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66 incidente Split înregistrate începând din aprilie 2026, cu actualizări oficiale, componente afectate, durată și informații despre rezolvare.
În prezent investigăm această problemă.
A fost implementată o soluţie şi monitorizăm rezultatele.
Acest incident a fost rezolvat.
Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.
Vă rugăm să verificați dev
Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.
Investigăm în prezent o problemă în grupul Prod3 în care componentele platformei Harness se încarcă mai lent decât ne aşteptam.
În prezent investigăm această problemă.
A fost implementată o soluţie şi monitorizăm rezultatele.
Acest incident a fost rezolvat.
## Rezumat Intre 7 si 8 iulie 2026, conturile clientilor gazduite in mediul nostru Prod 3 au experimentat incetinire intermitenta si esecuri la incarcarea conductelor si rezolvarea machetelor. Cauza de bază a fost o creștere ascuțită, susținută a traficului intern de căutare-flag de la serviciul nostru șablon-procesare la serviciul nostru de bază platforma backend. Problema este prezentată în două zile separate. În Ziua 1 \ (7 iulie \), echipa noastră a restabilit serviciul prin atenuarea nivelului infrastructurii prin repornirea serviciilor afectate și adăugarea capacității. Deoarece cauza de bază era încă prezentă, același mod de eșec a reapărut în ziua 2 \ (8 iulie \). Investigație mai profundă în ziua 2 a identificat caracteristica de pavilion și calea de cod responsabil, și inginerie expediate un fix astfel încât verificarea pavilionului este acum servit de la cache-ul local. Această fixare a fost implementată în toate clusterele de producție și a rezolvat pe deplin problema; aceasta nu a reapărut de atunci. Audităm toate celelalte steaguri caracteristice de pe platformă pentru același decalaj de cache și punem în aplicare procesul și monitorizează îmbunătățirile descrise în secțiunea Măsuri preventive de mai jos pentru a prinde această clasă de probleme mai devreme și a reduce riscul de recurență. ## Impact ** Simptome: ** Încetinirea intermitentă sau defectarea conductelor de încărcare; validarea și rezoluția lentă sau eșuată a șablonului; erori intermitente de conectivitate/ temporizare între serviciile platformei. ** Impact funţional:** Execuțiile de conducte și operațiunile de conducte-studio care depind de rezoluția șablonului au fost amânate sau eșuate în timpul ferestrelor active descrise în calendarul de mai sus. Unele executii necesita rejudecarea manuala ## Root cause Serviciul nostru de bază backend nu a putut ține pasul cu rata de sosire a cererii din cauza unui suport, neatins aspect-flagel de conducere un volum mare și în creștere de trafic intern după o versiune recentă. ## Metuation * Atenuare imediată \ (Ziua 1 și Ziua 2\): eliminat instanta backend saturate\ (s\) de la serviciu și capacitatea adăugată pentru a elibera blocajul acut. * Fix permanent \ (Ziua 2\): actualizat serviciul de prelucrare șablon astfel încât verificarea responsabilă a caracteristicilor-flag citește de la cache local în loc de a apela serviciul backend pe fiecare aspect, eliminarea traficului intern exces la sursa sa. * Fixa a fost implementată în toate clusterele de producţie şi verificată printr-o revenire la volumul normal al traficului intern şi timpii de răspuns. ## Preventive Measures & Next Steps * Audit de cacheu feature-flag: Revizuim toate steagurile de caracteristici folosite în căile de cod de înaltă frecvență de-a lungul platformei pentru a identifica și închide orice lacune similare de caching înainte de a putea provoca o repetare a acestei probleme. * Validarea lansării: Noi consolidăm testarea sarcinii înainte de eliberare pentru noi căi de cod marcate cu caracteristici, astfel încât regresiile call-volum de acest tip să fie prinse înainte de a ajunge la producție. * Alertare capacitate: Suntem adăugarea de alertă proactivă pe backend cerere-queue saturație, astfel încât această clasă de blockneck este prins și atenuat automat, înainte de a afecta timpii de răspuns orientate spre client.
Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.
Investigăm în prezent o problemă în UE1 în care utilizatorii au probleme folosind modulul IACM.
Am pus în aplicare un fix de partea noastră care a rezolvat această problemă. Continuăm să monitorizăm această problemă.
Acest incident a fost rezolvat.
Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.
Investigăm în prezent o problemă în grupul Prod3 în care componentele conductei se încarcă mai lent decât ne aşteptam.
Un fix a fost implementat într-unul dintre microservicele noastre responsabile cu abordarea modelelor de conducte care au rezolvat problema. Continuăm să monitorizăm problema.
Acest incident a fost rezolvat.
## Rezumat Intre 7 si 8 iulie 2026, conturile clientilor gazduite in mediul nostru Prod 3 au experimentat incetinire intermitenta si esecuri la incarcarea conductelor si rezolvarea machetelor. Cauza de bază a fost o creștere ascuțită, susținută a traficului intern de căutare-flag de la serviciul nostru șablon-procesare la serviciul nostru de bază platforma backend. Problema este prezentată în două zile separate. În Ziua 1 \ (7 iulie \), echipa noastră a restabilit serviciul prin atenuarea nivelului infrastructurii prin repornirea serviciilor afectate și adăugarea capacității. Deoarece cauza de bază era încă prezentă, același mod de eșec a reapărut în ziua 2 \ (8 iulie \). Investigație mai profundă în ziua 2 a identificat caracteristica de pavilion și calea de cod responsabil, și inginerie expediate un fix astfel încât verificarea pavilionului este acum servit de la cache-ul local. Această fixare a fost implementată în toate clusterele de producție și a rezolvat pe deplin problema; aceasta nu a reapărut de atunci. Audităm toate celelalte steaguri caracteristice de pe platformă pentru același decalaj de cache și punem în aplicare procesul și monitorizează îmbunătățirile descrise în secțiunea Măsuri preventive de mai jos pentru a prinde această clasă de probleme mai devreme și a reduce riscul de recurență. ## Impact ** Simptome: ** Încetinirea intermitentă sau defectarea conductelor de încărcare; validarea și rezoluția lentă sau eșuată a șablonului; erori intermitente de conectivitate/ temporizare între serviciile platformei. ** Impact funţional:** Execuțiile de conducte și operațiunile de conducte-studio care depind de rezoluția șablonului au fost amânate sau eșuate în timpul ferestrelor active descrise în calendarul de mai sus. Unele executii necesita rejudecarea manuala ## Root cause Serviciul nostru de bază backend nu a putut ține pasul cu rata de sosire a cererii din cauza unui suport, neatins aspect-flagel de conducere un volum mare și în creștere de trafic intern după o versiune recentă. ## Metuation * Atenuare imediată \ (Ziua 1 și Ziua 2\): eliminat instanta backend saturate\ (s\) de la serviciu și capacitatea adăugată pentru a elibera blocajul acut. * Fix permanent \ (Ziua 2\): actualizat serviciul de prelucrare șablon astfel încât verificarea responsabilă a caracteristicilor-flag citește de la cache local în loc de a apela serviciul backend pe fiecare aspect, eliminarea traficului intern exces la sursa sa. * Fixa a fost implementată în toate clusterele de producţie şi verificată printr-o revenire la volumul normal al traficului intern şi timpii de răspuns. ## Preventive Measures & Next Steps * Audit de cacheu feature-flag: Revizuim toate steagurile de caracteristici folosite în căile de cod de înaltă frecvență de-a lungul platformei pentru a identifica și închide orice lacune similare de caching înainte de a putea provoca o repetare a acestei probleme. * Validarea lansării: Noi consolidăm testarea sarcinii înainte de eliberare pentru noi căi de cod marcate cu caracteristici, astfel încât regresiile call-volum de acest tip să fie prinse înainte de a ajunge la producție. * Alertare capacitate: Suntem adăugarea de alertă proactivă pe backend cerere-queue saturație, astfel încât această clasă de blockneck este prins și atenuat automat, înainte de a afecta timpii de răspuns orientate spre client.
Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
We are seeing the backlogged items worked through and continuing to monitor results.
We are continuing to monitor results while the backlog is worked through.
This incident has been resolved.
**Incident Summary** Harness FME \(Feature Management & Experimentation\) faced substantial delays in scheduled impressions data exports on Jul 2, 2026. This issue stemmed from performance degradation within Tinybird's infrastructure, affecting query execution crucial to our export pipeline. **Root Cause** The core issue was a temporary **performance degradation on the provider's infrastructure**. This directly impacted the metadata retrieval endpoint, which failed to return job IDs intermittently. Consequently, completed export jobs underwent repeated retries, leading to a backlog in the export queue. **Impact** * The export backlog accumulated, peaking at more than 6 hours behind the planned schedule. * No data loss was detected during the incident. **Mitigation** 1. **Adjusted Temporal workflows:** Extended timeouts from ~30 to ~50 minutes and increased polling attempts from ~180 to ~300. 2. **Expanded resource capacity.** 3. **Traffic redirection:** Systematically shifted export workloads over to an optimized in-house cluster. 4. **Manual intervention:** Terminated stalling workflows stuck in retry loops from failed metadata lookups. **Next Steps** Complete the migration of all remaining export jobs to the internal analytics cluster \(In progress\).
Testing Maintenance
Scheduled maintenance is currently in progress. We will provide updates as necessary.
The scheduled maintenance has been completed.
Dev Statuspage incident - Testing
We are currently investigating this issue.
Harness is investigating an issue affecting our Prod 4 environments. Our log-services are affected and harness is currently working on restoring function. This can affect our CI, Chaos, IACM modules.
We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
### **Summary** During a planned security improvement to rotate service authentication secrets in the Prod 4 environment, an incorrect secret value was inadvertently applied to a subset of internal services. This resulted in authentication failures between platform components, impacting CI initialization, delegate task creation, and log streaming for certain pipeline executions. The issue was resolved by rolling back the token configuration to the previous known-good version and validating service recovery. ### **Impact** **Affected environment:** Prod 4 **Customer-visible impact:** * CI builds failed during initialization with errors such as: * _“Could not fetch token from log service”_ * _“token in request not authorized for receiving tokens”_ \(HTTP 400\) * CD and IaCM pipeline stages continued to execute but did not stream logs. * Some Shell Script steps failed during execution. * Delegate tasks could not be created or assigned for some pipeline executions. No customer data was lost or corrupted. ### **Root Cause** As part of a planned security initiative, authentication secrets used for communication between internal platform services were rotated in the Prod 4 environment. During the rotation process, an incorrect secret value was inadvertently configured for one of the services. Instead of applying the newly generated secret in the expected format, a default/incorrect value was introduced. This created a mismatch between services that authenticate using the shared token, causing authentication requests to be rejected with HTTP 400 errors. The authentication failures prevented CI components from obtaining log service tokens, disrupted delegate task creation, and prevented log streaming for affected pipeline executions. ### **Resolution** Engineering responded by: * Reverting the token configuration to the previous known-good secret. * Restoring consistent authentication across affected services. * Validating recovery through CI pipeline execution tests. * Verifying CD and IaCM pipeline execution and log streaming. * Executing a comprehensive validation suite to confirm platform functionality before closing the incident. ### **Follow-up Actions** To reduce the likelihood of similar incidents in the future, Harness will: * Implement additional pre-rotation and post-rotation validation checks to verify that the correct secret values and formats are applied before changes are activated. * Introduce automated verification of authentication between dependent services immediately following secret rotations. * Strengthen operational safeguards and deployment validation for security credential rotation procedures to detect configuration mismatches before they can impact customer workloads.
Testing CD outage
We are continuing to investigate this issue.
This incident has been resolved.
We are currently experiencing intermittent login issues with the Traceable cluster due to an issue with our login provider. We are actively working with the provider to resolve the issue. This incident does not impact data ingestion, and all ingestion pipelines continue to function normally. We will provide updates as we have more information.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
Issue has been fixed and we are closely monitoring
We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.
This incident has been resolved.
## **Summary** _Between **06:50 UTC and 07:20 UTC on June 26, 2026**, customers experienced intermittent login failures while accessing Traceable environments across multiple US clusters. The incident was traced to an issue with the external authentication provider \(Auth0\), where elevated socket timeouts caused increased login latency and authentication request failures. Login functionality gradually recovered as the upstream issue stabilized, and the incident was resolved after successful login validation across multiple impacted clusters._ ## **Root Cause** _The root cause was an issue with the external authentication provider \(Auth0\), which experienced elevated socket timeouts while processing authentication requests. These upstream timeouts increased login latency and caused intermittent authentication failures across multiple US-region clusters. Since authentication requests depended on the external provider, affected login attempts failed despite Traceable platform services remaining healthy. The incident was resolved once the upstream authentication service recovered and login requests consistently completed successfully._ ## **Impact** _Starting at approximately 06:50 UTC, customers experienced intermittent login failures when accessing Traceable environments across multiple US clusters. The issue affected user authentication, preventing some users from accessing the platform while underlying application services remained operational. Login functionality progressively recovered during the incident, and normal authentication was restored by 07:20 UTC._ ## **Remediation** _The engineering team worked with the external authentication provider while continuously monitoring authentication health across affected clusters. Login functionality was validated through platform metrics and manual verification across representative environments. After confirming consistent authentication success across impacted clusters, the incident was declared resolved._ ## **Action Items** _To prevent such issues going forward, Harness will,_ _Increase authentication resilience: Evaluate improvements to authentication request handling, including timeout tuning, retry strategies where appropriate, and graceful degradation for transient upstream failures._
We’ll be performing a backend infrastructure upgrade to improve reliability and compliance. During this maintenance window, Harness platform may experience brief, intermittent interruptions. We appreciate your understanding and are working to minimize any impact.
Maintenance will begin as scheduled in 60 minutes.
Harness login is failing. We are investigating the problem.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.
This incident has been resolved.
### **Summary** During a planned security improvement to rotate service authentication secrets in the EU1 environment, an out of sequence secret value was inadvertently applied to a subset of internal services. This resulted in authentication failures between platform components, causing login failures. The issue was resolved by rolling back the token configuration to the previous known-good version and validating service recovery. ### **Impact** **Affected environment:** EU1 **Customer-visible impact: Login Failures** No customer data was lost or corrupted. ### **Root Cause** As part of a planned security initiative, authentication secrets used for communication between internal platform services were rotated in the EU1 . During the rotation process, an secret value was inadvertently misconfigured for one of the services. There was a newer format of secret and had to be applied in a certain order. This created a mismatch between services that authenticate using the shared token, causing authentication requests to be rejected with HTTP 400 errors. The authentication failures prevented CI components from obtaining log service tokens, disrupted delegate task creation, and prevented log streaming for affected pipeline executions. ### **Resolution** Engineering responded by: * Reverting the token configuration to the previous known-good secret. * Restoring consistent authentication across affected services. ### **Follow-up Actions** To reduce the likelihood of similar incidents in the future, Harness will: * Implement additional pre-rotation and post-rotation validation checks to verify that the correct secret values and formats are applied before changes are activated. * Introduce automated verification of authentication between dependent services immediately following secret rotations. * Strengthen operational safeguards and deployment validation for security credential rotation procedures to detect configuration mismatches before they can impact customer workloads.
We have identified an issue affecting a small subset of accounts in the EU1 region. As a result, data ingestion for impacted integrations may have stopped.
FME will be undergoing scheduled critical maintenance during this window. No downtime is expected, and all services are anticipated to remain available. As part of this maintenance, updates or modifications to Large Segments will be temporarily unavailable until the activity is completed.
We will be undergoing scheduled maintenance during this time.
Maintenance will begin as scheduled in 60 minutes.
Scheduled maintenance is currently in progress. We will provide updates as necessary.
The scheduled maintenance has been completed.
We’ll be performing a backend infrastructure upgrade to improve reliability and compliance. During this maintenance window, Harness platform may experience brief, intermittent interruptions. We appreciate your understanding and are working to minimize any impact.
Maintenance will begin as scheduled in 60 minutes.
Scheduled maintenance is currently in progress. We will provide updates as necessary.
The scheduled maintenance has been completed.
Testing Dev in QA
We are currently investigating this issue.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
IDP Systems' communication was interrupted due to an update. Harness is rolling back changes. Impacted environments - prod0, prod1, prod2
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
This incident has been resolved.
# **Customer RCA: Executive Summary** On June 17, 2026, between 9:30 PM and 10:15 PM IST, customers in certain production environments experienced failures when accessing IDP \(Internal Developer Portal\) workflows. The issue was caused by a configuration mismatch in service authentication settings. ## **Impact** * **Affected Service:** IDP workflows * **Duration:** Approximately 45 minutes \(9:30 PM - 10:15 PM IST\) * **Customer Impact:** Users were unable to load IDP workflows during this period. * **Data Loss:** None * **Security Impact:** None ## **Root Cause** During a planned service deployment, a configuration mismatch occurred in the authentication settings used for internal service-to-service communication. Specifically, the authentication credentials configured in the newly deployed service did not match the credentials expected by existing services in prod environments. This mismatch caused authentication failures when services attempted to communicate with each other, resulting in workflow loading failures for customers. ## **Mitigation** The issue was resolved by reverting the configuration change to restore the previous working authentication settings. The engineering team was proactively monitoring logs immediately after deployment and identified error patterns several minutes before the first customer report. ## **Action Items/Next Steps** 1. **Enhanced Pre-Deployment Validation:** Automated validation checks will be introduced to verify that all required configurations, secrets, and service dependencies are correctly provisioned and consistent across services before any production deployment. 2. **Improved Deployment Procedures:** Updated deployment checklists with explicit verification of service authentication settings across services before rollout.
We are investigating an issue affecting artifact downloads from Maven Central following recent rate-limiting changes implemented by Sonatype. Sonatype has recently implemented rate limits and builds downloading artifacts from central sonatype https://central.sonatype.org/faq/429-contact-support/. Customers downloading artifacts would be impacted. We are actively engaging with Sonatype to mitigate the issue here.
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
Maven Central is rate-limiting requests originating from our us-central1 NAT egress IP. Other regions (us-west1, us-east5) are not affected. The Maven/Sonatype team has been engaged and is actively working on lifting the rate limit for our IP range.
We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.
This incident has been resolved.
## Summary On June 17, 2026, a subset of Harness Hosted CI customers experienced intermittent build failures when downloading Java/Gradle dependencies from Maven Central. Affected builds failed with `429 Too Many Requests` errors and could not proceed until the issue was resolved. The incident was not caused by a Harness code change or platform defect. It was triggered by a policy change implemented by Sonatype \(the operator of Maven Central\) that tightened IP-based rate limits for unauthenticated access. Because Harness Hosted CI routes builds through shared network egress infrastructure, the aggregate outbound traffic from multiple customers sharing a common IP address exceeded the new, lower thresholds — causing all builds behind that IP to be temporarily blocked. This was an industry-wide change. Other CI/CD platforms experienced identical incidents in the weeks prior to Harness being affected. ## Root Cause **Primary cause:** Sonatype tightened IP-based rate limiting policies on Maven Central \([repo1.maven.org](http://repo1.maven.org) and [repo.maven.apache.org](http://repo.maven.apache.org)\). Harness Hosted CI uses shared network egress infrastructure where multiple customer build environments route outbound traffic through common IP addresses. When the aggregate Maven Central request volume from all customers behind a given IP exceeded Sonatype's revised threshold, that IP was hard-blocked for approximately 30 minutes, causing all builds attempting to download Maven dependencies to fail with `429` errors. ## Mitigation **Immediate actions taken during the incident:** 1. **Regional redistribution:** For customers experiencing active failures, builds were routed to infrastructure regions whose outbound IPs had not yet hit the rate limit threshold, providing immediate relief for those customers. 2. **Sonatype engagement and IP whitelisting:** The Harness team contacted Sonatype support and provided the full list of Harness Hosted CI outbound IP addresses for whitelisting. Sonatype applied a "warning" rate-limit policy in place of hard blockingeliminating the `429` errors across all affected regions. Post-mitigation validation confirmed zero throttling across all tested IPs. ## Next Steps The following actions are in progress or planned to prevent recurrence and reduce exposure to similar incidents: **Near-term \(in progress\):** * Harness is in the process of establishing a commercial agreement with Sonatype for elevated rate limits on Maven Central and advance notification of future policy changes. * Harness is engaging other major dependency registries — including Docker Hub, npm, GitHub Packages, and the Gradle Plugin Portal — to proactively whitelist Harness egress IPs before similar incidents can occur. * We are publishing documentation on best practices for managing external dependency access in Hosted CI, including guidance on dependency proxies, mirrors, and caching strategies. * Harness plans to implement caching infrastructure for common dependencies at the platform level \(using Harness Artifact Registry\), which will significantly reduce direct Maven Central request volume and provide resilience against future external rate-limit changes. * We are enhancing our alerting alerting for `429` error patterns from external registries so that future rate-limit incidents are detected internally before customers are impacted. ## What This Means for You **To reduce future exposure**, we recommend: * **Enable Cache Intelligence** in Harness CI to cache dependency artifacts between builds, reducing how often Maven Central is contacted. * **Use Harness Save/Restore Cache steps** to persist your local dependency cache across pipeline runs. If you have questions or need help implementing any of these recommendations, please contact your Customer Success Manager or reach out to Harness Support.
We will be undergoing scheduled maintenance during this time.