Istoricul incidentelor Spreedly

1. 2 septembrie 2026 la 15:11 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly a detectat o problemă care ar putea duce la o performanță degradată pe API tranzacționale. În timp ce oferim o notificare timpurie într-un efort de a vă alerta cât mai repede posibil, încă investigăm domeniul de aplicare și impactul real și vom oferi o actualizare de îndată ce sunt disponibile mai multe detalii. Mulţumesc pentru răbdare.

2. 2 septembrie 2026 la 15:57 UTCmonitoring

   Lucrăm pentru a rezolva un decalaj de performanță care afectează unele procesare a plăților (în special achiziționarea, captarea și crearea de metode de plată) legate de întreținerea recentă a bazei de date. Un fix este în curs de desfășurare, și echipa noastră monitorizează activ sistemul. Vă rugăm să verificați aici pentru actualizări în timp real.

3. 2 septembrie 2026 la 21:32 UTCresolved

   Acest incident a fost rezolvat.

4. 9 septembrie 2026 la 21:50 UTCpostmortem

   ### 9 septembrie 2026 ### La 2 septembrie 2026, între 14:35 și 15:19 UTC, s-a înregistrat o perioadă de rate de eroare ridicate care afectează un subset de cereri de tranzacții în cadrul obiectivelor. Problema a durat aproximativ 44 de minute și a fost cauzată de o problemă la nivel de infrastructură cu platforma noastră de baze de date. Echipa noastră a identificat şi rezolvat problema în aceeaşi zi. Ce s-a întâmplat? În timpul unei actualizări schema de rutină, un defect în platforma noastră bază de date de bază a cauzat unul dintre nodurile noastre de baze de date să devină indisponibil. Acest lucru a redus temporar redundanța pentru o parte din datele noastre de tranzacție, ceea ce a condus la unele cereri fie de pauză, fie de a primi un răspuns de eroare de sistem \ (HTTP 500\) în loc de prelucrare în mod normal. Echipa noastră a lucrat direct cu vânzătorul nostru de baze de date pentru a identifica cauza rădăcină și confirma recuperarea completă a infrastructurii afectate. ### Next Steps Am identificat cauza de bază ca fiind o problemă cunoscută în software-ul vânzătorului nostru. În timpul întreținerii regulate este programată aplicarea unui fix furnizat de vânzător. În paralel, adăugăm o monitorizare suplimentară pentru a detecta această clasă de probleme mai devreme și pentru a adapta procedurile noastre interne în jurul lucrărilor de întreținere a bazelor de date pentru a reduce și mai mult riscul unui incident similar care continuă. - Echipa Spreedly

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 14 august 2026 la 16:14 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an increase in 5xx errors on the Core Transactional API. Some transactions may be failing or returning unexpected error responses during this time. We will provide an update as soon as we have more information.

2. 14 august 2026 la 16:34 UTCresolved

   A fix has been implemented and error rates have returned to normal. Some transactions may have failed or returned errors during the affected window. We're continuing to monitor and will follow up with a more detailed post-incident summary.

3. 3 septembrie 2026 la 20:55 UTCpostmortem

   ### Service Disruption on Transaction Endpoints ### ‌High Level Summary On August 14, 2026, Spreedly experienced a brief service disruption affecting some transaction-related API endpoints for approximately 20 minutes \(4:06 PM – 4:26 PM ET\). During this window, some requests to endpoints involving transaction lookups, captures, voids, credits, and payment method operations may have received error responses. The issue was identified and resolved quickly by our engineering team. ### What Happened A routine database schema update caused a subset of existing database connections to reference outdated schema information, resulting in intermittent errors on affected requests. Once identified, our team refreshed the affected database connections, which fully resolved the issue. ### Next Steps We are reviewing our schema migration process to add additional safeguards that will prevent this class of issue from recurring, and are improving automated testing coverage for this scenario. We have added auto-retry and recovery mechanisms so that if a connection does reference an outdated schema it will not affect transactions going forward.

1. 27 iulie 2026 la 13:50 UTCinvestigating

   În prezent investigăm această problemă.

2. 27 iulie 2026 la 14:00 UTCidentified

   Problema a fost identificată și se pune în aplicare o soluție.

3. 27 iulie 2026 la 15:00 UTCmonitoring

   S-a detectat o problemă care ar fi putut avea un impact asupra performanței tranzacției de bază. În timp ce problema pare să fie rezolvată acum, echipa noastră monitorizează în mod activ sistemele pentru a asigura stabilitatea continuă. Vom oferi o actualizare finală odată ce investigaţia noastră va fi completă. Vă rugăm să continuați să urmați statusPage nostru pentru ultima actualizare.

4. 27 iulie 2026 la 21:41 UTCresolved

   După monitorizarea atentă și confirmarea faptului că toate sistemele sunt stabilizate și funcționează conform așteptărilor, acest incident este considerat rezolvat. Nu se preconizează un impact suplimentar asupra clienților. Ne completăm investigaţia privind cauzele incidentului şi orice impact rezidual. Ne cerem scuze pentru orice neplăceri sau întreruperi.

5. 3 septembrie 2026 la 20:57 UTCpostmortem

   ### High Level Sumarul La 27 iulie 2026, au avut loc erori intermitente la un subset de cereri de tranzacţii, inclusiv achiziţii, autorizaţii şi webhooks. Ce s-a întâmplat? Migrația unei baze de date a actualizat schema unui serviciu intern care gestionează metodele de plată stocate. Acest lucru a cauzat erori pe conexiunile existente referindu-se la un depozit vechi. Ne-am întors schimbarea și cicluate aceste conexiuni, rezolvarea completă a problemei. ### Next Steps Ne revizuim procesul de migrare schema pentru a adăuga garanții suplimentare care vor împiedica această clasă de probleme să se repete și îmbunătățește acoperirea automată a testelor pentru acest scenariu. Am adăugat mecanisme de auto-retriere și recuperare, astfel încât, dacă o conexiune face trimitere la o schemă depășită, aceasta nu va afecta tranzacțiile care merg înainte.

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 11 iulie 2026 la 14:33 UTCinvestigating

   Investigăm rate ridicate de eroare care afectează anumite cereri API. Unele liste și criterii finale de recuperare pot reveni răspunsuri intermitente 500 în timp ce lucrăm pentru a identifica cauza rădăcină.

2. 11 iulie 2026 la 15:38 UTCresolved

   Am identificat și rezolvat problema cauzând răspunsuri intermitente 500 pe anumite liste și criterii de recuperare. A fost implementată o actualizare a configurației pentru a preveni încetarea prematură a cererilor și continuăm să monitorizăm serviciul.

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 8 iulie 2026 la 15:22 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly a detectat o problemă care ar putea duce la o performanță degradată în tranzacțiile Cybersource Credit. În timp ce oferim această notificare timpurie într-un efort de a vă alerta cât mai repede posibil, încă investigăm domeniul de aplicare real și impactul. Vă vom oferi o actualizare de îndată ce mai multe detalii sunt disponibile.

2. 8 iulie 2026 la 16:08 UTCidentified

   Am identificat eroarea de rezoluție DNS internă tranzitorie care a avut loc între orele 15:00 și 15:05 UTC, cauzând selectarea a 500 de erori între serviciile Spreedly. Vom continua să investigăm impactul complet și vom furniza informații suplimentare pe măsură ce acesta devine disponibil.

3. 8 iulie 2026 la 16:54 UTCresolved

   După monitorizarea atentă și confirmarea faptului că toate sistemele sunt stabilizate și funcționează conform așteptărilor, acest incident este considerat rezolvat. Nu se preconizează un impact suplimentar asupra clienților. Ne completăm investigaţia privind cauzele incidentului şi orice impact rezidual. Ne cerem scuze pentru orice neplăceri sau întreruperi.

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 17 iunie 2026 la 14:55 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly a detectat o problemă care ar putea duce la o performanță degradată cu tranzacții asincrone. În timp ce oferim o notificare timpurie într-un efort de a vă alerta cât mai repede posibil, încă investigăm domeniul de aplicare și impactul real și vom oferi o actualizare de îndată ce sunt disponibile mai multe detalii. Mulţumesc pentru răbdare.

2. 17 iunie 2026 la 15:00 UTCmonitoring

   Am implementat un fix și stabilizat tranzacțiile asincrone. Echipa noastră monitorizează îndeaproape situaţia pentru a se asigura că nu există impacturi suplimentare. Vă rugăm să continuați să urmați statusPage nostru pentru ultima actualizare.

3. 17 iunie 2026 la 16:03 UTCmonitoring

   Monitorizăm îndeaproape orice alte aspecte sau impact suplimentar. Vă rugăm să continuați să urmați statusPage nostru pentru cele mai recente actualizări.

4. 17 iunie 2026 la 21:42 UTCresolved

   După o perioadă de monitorizare, am confirmat că problema a fost rezolvată și că sistemele funcționează în mod normal. Dacă continuați să experimentați orice probleme, vă rugăm să ajungeți la Support.

5. 24 iunie 2026 la 20:10 UTCpostmortem

   24 iunie 2026 ** Rezumat la nivel înalt ** La 17 iunie 2026, de la aproximativ 10:02 AM până la 10:41 AM UTC, s-a înregistrat o perturbare care afectează tranzacțiile cu poarta asincronă și fluxurile de autentificare 3DS. În timpul perioadei de 39 de minute, aproximativ 1,634 de tranzacții au rămas într-o stare în curs de desfășurare fără un rezultat confirmat, reprezentând mai puțin de 1% din volumul total al tranzacțiilor în perioada respectivă. Ce s-a întâmplat? O punere în aplicare a unui cod a introdus o problemă de compatibilitate între cazurile de aplicare nou implementate și cele anterioare. În timpul unui proces de răsturnare, unele cereri au fost rutate prin intermediul versiunilor de cod mixt, cauzând eșecuri la procesarea actualizărilor stării tranzacțiilor asincrone. Tipurile de tranzacţii afectate includ tranzacţii de acces asincrone \ (poarta specifică 3DS şi alte verificări asincrone, autorizaţii şi achiziţii\) şi autentificarea globală 3DS. Tranzacțiile care au intrat în fluxul afectat în timpul acestei ferestre pot reflecta un rezultat nedeterminat, starea tranzacției la poarta dvs. poate fi diferită de ceea ce raportează Spreedly. **Următoarele etape** Recomandam revizuirea tranzactiilor din fereastra 10:02:10:41 AM UTC la data de 17 iunie care raman in curs: Verificarile pot fi rejudecate in siguranta. Autorizaţiile ar trebui anulate la poartă înainte de a încerca din nou. Achizițiile prezintă un risc de dublare, recomandăm rambursarea înainte de a încerca din nou. Vă rugăm să ajungeţi la sprijinul Sprinedly dacă aveţi nevoie de asistenţă pentru identificarea tranzacţiilor afectate sau pentru determinarea traseului adecvat de remediere. Lucrăm în mod activ pentru a preveni această clasă de probleme printr-o mai bună protecție a implementării și prin detectarea automată a răsturnării. - Echipa Spreedly

Traducere automată din actualizarea oficială a incidentului.

1. 8 mai 2026 la 18:00 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring results.

2. 8 mai 2026 la 18:05 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 19 martie 2026 la 15:13 UTCidentified

   We are currently investigating performance of the Dodgeball service.

2. 19 martie 2026 la 15:30 UTCidentified

   We are working to resolve an issue with delayed processing of requests to the Dodgeball services.

3. 19 martie 2026 la 15:55 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the Dodgeball component that was experiencing a partial outage. We are continuing to monitor

4. 19 martie 2026 la 16:07 UTCmonitoring

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

5. 19 martie 2026 la 16:09 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 16 martie 2026 la 17:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating elevated errors on API endpoints

2. 16 martie 2026 la 17:51 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring to ensure services are operating correctly

3. 16 martie 2026 la 18:07 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

4. 19 martie 2026 la 19:07 UTCpostmortem

   ### Mar 18th 2026 — _Decryption Errors on API endpoints_ ### Summary Between 5:40 PM and 5:43 PM UTC on March 16, 2026, we experienced a brief issue during a key rotation that caused a small subset of API requests to fail due to decryption errors. These errors occurred within our system before any external processing took place. The issue was quickly identified, and traffic was immediately redirected to a stable environment, restoring normal service. ### What Happened At 5:36 PM UTC, we routed traffic to a newly deployed cluster of our encryption service running with the latest security keys. Shortly after, we observed decryption errors affecting a small subset of records, which resulted in some requests returning 500 error responses. We promptly redirected traffic back to the existing cluster, restoring normal operation. Further investigation determined that these records were still associated with a key in the process of rotation, and we updated them as a follow-up action to prevent the issue from recurring. ### Next Steps We have enhanced our process to ensure that a key’s usage is fully verified before it is removed from the encryption service. -The Spreedly Team

1. 26 februarie 2026 la 16:45 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue affecting customers using Dodgeball. The production database backing Dodgeball has reached critically low available storage, which is expected to result in elevated error rates. Customers may begin experiencing errors within the next 10 minutes as the system’s ability to process requests degrades. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working to restore normal capacity as quickly as possible. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

2. 26 februarie 2026 la 16:59 UTCmonitoring

   The engineering team has successfully resolved the storage issue affecting the Dodgeball production PostgreSQL instance. Capacity has been restored and the system is now operating normally. At this time, we are not observing any elevated error rates for customers using Dodgeball. We will continue to monitor the system closely to ensure stability. Further updates will be provided if necessary.

3. 26 februarie 2026 la 18:44 UTCresolved

   The storage issue affecting the Dodgeball production instance has been fully resolved. Capacity has been restored and systems are operating normally. We are no longer observing elevated error rates for customers using Dodgeball. Thank you for your patience while we worked to resolve this issue.

1. 25 februarie 2026 la 19:18 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating performance of the Dodgeball service.

2. 25 februarie 2026 la 19:48 UTCidentified

   We are working to resolve an issue with processing of Checkpoints that is causing latency and errors for requests to the Dodgeball services.

3. 25 februarie 2026 la 20:35 UTCmonitoring

   Service has resumed and we are monitoring for further impact. We apologize for any inconvenience this has caused

4. 25 februarie 2026 la 21:52 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

1. 5 februarie 2026 la 15:56 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating an issue where credit transactions referencing Capture transactions are failing in production. Some customers may see errors when attempting to issue credits against Capture transactions. Capture transactions themselves are processing successfully. Our engineering team is actively investigating this behavior to determine the cause and confirm whether this is a regression or an unintended change. We will provide updates as soon as more information is available.

2. 5 februarie 2026 la 16:25 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve deployed a revert to address the issue where credit transactions referencing Capture transactions were failing. We’re actively monitoring to ensure credit requests referencing Captures are processing as expected. At this time, we’re not seeing further errors related to this behavior.

3. 5 februarie 2026 la 17:01 UTCresolved

   After monitoring the system post-deploy, we’re no longer seeing errors related to credits referencing Capture transactions, and processing has returned to normal. Thank you for your patience.

4. 10 februarie 2026 la 17:22 UTCpostmortem

   ### February 10, 2026 — Credits Referencing Capture Transactions Failing ### ‌High Level Summary Between approximately 1:56 PM UTC and 4:15 PM UTC on February 5, 2026, credit transactions where the reference transaction was a capture failed with the error "The specified `reference_token` corresponds to a transaction which cannot be used as a reference." ### What Happened At approximately 1:56 PM UTC on February 5, 2026, Spreedly rolled out a change to support credits on the CyberSource Rest gateway. This included a change in the way we validated reference transaction types used in credits. Specifically, there was an unintended side-effect which caused captures to no longer be treated as a valid reference type for credits on gateways other than CyberSource Rest. Once this was discovered, the code was reverted at 4:01PM UTC. By 4:15 PM UTC, credit requests against captures were fully functional. ### Next Steps * Any credit attempts that failed with this error are safe to retry * We are making improvements to our code review processes and regression test suite to ensure we catch similar errors before they make it into production * We have identified a gap in our observability surrounding validation errors that we will be prioritizing ‌ -The Spreedly Team

1. 4 februarie 2026 la 18:15 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue that is affecting multiple customers using Payflow Pro where some transactions fail with the error: “Invalid Request. Malicious string found in XML document”. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 4 februarie 2026 la 19:52 UTCmonitoring

   We are no longer seeing errors at this time, and the issue appears to have subsided. We are working with Payflow Pro to identify the root cause. Our team continues to monitor the situation closely to ensure stability. Please continue to follow our StatusPage for the latest updates.

3. 4 februarie 2026 la 19:56 UTCresolved

   This incident has been resolved.

1. 27 ianuarie 2026 la 19:59 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue related to a dodgeball component experiencing a partial outage. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 27 ianuarie 2026 la 20:12 UTCresolved

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the Dodgeball component that was experiencing a partial outage. After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

1. 27 ianuarie 2026 la 19:08 UTCinvestigating

   Spreedly has detected an issue potentially resulting in a high number of pending 3DS2 Global transactions. While we are providing an early notification in an effort to alert you as quickly as possible, we are still investigating the actual scope and impact and will provide an update as soon as more details are available. Thank you for your patience.

2. 27 ianuarie 2026 la 19:25 UTCmonitoring

   We’ve implemented a fix and stabilized the 3DS2 Global transactions. Our team is monitoring the situation closely to ensure there are no additional impacts. Please continue to follow our StatusPage for the latest update.

3. 27 ianuarie 2026 la 19:29 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected. We are completing our investigation concerning the causes of the incident and any residual impact. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption.

4. 3 februarie 2026 la 15:38 UTCpostmortem

   ### February 3rd, 2026 — 3DS2 Global Transactions Pending ‌ Between 5:40 pm UTC and 7:24 PM UTC on January 27, 2026 the latest version of the Spreedly iFrame \(`iframe-v1`\) was configured to use version 1.180 which contained a bug related to the handling of device fingerprinting for `Sca::Authentications` in an end user's browser. As a result there was an elevated number of `Sca::Authentications` stuck in a pending flow with a `required_action` of `device_fingerprint`. These transactions were held in a pending state and never completed. Our team identified the issue and updated the version of iFrame \(`iframe-v1`\) to utilize `1.179`. ### What Happened At 5:40 pm UTC on January 27th, 2026 a new version of iFrame was released \(1.180\) and updated the version to be used in the `iframe-v1.min.js` asset to point to `1.180`. This change was meant to improve the error handling for the loading of 3rd party critical SDKs however it caused the SDK to enter a permanently error-ed state when attempting to perform device fingerprinting due to a race condition with loading the SDKs. At 7:20 pm UTC on January 27th, 2026 the change was rolled back and by 7:24 pm UTC, 2026 the `iframe-v1.min.js` asset globally was pointing to version `1.179`. ### Next Steps We have identified a gap in our observability and alerting within the iFrame service related to the managing of 3DS lifecycle flows that we will be prioritizing. -The Spreedly Team

1. 9 ianuarie 2026 la 18:46 UTCinvestigating

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. 9 ianuarie 2026 la 18:52 UTCinvestigating

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. 9 ianuarie 2026 la 19:07 UTCmonitoring

   A fix has been deployed and we are seeing systems recover. We will continue to monitor to ensure stability and will provide further updates as needed.

4. 9 ianuarie 2026 la 19:10 UTCresolved

   After a period of monitoring, we have confirmed that the issue has been resolved and systems are operating normally. If you continue to experience any issues, please reach out to Support.

1. 29 decembrie 2025 la 16:50 UTCresolved

   Between 7:00 PM EST on Saturday, December 27th, and 1:00 AM EST on Sunday, December 28th, we identified a period of higher-than-normal latency caused by a pre-planned customer event that resulted in a significant traffic spike. Although we did not observe any service failures or timeouts, our systems experienced degraded service due to the increased latency. Systems recovered quickly once peak traffic subsided and are now operating normally. We expect performance to remain stable moving forward.

1. 16 decembrie 2025 la 21:56 UTCresolved

   Between 3:59 and 4:03 EST, customers may have experienced degraded performance when processing transactions that required 3D Secure (3DS) authentication via our Global 3DS service. Performance has since returned to normal, and no further impact has been observed. If you have any questions about potential impact to your transactions during this time window, please reach out to Spreedly Support for assistance.

2. 18 decembrie 2025 la 21:26 UTCpostmortem

   # _December 18, 2025 — Delayed Processing of Some 3DS Global Transactions_ ‌ _A targeted update intended for Gateway-Specific 3DS processing impacted a subset of 3DS Global transactions. This caused a small number of transactions to remain in a "Pending" state rather than progressing to completion._ ### What Happened Between 08:59 PM and 09:03 PM UTC on December 16, 2025, a deployment intended to update Gateway-Specific 3DS logic inadvertently affected the processing of 3DS Global transactions. As a result, 52 transactions failed to reach a final state and remained "pending." During this 4-minute window, customers attempting a 3DS-authenticated operation would have encountered an interruption, preventing their transactions from completing. Our team identified the impact immediately and rolled back the change to restore normal service. ### Next Steps _We have successfully identified and corrected the underlying logic error within the change. We are also enhancing our automated deployment tests to better catch cross-module dependencies of this nature. We sincerely apologize for any disruption this caused to your operations._ ‌ — The Spreedly Team

1. 9 decembrie 2025 la 15:58 UTCinvestigating

   We are investigating an issue where roughly 30–40% of transactions are not appearing in Spreedly reporting since 12/03. Primary datastores and secondary services show no data loss, indicating the issue lies within the reporting ingestion process. Please reach out to Spreedly Support if you need assistance.

2. 10 decembrie 2025 la 06:53 UTCinvestigating

   Our team continues to investigate the root cause of the missing transaction data appearing in Spreedly reporting. All primary datastores and transactional processing are functioning normally, and there is no indication of data loss at the source. The issue appears to be isolated to the reporting ingestion process.

3. 10 decembrie 2025 la 14:42 UTCmonitoring

   We have identified and fixed the issue that was causing some transaction data to be missing from Spreedly reporting. Our team is now working on backfilling the missing reporting data to ensure completeness and accuracy. All primary processing systems continue to operate normally, and there is no impact to transaction processing.

4. 10 decembrie 2025 la 20:04 UTCresolved

   Our team has completed the backfill process, and all missing transaction data has now been fully restored in Spreedly reporting. Transaction reporting is up to date and functioning as expected. All primary processing systems continued to operate normally throughout this incident, and no transaction processing impact occurred.

5. 2 ianuarie 2026 la 21:44 UTCpostmortem

   ### _Postmortem: January 2, 2026_ — _Transaction Reporting Degraded_ ### ‌High Level Summary Select data related to transactions did not make it into our downstream systems, causing inaccurate reports in [app.spreedly.com](http://app.spreedly.com) ### What Happened After completing system updates on December 3, 2025, approximately 30-40% of data related to transactions did not make it into our reporting tools due to a latent bug in one of our supporting applications. This caused inaccurate reports in [app.spreedly.com](http://app.spreedly.com). This did not impact any primary system functionality and no data was lost. ### Next Steps * Our team has since identified and fixed the affected application. The missing data was backfilled and subsequent data continues to flow normally * We are adding additional monitoring in order to more quickly flag discrepancies * We are continuing to make updates to simplify our data pipeline that will prevent similar issues in the future -The Spreedly Team

1. 20 octombrie 2025 la 15:41 UTCidentified

   The major AWS outage on October 20, 2025, has been largely resolved for most affected services, though some residual issues may persist. Spreedly’s core platform remains stable and fully available. However, due to downstream impact from the AWS outage, some of Spreedly’s indexing endpoints and callback processing are experiencing delays. This is related to dependencies on third-party systems that were affected by the outage and are still undergoing recovery. As a result, you may continue to see intermittent latency or delayed responses for API requests involving these systems. We are actively monitoring the situation as AWS and its downstream services continue recovery efforts. For ongoing updates, please refer to the AWS status page here

2. 20 octombrie 2025 la 20:22 UTCresolved

   After closely monitoring and confirming that all systems are stabilized and functioning as expected, this incident is considered resolved. No further customer impact is expected.

3. 23 octombrie 2025 la 18:27 UTCpostmortem

   ### Postmortem: October 24, 2025 — _AWS outage_ Monday's AWS outage had downstream impact on some 3rd-party systems utilized by Spreedly's platform. Namely, our indexing endpoints and callbacks lagged behind due to the outage and recovery steps. ### What Happened Spreedly's 3DS global service and legacy smart routing product both faced a period of failures due to 3rd-party systems relying on AWS. ### Next Steps Spreedly will improve its response to our alerts platform, and are actively working on multi-region support slated for 2026, which should mitigate the impact of similar events going forward. -The Spreedly Team