Istoricul incidentelor Knowbe4

1. 4 septembrie 2026 la 10:53 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports of an issue with delivery of Email verification MFA for Workspace. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 4 septembrie 2026 la 14:24 UTCmonitoring

   We have received reports that the issue with delivery of Email verification MFA for Workspace has been mitigated by Microsoft, and we are monitoring the results.

3. 7 septembrie 2026 la 08:25 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 26 august 2026 la 16:19 UTCinvestigating

   We have identified an issue where users may experience delays in messages being processed, and our engineering team is looking into a fix.

2. 26 august 2026 la 16:46 UTCmonitoring

   Our engineering team has implemented a fix for the issue that causing message processing delays in PhishER, and we are monitoring the results.

3. 26 august 2026 la 19:51 UTCresolved

   Our engineering team has implemented a fix for the issue that causing message processing delays in PhishER.

1. 21 august 2026 la 08:52 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports that the Gmail Phish Alert Button shows the error "[reportPhishAttempt()] An internal error has occurred. Please try again." when reporting phish. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 21 august 2026 la 12:03 UTCidentified

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

3. 21 august 2026 la 13:08 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 21 august 2026 la 14:57 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

5. 26 august 2026 la 15:55 UTCpostmortem

   On Friday, August 21, 2026, from approximately 05:20 to 12:55 \(UTC\), some customers experienced intermittent failures when using the Gmail Phish Alert Button add-in to report suspicious emails, receiving the "An internal error has occurred" message instead of a successful report confirmation. The issue affected customers across all regions, with the highest error volumes concentrated in the EU-West and US-East service regions. This issue was caused by a disruption in a caching service on Google's Apps Script platform, which the add-in relies on to store per-user session configuration. The service began intermittently returning empty results on read while still accepting new writes, causing affected report submissions to fail. KnowBe4 engaged Google directly and filed a formal bug report between approximately 12:19 and 12:39 \(UTC\). Error volume declined sharply shortly after as the vendor-side condition cleared, and the Gmail Phish Alert Button returned to normal performance by approximately 12:55 \(UTC\). To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are continuing to work with Google to track the resolution of the underlying caching defect. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 18 august 2026 la 14:29 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue causing a Non-Delivery Report (NDR) to be returned when a message is reported via the Phish Alert Button and "Send Us a Copy" is enabled in Account Settings

2. 18 august 2026 la 15:26 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 18 august 2026 la 20:14 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 5 august 2026 la 19:29 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting Google PhishRIP queries, which may cause them to fail.

2. 5 august 2026 la 21:24 UTCmonitoring

   Based on our investigation into the recent errors affecting Google PhishRIP queries, it appears these may be related to suspended Gmail accounts. We are continuing to monitor the issue.

3. 6 august 2026 la 21:56 UTCresolved

   Upon further investigation we have determined that the errors affecting Google PhishRIP queries were related to individual issues on Google accounts.

1. 4 august 2026 la 19:19 UTCidentified

   We have identified an issue preventing account settings from loading in the SAT console.

2. 4 august 2026 la 19:51 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 5 august 2026 la 12:17 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 28 iulie 2026 la 20:00 UTCinvestigating

   Investigăm o problemă legată de e-mailurile aflate în carantină de PhishRIP pe neaşteptate

2. 28 iulie 2026 la 20:35 UTCmonitoring

   S-a pus în aplicare un fix pentru această problemă, iar întrebările PhishRIP nu mai sunt mesaje cu caracter carantinic pe neaşteptate. Încă investigăm întrebări care ar fi putut fi afectate

3. 29 iulie 2026 la 18:58 UTCresolved

   Acest incident a fost rezolvat.

4. 30 iulie 2026 la 16:38 UTCpostmortem

   "Summary" La 28 iulie 2026, o actualizare a serviciului PhishRIP a determinat unele întrebări de căutare PhishRIP să se potrivească mai larg decât ar fi trebuit. E-mailuri benigne care nu au îndeplinit criteriile configurate expeditor au fost în carantină în cadrul unor conturi de clienți. Biletele de monitorizare automată și de sprijin pentru clienți au ieșit la suprafață rapid problema. Ingineria a returnat schimbarea în aproximativ 25 de minute de la declararea incidentului şi a oprit carantina neintenţionată. Ingineria apoi a restaurat manual e-mailurile incorect carantina la clienti . Cauza Root Pe 28 iulie 2026, am implementat o actualizare de întreținere la serviciul de interogare din spatele PhishRIP. Această actualizare a fost concepută pentru a îmbunătăți manipularea adreselor expeditorului invalid, permițând sistemului să se retragă la căutarea numai a porțiunii domeniului de adresa. Cu toate acestea, logica de validare existentă a folosit o expresie regulată care necesita un simbol "@" în câmpul expeditorului. Atunci când o cerere a folosit un domeniu gol, cum ar fi [exemplu.com](http://exemplu.com) fără nume de utilizator sau simbol "@," regex a semnalat domeniul ca fiind invalid. Acest conflict între validarea existentă și actualizarea domeniului de cercetare a determinat sistemul să scadă în întregime criteriile expeditorului. Interogatoriul a fugit împotriva inboxes folosind doar parametrii rămași, potrivire și e-mailuri cu mult în afara expeditorului intenționat. "Timeline" Toate timpurile sunt în UTC. Traducerea şi adaptarea: - Da. Pagina noastră de stare a fost actualizată în consecință. Traducerea şi adaptarea: **Cod revert.** Am cântărit oprirea operaţiunilor active PhishRIP la jumătatea cursei împotriva inversării codului. Oprirea sarcinilor de fundal ar fi perturbat fluxurile de lucru legitime de securitate pentru fiecare chiriaș, astfel încât revenirea a fost opțiunea mai bună. Codul revert a fost implementat și verificat în producție în aproximativ 40 de minute de la escaladare. ** Restaurarea e-mailului.** Pentru a evita eliberarea de e-mailuri cu adevărat maliţioase înapoi în mediile clienţilor, le-am restaurat manual mai degrabă decât în vrac. Inginerie folosit instrumente interne admin pentru a restabili e-mailuri în loturi, și a lucrat cu Suport pentru a verifica fiecare ID cont, ID-ul de interogare, și primi aprobarea clientului mai întâi. Toate conturile raportate au fost restaurate peste noapte. ## **Măsuri preventive** * **Regresia acoperire**: Adăugăm teste de unitate și integrare numai pentru domenii, non-standarde, precum și întrebări expeditorului fără coarde pentru a prinde aceste cazuri de intrare înainte de desfășurare. * ** Query Guardrails**: Adăugăm un cec în motorul de interogare care blochează interogările de funcționare dacă parametrii de filtrare de bază sunt scăzuți în timpul evaluării. ## **Conclusion** O singură regulă de validare a cauzat acest lucru: un regex care a presupus fiecare câmp expeditor conținea o @@ Atunci când întrebările au folosit un domeniu gol, această ipoteză a scăzut filtrul expeditorului și întrebările s-au potrivit mult mai mult cu mail decât era destinat. Fix a fost simplu odată ce l-am găsit, și revert oprit prejudiciul în aproximativ 25 de minute de la declararea incidentului. Restaurarea e-mail-ului în carantină a fost un proces mai dificil: nu am putut restabili e-mailurile în vrac fără a risca e-mailuri cu adevărat maliţioase care se întorc în inboxes. Echipa noastră a ales să continue cu atenție, cont de lucru de cont cu Suport pe tot parcursul nopții. Două măsuri preventive ar fi prins acest lucru mai devreme: un test care acoperă numai domeniile expeditorului întrebări, și un parapet care refuză să ruleze o interogare atunci când filtrul expeditorului său a fost deposedat. Ambele sunt acum planificate pentru. Problema imediată este rezolvată şi toate conturile raportate au fost restaurate. Glosar * **PhishRIP:** O caracteristică PhishER care permite administratorilor de căutare și carantină potrivire phishing e-mailuri pe fiecare inbox utilizator într-o organizație. * ** Regex \ (exprimare regulată\): ** Un model folosit în software pentru a căuta text și a valida intrare, cum ar fi verificarea faptului că o adresă de e-mail este formatată corect. * ** Cod revert:** Back o actualizare software pentru a reveni la versiunea stabilă anterioară.

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 17 iulie 2026 la 13:18 UTCinvestigating

   Investigăm utilizatorii care nu pot cumpăra licențe de protecție pe magazin.knowbe4.com. Vom actualiza această pagină atunci când vom avea mai multe informații.

2. 17 iulie 2026 la 18:55 UTCmonitoring

   Am pus în aplicare un fix și noi suntem monitorizarea rezultatelor pentru a vă asigura că nu apar alte probleme.

3. 20 iulie 2026 la 18:24 UTCinvestigating

   Am primit rapoarte că clienții nu sunt în măsură să cumpere licențe de protecție pe magazin.knowbe4.com. Investigăm această problemă și vom actualiza această pagină atunci când vom avea mai multe informații.

4. 29 iulie 2026 la 18:40 UTCmonitoring

   Am implementat un fix pentru magazinul online și noi suntem monitorizarea rezultatelor pentru a vă asigura că nu apar alte probleme.

5. 17 august 2026 la 21:02 UTCmonitoring

   We are continuing to monitor the implemented fix for the online store, to ensure that no further issues occur.

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 16 iulie 2026 la 19:48 UTCinvestigating

   Am identificat o problemă în care utilizatorii pot primi o redirecționare la logare în apărare, și echipa noastră de inginerie este în căutarea într-o fix.

2. 16 iulie 2026 la 20:09 UTCidentified

   A fost identificată o soluţie şi vom monitoriza rezultatele pe măsură ce se termină.

3. 16 iulie 2026 la 21:20 UTCresolved

   Acest incident a fost rezolvat.

4. 20 august 2026 la 21:32 UTCpostmortem

   On Thursday, July 16, 2026, from approximately 19:57 to 21:12 \(UTC\), some customers experienced difficulty logging in to the Defend console, seeing a **Find Out More** screen instead of console access. This issue was caused by a synchronization issue between Salesforce and our internal licensing systems, which incorrectly set some customer license counts to zero. As a result, affected customers were unable to log in. To resolve this issue, our team applied a temporary license override to restore access for affected customers while correcting the underlying licensing records in Salesforce. Once corrected, the systems automatically synchronized the accurate values, and the Defend console access returned to normal performance by approximately 21:12 \(UTC\). To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are implementing improvements to the Salesforce synchronization process to ensure accurate license counts. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 15 iulie 2026 la 16:51 UTCinvestigating

   Investigăm utilizatorii care nu pot cumpăra licențe de protecție pe magazin.knowbe4.com. Vom actualiza această pagină atunci când vom avea mai multe informații.

2. 15 iulie 2026 la 16:54 UTCinvestigating

   Continuăm să investigăm această problemă.

3. 16 iulie 2026 la 01:23 UTCmonitoring

   A fost implementată o soluţie şi monitorizăm rezultatele.

4. 16 iulie 2026 la 14:04 UTCresolved

   Acest incident a fost rezolvat.

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 22 iulie 2026 la 21:01 UTCresolved

   O caracteristică în amonte a serviciului de pavilion problemă degradat model de rutare în colaborare-conferință, ceea ce determină evaluările PhishML pentru a reveni 0/0/0 erori implicite. Partea terță a implementat un fix, iar o actualizare de cod a fost trimisă la producție adăugând ruta statică de rezervă. Toate serviciile şi-au revenit şi funcţionează normal.

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 1 iulie 2026 la 14:40 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports that users are experiencing issues when logging into the US instance. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 1 iulie 2026 la 16:02 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 1 iulie 2026 la 18:01 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 8 iulie 2026 la 18:52 UTCpostmortem

   ## **Executive Summary** On July 1, 2026, the KnowBe4 Security Awareness Training \(KSAT\) platform experienced a period of degraded performance resulting in intermittent login errors and high latency for users on our United States \(US\) instance. The issue was initiated following a routine platform deployment that introduced an unoptimized database query. This query placed an excessive operational load on our primary database reader cluster, causing database sessions to saturate and subsequent login requests to queue up. Engineering teams promptly identified the degradation, reverted the deployment, and systematically cleared the backlogged database sessions to restore optimal performance. The issue did not affect data integrity or security, and service was fully stabilized. ## **Technical Root Cause** The root cause was determined to be a newly introduced query within a standard application update. Upon deployment, this specific query pattern bypassed optimal indexing strategies, resulting in full table scans and highly extended execution times on the database reader infrastructure. As a high volume of authentication and application requests arrived concurrently, the database reader quickly exhausted its available connection pool due to these long-running, unmitigated database sessions. This resource starvation immediately manifested as severe application latency and intermittent timeouts during the user authentication process. ## **Timeline of Events** The incident began in the mid-morning hours and progressed through identification, remediation, and verification stages over a period of approximately 152 minutes. An internal high-severity incident response group was established immediately following automated monitoring alerts indicating that health checks targeting our application programming interface \(API\) routing layer were failing from regional cloud monitoring nodes. This behavior was confirmed by concurrent engineering analysis of user HTTP Archive files, which demonstrated severe latency spikes specifically isolated to the authentication endpoints. Within three minutes of establishing the response team, cross-referencing recent system changes pointed to a recent application deployment as the primary catalyst. Engineers immediately initiated the rollback process, drafting and approving a revert modification to extract the problematic code from the deployment pipeline. The deployment of the reverted codebase to the US production cluster commenced shortly thereafter. While the deployment processed over the subsequent twenty-five minutes, technical personnel prepared direct database interventions to clear the residual system strain. Once the stable code version was completely active across the fleet, engineers began systematically terminating the lingering, long-running database sessions that had been spawned by the unoptimized query. To ensure a pristine state, the database reader infrastructure was cycled twice. Following these administrative infrastructure restarts, operational telemetry showed the database reader load dropping significantly to a healthy baseline of approximately thirty-six percent. System performance normalized, and administrative logging verified that authentication requests were processing within standard latency thresholds. After monitoring the environment to confirm sustained stability, engineers officially marked the incident as mitigated, later shifting the status to fully resolved following an extended window of zero performance spikes and complete passes on all automated sanity test suites. ## **Mitigation** To alleviate the immediate infrastructure distress and restore user access, the engineering team executed a multi-phased mitigation strategy: * **Codebase Rollback:** The changes introduced in the recent deployment were immediately isolated, reverted, and redeployed to production to prevent any further generation of the unoptimized query. * **Database Session Termination:** Internal engineering tools were utilized to explicitly terminate active, long-running database queries that were blocking the connection pools. * **Infrastructure Cycling:** The database reader instances were restarted twice in succession to flush out stale memory allocations and guarantee that all orphaned database sessions were permanently cleared. ## **Preventative Measures** To prevent a recurrence of this specific issue and mitigate the impact of similar query-based database bottlenecks in the future, KnowBe4 is implementing the following actions: * **Enhanced Query Linting and Analysis:** Integrate automated query execution plan analysis into our continuous integration and continuous deployment pipelines to flag unindexed or high-cost queries before they reach production environments. * **Database Connection Pooling Guardrails:** Adjust database timeouts and implement aggressive circuit-breaker thresholds for user authentication paths to prevent single, long-running query patterns from exhausting the entire connection pool. * **Load Shedding Policies:** Implement strict application-level timeouts on read-heavy database calls to ensure they fail gracefully rather than degrading the overall availability of the core login workflows. ## **Conclusion** We sincerely apologize for the inconvenience and friction this performance degradation caused our customers and partners. KnowBe4 is dedicated to maintaining high availability and reliability across our product suites. By refining our pre-deployment automated query validation and bolstering our database connection resiliency, we are actively working to ensure the continuous, seamless operation of the KSAT platform. ## **Glossary of Technical Terms** * **API \(Application Programming Interface\):** A set of protocols that allows different software applications to communicate with one another. In this context, it routes authentication requests from the user interface to the backend servers. * **Database Reader:** A dedicated database instance or cluster responsible for handling read-only queries \(such as fetching user profiles or validating login configurations\), separating this traffic from write operations to optimize performance. * **HAR \(HTTP Archive\) File:** A JSON-formatted log file that records a web browser's interaction with a website, used by engineers to diagnose performance and network latency issues. * **Latency:** The time delay or duration it takes for a data packet or request to travel from its source to its destination and return a response. * **Sanity Suite:** A collection of automated tests executed against a deployment environment to quickly verify that the core functionality of an application is working correctly.

1. 30 iunie 2026 la 16:14 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports that emails sent to Defend are experiencing delays being delivered to inboxes using SMTP. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 30 iunie 2026 la 19:46 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

3. 3 iulie 2026 la 15:23 UTCpostmortem

   #### Summary On June 30, 2026, customers using the Defend US service experienced delays in email processing. The incident began at approximately 14:00 UTC and was fully resolved by 19:45 UTC. ‌ #### What Happened A scheduled maintenance operation began in the early morning of June 30. As this operation progressed, it placed an unexpectedly high load on our infrastructure, which caused email processing to slow down across our US service. ‌ Our team identified the issue and declared an incident at 16:00 UTC. Steps were taken to reduce the load and restore normal processing speeds, including pausing non-essential background activity and engaging our infrastructure provider for additional support. ‌ By 17:45 UTC, email delivery delays had been fully resolved. Email analysis continued to recover and was back to normal by 19:45 UTC. ‌ #### Customer Impact Email delivery \(SMTP customers\): Emails were delayed in transit by up to 30 minutes between approximately 14:00 UTC and 17:45 UTC. All emails were delivered; no messages were lost. ‌ Email analysis \(Microsoft 365 / Graph API customers\): Email analysis was delayed by an average of 30 minutes before emails were analysed, between approximately 14:00 UTC and 19:45 UTC. Email delivery to end users was not affected. ‌ #### What We Are Doing We have rescheduled the maintenance operation that triggered this incident to run during an overnight, low-traffic window, giving it sufficient time to complete without affecting the live service. ‌ We are also investing in infrastructure improvements to better isolate maintenance operations from customer-facing workloads, so that future maintenance cannot affect email processing in this way.

1. 30 iunie 2026 la 14:18 UTCinvestigating

   Am identificat o problemă în care evaluările PhishML cauzează aplicarea etichetei "PML:BYPASSED.".

2. 30 iunie 2026 la 15:42 UTCmonitoring

   Am implementat un fix pentru PhishER și noi suntem monitorizarea rezultatelor pentru a vă asigura că nu mai apar probleme. Mesajele de impact pot fi reluate prin toate regulile și acțiunile. Vă rugăm să rețineți că acest lucru ar putea duce la trimiterea de răspunsuri duplicate în cazul în care o acțiune a rulat cu succes în timpul acestui incident. Dacă aveți întrebări sau preocupări suplimentare, vă rugăm să contactați direct echipa noastră de sprijin: https://support.knowbe4.com/hc/en-us/questions/new Următorul articol de bază de cunoștințe conține instrucțiuni privind modul de reluare a mesajelor: https://support.knowbe4.com/hc/en-us/articles/131693385619-PishER-Inbox-Guide#h 01HCNEBF8CJQ98GE9PGM7HGDZ0

3. 30 iunie 2026 la 19:11 UTCresolved

   Acest incident a fost rezolvat.

4. 22 iulie 2026 la 13:20 UTCpostmortem

   Marţi, 30 iunie 2026, de la aproximativ 07:40 la 19:15 \ [UTC\), clienţii au avut rezultate incorecte din punctajul PhishER PhishML. Emailurile afectate au primit o etichetă PML:BYPASSED în loc de o clasificare PhishML legitimă, iar scorurile de încredere lipsesc din mesajele afectate. Regulile și acțiunile care depind de rezultatele PhishML nu au activat. Această problemă a fost cauzată de un refactor de cod introdus cu aproximativ două săptămâni mai devreme. Acest refactor a introdus o actualizare defectuoasă care a omis drivere esențiale necesare pentru a rula scorul PhishML. Cu toate acestea, problema a rămas latentă până când o altă actualizare a declanșat o nouă implementare a modelului PhishML, ceea ce a cauzat apariția problemei scorului. Pentru a rezolva această problemă, echipa noastră s-a întors la ultima implementare stabilă și a adăugat mai multă capacitate pentru a procesa backlog-ul rezultat al evaluărilor e-mail. Punctajul Phisher PhishML a revenit la performanța normală până la 19:15 \ [UTC\]. Pentru a preveni acest tip de problemă în viitor, am îmbunătăţit controalele de sănătate prin introducerea unui nou obiectiv pentru testarea fumului de fum noi modele înainte de desfăşurare.

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 24 iunie 2026 la 15:48 UTCinvestigating

   Am identificat o problemă în cazul în care utilizatorii pot primi o eroare 500 la logare în KCM GRC, și echipa noastră de inginerie este în căutarea într-o fix.

2. 24 iunie 2026 la 22:06 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified an issue where users may receive a 500 error upon logging into KCM GRC. A fix has been implemented, and we will continue to monitor this issue.

3. 25 iunie 2026 la 13:10 UTCresolved

   We have identified an issue where users may receive a 500 error upon logging into KCM GRC. A fix has been implemented, and users should be able to login without error.

4. 4 august 2026 la 14:50 UTCpostmortem

   From Tuesday, June 23, 2026, at approximately 10:03 \(UTC\) to Thursday, June 25, 2026, at approximately 11:54 \(UTC\), some US and EU customers experienced intermittent 502 errors when logging in to KCM GRC. This issue was caused by network traffic attempting to connect to invalid multilevel subdomains, which overwhelmed the cache serving KCM GRC and resulted in login errors. Our team initially updated the configuration of our content delivery network, which temporarily resolved the errors, but they returned later that day. After further investigation, we identified the caching issue as the root cause and deployed an infrastructure-level fix to prevent multi-level subdomain traffic from affecting the cache. KCM GRC returned to normal performance by 11:54 \(UTC\) on June 25, 2026. To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are evaluating additional protections to guard against similar traffic that could affect the cache. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 18 iunie 2026 la 21:14 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports of the Phishing test reports tab currently being unavailable. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 18 iunie 2026 la 21:16 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 18 iunie 2026 la 22:42 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. 19 iunie 2026 la 14:01 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

5. 7 iulie 2026 la 19:45 UTCpostmortem

   From Tuesday, June 16, 2026, at approximately 17:34 \(UTC\), to Thursday, June 18, 2026, at approximately 22:41 \(UTC\), some customers experienced intermittent unavailability of the **Phishing Security Test Reports** page in the KnowBe4 console. This issue was caused by a code change that introduced a conflict between two methods for processing phishing campaign data. As a result, phishing campaigns still using legacy phishing categories were unable to load the **Phishing Security Test Reports** page. To resolve this issue, we updated the code to process campaigns correctly under both classification systems, and the **Phishing Security Test Reports** page returned to normal performance by June 18, 2026, at 22:41 \(UTC\). No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 18 iunie 2026 la 15:13 UTCinvestigating

   We have received reports that the Human Risk Managment widget is showing no results in the KnowBe4 Security Center. We are investigating this issue and will update this page when we have more information.

2. 18 iunie 2026 la 15:43 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix for the Human Risk Management widget and we’re monitoring the results to make sure no further issues occur.

3. 18 iunie 2026 la 19:12 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 8 septembrie 2026 la 15:44 UTCpostmortem

   From Wednesday, June 17, 2026, at approximately 19:00 \(UTC\), to Thursday, June 18, 2026, at approximately 18:20 \(UTC\), some customers were unable to view results in the KnowBe4 Security Center’s Human Risk Management widget. ‌ This issue was caused by a recent infrastructure migration that left an internal service connection pointing to an outdated endpoint. Though the underlying data processing was unaffected, the Human Risk Management widget could not retrieve data or display results. To resolve this issue, our team updated and reapplied the connection configuration, and the KnowBe4 Security Center returned to normal performance by approximately 18:20 \(UTC\) on June 18, 2026. To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are improving our migration process to ensure that all endpoints are valid after a migration. We are also strengthening known-good rollback procedures in cases where a migration cannot be completed as planned. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 16 iunie 2026 la 22:23 UTCinvestigating

   We've identified an issue that has resulted in inconsistent reporting, and our engineering team is looking into a fix.

2. 17 iunie 2026 la 12:48 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

3. 17 iunie 2026 la 20:19 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

4. 21 august 2026 la 18:00 UTCpostmortem

   From Tuesday, June 16, 2026, at approximately 22:23 \(UTC\), to Wednesday, June 17, 2026, at approximately 20:19 \(UTC\), some customers experienced inaccurate user counts in KSAT reporting. Downstream features that rely on this data were also affected, including AIDA Orchestration, Risk Score, and ModStore recommendations. This issue was caused by an incomplete rebuild of the users' data table. A data storage policy removed historical data earlier than intended, so when a full table rebuild ran, some older data was unavailable, causing user counts to drop. To resolve this issue, our team performed a full data migration sync on the users' table and retriggered the dependent data pipelines to update downstream systems. We then tested and confirmed that user counts were returning correct results, and the KSAT console returned to normal performance by June 17, 2026, at 20:19 \(UTC\). To prevent this type of issue in the future, we are correcting the underlying data storage policy to ensure complete historical data is retained for the full rebuild process. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 15 iunie 2026 la 16:56 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

2. 20 august 2026 la 19:41 UTCpostmortem

   On Monday, June 15, 2026, from approximately 15:30 to 16:34 \(UTC\), some customers experienced processing delays with phishing and training campaigns in the KnowBe4 console. This issue was caused by an update that introduced an incompatible software version. This software prevented our background processing service from completing queued tasks. As a result, training enrollments, notification sending, and SmartGgroup enrollments were delayed. To resolve this issue, our team deployed a fix that reverted the affected dependency and restored normal job processing. Once the fix was deployed, the affected queues cleared, and the KnowBe4 console returned to normal performance by 16:34 \(UTC\). To prevent this issue in the future, we have implemented additional testing layers for similar deployments. No data loss occurred as a result of this issue.

1. 3 iunie 2026 la 15:07 UTCinvestigating

   Am primit rapoarte de 500 de erori care apar atunci când navigăm către profilurile utilizatorilor. Investigăm această problemă și vom actualiza această pagină atunci când vom avea mai multe informații.

2. 3 iunie 2026 la 16:16 UTCmonitoring

   A fost implementată o soluţie şi monitorizăm rezultatele.

3. 3 iunie 2026 la 18:14 UTCresolved

   Acest incident a fost rezolvat.

4. 15 iulie 2026 la 15:23 UTCpostmortem

   Miercuri, 3 iunie 2026, de la aproximativ 14:49 la 16:09 \ [UTC\), clienții au experimentat erori atunci când au accesat pagina **User Detalii** din consola KSAT. Această problemă a fost cauzată de o actualizare care a introdus câmpurile lipsă, ceea ce a împiedicat încărcarea paginii **Details user**. Pentru a rezolva această problemă, echipa noastră a actualizat consola din nou pentru a restabili câmpurile lipsă, iar consola KSAT a revenit la performanța normală cu aproximativ 16:09 \ [UTC\]. Pentru a preveni probleme similare în viitor, au fost adăugate teste automatizate suplimentare. Nu s-a produs nicio pierdere de date ca urmare a acestei probleme.

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.