queued events were reviewed and replayed where safe to restore data consistency for billing, audit logging, and other background processes. **Identity Services** Between 00:22 and 02:50, customers with tenants hosted in the prod-east region experienced delays in the propagation of identity and group membership changes to downstream Atlassian products. Core identity operations, including authentication, login, and direct group management actions, were not affected and continued to function normally throughout the incident. The impact was limited to asynchronous, event-driven operations that depend on the event processing pipeline. This included delays in delivering group membership and user profile changes to products such as Jira and Confluence, which affected downstream permission synchronisation and crowd sync flows. A small number of SCIM-based identity synchronisation and site provisioning workflows also experienced temporary delays. After the event processing infrastructure recovered, backed-up identity and group directory events were replayed where required, restoring downstream consistency for affected products. No identity data was lost. Group membership changes, user profile updates, and provisioning-related events that occurred during the impact window were retained and processed after recovery. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages impact your productivity. While our monitoring and recovery processes helped us respond quickly, this incident highlighted opportunities to further strengthen resilience for event-driven services. We are prioritizing improvements that will: * **Enhance failover coverage** so critical event processing can recover more smoothly during infrastructure disruptions. * **Strengthen recovery handling** so replayed events can be processed more quickly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support.

1. 14 aprilie 2026 la 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We are actively investigating reports of a partial service disruption affecting Rovo, specifically for customers using automation rules that invoke Rovo agents. Some customers may find that these automations are not completing as expected. We'll share updates here as more information becomes available.

2. 14 aprilie 2026 la 12:25 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified that this incident also affects automation rules in Confluence that use Rovo agents. We are investigating and will provide updates as we learn more.

3. 14 aprilie 2026 la 14:11 UTCidentified

   We have identified the issue, and our teams are working to resolve it and restore normal operations as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as they become available.

4. 14 aprilie 2026 la 15:46 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

5. 14 aprilie 2026 la 16:11 UTCresolved

   On April 14, 2026, affected users may have experienced some service disruption with automation rules that use Rovo agents. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 13 aprilie 2026 la 07:29 UTCmonitoring

   Our team is aware that some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. While we believe this issue is now resolved, we are continuing to monitor all products and services for any ongoing impact. Our team is investigating with urgency, and we will provide an update within 1 hour.

2. 13 aprilie 2026 la 08:33 UTCmonitoring

   Atlassian account login services are now operating as expected, and we are not observing new errors. We continue to closely monitor our systems to ensure they remain stable. We will provide another update within 60 minutes or sooner if we detect a change in status.

3. 13 aprilie 2026 la 10:17 UTCresolved

   On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 a.m. and 06:25 a.m. UTC, some users were unable to log in to Atlassian products with their Atlassian accounts. The underlying issue has been addressed, and authentication services have remained stable with no new impact observed.

4. 21 aprilie 2026 la 02:33 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 13, 2026, between 05:49 and 06:29 UTC, customers experienced failures when attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, and complete multi-factor authentication flows across Atlassian cloud products. Approximately 90% of authentication requests failed during the peak impact window, affecting users in the US East and EU regions. The incident was mitigated within 40 minutes through manual intervention, and full service was restored by 06:29 UTC. ### **IMPACT** * **Duration**: ~40 minutes \(05:49–06:29 UTC, April 13, 2026\) * **Affected regions**: US East and EU \(authentication infrastructure serves EU traffic from US East, with traffic primarily from EU at this time of day\). * **Affected products**: All Atlassian cloud products requiring authentication, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, and Trello. * **Customer experience**: Users attempting to log in, sign up, reset passwords, or complete MFA flows received errors. Users already logged in with active sessions were unaffected. ### **ROOT CAUSE** This incident had several contributing factors that combined to produce a failure that the system could not recover from without manual intervention. **The primary cause** was a recently enabled change that caused our authentication infrastructure to retry requests to a downstream identity service when those requests were slow to respond. This retry behaviour was rolled out to 100% of traffic earlier the same day. Under normal conditions this would be benign, but it meant that any slowness in the downstream service was amplified. Since multiple upstream services were also independently retrying their own failed requests, the amplification compounded further into a retry storm. **The trigger** was a burst of legitimate user traffic. A pattern of many parallel link preview requests for a single user caused a concentrated load spike on a downstream identity service, pushing its response times above the retry threshold. On its own, this kind of spike had occurred many times before and always recovered. With the retry amplification now in effect, the spike instead created a runaway feedback loop: slow responses caused retries, retries increased load, increased load caused slower responses, preventing recovery. The incident was mitigated by manually scaling up the downstream identity service to provide sufficient capacity to absorb the amplified load. Once scaled, the service recovered immediately, bringing authentication error rates to zero within one minute. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We are taking the following actions designed to prevent recurrence and improve our resilience: 1. **Immediate**: The retry-on-timeout change has been disabled. 2. **Load shedding and self-healing**: We are adding load shedding capabilities to our authentication services so that they can automatically shed excess load and self-recover during traffic spikes, without requiring action before automatic scaling starts. 3. **Reducing request fan-out**: We are reviewing patterns where a single user action can generate many parallel downstream requests, and will introduce methods where possible to reduce the amplification potential. We apologize to customers whose services were interrupted by this incident and we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s reliability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 8 aprilie 2026 la 06:01 UTCinvestigating

   The impact of this incident is now understood to also be impacting search in Jira and Confluence, as well as additional downstream impacts to Rovo Chat, User Management, Administration and Guard. Our team is continuing to investigate with urgency and we will provide further update within 1 hour.

2. 8 aprilie 2026 la 06:25 UTCinvestigating

   Our team is aware that users are currently experiencing errors while attempting to search in Confluence and Jira. Our team is investigating with urgency and will be providing an update within 1 hour.

3. 8 aprilie 2026 la 07:40 UTCidentified

   Confluence and Jira search reliability is improving, and we expect full recovery shortly; we will continue to closely monitor the services to ensure they remain stable.

4. 8 aprilie 2026 la 08:33 UTCidentified

   We have restored core search functionality and services are operating again, but some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour while new data continues to be indexed. We are actively working to complete reindexing and will update this page as performance fully recovers.

5. 8 aprilie 2026 la 09:03 UTCidentified

   We are also aware of impact as a result of these search failures to Customer Service Management, Asset Reports, Jira Service Management and dashboards within Focus. Our team have identified the potential root cause of the issue and our teams are working with urgency on a resolution. We will provide further update within 1 hour.

6. 8 aprilie 2026 la 09:03 UTCmonitoring

   The issue has been resolved, and services are now operating normally. Some customers may still experience delays when searching for data changed within the last hour, while new data continues to be indexed. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

7. 8 aprilie 2026 la 11:43 UTCresolved

   The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

8. 17 aprilie 2026 la 16:24 UTCpostmortem

   ### Summary On April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. A configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high‑density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers. The root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC. ### **IMPACT** During the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period. Impacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context. **Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions. **Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue. **Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC. **Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC. **Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC. ### **ROOT CAUSE** Atlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. An infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \(CPU & Memory\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products. The change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst‑affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: * **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types** Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly. * **Strengthen automated pre‑deploy validation for resource changes** Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads. * **Improve post‑deploy verification and alerting** Enhance monitoring and post‑deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod‑IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out. * **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits** Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts. * **Enhance recovery automation** Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

1. 12 martie 2026 la 13:38 UTCinvestigating

   Confluence Cloud users may experience errors when accessing certain Marketplace macros. Affected customers are seeing the message Error rendering macro 'static-macro': Page loading failed. Our team is actively investigating this issue. We will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner.

2. 12 martie 2026 la 13:38 UTCidentified

   Our team has identified the cause of this issue, and a fix is currently being deployed. We are monitoring the deployment, and we will provide another update within 2 hours, or sooner if needed.

3. 13 martie 2026 la 00:26 UTCresolved

   On March 12, 2026, affected Confluence Cloud users may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 10 martie 2026 la 00:15 UTCinvestigating

   We are aware of customers experiencing delays with their automations within Jira, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Jira Product Discovery and Confluence. Our team is investigating with urgency and we will provide an update within one hour.

2. 10 martie 2026 la 00:15 UTCidentified

   Our team has now identified the cause of this issue relating to delayed automation events and has put a hotfix in place to help restore automation performance. We will continue to monitor performance as the backlog of issues is now being processed.

3. 10 martie 2026 la 00:51 UTCmonitoring

   The performance degradation of automations has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. 10 martie 2026 la 00:59 UTCresolved

   On 9 March UTC, Automation users in the APAC region may have experienced performance degradation within Jira, Jira Product Discovery, Jira Service Management, Jira Work Management, Confluence. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

1. 20 februarie 2026 la 04:14 UTCidentified

   Customers using Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours as we continue our investigation.

2. 20 februarie 2026 la 12:26 UTCidentified

   We understand that customers using Customer Service Management, Jira, Jira Service Management and Confluence may be experiencing difficulties with user and team selection in certain system and custom fields. We are continuing to work towards mitigating this issue for all users and products. We anticipate our next update to be posted within 6 hours or sooner based on significant progress.

3. 20 februarie 2026 la 12:26 UTCresolved

   This issue has been resolved and all services are functional.